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Appendix F Situational Awareness This appendix provides background information on the committee's assessment of situational awareness (SA) technologies. The importance of SA on the battlefield of the next century cannot be overstated. Having accurate information (such as friendly and enemy locations, maps or images of local terrain, processed intelligence regarding opposing forces, weapons, and activities) has been uppermost in the minds of military commanders since the days of semaphores and rudimentary battlefield communications. Technology can make all of this and more possible for the Army After Next (AAN). Advanced satellite and observation systems, as well as sensors and location devices, will operate in a network "global grid" that provides secure, high bandwidth, high through- put communications capabilities. Widespread, diverse sensor arrays, communications links, encryption, and computers will work together to provide relevant intelligence data for near-perfect and near real-time SA to the AAN force commander. SA and information dominance will be fundamental to the success of the AAN battle force. Perfect, or near-perfect, real-time SA will help to minimize the impact of AAN logistics burdens. Accurate knowledge of enemy locations and capabilities and precision targeting with high kill probabilities will minimize the weight and volume of the ammunition burden. Perhaps even more significant, with accurate planning and operational information enabled by SA, the AAN will be able to insert a right-size force with the right suite of weapons and equipment at the right place and time. This "right sizing ot the force will determine In advance the optimum number of soldiers, weapons, armor protection, numbers of vehicles, fuel requirements, and overall deployment weight of the force. Although modernization through "digitization" of the battlefield is an important goal for Army XXI, the information capabilities gained will not reduce the need for A ~ ~ A research and development in SA technologies. The committee believes that research and development programs in the technology areas discussed in this appendix will be vital. Information technology is changing faster, and much more significantly, than any other aspect of the AAN scenario. The committee believes that rapid progress in the technological foundations for information dominance will continue into the AAN time frame. Relevant enabling technologies include electronic and photonic devices; integrated circuits; microprocessors, processors, and firmware logic; software (computing instructions); communications hardware and information transmission algorithms; complex system and network design, integration, and management. Progress will not be uniform for any particular technology. As a technology matures, the rate of progress will eventually decrease, although ongoing innovations make the time of maturation impossible to predict. When a maturing technology is replaced through radical innovation, rapid growth may resume in capabilities based on in, ~ 197
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198 RED UCING THE L OGISTICS B URDEN FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT the innovation, or entirely new capabilities may appear. In short, although overall progress can be expected, predictions of the trajectories of particular SA capabilities for even five or ten years are unreliable. Inhere fore, it would be dangerous for the Army to expect to maintain information dominance in 2025 by relying either on the continuation of a current trend in a particular technology or on the prediction of a technological limit to the improvement of an SA capability. The committee is concerned that AAN planners may assume that incorporating today's (or even tomorrow's) information technologies into Army XXT systems (around 2010) will ensure full SA and information dominance for AAN (in 2025~. The Army must continue to make substantial efforts to follow and incorporate state-of-the-art developments in SA technologies (in AAN terminology, improve "mental agility"), at the same time as other aspects of force enhancement ("physical agility") become the focus of AAN systems development efforts. One important consequence of rapid but unpredictable growth in SA technologies is the necessity for constant reassessments of the consequences of unanticipated SA advances (or a lack of expected progress) on AAN operational concepts and systems design. The modeling and simulation (M&S) environments described in the body of this report should include simulations of the impact of alternative levels of SA capability on particular systems or operations (engagements). Simulations to support major decisions on design, development, or reengineering should include sensitivity studies that mode! the effects of incremental increases or decreases in SA capabilities. These simulations should also be used to provide insight on how the loss or severe degradation of an SA capability (through component failure or hostile countermeasures) would affect system functions and operational outcomes. The hardware for both communications and computing will come mostly from commercial sources; the Army should concentrate on unique applications of commercial technologies. Information gathering will be done by a wide range of sensors (e.g., electromagnetic sensors, [ultraviolet, visible, infrared and millimeter wavelengths], acoustic sensors, and chemical biological warfare sensors) configured in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), multipoint fixed arrays, and manned vehicles. This information will have to be communicated back to the command center. To reduce the communication demands of increasingly capable sensors, local intelligence will be incorporated at the sensor to preprocess the data and reduce bandwidth requirements for transmission. A single multispectral (5 bands), real-time (60 frames/s), high-resolution (2000 x 2000 pixels) video signal could require as much as 600 MB/s bandwidth. The volume of data to be processed will require sophisticated computation for automated analysis and semi-automated decision making and rapid response. After target acquisition, decisions must be communicated to the appropriate weapon platform. Supply units must be updated on ammunition supplies. Sensor feedback on battle damage must be assessed and intelligence data updated. Figure 6-! is a schematic representation of the components of this SA system. All of the computation requirements (at the sensors, at the distributed command and control nodes, and at the response platforms) will need more robust software than is currently required to perform mission-critical functions. An opponent skilled in camouflage and deception could defeat a totally computerized system (as well as human observers who do not actually make physical contact, such as those looking at remote videos).
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APPENDIX F 199 The communications links will have to be exceptionally robust. Large amounts of data will have to be transmitted securely and reliably over a complex and rapidly changing network in the face of enemy attempts at disruption and dis-information. This system will be vital to the success of a numerically inferior force that will have to operate swiftly and effectively at a significant distance from its base. This appendix discusses technologies that are vital to ensuring unequivocal lethality including: sensors, communications, ground positioning, computers, and battlefield management. Some of these are treated with less depth than the others because information about them is classified and was not available to the committee. As long as these technologies are on a trajectory that will continue into the AAN acquisition time frame, the Anny must not assume that the job is done and turn its attention away from the underlying silicon technologies. The SA battlefield environment can provide complete, real-time, and near perfect knowledge of the battlefield. The SA environment will provide detailed, accurate location information for friendly, allied, or coalition forces, as well as for opposing forces. It will also provide planning information for course of action analyses and mission planning of battle force operations. The SA environment described here will also be a fundamental toot for reducing ammunition, force size, and armor and vehicle loading and wit! enable the shift from "just in case" logistics to "just enough" logistics. Sensors The AAN will use a wide range of sensor technologies, ranging from highly sophisticated focal-plane arrays to single-point chemical sensors, perhaps on widely dispersed networks. Prognostic sensors will provide information on readiness. Ambient sensors will provide detailed mapping of local environmental conditions. Threat sensors will detect enemy forces in highly cluttered environments. Target sensors will designate targets and provide guidance information. Combat Threat Detection In broad terms, the objective of these sensors is to detect and identify targets in cluttered environments at the greatest possible distances. This will require not only enhanced sensors but also signal processing and artificial intelligence that can extract useful information from the mass of available data. Sensors will be both passive (e.g., detecting differences in emissions between the target and the background over multiple spectral ranges) and active (e.g., laser detection and ranging and radio detection and ranging [I ADARfRADAR]~. Current research programs are addressing multiple aspects of these sensor systems, including high-resolution, staring focal-plane arrays that are sensitive over multiple spectral ranges (including millimeter-wave, infrared, visible, and ultraviolet spectral regions); local networking links that can transfer data from multiple focal planes to a central processor for data fusion; and advanced signal processing that can extract useful intonation from the mass of data. Advances in complex semiconductors and processing will be necessary to fabricate these devices. In particular, infrared sensors will require multilayer compound semiconductor structures that can be tightly integrated with silicon processors.
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200 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT Current research is focused on a number of material systems, including TnGaAs quantum-well infrared photodetectors and HgC6Te systems. A critical issue in each of these is the speed of data transfer from the compound semiconductor to the silicon processor. Both highly parallel optical interconnects and heterogeneous material integration (e.g., wafer bonding of the focal plane array and the silicon electronics) are being actively investigated. Advances in the scale of electronic devices are making it possible to integrate much more processing locally (e.g., within a pixel and between adjacent pixels). Emphasis on automatic target recognition (ATR) signal processing capabilities will become increasingly important as the number of sensors increases and their capabilities improve. The closer to the sensor ATR can be done, the lower the demands on communications resources. In parallel with the development of these highly capable imaging sensors is the development of a distributed network of inexpensive sensors. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on the development of a network of randomly distributed, acoustic sensors that can communicate via a Tow-bandwidth wireless radio frequency net. A major attribute of this network is the relatively Tow cost of each individual sensor, which would make highly redundant distribution affordable. Thus, only a small subset of the total distribution network would have to be working. The signal processing and communications requirements for this kind of redundant, dynamically reconfigurable distributed network are very different from those of expensive, hyperspectral focal plane array sensors. Even though the fusion of data sets from different sources has been under investigation for more than 20 years in the Beta Test Beta program and other data fusion programs for intelligence and sensor data, accelerating advances in sensor technology require new insights into data fusion for the optimal extraction of information. Distributed Threat Detection Chemical and biological agents are growing threats, particularly for the asymmetric confrontations anticipated for the AAN. The problem is exacerbated because protective measures tend to be uncomfortable and to restrict war-fighters' capabilities in terms of vision, mobility, and reaction. Protective gear will only be used at all if there is a reliable advance detection and warning of chemical and biological agents. Current technologies for building microminiature chemical and biological processors that can combine chemically or biologically specific surfaces with electronics and optics using simple forms of micromachining are still rudimentary. Chemical sensing micromachines have been used for miniature gas chromatography and ion-trap mass spectroscopy. Selective surfaces include reactive metals (e.g., PU for sensing H2 as the gate metal for a silicon field effect transistor) and biologically specific absorbents for optical sensors (e.g., surface plasmon resonance devices). These are currently very active areas of research, and major advances in the capabilities of these devices can be expected by the AAN time frame. All of these local devices will have to be networked to provide broad coverage and advanced warning. If they are integrated into UGVs for use in different locations, they would increase complexities in terms of distribution, communications, and signal processing. On the other hand, if advances in sensor processor technology follow the path of advances in semiconductor technology, sensor processors are likely to be very
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APPENDIX F 201 small and very inexpensive, which could result in affordable networks that are highly redundant, fault-tolerant, and difficult to disrupt. Environmental Sensors Terrain. An extended terrain database will be necessary for the AAN to achieve high-speed mobility and to engage the enemy effectively. Real-time mapping and data storage will be necessary to provide the SA capability before and during hostilities. Mapping information should be provided to the force in a retrievable electronic form, rather than adding to the already difficult communications burdens. The very high- density storage devices, high-resolution displays, and software to accommodate this information are likely to be developed by the commercial sector. Therefore, the Army should concentrate on ensuring reliable, high-resolution terrain data. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is responsible for coordinating all government activities in this area (see Chapter 5 for discussion of AAN terrain database requirements to support mobility modeling). Weather. Weather sensors should provide a three-dimensional, high-resolution description of the local weather, including wind conditions, to optimize performance of projectile weapons systems. Local weather data will probably be provided by UAVs. Prognostics. Prognostic sensors can be valuable for maintaining equipment and ensuring the readiness of combat systems, vehicles, and soldiers. Large-scale applica- tions of prognostic sensors will most likely be driven more by the commercial sector than by the relatively small military market. Considering the short-duration AAN sce- nario, the committee believes that "mission reliability" is a better approach to ensuring the availability of resources for the AAN (see Chapter 7~. Computers Computers are, and will continue to be, the heart of weapon systems and other combat-related systems. Therefore, they will also be essential to reducing logistic bur- dens. Although commercial developers will provide most of the hardware tools, the Army will have to ensure stable, secure, user-friendly, timely information and options analysis for a battle force on the move. Computer technologies are closely related to communications, as well as to data acquisition and sensors, ground positioning, battle- field management, guidance control, and supply. Computers will permeate AAN systems. The committee agrees with the recommendation of an earlier NRC report, Energy Efficient Technologies for the Dismounted Soldier (NRC, 1997a), that it may be inappropriate for the Army to distribute ruggedized versions of personal computers to every soldier. This would, of course, increase the soldier's Toad and add to the soldier's logistics burden. Just as modern industry is unthinkable without computers and tied-in communications, warfare in the twenty-first century will be unthinkable without applying information technology to the projection of force. The very large commercial market drivers pacing the changes in information technology are unique to this technology area. Looking back 35 years gives one a perspective on the changes that have
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202 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT been made, from slide rules and mechanical calculators to laptop computers and from rotary dial handsets to cellular connections to the Tnternet. The Arrny cannot make a static, one-time decision to adopt information technology, because the dynamic, constantly changing environment of information technology will continue after Army XXT becomes a reality. In the near term, computers will have a direct impact on logistics by improving inventory control and resupply efficiency (~ust-enough logistics and "end-to-end asset visibility") through improved information flow and tighter management. in the future, predictive and diagnostic sensors could conceivably be linked with the information network to ensure that proper repair and maintenance supplies are available. Even though the relatively short duration of AAN missions will minimize the utility of predictive and diagnostic sensors on the battlefield, the sensor information will still be of high value to the Army as the basis for system analyses. Portable computers will be a major consumer of battery power. Because this will also be a problem for commercial computers, industry will probably address it. The Army should have an advantage for supplying power because chargers in vehicles should be easily available. Servers may require cooling, even if they are small, which will be a more significant problem for the Army than for commercial users, who are not required to operate in extreme outdoor environments. The Army has acknowledged that the cooling of electronic equipment is a growing problem, particularly in enclosed combat vehicles. In fact, a thermal management system (i.e., air conditioning) is presently being investigated for the MIA2 main battle tank to protect the electronics and crew from overheating. Long-term logistics issues associated with maintaining and upgrading both hardware and software systems will have to be addressed. Because of rapid evolution in both areas, it will be a challenge for the Army to maintain an integrated system across all of the evolving platforms. Both hardware and software upgrades will have to be implemented in planned stages so that applications programs can be developed in good time. The cost of continually updating computers and software will be substantial, especially if the current rate of change continues for the next 30 years. Computer hardware and software for AAN field use must be reliable and stable (physically rugged and not subject to software glitches). It must also be user friendly because users will be under significant stress. Computers should not contribute to information "overload," and computer networks must be redundant enough to sustain combat Tosses of individual servers and communications links. Current research on hardware is dominated by commercial requirements. The Army cannot count on the commercial sector, however, to provide reliable enough hardware to meet military requirements for ruggedness, bulk, and display resolution. The commercial goal of replacing disk drives with solid-state memories with sufficient capacity for limited tasks might improve ruggedness, but the commercial sector will only address military concerns coincidentally. The Army's cost for the development of acceptable computers may be high because the economies of scale in the commercial market will not apply to the small numbers of computers needed by the Army. Other uncertainties about SA technologies are common to both commercial and Arrny (military) applications, although the appropriate responses to these uncertainties may differ for military and commercial-market planners. A good example of the unpredictability of progress in a key enabling technology is the significant debate as to
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APPENDIXF 203 how much longer Moore's Law will continue to hold. There is general agreement that capacity will increase by at least one to, possibly, three orders of magnitude (10 to 1,000 times the capacity of 1998 technology) by 2025. Among the points at issue are how Tong the historical growth trend in functional capacity can be sustained and how quickly the improvement rate will drop for silicon-based semiconductor technology. So far, the manufacturing improvements responsible for sustaining this exponential trend have been based on scaling down device parameters such as silicon oxide thickness, doping, and gate length, while continuing to use silicon as the semiconductor material. This scaling can probably continue to gate lengths of around 50 nm. Experimental transistors and circuits with 50-nm gate lengths have been demonstrated. For comparison, ante! is now producing 250-nm gate lengths and is moving towards production based on a 1SO-nm gate length. The U.S. semiconductor industry currently projects that performance improvements in production manufacturing will fall below a Moore's Law extrapolation by a factor of two in 2006 (STA, 1997~. Yet even this performance assumes that transistors can be manufactured with a silicon oxide thickness of about 2 nm. Currently, when the oxide thickness is below 10 nm, current leakage increases because of direct tunneling, a fundamental characteristic derived from the quantum properties of atomic-scare phenomena. To prevent a destructive buildup of heat from this leakage, the voltage across the oxide layer would have to be reduced from the present 3.3 volts to about 0.5 volt for a chip with a billion devices. The industry road map projects a reduction to about ~ volt, which would require a significant compensating loss in per- formance to avoid the heating problem. in addition, there are significant concerns that current through the oxide even at this level will seriously detract from the reliability of the devices (Okada et al, 1998~. Even before the decrease in oxide layer thickness begins to be an obstacle, other problems may impede improvements in microprocessor performance. Thermal Toads and both intra- and inter-chip interconnect performance are major outstanding issues that also threaten to slow the advance of silicon technology. Approaches to mitigating various problems are being developed, such as reducing voltage requirements by decreasing operating speed or using silicon-on- insulator technology. Active cooling may allow some more development, but it is not known at this time how much. Moreover, cooling requires energy. Thus far, these mitigating options are one-time improvements that do not constitute a radically different technology trajectory. Nanotechnology (e.g., single-elec~on Coulomb blockade Moore's Law is an empirical generalization first stated in 1965 by Gordon Moore, then the chairman of Intel Corporation. Moore observed that a graph of the growth of memory chip capacity (measured in numbers of transistors per chip or millions of instructions executed per second [MIPS] approximated an exponential growth curve with a doubling time of one year. Since then, growth has slowed, and the period for doubling microprocessor capacity is now usually given as 18 months (Intel, 1998; Ziff- Davis, 1998~. Intel describes Moore's generalization for memory chips as having a period of 18 to 24 months (Intel, 1998~. In September 1997, Moore pointed out that the physical limits of silicon technology would put a limit on the ability of the semiconductor industry to continue the Moore's Law trend in manufacturing improvements. Moore also said that power consumption and the resulting heat will be an enormous challenge long before the physical limit on transistor size is reached (Kanellos, 1997~.
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204 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT transistors and cellular automata architectures) is being explored with the hope that it might provide an alternative to the traditional metal-oxide semiconductor transistor technology as the latter reaches fundamental limits. To date, none of these approaches appears likely to surpass the functionality provided by mainstream silicon technology. In summary, although some improvements in performance will continue beyond the next decade, they will probably not be achieved by continued scaling down of transistor size at the historic Moore's Law rate. For critical operations (including many Army applications), trade-offs among performance characteristics, such as processing speed, size, and reliability, at the circuit and component levels will have to be assessed. Reliability standards that are acceptable for mass-market commercial applications may be unacceptable for Army SA systems. Software is also a serious problem. Windows, the operating system used in most small computers, is notably unstable, especially when used for multitasking. OS/2 is better, but less user friendly. UNIX-based systems are still better but are not notably user friendly. It is not yet clear what the stability of Windows 98 or Windows NT will be although the latter is a distinct improvement over Windows 95 and might be as stable as UNIX. Neither compares with mainframe operating systems, however, in terms of stability and reliability. Because the requirements for stability on the battlefield exceed those of personal users and even of most commercial users like banks, insurance companies and airlines, there may not be a demand for extremely stable systems that are user friendly in the commercial arena. The task of development would, therefore, be left to the military. The closest match to military requirements may be the requirements for reliability of the air traffic control system, although the military will require far more redundancy and operate in a much more chaotic environment. The military network must be capable of being broken up into smaller networks if the reliability of the larger network becomes suspect. This will reduce vulnerability to attack and facilitate reconstitution and recoverability. Another difference between commercial and military networks is that the military command network must be hierarchical while other military networks, such as the indirect fire support network that responds to targets of opportunity, must be less hierarchical. It is doubtful that a single commercial architecture could efficiently handle both. The Army also must resolve significant issues related to software complexity and adaptability. The AAN will require a very complex software overlay for handling intelligence that will receive terabits of information from a large number of sources in a rapidly changing environment and distill the information for users as diverse as commanders and autonomous platforms. Fundamental questions must be answered about the limits of robustness and stability in such a system. Security problems for commercial and military computers are similar in some respects but different in others. The short time of each AAN engagement will reduce the vulnerability of field ciphers but the number of engagements will increase it. Most mili- tary studies of cryptography and security have been done by the Anny in conjunction with the National Security Agency (NSA). A new generation of "Fastiane" encryption technology, which has been developed to accommodate the speed, volume, and band- width needed by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), when coupled with asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) communications links and a centralized key man- agement system, will go a long way toward solving the security problems that will be encountered in the AAN time frame. Because most information on security issues and
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APPENDIX F 205 technologies is classified, the committee can only reiterate the general seriousness of security considerations. Display (Soldier-Computer Interface) Unless we give over the battlefield to computers and robots, the Army will have to devote a good deal of attention to the final communications link between the computer and the human brain. This is both a hardware and a software issue. Display hardware will have to be improved in resolution, robustness, and portability. The needs of the force commander, of mounted soldiers, and of dismounted soldiers are very different. Dismounted soldiers will need lightweight, heads-up displays that provide information without restricting their peripheral vision. Many active software programs that can visualize complex data (e.g., virtual reality, graphic presentations of databases, three-dimensional modeling) simplify data presentation but incur large costs in computational resources and in time. Much more work will be required to make timely information available in a form that is more suited to humans than computers. Although the sense of sight is the most information rich of all human senses, in some situations, auditory or other sensory inputs may be more efficient and less distracting. The Army should investigate interfaces that involve all of the human senses. 7 7 Communications Although radio communications systems and the global positioning system (GPS) are vulnerable to jamming, the committee found little evidence that the Army takes the threat of enemy jamming seriously. In tactical war games and field problems, opposing forces are usually prohibited from jamming. Eventually, this policy could prove to be disastrous, especially to an AAN battle force that will be entirely dependent on massive data transfer. Even though electronic warfare technologies are classified and this discussion was limited, the committee believes that jamming poses a significant threat to the AAN. A very large aggregate bandwidth will be necessary to transmit detailed, high- reso~ution, real-time, multispectral mapping/imaging and threat identification to a changing battlefield with a large number of nodes with radio frequency links. Current and follow-on technologies being developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) initiatives (FastIane encryption and ATM networks) are expected to resolve some of the throughput and bandwidth problems before the AAN time frame, but bandwidth requirements will continue to expand. A shift to millimeter-wave links will be necessary, even if terrain information is loaded prior to battle. Broad-band communication will be critical and could be vulnerable if airborne relays are required. The communication network needed for the AAN will include many sources of very large amounts of data, many nodes trying to access information, many redundant communications channels (e.g., radio frequency, microwave, optical, earthbound, UAV, and satellite) to ensure connectivity, and many protocols (e.g., encryption, spread spectrum, frequency hopping, code division multiplex) to ensure authenticity and
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206 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT increase aggregate bandwidth. Network management in such a complex environment will require robust software to ensure that the system can operate reliably under high- stress battlefield conditions. Commercial systems are based on the highly democratic Tnternet protocol (i.e., the system slows down as more users demand access). A military system must have a more hierarchical structure based on dynamic prioritization. The commander will need a continuous overview. A sensor that detects an incoming threat must be able to get its message across. This is a complex problem that will be very difficult to solve. Neither a detailed analysis of the bandwidth requirements associated with an AAN battle force nor a mapping of bandwidth requirements into available resources was discussed with the committee, which therefore assumed that the Army is not yet working on battle force communications issues. If this assumption is correct, the committee rec- ommends that the Army coordinate its development plan with NSA and PRO initiatives. The Army should have an ongoing assessment of communication requirements and a planning process either to accommodate them or reduce them. Vulnerability The flip side of self-reliance is dependency. Information technologies (e.g., sensors, computers, artificial intelligence, and communications) are essential to SA, which in turn is essential to AAN battle force systems. At the same time, information technologies can increase the battIeforce's vulnerability. The SA system for the AAN will be one of the most complex, dynamic, interwoven systems ever produced. Failures could arise from errors in the fabric of the system that are revealed only by the stress of the battlefield, from hardware failures, or from enemy attempts to disable or misinform them. The year 2000 software problem is an object lesson in the difficulties of providing truly robust software for complex systems. A software decision made many years ago when computer memory was in short supply to use only two digits to encode the year (e.g., 65 for 1965) has necessitated major expenditures of time and money as 2000 approaches. This was a predictable problem, but systems designers in 1965 (or even ~ 990) did not anticipate that the code would still be in use in 2000. Complex code can also have hidden software errors. Many large complex com- mercial systems (e.g., the extended failure of AT&T long distance telecommunications computers in 1996) have gone out of service because of unforeseen combinations of cir- cumstances that caused the software to crash. Everyone who uses the Windows'95 operating system on a personal computer has experienced system crashes. These crashes may be annoying, but they are not serious because they can be corrected by rebooting the computer and reentering material that had not been saved. The network software for AAN will be vastly more complex, will have to be dynamic to accommodate rapidly changing circumstances, and will undoubtedly be tested in unforeseen ways by battlefield stresses. A failure that requires the equivalent of rebooting the system would be clearly unacceptable. The Army will have to apply a rigorous testing and evaluation program not only to eliminate as many vuInerabilities as possible, but also to ensure a graceful failure that can rapidly shed problems (both software and hardware) without bringing the entire system to a halt. This will be a major software challenge.
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APPENDIXF 207 Hardware reliability and hardening are other issues that must be addressed. First, redundancy will be essential (e.g., the Internet provides multiple routing options and does not depend on a single communications link). Second, electronics can be vulnerable to high-power electromagnetic radiation. Unfortunately, this vulnerability has increased with the increasing numbers of transistor-based devices used in advanced microelec- tronics. Third, the Army will have to protect electronics against attack. This is a more serious issue for nodes and command centers where there are concentrations of electronics than for distributed, redundant sensor networks. Enemies have always attempted to exploit vuInerabilities in the SA system to improve their battlefield situations. As technology has advanced, methods of protecting information have not always kept pace. Increasing functionality is often more exciting (and more fundable) than ensuring its security and authenticity. As certain technologies become available routinely, both sides will probably achieve parity; an opponent who has no installed system could even have advantages over a larger force with installed systems that are expensive to update or replace. The Army will have to guard against these twin dangers as technology develops into the AAN time frame. Existing Programs The Army has significant research focus under the battlefield communications strategic research objective (SRO). The Army Research Laboratory is working in integrated teams with university and industry laboratories, computer networks, automated target recognition, and wideband communications. Many of these programs are predicated on the maximum use of commercial hardware and software. If rigorous field and operational testing should show that commercial equipment and systems are inadequate for the AAN, the scope of the research projects will have to be increased. All of the services and DARPA have large research programs on sensor tech- nologies. The Air Force is working on electro-optics for both air-based and space-based reconnaissance and is investing heavily in UAV technology. DARPA has extensive pro- grams in forward-Iooking infrared sensors. The Navy has several university initiatives in chemical/biological warfare sensors. National laboratories, including Sandia, Livermore, Argonne, and Oak Ridge, are working on various aspects of sensor, communications, and computer technologies that are relevant to the AAN. The committee was not con- vinced, however, that these programs and projects are well coordinated. REFERENCES Intel. 1998. Processor Hall of Fame: What is Moore's Law. Internet World Wide Web page by Intel Corporation. URL: . October 5, 1998. Kanellos, M. 1997. Moore says Moore's Law to hit wall. Internet World Wide Web page by CNET News published September 30, 1997. URL:
208 REDUCING THE LOGISTICS BURDEN FOR THE ARMYAFTER NEXT Okada, K., H. Kubo, A., Ishinaga and K.Yoneda. 1998. A New Prediction Method for Oxide Lifetime and Its Application to Study Dielectric Breakdown Mechanism. Paper presented at the 1998 Symposium on VLSI Technology, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 11, 1998. Digest of Technical Papers. Piscataway, New Jersey: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. SIA (Semiconductor Industry Association) 1997. The National Technology Roadmap for Semi- conductors. San Jose, Calif.: Semiconductor Industry Association. Ziff-Davis. 1998. ZDNet Webopedia: Moore's Law. Internet World Wide Web page by Ziff" Davis, Inc. URL:. October 5 1998.
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