Mr. Reingruber noted that because the workshop had an unclassified forum, he could present very little information about deep underground (DUG) facilities. Instead, he focused on threats to infrastructures in general terms. The good news, he said, is that the probability of a terrorist attack on a DUG facility is quite low. Therefore, he could state that a DUG facility would be a very effective foil to terrorist attacks. Mr. Reingruber acknowledged that some of his colleagues might disagree with him, but he believes that terrorists would be more likely to look for an easier target.

In a global sense, terrorism now includes acts by both criminals and disaffected employees. Traditional terrorists have had political motives and used terrorism to influence peace-loving governments. Ad hoc terrorists, however, may be trying to make a personal statement, such as showing their anger at an oppressive government or a former employer. No terrorist, however, will select targets that are very difficult to bring down. A DUG facility, for example, would only be attacked during a war.

Mr. Reingruber identified several factors that must be taken into account in considering the use of UGFs for the protection of critical infrastructure:

• Threat. The threat is a function of capability and intent. The capability to disable an infrastructure does not mean that the infrastructure is threatened. Capability must be coupled with intent to do harm.

• Cost. Does the threat to the infrastructure justify the cost of protecting it, and who is going to pay to protect it?

• Effect on the American psyche. Americans would reject the idea of building a "Fortress America." Therefore, we can protect some infrastructures using DUGs, but the costs of protecting all of them would be astronomical.

• Other options. The first obvious option is to increase security measures to protect existing infrastructures. A second option would be to design infrastructure architectures that are less vulnerable to terrorist activities, such as, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that are designed to mitigate the effects of attack. The design philosophy of SCADAs builds in fire walls and redundancy. A third option would be to reconsider which of our infrastructures should be made invulnerable (e.g., national security information.) Hackers who breach national security systems should be punished, but sabotage by an insider remains a risk.

Mr. Reingruber described the group he cochairs, the technical support working group (TSWG), which conducts the national interagency program for combating terrorism and coordinates government R&D. One of the eight subgroups of the TSWG is the infrastructure protection group, which is

Front Matter (R1-R6)

Introduction (1-4)

Welcoming Address (5-6)

Findings of the President (7-11)

Key Issues in Going Underground (12-12)

Infrastructure Protection in the United States: A Norwegian Perspective (13-14)

Panel Discussions, Panel 1: Infrastructure Protection Issues (15-23)

Panel 2: Needs and Requirements of the Infrastructure Community (24-29)

Panel 3: Experience with Underground Facilities: Capabilities, Limitations, and Applications (30-37)

Panel 4: Factors Influencing the Decision-Making Process (38-44)

Breakout Sessions (45-47)

Closing Remarks (48-49)

Appendix A: Speaker Biographies (50-58)

Appendix B: Workshop Agenda (59-61)

Appendix C: Workshop Participants (62-63)