4
Process and Culture

4.1 Managing Change

The catch phrase used to capture the technology-driven transformation in almost all aspects of warfighting in the years ahead—the so-called revolution in military affairs—points to the magnitude of the institutional challenges associated with this transformation. Revolutions do not occur smoothly, nor do they succeed without significant breakage on many fronts. Revolutionary change and transformation are even more difficult when the institutions are steeped in proud histories and imbued with strong cultures. And, in the absence of an immediate crisis facing them, institutions are particularly challenged to transform themselves.

Although the military situation is different in major ways from that of the industrial sector, some useful guidance is available in the form of generally effective principles that have been learned from the revolutions currently under way in banking, retailing, the distribution industry, and a number of other commercial sectors. Six keys to success derived from a study of successful transformations in the commercial sector are the following:

  •  A consistent and clear driving vision;
  •  A set of supporting processes, drawing broadly on those affected by change and often using specific institutions, to refine and communicate the vision, to quantify and test its reality, and to translate it into implementable pieces;
  •  A persistent and constant in-place leadership cadre, driving an ongoing sense of urgency;


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--> 4 Process and Culture 4.1 Managing Change The catch phrase used to capture the technology-driven transformation in almost all aspects of warfighting in the years ahead—the so-called revolution in military affairs—points to the magnitude of the institutional challenges associated with this transformation. Revolutions do not occur smoothly, nor do they succeed without significant breakage on many fronts. Revolutionary change and transformation are even more difficult when the institutions are steeped in proud histories and imbued with strong cultures. And, in the absence of an immediate crisis facing them, institutions are particularly challenged to transform themselves. Although the military situation is different in major ways from that of the industrial sector, some useful guidance is available in the form of generally effective principles that have been learned from the revolutions currently under way in banking, retailing, the distribution industry, and a number of other commercial sectors. Six keys to success derived from a study of successful transformations in the commercial sector are the following:  A consistent and clear driving vision;  A set of supporting processes, drawing broadly on those affected by change and often using specific institutions, to refine and communicate the vision, to quantify and test its reality, and to translate it into implementable pieces;  A persistent and constant in-place leadership cadre, driving an ongoing sense of urgency;

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-->  The willingness and drive to reengineer any process, doctrine, or organization and to take risks;  The willingness to allocate the funding necessary for change and to reprioritize budget allocations; and  A commitment to align the measurement system across the hierarchy and in accordance with the vision. Each of these items is discussed below in the context of DOD implementation of these principles. Metrics for the management measurement system are addressed in section 4.6. 4.1.1 Clear Vision for the Future As noted in Chapter 1, Joint Vision 2010 reflects the top-level vision in the DOD of what is possible through the exploitation of C4I technology, and the services have each translated this top-level vision into a service-specific vision. Today, the culture of the DOD regarding C4I systems and capabilities is in a state of transition, with senior military leadership becoming more broadly aware of information technology as an evolutionary force in doctrine and operations. This evolution is characterized by changes in doctrine, growth in new descriptive terminology, and substantial leadership investment in awareness. In short, the committee believes that the DOD has performed reasonably well in articulating a vision for the future. 4.1.2 Supporting Processes In the course of its work, the committee encountered a number of efforts aimed at refining and quantifying the vision of advanced C4I systems and at learning and capturing the creative energies of the services and numerous supporting industries; these efforts included some of the exercises and experiments of several services, and demonstrations such as the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations. The DOD leadership has also approved a number of recent concept studies and organizations that aim to better understand and, where possible, quantify the contributions to military effectiveness that can be realized from effectively exploiting information technology. So-called ''battle labs," along with numerous simulations, experiments, tests, and exercises, have contributed to a body of significant knowledge regarding the utility of advanced C4I systems. The committee found a large number of overlay offices and processes aimed at achieving jointness and interoperability, indicating at least some significant organizational acknowledgment of these matters. Nevertheless, as is often the case in the evolution of any large enterprise, DOD's doctrinal and technical visionaries are far ahead of DOD's

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--> institutional reality in terms of bringing information technology to bear on current and future military needs. For example, the mere presence of offices and processes does not mean that the organization as a whole places a high priority on jointness and interoperability, and there is a big difference between a laboratory or an experiment that is fully joint in spirit and execution and one that is focused primarily on a specific service but with token involvement of other services at the edges.1 And, in the information security area, the committee did not observe a comparable organizational acknowledgment. Many factors have been blamed for the less-than-full realization of the potential impact of C4I on military operations. These factors include the following:  Equipment, by law, must be purchased in the individual services.  Time and tradition have created distinctive cultures within the services.  In each service, promotion depends heavily on combat command experience.  Congressional mandates have forced the DOD's suppliers to operate at greater and greater arm's length from those they serve.  Traditional weapons change slowly, and the military has become accustomed to procurements that take many years to complete.  Information technology in computers, communication, and sensors is changing at an exceptionally rapid pace.  The military market for many commercial information technology products is comparatively small. Numerous efforts are under way to deal with some of those individual causes. Yet none seems sufficient despite the prevalent answer to almost any question: "Yes, we're taking care of that." Because the issues are so diverse, it is necessary to aggregate the resources needed to deal with them, and thus an organizational approach to promoting change—much like Motorola University or the General Electric Crotonville school—seems a more promising approach.2 In this context, the organization pro- 1.   An illustration would be an experiment that focuses on new doctrinal concepts for one service but that involves the other services based on their existing doctrine. Thus, for example, the Army experiments of Force XXI did not appear to take into account possible developments in Air Force expeditionary force doctrine. This point is an observation, not a criticism. 2.   Note that an actual physical institution is not necessarily needed. Modern techniques for managing independent collaboration through the use of software and communication techniques are well developed in industry, and experience makes it clear that close collaborative work and action can take place among separated groups and individuals. See J. Quinn, J. Baruch, and K. Zien. 1997. Innovation Explosion, The Free Press, New York, pp. 107-140.

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--> vides an experimental context in which knowledge is captured at the point of action—because practitioners have the opportunity to codify their knowledge—and lessons learned become imperatives and lead to adaptation. If these lessons then link to doctrine, this learning process can be an institutional mechanism for responding to environmental change. It is critical to this approach that a strategic perspective be used, or else the knowledge management effort will degrade into one that creates only large repositories of reports. The role of communities of practice not only can affect the decision process (including key stakeholders and implementers) but also can begin to affect culture. Consider, for example, General Electric's Crotonville Management School as a focus for then-CEO Jack Welch's continuing efforts to transform General Electric. Crotonville is far more than a typical management school. It is a key center of debate and refinement of the waves of strategic change that have made General Electric one of the world's most competitive and successful companies. It is both the source of refinement of the gospel and the place where it is debated and driven home across the General Electric management structure. The committee did not find any DOD entity analogous to the Crotonville school that might be the center of education and research aimed at driving the revolution in military affairs forward in a truly joint manner. To the best of the committee's knowledge no analogous transformation-driving institution exists within the military, particularly with respect to joint and/or combined operations. 4.1.3 Persistent Leadership Creating a Sense of Urgency In the civilian world, chief executive officers and other key personnel can remain in place for as long as necessary to guide a substantial organizational change (i.e., time periods long enough to convince lower levels of the organization that waiting until the focus of management changes is not a viable option). Thus, CEOs and others can be chosen for their vision and commitment to change with the expectation that the individuals will endure. One military analog of such a leader was Admiral Hyman Rickover, an individual who personified a vision for the future with respect to the nuclear Navy and who could drive progress today, tomorrow, and every day beyond that.3 A more recent example is Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer, who presided over the development and deployment of 3.   This is not to say that all of Admiral Rickover's decisions regarding the nuclear Navy were appropriate. For example, many have pointed to the fact that one of Admiral Rickover's legacies is the reliance on nuclear reactors whose design and performance fall far short of what would be possible with other nuclear reactor technologies. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Rickover had a profound influence on keeping the Navy focused on developing nuclear propulsion technology.

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--> AEGIS for almost 14 years.4 It is also significant that AEGIS was developed more or less within all of the acquisition bureaucracy and constraints of the testing community. But in the military, the long tenure of individuals is the exception—in general, short time limits on the tenure of driving visionaries within the DOD encourage the natural tendency of an organization to resist change. The DOD suffers from management turnover in the top military (and civilian) leadership that is much more frequent than turnover in the private-sector companies that have successfully effected major cultural changes. The committee met and were briefed by numerous impressive leaders—among them both operators and top-level staff—who were clearly providing a strong driving force for transformation, but who were within a short period, sometimes less than 1 year, of either retiring from the service or moving on to the next assignment. This lack of continuity presents a major challenge for the military. Because the DOD is a government organization, its senior leadership is expected to rotate on a regular basis. The average tenure of a secretary of defense is 18 months, and while senior military leaders are expected to remain somewhat longer, both tenures are short compared to the time needed to effect major cultural changes.5 Thus, sustaining attention to large issues such as interoperability requires the existence of an institutional process to facilitate such change, rather than relying on a strong personality. Because DOD is not constructed in such a way that a single individual personality can readily create the focus needed for change, it must instead rely on organizational entities that persist over time. Recognizing that the functions of C4I are the constituent elements of an integrated whole and that the C4I "fabric" must be treated as a global system in order for the functions of command and control to achieve optimum performance, the DOD in early 1998 consolidated intelligence, security and information operations, C4ISR and space systems, and the Chief Information Officer's responsibilities in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I. However, a year before this new structure was established, DOD decided to separate intelligence oversight from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I and subordinated command, control, and communications oversight inside the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. The decision directing the separation also would have eliminated 4.   AEGIS is a ship-based combat system that is capable of simultaneous operation in anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare modes. 5.   For example, the statutory limit for members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is 24 months (with the possibility of renewal); the average tenure is approximately 4 years. The average tenure for other senior leaders is approximately 2 to 4 years.

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--> enforcement authority, leaving the residual bodies as policy-making organs.6 Finally, an institutional sense of urgency is also needed to create revolutionary change. Within the DOD, actual conflict and operational deployments are often required to move the system faster.7 Sometimes, a large, looming threat creates the same urgency, as the Soviet threat in the late 1950s and early 1960s drove the U.S. strategic nuclear program. But absent immediate conflict or looming threat, it is difficult to motivate rapid change. Moreover, lack of urgency in the DOD today is also underscored by the apparent unwillingness of the system to follow through on identified opportunities with rapid fielding, follow-through that would require significant reallocation of resources between weapons systems and C4I systems. In short, DOD does not exhibit persistent leadership in this area today. 4.1.4 Process Reengineering Experience in the private sector with the application of information technology suggests that modest improvements are possible when such technology is used to automate existing processes. Applying information technology for such purposes is relatively straightforward, and most organizations are capable of using information technology in such ways to achieve incrementally faster and more accurate information flows and more efficient business processes. The private sector has often found that radical (rather than incremental) improvements leading to real competitive advantage can be achieved only by significant reengineering of processes, operating methodologies, and organizations to exploit fully the capabilities enabled by information 6.   The committee's view of this separation is negative. Those who viewed the separation as positive sometimes argued that C3 (rather than intelligence) is the "glue" that holds most weapon systems together, and thus that C3 should be institutionally integrated with weapon systems acquisition more than with intelligence. In this view, intelligence is regarded as a less real-time function that serves the political leadership in prioritization as much or more than it does the warfighter, while surveillance and reconnaissance are part of C3/weapons systems. The committee respects this argument but believes that the weapons system acquisition culture is so fundamentally different from C4I and so much more dominant within DOD that integrating the two would inevitably result in C4I being treated like weapons systems—a fundamentally misguided treatment when the underlying technologies are so different. Furthermore, the committee believes that the future of intelligence on the battlefield is that it must become more real-time in nature to be more useful to the warfighter. 7.   For example, the GBU-28 "Bunker Buster" bomb was assembled in record time to support targeting of hardened Iraqi command bunkers in the Gulf War. The U.S. Air Force asked industry for ideas on how to destroy such bunkers in the week after combat operations started. The first operational bombs were delivered to the Gulf theater in less than a month (from project go-ahead). See the Federation of American Scientists' home page online at <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/gbu-28.htm>.

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--> technology. Indeed, in some cases, such reengineering has resulted in the creation of entirely new business processes that are the foundation of entirely new lines of business. Such new enterprises in essence redefine the terms of competition. Wal-Mart, a company studied by DOD as an example of the achievement of major competitive advantage, did not simply replace paper with computers in its key processes. It reengineered most of its key processes in its distribution network around the new capabilities offered by the progress of technology, dramatically improving key aspects of its business from sourcing logistics to distribution to store operations. (Note also that Wal-Mart did not rely on state-of-the-art information technology and was thus able to minimize its expenses for new technology acquisitions.) Federal Express did not simply computerize what United Parcel Service had been doing, nor did Amazon.com merely automate what Barnes and Noble was doing. They reengineered their processes and aimed for dramatic rather than incremental improvement. It was as much success in this reengineering of process and organization as the application of technology that provided the competitive advantage in each of these cases. In the DOD context, an operational focus on how C4I can lead to improved outcomes (rather than just providing new capabilities) raises the important question of how to reengineer operational processes and procedures to achieve improved outcomes with advanced information technology. Such reengineering will take on greater urgency as new digitized weapon systems are fielded. An all-digital capability will allow information available on individual weapon platforms to be shared simultaneously and acted on from across the battlespace. Targets acquired by sensors in aircraft, for example, can be seen concurrently at multiple echelons of command and can be engaged with minimal delay by designated air or surface-based weapons operating within preestablished rules. Reengineering can also have an impact that ripples throughout an entire organization. For example, if combat forces can be applied quickly at the right location at the right time (perhaps as the result of using C4I effectively), then there is less need for larger force structures to be prelocated to cover the range of possibilities. With smaller force structures, the need for high-volume platform modernization is diminished, the need for supporting logistics is lessened, the need for lift is lowered, the need for infrastructures is cut, and the time needed to move forces is reduced. Military doctrine can focus less on forward basing and more on rapid deployment. In short, reengineered technology-exploiting processes are likely to enable major competitive advantage for the DOD, just as they do on the civilian side. In its site visits, the committee did see some efforts that embodied the concepts of reengineering, such as the Army's Force XXI program. Such

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--> efforts call for both business processes and combat doctrine to be reengineered. (An example of business process reengineering is the idea of reducing by a factor of 10 the personnel needed to operate a tactical operations center. An example of doctrinal reengineering is the idea of engaging in coordinated strikes across the entire 200-km-deep battlespace rather than engaging in attrition warfare.) However, in a number of cases it appeared that too little of this type of effort was under way, and that the result may be a requirement for so much technology and so much skilled manpower that the technology-enhanced versions of military units may be unaffordable, insufficiently nimble of movement, or otherwise unachievable. 4.1.5 Budgets and Reprioritization of Investment Leveraging information technology to create large-scale institutional change usually requires the commitment of significant resources to that effort. In a world of finite budgets, such commitment inevitably entails the reprioritization and reallocation of budget lines. Moreover, given the pace at which information technology changes, ways of using information technology that are optimal today will inevitably be different in 5 or 10 years. The optimal balance and manner of use at any point in time will not be optimal—or anywhere near optimal—5 years later. Large corporations deal with such change by replacing information technology on a relatively frequent basis (i.e., more rapidly than they replace other capital investments). In the military context, balance and investment trade-offs arise at two fundamental levels: among C4I programs and capabilities and between C4I programs and weapons/platforms. In observing DOD efforts in this area, the committee found little evidence that the very powerful statement of Joint Vision 2010 (or its service derivatives) has led to significant consequent reprioritization of resources and budgets. Indeed, because defense budget programming is undertaken incrementally, the trade-off is usually captured in terms of a question such as, Should an incremental dollar be spent on C4I or on weapons systems? This trade-off reflects a pervasive and very significant tension between the historical quest of military leadership for traditional weapons modernization and the call for investment in "force multipliers" such as modern C4I systems and applications. Furthermore, DOD does not have the luxury of rapid turnover in its C4I systems, as it often faces the tacit belief of its budget overseers in Congress and the Administration that C4I systems should have the same useful lifetime as do major weapons systems. Because of the continued and anticipated rapid rate of advance of information technology, the appropriate balance between weapons systems and C4I technology will continue to shift, posing major challenges

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--> for the military services. DOD will never solve the C4I problem "once and for all" but will need to think constantly about how information technology could be changing the way the services perform their missions, and how best to optimize the allocation of resources among C4I systems, weapons modernization, and force structure. The point in highlighting this issue is not to substantiate the need for a particular balance, rebalancing, or change in investment strategy. Rather, it is to emphasize that the question of balance, its evolution over time, and the impact on military effectiveness are critically important and warrant having a standing and continuing activity to look at broad investment trade-offs, with military effectiveness being the dominant consideration. 4.2 Special Non-Technical Challenges Faced by the Military Realization of the full exploitation of C4I will require major changes in military operations and in the processes and culture of the military institutions themselves. Discussions with individuals from the top military and civilian leadership in DOD as well as with captains, corporals, and other operators in the field during exercises and experiments helped the committee to appreciate the enormity of the challenge. This transformation is occurring (or trying to occur) at a time of significant reduction in resources. To those actively engaged in the process, reductions in resources will always appear to be a major aggravating factor making the transformation more difficult. Nevertheless, a number of committee members have participated in similar transitions in the commercial world, and note that while significant resource reductions are a major source of pain for those involved in the transformation, such reductions also can in fact have positive effects because they eliminate any doubt of the need for rapid change. In addition, this urgency can drive major reengineering rather than incremental progress, and thus produce a more positive result. Still, the DOD faces many challenges that are not found in the private sector, challenges that are specific to the role, history, and culture of the military. None of these is an absolute inhibitor of the required transformation, but taken together they loom large. Success in moving forward at a sufficiently rapid pace will require awareness of these factors and conscious effort to deal with them. 4.2.1 Situational Challenges Like most other modern institutions, the military lives and operates in, and must plan effectively in the face of, a highly uncertain world. While a few situations, as in Korea, provide reasonable planning scenarios,

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--> the military must in large part be prepared to respond rapidly and effectively to situations that are far less predictable, against a variety of potential aggressors, and with a wide range of potential coalition partners. In addition, and in contrast to most private-sector institutions that have shown how to achieve competitive advantage based on technology, the military can only exercise and practice anticipated types of operations, rather than build on continuous experience, which allows incremental progress. Commercial organizations are engaged in their regular business every day, and the partners with whom they work and their competitors are a relatively stable set. Thus, real operational successes and failures are apparent if management knows how to look for them, giving decision makers a near-real-time window into the operational effectiveness of the organization. By contrast, the competitive arena for the military is not nearly so orderly or well defined as for the private sector, and the analogy to the private sector has many limitations. While generating profit is the clear and unambiguous objective for private-sector firms, success or failure of the DOD is not something determined in the "marketplace"—as a matter of national policy, it is unacceptable for the DOD to fail. Furthermore, unlike private sector firms that practice their particular business every day, the DOD must be prepared for a very wide range of possible military operational scenarios under the constraint that (thankfully) the nation is not continually engaged in those scenarios. The military services train regularly, but the stakes involved in exercises are simply not the same as those associated with war, nor is the degree of unpredictability the same. Furthermore, live exercises are expensive. The result is that DOD must rely on a variety of surrogate indicators (e.g., the outcome of simulations, the judgments of experts) to assess itself. This set of differences is compounded by the major shift in command structure, from a service-based preparedness mode to a joint task force operational mode, which occurs upon deployment. 4.2.2 Organizational Challenges By law, the services have the responsibility to organize, train, and equip their forces. As such, they control the budgets for their acquisition programs. Service program managers—who are responsible to the service—will naturally pay greatest attention to satisfying program requirements that are most desired by the service. For those situations in which interoperability is both not a service priority (for whatever reason) and also entails additional expense, budget pressures work against interoperability. (Box 4.1 provides an illustration of how military culture, the acquisition system, and doctrine can affect system design for data com-

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--> BOX 4.1 Data Sharing Acquisition, and Doctrinal Reengineering A good illustration of how cultural and Institutional factors can affect system design involves the issue of data interoperability. As discussed in. Chapter 2, data incompatibilities between systems are a major source of interoperability difficulties. But in addition to technical reasons that lead to data incompatibilities, cultural factors can also create significant impediments, to reaching, agreement on data definitions Many of these factors manifest themselves as operational and doctrinal concerns. One concern is that delivery of Information to a subordinate may be confused with authority to act on that Information. traditionally, flows of Information to, lower echelons have been limited by available resources and, accompanied by direction, (commands). But because interoperable systems by definition facilitate information, exchanges with few constraints, they make it much easier to separate Information from command. As a result, doctrine based on combining Information with command or authority is threatened by a reengineering of doctrine that involves the separation of information from authority. One illustration of this threat to existing doctrine is that a common operating picture shared at all levels of the command hierarchy enables a mode of command known as "command by negation." In this mode, subordinate units—possessing a clear picture of the overall battlefield and knowing the commander's overall intent—act on their own initiative consistent with the commander's intent. Thus, they need not wait for approval or direction from higher authority and can operate at a much higher tempo. if the commander observes the unit doing something inappropriate, or if the, commander's intent changes for the unit's operating area of responsibility, he can direct the unit to do something else. A second illustration relates to trust among, units from different services and even from the same service Data collected organically by a unit (locally collected data) are often regarded. by. that unit as more trustworthy than data fed to that unit from other sources (foreign data). The reason is that, the meaning and value attached to data are contingent on the circumstances under which the data were collected and on the theory used to collect the data, and the unit is much more familiar with the theory and circumstances surrounding locally collected data (and thus its limitations and qualifications) as compared to foreign data. Handling of data that a subsequent system will regard as foreign data is considered risky, because the performance of the subsequent system or operational element becomes vulnerable to imperfections in that data. Because it is the characteristic of interoperability that enables data to be passed for subsequent use in the first place, interoperability can be regarded as a kind of threat to system performance.

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--> vide the demand side—the commander's "druthers," i.e., what he would like to be able to do militarily—information that can stimulate the development of new applications and perhaps new technologies. Technologists will learn from the operators in side-by-side contact and in understanding lessons learned from demonstrations, experiments, exercises, and operational deployments. The educational dimension of the institute would be approximately that of advanced graduate education in the private sector—learning through problem-based work rather than courses (as is more typical of undergraduate education). Thus, its educational intent would be to share knowledge rapidly and adapt what it teaches to the changing world in a timely manner. In this fashion, it would not operate as a training command, in which courses focus on established doctrine (which—quite properly—takes a long time to evolve). An educational dimension structured along such lines would also enable the institute to provide ongoing support for a career path for C4I specialists. The institute would also serve as a "think tank" responsive to the services (especially the doctrine commands) and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The output of the institute would be both reports and "prototype" or "proof-of-concept" demonstrations. (In this latter output, the institute would differ from traditional think tanks.) As a rule, the institute would not develop technology on its own, instead focusing on the potential adaptation and use of commercial off-the-shelf capabilities in military information technology applications. The technology work undertaken by the institute would thus focus primarily on integration and "stitching together" COTS components to serve military needs. It is expected that the institute would connect closely with a variety of different institutions and activities:  Training and doctrine commands and the Joint Battle Center, through which the institute could facilitate a close coupling between service-based strategy and analysis and joint C4I experimentation;  Service and defense agency research and development efforts in information technology, and the service development laboratories, through which the institute could keep abreast of current C4I developments;  The Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations, through which the institute could demonstrate in-house work of its own and/or facilitate appropriate work originating in other DOD or contractor bodies;  The Joint Staff (especially the Directorate for C4 Systems and the Directorate for Operations), through which the institute could couple to operational concerns; and  The various war colleges, through which the institute could help to

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--> develop the intellectual basis for a broad educational program on C4I issues, particularly for military leaders. With a stated mission to ensure excellence in professional military education and research in the essential elements of national security, the National Defense University is one possible location for the proposed institute, though it would have to extend itself to engage technologists and system developers. The Joint C4ISR Battle Center is a second possible location, though it would have to extend itself to embrace a research and education function that it currently does not have. Recommendation P-4: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, working with the service Secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should direct that as a general rule, every individual C4I acquisition should (a) use evolutionary acquisition; (b) articulate requirements as functional statements rather than technical specifications; and (c) develop operational requirements through a process that includes input from all the services and the CINCs. Over the time scale of a typical military C4I program, the applicable technology underlying the program, as well as operational requirements for its use, the doctrine that governs its operation, and the world and local environments in which it must operate, can be expected to change dramatically. Large increases in performance mean that features or capabilities desired by users that may have been unrealistic at the start of the program (i.e., when the requirements are first defined) may become more realistic later in the program. Moreover, the nature of the relationship between users and C4I systems is such that users are often unable to foresee how a system might be used without actual operating experience. However, once given that operating experience (something that requires a functioning system), they are in a much better position to articulate other needs and requirements that they did not realize they had. Waiting for a 100% complete statement of requirements that the system will eventually have to meet is a recipe for radically increasing costs and extensively delaying system deployment. For these reasons, an "80% solution"—an evolutionary acquisition—to the functional requirement, followed by effective preplanned product improvements is not unreasonable as the initial statement of requirements. Such a formulation would encourage commercial technology application and dramatically reduce the cycle time for developing new C4I systems. An important corollary is that in many cases it is necessary for program plans to state only functional requirements. Indeed, overspecifica-

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--> tion of the design limits the ability of a supplier to find better or more cost-effective ways of implementing the system. The major exception to this general principle is in the specification of interfaces to other systems. Because these interfaces are essential to achieving interoperability, a high degree of detail is appropriate in specifying them. Such detail should be derived from the operational, technical, and systems architectures that describe the system in question and how it relates to other C4I systems. Finally, if the intent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 35—that all C4I systems developed for use by or in support of U.S. forces are by definition to be considered for use in joint operations—is to be met, the requirements definition process should be under the control of a group that represents the interests of all stakeholders. As a general rule today, requirements are initially specified by the service programmatically responsible for a system to be acquired; other stakeholders such as the CINCs or the Joint Chiefs of Staff have opportunities for input, but primarily in later stages of program review when the system has been largely defined. Furthermore, while the requirements for some programs are vetted through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Defense Acquisition Board, or the Major Automated Information Systems Review Council, these bodies deal only with programs exceeding some (relatively large) dollar threshold (and the magnitude of a C4I program is not a good indicator of its operational importance). And, the fact that these bodies perform a review and oversight function for many programs means that they are limited in the attention that they can give to any specific program. The committee believes that a process that ensures input from the CINCs and inter-service input in the initial formulation, as well as the review of requirements, increases the likelihood that the requirements that a system is designed to meet will in fact satisfy needs for interoperability and jointness. 36 Note: This recommendation does not call for the establishment of joint offices for program management. While under some circumstances a joint program office for a C4I program may be appropriate, a joint program is dependent on the services for the monetary support, staffing, contracting, 35.   Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6212.01A 36.   It can be argued that the involvement of all services and the CINCs in the formulation of C4I requirements will simply result in an ever-expanding list of requirements that would lead to higher unit costs. For example, if an advocate of certain requirements has no responsibility for supporting a system to meet them, the "wish list" becomes a free good that is easy to abuse. It therefore falls to program managers to discipline the process of formulating requirements so that the list does not continue to expand. (One approach might be to require programmatic contributions from other services to fulfill requirements that are associated with the needs of those other services.) In any event, a broad perspective on C4I requirements is intended by this recommendation.

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--> and purchasing authority needed to execute an acquisition. Such dependency frequently leads to multiple inadequacies in program execution and can make the joint program less effective due to the inability of a joint program director to control service support for his program. Because the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I have the ultimate responsibility for acquisition matters related to C4I, those offices are the appropriate ones to take action. The policy promulgated must require explicit justifications for approaches to acquisition that do not call for evolutionary acquisition, must be observed by all service acquisition arms, and must specify that all requirements contained in program documents for all C4I programs and all C4I within weapons systems be stated as functional statements. Recommendation P-5: The Secretary of Defense should seek, and the Congress should support, an appropriate level of budgetary flexibility to exploit unanticipated advances in C4I technology that have a high payoff potential. As new commercial information technologies and applications emerge that can significantly improve military capabilities, management and budgeting approaches must be flexible and responsive if timely acquisition of fast-paced information technological developments is to succeed. High-value C4I applications that emerge from an advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) or a demonstration such as those in the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations are all too often "orphaned" in relation to the regular acquisition track, and follow-through has been difficult in the past. The reason is that the normal planning and budget process programs funds years in advance. Thus, some "offline" funding mechanism is required to cover unanticipated needs.37 Furthermore, even if an ACTD does not enter the mainstream acquisition process, funding streams are 37.   Today, mechanisms available to cover unanticipated needs include reprogramming authority (which, up to a certain limit, can be exercised without congressional approval) and emergency or supplemental appropriations (which require congressional action). By definition, reprogramming funds one program at the expense of another, and so can be expected to generate considerable controversy. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the program being used as the funding source, reprogramming adds considerably to the difficulty of managing it. Supplemental appropriations leave previously authorized/appropriated funding streams intact, but take time to happen and are procedurally cumbersome. The committee does understand congressional concerns about exercising oversight responsibilities, but the legislative time scale is long compared to the time scales that characterize the emergence of new opportunities in information technology.

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--> needed to ensure that leave-behinds from ACTDs are compatible with the other systems where they are deployed, and are maintainable and supportable. Of course, a C4I ACTD that is developed independently of various requirements to support interoperability and security is unlikely to be adequately interoperable or secure. Thus, ACTDs should be developed in conformance with such requirements, even if such development increases the initial research and development cost. C4I ACTDs that are not adequately interoperable or secure are not likely to have significant "leave-behind" operational utility in the long run in any event, so that funding streams for such ACTDs are not needed. Given the tension between effective budgetary oversight and budget flexibility, the senior leadership of the DOD must take the lead in expressing the need. While budget flexibility is always regarded as desirable by those whose budgets are being overseen, the time scales on which useful applications of C4I can emerge is much smaller than the characteristic time scales of the DOD budget, making such flexibility particularly important in the C4I domain. For example, one approach for increasing flexibility that might warrant consideration (though the committee is not specifically recommending it) is to increase for C4I programs (and for C4I programs only) the current thresholds for budget reprogramming below which the DOD can take action without explicit legislative approval. Recommendation P-6: DOD should put into place the foundation for a regular rebalancing of its resource allocations for C4I. C4I is a fundamental technological underpinning of information superiority. If DOD is serious about its commitment to U.S. information superiority on the battlefield of the future, it must be engaged in a thoughtful and continuing examination of the resources it allocates to C4I. The outcome of such examination may support the beliefs of different constituencies within DOD about the proper future trajectory of C4I resources. Some believe that the fraction of the DOD budget devoted to C4I should increase significantly in the future; others believe that the amounts should decrease, and still others say it should remain about the same. The committee is explicitly silent on whether the budget is appropriately balanced today among readiness, weapons, force structure, and other types of military spending, but it does note that an increase in the fraction of the budget devoted to C4I necessarily entails trade-offs against these categories. The committee believes that DOD would increase the likelihood of making sensible budget decisions about C4I if it put into place the foundation necessary for undertaking a rebalancing of C4I vis-à-vis weapons

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--> and force structure as part of the regular budget process. Key elements of this foundation are the focus of the following two sub-recommendations. Recommendation P-6.1: The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) should explicitly account for C4I spending as a whole in DOD's budget process. As noted in Chapter 1, C4I is not a budget category within the annual DOD budgeting process. In the absence of such information, it is left to a large extent to the services to determine their own C4I priorities and how those weigh against their needs for force structure and weapons procurement. Input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides an opportunity to take a more integrated perspective, but without knowing what is being spent by all of the services on C4I in any given year, it is obviously difficult to take a defense-wide perspective on the level of overall spending. It is true that the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (1997) performed a cross-walk through the budget to determine how much was being spent on C4I. However, 4 years is far too long a time to elapse between the points at which the overall spending on C4I is understood. While it does not make sense to build a new C4I plan every year, plans must be updated on a time scale comparable to that for significant progress and change in the underlying technologies. This time scale is much closer to 1 year than 4 years. Whether an overall assessment of spending on C4I should include C4I that is embedded into weapons systems is an open question. On the one hand, weapons systems and command decisions will rely on certain capabilities, whether they are provided by systems that are programmatically designated as C4I systems or not. Thus, from an analytical standpoint, the programmatic category should not matter. On the other hand, extracting the costs of embedded C4I from the overall costs of a weapons system in which it resides may be quite difficult and prone to error. In particular, data not subject to a consistent reporting scheme across all weapons systems programs may cause problems for one program vis-à-vis another. Furthermore, weapons systems program managers may well be reluctant to explicitly call out the cost of C4I for fear of increasing its visibility to budget auditors. Whatever definition of "C4I" is adopted, it must be governed by consistent accounting rules. These rules would address questions such as whether or not to include sensors physically carried by a platform (e.g., the radar built into the F-22), sensors operating in close proximity to a weapon (e.g., the radar associated with the Patriot missile system), and off-board sensors used to support precision strike operations (e.g., sensors carried on platforms such as a JSTARS aircraft).

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--> Because the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is responsible for supervising and directing the formulation and presentation of defense budgets and establishing and supervising the execution of uniform DOD policies, principles, and procedures for budget formulation, it is this office that must take the ultimate responsibility for a more frequent accounting of C4I expenditures and for using this accounting in establishing spending priorities. Of course, it is expected that the comptroller would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I in conducting such an accounting. Recommendation P-6.2: The Joint Chiefs of Staff should develop and use measures of military effectiveness that can be used to assess the contribution of C4I to military effectiveness. An increase in the fraction of the budget devoted to C4I necessarily entails trade-offs against other modernization, readiness, and force structure. Given that these costs will likely have major implications for force effectiveness, DOD should be confident that the benefits from more C4I resources are strong enough to provide a net positive result if it decides to move in that direction. Quantitative measures of military effectiveness will thus be necessary to support a continuing process of rebalancing investment among C4I, weapons, and force structure (and among C4I systems themselves). Furthermore, quantitative measures can also help to inform the judgment of senior military leaders about how the capabilities offered by C4I can best be exploited in conducting military operations (i.e., in the formulation of military doctrine). 38 Some indications of the contribution that C4I can make to military effectiveness are known from simulation and modeling as well as experiments. However, authoritative, accepted models typically do a poor job of representing C4I capabilities and performance in a realistic way, and C4I-oriented models that at least partially compensate for this shortcoming are generally neither comprehensive nor broadly accepted. Most commercial communications systems and process control systems do use mathematical models and simulations in some fashion. Sometimes relatively simple models and measurements result in substantive improvements. The same should apply to C4I systems. 38.   This argument is not to say that all aspects of warfare can be quantified with precision. In particular, quantitative measures of military effectiveness that support force structure and investment decisions are very different from statistics that measure operational battlefield encounters. Emphasis on the latter leads to a ''body count" mind-set that may have minimal relevance to actual military outcomes, and to managers "making their numbers" without regard for the overall objective.

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--> To support intelligent decisions about investment and doctrine, tools are required at several levels:  Measures that characterize the performance of C4I systems such as decreased latency of situational information at all echelons;  Measures that characterize the contribution of C4I systems to particular military operations such as improved rates of fire, more effective expenditure of firepower, or increased ability to place targets at risk; and  Results from force-on-force simulation and exercises, which enable assessment of overall contributions afforded by C4I as well as new doctrine that exploits C4I capabilities. Analysts have sought for many years to develop measures of military effectiveness for C4I, and the committee recognizes the difficulty in developing them. But the difficulty in developing such measures should not be used as an excuse for ignoring them. Measures of military effectiveness for C4I, including intermediate measures for interoperability and security, can be defined, however incomplete and overly simplistic they may seem initially, and systematically used to measure progress in achieving the DOD's objectives for C4I. In some cases (perhaps such as interoperability—see Chapter 2), scorecards will have to suffice initially. Finally, measures of military effectiveness and simulations and exercises must be based on scenarios with operational significance. They must be based on real military requirements and independently developed rather than developed specifically to showcase particular C4I systems or concepts. The Joint Staff Directorate for Operations is the most plausible office to take action to support this recommendation because it has the closest connection to operational scenarios and deployments. Because a considerable amount of research and development in this area may be necessary (indeed, new theories of warfare may be needed), the Directorate for Operations may well contract significant work with various analytic organizations (e.g., RAND, the Institute for Defense Analyses, MITRE). Recommendation P-7: The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the service Secretaries should sustain and expand their efforts to carry out experimentation to discover new concepts for conducting information-enabled military operations. Experimentation within the DOD context is analogous to business process reengineering in the private sector. Both seek radically new ways of doing things that create value and advance the ability of the organization to conduct military operations or to make money. Experimentation

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--> and business process reengineering can take place at many different scales—from how a combat operations center does its work to how Army corps and Air Force wings and Navy battle groups fight battles. Some may be relatively costly (e.g., the Army's Advanced Warfighting Experiment), others less so (e.g., the Air Force's Expeditionary Force Experiment). Sometimes small-scale experiments that are less inexpensive lay the groundwork for success in larger experiments. For example, it is appropriate for the Army to have conducted small-scale experiments with digitizing battalion-sized forces before similarly equipping a full brigade. Even larger-scale experiments may be cost-effective in the long run if they help make the right investments and avoid the wrong ones. However, it is also important to note that the reengineering of business processes can have a high impact even with relatively low expenditures on technology (as the Wal-Mart experience demonstrates). A number of techniques have been used to facilitate process reengineering. For example, the use of integrated process teams in key functional areas could be used to develop reengineered processes to go along with the use of new (or existing) C4I systems. Process "tiger teams" can be used in the field to "walk the process" and talk to individuals involved in a process at every level; such teams can be useful not only in discovering reengineering opportunities, but also in gaining understanding and support from the community that is the object of reengineering. Reengineering often entails disincentives. Specifically, reengineering of business processes often results in many fewer people being needed to accomplish the same end result. The people who might be displaced by reengineering have vested interests in resisting it (and there is also the non-trivial emotional factor of being deemed "irrelevant"). Furthermore, the larger organization of which these people are a part may not wish to give higher authority a rationale for reducing its personnel levels (or budget). The fear is that if an organization saves money through reengineering, its budget will be cut, the savings directed elsewhere, and the organization left vulnerable to the risks of innovation. Under such circumstances, assurances that the organization will not face such losses can play an important role. (In the DOD context, such assurances must come both from the senior leadership of the DOD and from the Congress as well.) Significant efforts to support experimentation are under way today. For example, a major step in this direction has been taken in the designation of the U.S. Atlantic Command as the leader in joint experimentation, with a new organization in the Joint Chiefs of Staff for experimentation consisting of approximately 400 staff. The Army's Advanced Warfighting Experiment has been strongly supported by the DOD and the Congress.

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--> In a recent initiative, the U.S. Pacific Command recently conducted an experiment to assess the value of the Virtual Information Center to support the needs of the theater commander-in-chief and joint task force commander in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. The Joint Battle Center, a creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the combatant commands, at the joint task force level, with a joint capability and experimental environment that will be a forcing function for joint C4ISR capability and will foster rapid, near-term insertion of C4ISR technology. The Joint Battle Center will be a learning and experimentation center for the warfighter and the technologist, supporting Joint Vision 2010 and the requirements of CINCs for C4I capability. Nevertheless, it is all too easy to fall back to "business as usual" when faced with budget pressures. Experimentation is undeniably expensive, and failure is to be expected from time to time. Well-meaning critics who focus on the cost and possible failure of particular individual experiments may wind up doing more damage than good in the long run. Fortunately, such criticism is rare today, but the committee lays down a marker for the future. The organizations that support experimentation need no exhortation that experimentation is a good thing to do. But in the face of budget pressures to cut back on experimentation, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the service chiefs will have to strongly uphold the value of investing in the future. Recommendation P-8: DOD should develop and implement a set of management metrics that are coupled to key elements of C4I system effectiveness. Achieving large-scale cultural change in an organization requires commensurate change in management metrics. Indeed, a maxim of quality management is "if you can't measure it, you can't improve it." Metrics, a major motivator of human behavior, have been demonstrated to be an essential element of making improvements, and are the base for driving continuous progress. In general, management metrics focus on the characteristics or performance of an organization, and are used by senior management to assess the effectiveness of the organization and its leadership. The committee is aware of some areas where DOD is attempting to apply management metrics to drive cultural change within the department.39 39.   One example would be DOD's formulation of criteria (still in process) for holding unit commanders responsible for information security practices in their commands, as discussed in footnote 27.

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--> A range of such management metrics are required to assess and drive change associated with exploiting the full leverage of C4I in warfighting. Metrics aligned with such key areas as interoperability, security, and overall rate of implementation, as well as such associated elements as training, and skill resource levels, are called for. These metrics must be as quantitative as possible, though in some cases judgment-based ratings will have to be used. The metrics should be applied to units as well as commanders at higher echelons in a manner consistent with their responsibilities. Box 4.3 provides some examples of management metrics for gauging progress toward C4I implementation goals.