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--> 1 Introduction At the brink of a new century, the U.S. military is grappling with its role, its requirements, and its operational imperative as an instrument of national power. Military responsibilities span a wide range, from peacetime engagement to shape the international environment, maintain alliances, and ensure access; to stability and support operations including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping; to a capability for prosecution of conflict from small-scale contingencies to major theater war. Primarily a deterrent force during the Cold War, today the U.S. military is seen more as an integral element of U.S. national power that is committed around the world on an ongoing basis. At the same time, its forces are smaller and stationed mainly in the continental United States, and the military budget will likely continue to be constrained. The resulting leaner force structure will need the versatility to project power flexibly, rapidly, and from a distance, in combination with allies and coalition forces. Information creation, communication, analysis, and exploitation have always played a key role in military strategy and operations. But the recent and continuing rapid progress in information and communications technologies dramatically enhances the strategic role of information, positioning effective exploitation of these technology advances as a critical success factor in military affairs. These technology advances are drivers and enablers for the "nervous system" of the military—its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems—to more effectively use the "muscle" side of the military, namely the weapons and platforms and troops. The growing importance of C4I systems reflects an
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--> information technology-driven transformation of strategy and operations similar to what is occurring across almost every segment of society. Information superiority, indispensable to dominance in the full range of military operations, is central to Joint Vision 2010,1 the conceptual template guiding Department of Defense (DOD)2 efforts to leverage technological opportunities and structure innovations by military personnel to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint military operations. As this report discusses in detail, in realizing this vision for C4I the U.S. military faces a fundamental set of technical and management challenges. 1.1 What Is C4I? The acronym C4I stands for "command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence" (see Box 1.1 for DOD definitions of each of these terms). Command and control is about decision making, the exercise of direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission, and is supported by information technology (the computers and communications part of C4I). The United States is aggressively exploiting these technologies in order to achieve information superiority, with the objective of achieving better and faster decisions,3 and continually projecting, albeit with uncertainties, future desired states and directing actions to bring about those future states. (Box 1.2 describes some major C4I systems; Box 1.3 describes elements of the defense information infrastructure.) One important capability that C4I systems provide commanders is situational awareness—information about the location and status of enemy and friendly forces. A necessary component of achieving superiority in decision making, it does not alone guarantee superior decision making. Commanders must take relevant knowledge and combine it with their 1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 1996. Joint Vision 2010, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 2. According to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, promulgated September 25, 1987, the Department of Defense is composed of "the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments and the Military Services within those Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities and commands as may be established or designated by law, or by the President or the Secretary of Defense." This report adopts this convention, and the use of the term "DOD" without other qualification refers to all of the constituent elements described in this directive. 3. Such decisions can range from those at the theater level (e.g., deciding which forces should be deployed in what locations) to the tactical level (e.g., deciding which specific weapons should be allocated against which targets).
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--> BOX 1.1 DOD Definitions of Terms: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Command and control (C2)—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Command—The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. Computing and communications—Two pervasive enabling technologies that support C2 and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Computers and communications process and transport information. Control—Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. Intelligence (I)—The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. Sometimes the term "C4ISR" is employed. The additional elements included in C4ISR are the following. Surveillance—The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Two additional terms are commonly used in describing C4I capabilities: Situational awareness—The knowledge of where you are, where other friendly elements are located, and the status, state, and location of the enemy.
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--> Information superiority—The relative advantage of one opponent over another in commanding and controlling his force. Information superiority or dominance is achieved both through the training of leaders to make rapid and appropriate decisions using superior technical information means provided to them, and through efforts to degrade and deny these same capabilities to an opponent while protecting one's own capability. SOURCE: joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through December 7, 1998 Joint Publication 1-02). judgment—including difficult-to-quantify aspects of human behavior (such as fatigue, experience level, and stress), the uncertainty of data, and the plausible future states resulting from actions by both their own force and the enemy—to make decisions about future actions and how to convey those decisions in ways to facilitate their proper execution. In doing so, commanders are supported by tools to enable and accelerate the planning and decision-making process, to achieve the decision-making superiority envisioned by DOD. And, of course, to be effective, command decisions must be implemented, a process to which C4I technologies are also relevant (e.g., in speeding up the link through which targeting information is passed to weapons, the so-called sensor-to-shooter link). The development and use of the right tools allow the commander to focus better on those issues associated with the essence of command—the art versus the science. As more and better-automated tools are developed and people are trained to use them, it will become even more important to recognize the art of command as distinguished from the mechanics of the tools used to provide information. 1.2 The Impact of C4I on Military Effectiveness 1.2.1 Evidence from Recent Experience Although the Gulf War was plagued by innumerable problems with C4I capability, timeliness, and interoperability among both U.S. and allied forces, the real-world impact of C4I technology in enhancing the effectiveness and security of the coalition forces was amply demonstrated. The C4I capabilities on which allied forces depended were highly tenuous and relied on inadequate methods for construction and distribution of operational plans and execution orders (e.g., the air tasking order had to be delivered manually to ships at sea), collection and assessment of battle damage information, and coordination of operations on a global
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--> BOX 1.2 Examples of C4I Systems The following examples of some current C4I systems are intended as illustrative only; many other C4I systems would serve equally well to provide context and orient the reader to the myriad of C4I systems used currently by DOD. Global Command and Control System. The Global Command and Control System is designed to provide an integrated picture of the battlefield as well as core planning and assessment tools required by combatant commanders and joint task force commanders. The system includes a growing set of applications including (1) the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System, which is used to plan and execute joint military operations, and (2) the Requirements Development and Analysis application, which generates the time-phased force and deployment database for an operation (including time-phased force, non-unit-related cargo, and personnel data; data on movement for the operation plan; units to be deployed to support the operation plan; routing of forces to be deployed; data on movement associated with deploying forces; and transportation requirements). Contingency Theater Air Planning System. The Contingency Theater Air Planning System assists theater-level air battle staffs with the development and execution of air tasking orders, which lay out the strike plan for air assets and control the operation of all other airborne assets. Joint Maritime Command Information System. The Joint Maritime Command Information System is the Navy's designated command and control system for the future Global Command and Control System. It supports command and control and tactical intelligence warfighting requirements for afloat, ashore, and tactical/mobile units. The Joint Maritime Command Information System provides timely, accurate, and complete all-source C4ISR information management and develops a common operational picture for warfare mission assessment, planning, and execution. It incorporates the Marine air-ground task force C4I software. Maneuver Control System. The Maneuver Control System provides units with the multidimensional (air, land, sea, and space) order of battle and rules of engagement. For example, it provides Army tactical commanders and their staffs (corps through battalion) automated, online, near-real-time systems for planning, coordinating, and controlling tactical operations. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. This system provides automated fire support command and control functions, including tactical fire direction, fire planning, fire mission execution, and fire asset control. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System. The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System provides secure, anti-jam-protected digital data and voice communications for theater, air, ground, and naval forces. The system is designed to enhance combat capability in fighter aircraft, command and control platforms, and surface air defense units, and it provides a data transfer link between weapon platforms and C4I systems for real-time situation awareness, targeting, and mutual support.
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--> BOX 1.3 Major Elements of the Defense Information Infrastructure Defense Information Systems Network The Defense Information Systems Network is the global, end-to-end, information transfer infrastructure of the DOD. The Defense Information Systems Network provides the communications infrastructure and services needed to satisfy national defense command, control, communications, and intelligence requirements and meet worldwide U.S. defense requirements. The purpose of the Defense Information Systems Network is to enable rapid, reliable and secure information access to conduct effective military operations, and, in particular, to allow any warrior to perform any mission, any time, any place in the world, based on information needs. The network's architecture prescribes a global network integrating DOD-wide communications systems assets, military satellite communications, commercial satellite communications initiatives, leased telecommunications services, dedicated DOD service and defense agency networks, and mobile/deployable networks, i.e., the consolidated worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications infrastructure that provides the end-to-end information transfer component of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII). The Defense Information Systems Network infrastructure consists of the sustaining base (i.e., base/post/camp/station) C4I infrastructure (including legacy systems) that interfaces with the long-haul network in order to support the deployed warfighter with reach-back services, the long-haul telecommunications infrastructure (including today's defense communications systems and the communication systems and services between the fixed environment and the deployed (joint task force/combined task force) warfighter), and the deployed warfighter and associated telecommunications infrastructures that support the joint task force/combined task force. The Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment The Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII-COE) is a software infrastructure for supporting DOD's C3I and combat support applications. It consists of a collection of reusable software components (commercial off the shelf (COTS) and government off the shelf) along with a set of guidelines, applications program interfaces, and built-in conformance with standards specified in the Joint Technical Architecture. The key goals of the DII-COE are interoperability among joint service applications and data, software reuse, and rapid information retrieval. The payoff of a common software infrastructure lies in the reduction of costs related to acquisition, operations, and support. Acquisition costs can be reduced by taking advantage of commercial trends and COTS software products. Reductions in operations and support costs will be attained with government off-the-shelf software reuse, easier system upgrades to new software
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--> versions or platforms, and a common environment for operations and training. The software structure of the DII-COE is composed of three layers: the kernel, infrastructure services, and common support applications. The kernel consists of the computer's operating system (e.g., Solaris, HP/UX, Windows NT, etc.) and fundamental services for desktop functions (e.g., display presentation, file management, printing, and network and system administration). The infrastructure services layer contains utilities, tools, and software for network and database management (e.g., relational database server/ tools), and communications and presentation services (e.g., TCP/IP, World Wide Web browser, etc.). The common support applications layer contains software for message processing (e.g., Automated Message Handling system, map display development via the Joint Mapping Tool Kit, track correlation, alerts, help, and office automation). The Defense Message System The Defense Message System is a joint DOD program created to improve the department's electronic messaging capabilities while reducing the cost associated with the current messaging systems. The Defense Message System is undergoing an evolutionary transition from the baseline Automatic Digital Network and electronic messaging services to an integrated system using the common user communications transport provided by the Defense Information Systems Network. During the transition, the Defense Message System requires the ability to maintain interoperability between the baseline systems, the allied messaging systems, other governmental agencies, and commercial messaging users. The target Defense Message System is based on international standards for messaging, directory, and service management. It will employ security services as approved by the National Security Agency to provide protection appropriate to the required level of trust. C3 and Combat Support Applications Global Command and Control System. The Global Command and Control System is intended to provide combatant commanders one integrated resource for generating, receiving, sharing, and using information securely. It provides for surveillance and reconnaissance information and access to global intelligence sources as well as data on the precise location of friendly forces. The Global Command and Control System provides support for crisis planning, intelligence analysis, tactical planning and tactical execution, and collaborative planning. It establishes the top-level technical infrastructure for automated support to command and control (C2) operations. The Global Command and Control System supports the National Command Authorities and subordinate elements in the generation and application of national power. It is intended to provide for maintenance of a common perception of the crisis or battlespace, access to planning support information, collaborative access to a common operational plan, visibility of plan execution status,
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--> and adaptive control of communication and information centers for surge needs and users with degraded communications. Global Combat Support System. The Global Combat Support System provides information access and fusion across the entire spectrum of combat support. The Global Combat Support System provides each combat support functional area—supply, transportation, finance, medical, personnel, acquisition—with access to authoritative data and integrating existing combat support information to gain efficiency and interoperability in support of the warfighter. It is designed to overcome existing shortfalls in the limited breadth of isolated and stovepiped systems by combining and/or fusing data provided from multiple authoritative sources into relevant, coherent, integrated information. It applies current information technology to provide that full spectrum of information system capabilities to the warfighter and to the sustaining bases. The Global Combat Support System will enable accurate and real-time combat support information to be available to the National Command Authorities, services, CINCs, the joint task force commanders, and service components. The Global Combat Support System is a demand-driven, joint warfighter-focused capability to accelerate delivery of improved combat support effectiveness. Ultimately, both the Global Combat Support System and the Global Command and Control System applications will be available on the same workstation to provide a truly integrated view of the battlespace. Theater Deployable Systems The Standardized Tactical Entry Points program provides global access to standardized Defense Information Systems Network services that support deployed joint task forces. Standardized Tactical Entry Points constitute a global network that provides interoperable communications between the strategic and tactical forces and provides essential circuits and worldwide information transfer capability by using the Defense Information Systems Network. The Standardized Tactical Entry Points network provides standard/prepositioned C4I communications for the warfighter and improves tactical access to strategic voice and data services, tactical/strategic communications interoperability, deployed tactical commanders' access to headquarters, CINCs, and the Pentagon, and interoperability and reach-back for the tri-service tactical ground mobile forces and the Navy shipboard tactical users. Network and System Management Management of the DII as a whole is performed by a combination of the Defense Information Systems Agency and the CINCs, services, and agencies that work in collaboration to provide an end-to-end enterprise view of the DII. This collaboration of systems, roles, and responsibilities is termed the
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--> Joint DII Control System. From a network and systems management perspective, the DII is composed of three ''blocks" or domains: the sustaining base block (managed locally by CINC/service/agency control), the long-haul block (managed by the Defense Information Systems Agency), and the deployed block (managed by the joint task force commander). The Joint DII Control System establishes the operational integration of the systems and network management roles, responsibilities, and relationships across all three "blocks" or domains of the DII. It will also result in establishing the common operating picture that will be shared by the CINC/service/agency managers. The Joint DII Control System is based on a jointly defined technical architecture, interface standards, and performance standards derived from the Joint Technical Architecture and the DII-COE. The ultimate goal of the Joint DII Control System is to field a capability whereby all DII users and providers will be able to share a common picture of their DII assets and supporting infrastructure. The Joint DII Control System will also provide a converged capability with information assurance and defensive information operations to ensure that a fully articulated picture is available for global situational awareness. scale among systems ranging from highly sophisticated to significantly outdated. Nonetheless, given sufficient time (in the case of the Gulf War, nearly 6 months) to prepare, a formidable capability was established for command and control of a multinational force in a region of the world where virtually no infrastructure previously existed to accommodate such complex operations. C4I has been reported in numerous after-action media as a major force multiplier in the conflict. For example: C4I systems supported—through simultaneous suppression of enemy air defenses—highly effective, precise, orchestrated strikes on a variety of targets in Baghdad on the initial night of war, with extremely low casualties. The Global Positioning System allowed orchestrated movements of coalition armored forces to outflank Iraqi forces and engage them at the maximum effective range of coalition weapons. More recently in Bosnia, advanced C4I technology has provided forces with enhanced capabilities to detect, process, decide, and communicate. For example: The Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle has improved monitoring of compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord.
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--> Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe4 systems have facilitated the sharing of intelligence among selected coalition partners. The Joint Surveillance Target Airborne Radar System supported the insertion of ground forces into Bosnia. Many warfighters involved came away from the Gulf War with the view that improving C4I capability and interoperability would add more to military operations than additional improvements in weapons. Continued improvement in the precision and/or lethality of weapons remains a priority; in fact, such enhancements in capabilities may well result more from application of C4I improvements than from near-term advancements in weapons technology. In addition, the challenges of operating in urban environments and in rough, wooded areas must be addressed rather than simply extrapolating the successes achieved in a desert environment. 1.2.2 Potential Impact of C4I on Military Operations The examples below are illustrative of how many military thinkers conceptualize the potential impact of C4I on military operations. Some evidence to support these concepts is available from studies and exercises and experiments,5 but for the most part their full significance has not been demonstrated in real-life operational scenarios. Information Superiority and Greater Situational Awareness To exercise authority and direction effectively in combat and other military operations, commanders must have situational awareness. Use of information technology to make a commander's situational awareness better also creates the potential to improve the effectiveness with which the commander directs and controls his forces. To the extent that the promise of C4I technologies is realized, reduced force size might be compensated for by information superiority—the ability of a force to have, and protect, a comprehensive view of enemy and friendly forces as well as the combat environment, while denying the enemy a comparable capa- 4. Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe is the U.S. European Command's system that provides U.S. and NATO forces, and other allied forces, with near-real-time correlated situation and order-of-battle information. For more information see Joint Distributive Intelligence Support System Program Office, online at <http://www.jdisspmo.org/relpro/loce.htm>. 5. See, for example, H.S. Marsh and P.J. Walsh, Employment Strategies and CONOPS Enabled: A Compilation of Draft White Papers on Future Employment Strategies and CONOPS Enabled Prepared to Support the C4ISR Mission Assessment, November 22, 1996, Draft, SRI International.
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--> bility—where it can be shown that information superiority is a force multiplier. The growing list of land-, air-, sea-, and space-based sensors combined with other sources makes the fusion of information an essential dimension of situational awareness. Fusion of data from this multitude of sources is indispensable to achieving information superiority in the regional environment. The challenge in doing so goes beyond the receipt and display of sensor data to include reconciling those data (eliminating redundancy and outdated information) and extends to the fusion of multiple sources of information into timely and meaningful intelligence. Through this process, true information dominance can be achieved. In that regard, information dominance must also include situational awareness with regard to space-based systems. Knowing friendly, enemy, and neutral satellite coverage and capability will be of vital concern to the joint commander and his component commands. The cornerstone of information superiority is advanced C4I technology and systems, which can provide to all tactical levels of command a robust, continuous, common operating picture of the battlespace. 6 The resulting heightened situational awareness should vastly improve the effectiveness with which commanders at all levels can pursue a mission. The common operating picture can allow tactical decision making at the lowest levels of command consistent with the higher-level commander's operational objectives, and the decentralized tactical execution can enhance the ability of lower-level tactical units to react quickly to changing circumstances. A common operating picture is a central element in a number of initiatives, including the following four:7 The Army Digitization Master Plan (Force XXI). The Army Digitization Master Plan is intended to "create a simultaneous, common picture of the battlefield from soldier to commander at each echelon 6. In some usages, the term "common operating picture" refers to a view of the battlespace that is near-real-time; in other usages, it refers to a view that lags by as much as an hour. This report adopts neither usage, preferring instead to make the time dimension explicit when it is relevant to the discussion. 7. This is not to say that the notion of a common operating picture is new. For example, the foundation of the Navy's Joint Maritime Command Information System is a common operating picture of a battlespace that is relevant to Navy operations, and JMCIS has been in existence since around 1993. The JMCIS common operating picture integrates reports from a variety of sensors, including some on the ship where the common operating picture is displayed and other off-board sensors on accompanying platforms dispersed in the battlespace. However, because JMCIS is oriented toward Navy operations, the JMCIS common operating picture is available primarily to surface and subsurface platforms. The intent of the programs described is to pass a common operating picture to tactical echelons that are much lower in the command hierarchy.
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--> A challenge to regional deployments is the missile threat, particularly short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. While each of the military services may provide some capability for defense against missile attack, it would desirable to rapidly phase in and integrate these capabilities upon initial deployment. Likewise, protecting the arriving forces from air attack will be an important first task involving elements of each of the services. While clearly a critical initial task, an effective air and missile defense must be sustained for both fixed assets and mobile forces. In that environment, C4I and related surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities will need to provide a common air picture, reduce sensor-to-shooter time lines, and integrate service weapon systems into the overall joint mission. Air power may be the earliest arriving capability and will most likely be a combined effort of contributing nations and elements of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. Accompanying C4I systems will need to provide the means to determine the most appropriate air assets to allocate to each mission, and disseminate this information in time to allow the missions to be prepared adequately and to be responsive to moving as well as stationary targets. These C4I requirements apply to the Joint Air Operations Center, each service component command, and the air command elements of the contributing nations' air forces. 1.4.4 Proliferation in the Use of the U.S. Military for Sustainment and Support Operations (Military Operations Other Than War) Current military planning for advanced C4I capabilities is based largely on scenarios in which forces are employed against traditional adversaries in relatively traditional conflict situations. While this focus of planning is generally reasonable, planning must also be sufficiently broad to take into account the likely use of the U.S. military in a much more varied spectrum of military operations. The commitment of U.S. forces to military operations other than war such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and non-combatant evacuation operations places different demands on C4I systems and may require some different C4I capabilities and/or equipment. U.S. forces are and will continue to be employed to conduct operations other than war, stability and support operations that cover a wide spectrum of very different missions. Military operations other than war, in contrast to more traditional military operations, can be characterized by (1) forces tailored to accomplish the specific stated mission, which often will involve creating non-standard and non-traditional organizations from elements of other organizations; (2) a need for greater coordination
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--> and interoperation with government and non-government agencies; (3) the operation of these tailored forces with new command organizations; (4) forces limited in size;15 (5) forces that are dispersed and require greater operational independence; (6) restrictive rules of engagement aimed at reducing the potential for undesired escalation, and providing clear limits on the force, and which are understood by potential adversaries; and (7) the potential for undesired escalation or "mission creep" without having the proper force to deal with the new or expanded mission. For operations other than war, requirements for C4I may entail some of the following issues: Intelligence collection and analysis. In traditional military operations, the enemy is reasonably well defined; in operations other than war, changing environments and situations may lead to rapid, radical shifts in the definition of the enemy. Intelligence for operations other than war is more focused on individual human beings rather than vehicles or weapons platforms. Thus, intelligence efforts (and hence C4I systems) for operations other than war must have a greater focus on human intelligence—scout patrols, informants, and the like. Operations other than war have a different set of information requirements, such as the need for a great deal of detail on a small area (e.g., the layout and shape of a particular room and the route to that room in a building in which a particular group of people is located). And finally, because in operations other than war forces are often inserted into a situation in which political and historical factors may be highly significant, intelligence analysis must include such contextual factors. Combat Identification and Identification Friend or Foe. In operations other than war, hostile parties may not identify themselves (e.g., with distinctive personnel uniforms or vehicle insignias). A hostile party may be an individual from the same population that U.S. forces are trying to help, or a large group of refugees on the move that may overwhelm available resources. Furthermore, "hostile" behavior may not even be easy to identify. Planning and coordination. Because DOD planning tools are for the most part oriented toward major conflict, they often do not provide the 15. Small forces are preferred for operations other than war because they minimize political concerns about undue U.S. involvement, both in the host nation and in the United States. In addition, small forces are much easier and faster to deploy, characteristics that are needed in crisis response situations. Finally, when forces are oversized relative to the job that needs to be done, certain capabilities go unused. The presence of non-useful personnel not only consumes resources; it also leads to boredom and complacency, factors that impede operational readiness and capability.
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--> granularity needed to manage the relatively small forces that are generally deployed for operations other than war. For example, a force sized for such an operation might in its entirety be composed of a couple of battalions-worth of individuals, with platoon- and squad-sized units providing critical functions, whereas planning tools for a major conflict might quantize components by battalion-sized units. Tactical connectivity. Higher-frequency wireless communications are generally limited to line-of-sight connections. Passing a message from one point to another thus requires either a direct line-of-sight connection or relays that can provide intermediate connection points. When a small force is responsible for a large area (as is the case in distributed expeditionary operations), the density of relay nodes is low, distances between relay nodes are large, and connectivity thus may be more intermittent for patrols communicating with field headquarters. Satellite-based or unmanned aerial vehicle-based communications are an obvious solution, and a number of programs now under way provide such intermediate nodes.16 Coordination with non-military organizations. Non-DOD U.S. government agencies, inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations, indigenous agencies such as the local police force, and non-governmental organizations (and perhaps non-compliant or even belligerent parties) often play key roles in operations other than war, and effective command and control requires communication with them. A high degree of interoperability between U.S. communications equipment and the civilian communications infrastructure, for example, can support non-governmental organizations, thus helping to build trust and good working relationships. Command and control over junior personnel at a distance. Because of the potential for inadvertent escalation of an interaction between U.S. forces and others (e.g., indigenous civilians or military personnel), troops in the field must often think before they act, whereas a traditional military operation would place a premium on their acting (or reacting) very quickly. Situation assessment must be done in real time by the very junior personnel (privates and corporals) who do the real work in the field. Supporting these junior personnel at a considerable distance can be problematic because many contextual cues are not available to an off-site senior commander. Such field personnel would have greater need for technologies that support consultations and assessment (e.g., laptop computer access to intelligence databases, translation and language services, remote 16. For example there is an effort under way to create a version of the Trojan Spirit system, which provides satellite-based access to intelligence information, that is sized down to be carried by a single vehicle.
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--> conferences with a wide spectrum of possible players) rather than for the capabilities required for combat such as automatic downloads of targeting information. The C4I implications of military operations other than war and those of counterterrorist operations and operations against the use of weapons of mass destruction will need further study. 1.4.5 Complexities of Exercising Command and Control of Forces in Regional Conflict Environments Smaller, more capable forces that are widely dispersed will have to depend on firepower from weapons that are not under their direct control. Command and control of these ground forces will be conducted by dispersed and often mobile command elements that also may perform their tasks from multiple locations. To survive and be effective in this environment, dispersed units will need timely, accurate, and common pictures of the combat environment and rapid exchange of target information. Ground line-of-sight communications will not be sufficient, nor will manned or time-consuming relay and switching equipment. A basic requirement is mobile, agile command and control that can be transferred, for example, from shipboard to ground or from air to ground during the execution of an operation without degrading command and control. The C4I system must be capable of providing robust data, voice, and video communications suitable for collaborative planning. A fundamental and enduring C4I requirement is to facilitate rapid decision making so that the multiple military capabilities of the services can be appropriately integrated and exploited. The conditions under which U.S. forces are deployed to support military operations other than war may well become more characteristic of some wartime operations in the future. Urban warfare in particular has many of the same characteristics as military operations other than war, e.g., an orientation toward individuals rather than platforms, and a difficulty in separating combatants from non-combatants. In other scenarios, smaller land forces—relying in part on C4I technologies—might be used to control larger expanses of territory, much as forces deployed in operations other than war today do. 1.4.6 Strategic Vulnerability of Infrastructure to Information Attack The growing dependence of the United States on its national information infrastructure, as well the dependence of other elements of its infrastructure (e.g., electric power, transportation) on information technology,
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--> poses potential strategic vulnerabilities that are without precedent. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities by an adversary poses the risk of asymmetric warfare or conflict, in which an adversary does not directly challenge U.S. military might but rather seeks to do damage to the United States in ways that do not require large military forces and where the source of the attack is difficult to identify with certainty. A further concern is that the U.S. military itself is highly dependent on the U.S. national infrastructure for C4I (information and communications) as well as other services. Thus, a successful attack on the U.S. infrastructure might well have the additional effect of compromising traditional U.S. military readiness and ability to respond militarily. 17 1.5 Expected Information Technology Trends for C4I Rapid development of information technology and the expectation that C4I technology can dramatically increase force effectiveness have made this technology a critical element of future military modernization. The time constant of progress in information technology, computers, and communications is measured in months, not years. Hardware technologies will continue to evolve at a rapid pace to produce significantly improved capabilities at ever-lower cost—an order-of-magnitude improvement in performance every 5 years for the same cost is likely to continue to be the norm for progress in computing capability (Moore's law), memory and storage capacities, and communications speed. Academic research and the commercial sector are, and will continue to be, the primary sources of fundamental advances in information technologies. Industry exploits these advances, developing and manufacturing high-volume, low-cost, high-reliability products and setting most of the relevant standards. This driving force and dominant market for this expanding capability will continue to be the commercial marketplace, and the same level of basic technology will be readily available to all comers. A key challenge to DOD and the services will continue to be to develop an appropriately responsive acquisition system that can procure, deploy, and exploit these commercial hardware and software capabilities for the military in a timely and cost-effective way. Much of, although by no means all, the sensor technology essential to C4I systems is specifically developed by the military and for military ap- 17. See President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. 1997. Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.; Defense Science Board. 1996. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense (IW-D), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Washington, D.C.
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--> plications. The pace of growth in capability is slower than for the base information technologies. Continued focused investment by DOD is expected to maintain a significant margin of leadership in critical sensor technologies. 1.5.1 Computers The rate of progress predicted by Moore's law means that capabilities seen today in raw processing power of individual computers, as well as associated memory and storage capacities, are about 1% of what will be available at the same cost a decade hence. In addition, major progress will continue on other fronts with significant implications for military application. Decreases in physical size, power consumption, and cost will lead to expanded flexibility and scale of application at the systems level. Expanded and qualitatively more capable applications will become available. For example, more highly automated decision-support systems using intelligent agents will be able to search large databases, including images and other non-coded information, for specific information and features, process the results, and present tactical alternatives to a commander. Continued rapid progress will be made in technologies enabling easier human interaction with computers, including spoken input, high-resolution personal heads-up (e.g., helmet-mounted or windshield) displays, and distributed wearable systems. 1.5.2 Communications The trend in information distribution and control systems is toward a communications medium that is completely transparent and robust to the military user. These systems will provide global coverage, consisting of highly automated digital networks utilizing both military and commercial transmission media. Current and future developments will enable multimedia service (voice, data, video) to all military users. Key areas of progress in communications technology applicable to C4I will include advanced video and data compression techniques to transfer expanded information sets through limited-bandwidth channels; wireless wide area network/local area network packet-switched networks utilizing mobile base stations; wider-bandwidth optical communications networks for low-cost, robust terrestrial connectivity; advanced waveforms to maximize coding gain; advanced modulation approaches to increase bandwidth efficiency, given the pressures on military spectrum allocation; ''software" radios that provide broadband digital processing; and multifunction, multiband phased array antenna technology that will find application in both communications systems and sensor development.
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--> 1.5.3 Sensors The capability of active and passive multispectral high-resolution sensors in all physical domains (acoustic, thermal, electromagnetic, electro-optical, nuclear, biological, and chemical) is expected to progress at a pace somewhat slower than that of the base information technologies, but still at a rate that will yield impressive opportunities for application to all types of military systems. Continued miniaturization of these sensors and their associated processing units will make them deployable on a variety of platforms, including spacecraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and manned aircraft, land vehicles, ships, and personal battlefield systems. For example, radar technology advances are expected in solid-state transmit/ receive modules for higher output power, greater direct current to radio frequency conversion efficiency, increased miniaturization, and wider frequency band operation. Multispectral imaging sensors will prove to be of significant military value in detecting manmade and natural objects. Technologies for geospatial referencing (such as the Global Positioning System and enhancements to it) that enable the location of targets, events, and friendly forces will also be important. Such technologies confer the ability to register events and objects in the same coordinate system, and underlie the ability to generate a common operating picture. Some of this capability, originally military in its focus, will become readily available at low cost in the commercial world; some will be specifically developed by the military for its unique requirements. Examples of widely available technologies that were once predominantly military include low-cost Global Positioning System devices and satellite imaging.18 Examples of military-unique sensor systems include the Airborne Warning and Control System, the Space-based Infrared System, and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. DOD will be faced with determining and implementing the appropriate and timely application of this wide array of technologies. 1.5.4 Weapons Future weapons systems will have integrated digital information subsystems (versus simply having digital communications) that are tightly integrated with the overall C4I system of systems. This capability will allow information available on individual platforms to be simultaneously shared and acted upon across the battlefield (and airspace). Targets acquired by sensors in ground systems and aircraft will be seen concur- 18. Of course, commercial imaging satellites do not provide the resolution that military satellites provide, although commercial image quality will be adequate for many purposes.
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--> rently by multiple platforms and will be rapidly targeted by surface weapons, given pre-established rules. Over time, the value of remote, precision weapons will increase relative to that of other platforms (e.g., tanks, airplanes) as long as the challenge of target identification is solved. 1.6 DOD Budget And Organizational Structure for C4I 1.6.1 Budget In a defense budget on the order of $257 billion for FY 1998, spending on C4I is widely quoted as approximately $40 billion,19 but this figure does not represent an official DOD budget category. The DOD budget category for intelligence and communications is approximately $30.4 billion. But association of this particular figure or any other figure with spending on C4I must come with several caveats and cautions. Among them are the following: C4I programs are scattered throughout the 11 primary DOD budget categories.20 For example, the account for strategic forces includes some funding for C4I systems intended for command and control of the strategic forces. However, these systems can be used to provide connectivity to the general-purpose forces as well. (A good example is Milstar—originally a communications satellite for strategic use, it is now used for non-nuclear purposes as well.) C4I programs per se are distinct from C4I systems embedded within weapons systems. For example, neither the radar for an F-22 fighter nor the radar for a Patriot air defense system would be counted as C4I programs, though they are clearly C4I systems. C4I programs include systems for intelligence work, much of which is "black" and thus not known publicly. Programs for surveillance and reconnaissance are not always included in an accounting of C4I systems. One public estimate of the amount of "electronic content" in the overall defense budget provided by the Electronic Industries Alliance is ap- 19. General Accounting Office. 1998. Defense Information Superiority: Progress Made, But Significant Challenges Remain, GAO/AIMD-98-257, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. 20. These categories are strategic forces; general-purpose forces; intelligence and communications; air and sealift; guard and reserve forces; research and development; central supply and maintenance; training, medical, and other; administrative and associated costs; support to other nations; and special operations.
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--> proximately $51.5 billion in FY 1998, a figure that includes acquisition as well as operations and maintenance.21 This figure covers all possible categories of C4I systems, including those for surveillance and reconnaissance. These data are provided to give the reader a sense of scale of C4I within the defense budget. But it should be noted from the outset that because the committee does not seek to provide detailed programmatic guidance, the analysis, findings, and recommendations of this report are essentially independent of the numbers discussed above. 1.6.2 DOD Organizational Structure for C4I Responsibility for the development, procurement, operations, and maintenance of specific C4I systems generally lies with the services. However, CINCs. 22 and field units do have some discretionary budget authority to purchase systems below a certain cost threshold. The Defense Information Systems Agency has the primary responsibility for maintaining defense-wide C4I infrastructure (e.g., that for long-haul communications). Research and development into information technologies that may eventually be integrated into actual C4I systems is undertaken by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the various service research arms. The National Security Agency plays a key role in providing technologies and products for information security. Oversight of C4I system acquisition is performed by a myriad of organizations and offices. Some of the most important are the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the ultimate authority within DOD on acquisition matters; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, the focal point of DOD policy with respect to matters related to C4I and information superiority (and also today the DOD's Chief Information Officer); the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, an organization that validates requirements and military needs for "major" C4I systems; the Defense Acquisition Board, which is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and advises on individual acquisition programs and generally on acquisition policies and procedures; the 21. Electronics Industry Association press release, "EIA Ten-Year Forecast Projects 14% Growth in Electronics; Defense Market Remains Stable," October 8, 1997; available online at <http://www.eia.org/pad/press/files/9710/97-59.htm>. 22. CINC, an acronym for "commander-in-chief," refers to the commander of a specified or unified combatant command. The term "CINCs" refers to the commanders of the combatant commands. The combatant commands include the U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Strategic Command.
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--> Major Automated Information Systems Review Council, which is mandated to advise the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I on decisions regarding major individual automated information system acquisition programs; and the Directorate for C4 Systems of the Joint Staff, which has responsibility for command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems, especially with respect to interoperability and integration. This listing of organizations is far from complete—indeed, the committee was struck by both the multiplicity of organizations and offices with some responsibility for C4I matters, and the relative rapidity with which the organizational structure for C4I has been evolving. 1.7 Challenges to the Exploitation of the Military Leverage of C4I While the complexities and uncertainties of the future produce a major set of challenges to the development, integration, and fielding of the "right" set of C4I systems and processes, the U.S. military faces another set of challenges in implementation. These challenges are of both a technical and management nature, and most are specific to the military system. They are challenges that can be, and indeed are being, addressed now. The remainder of this report is devoted to the committee's view of the nature of these challenges, the state of progress in addressing them, and the actions that must be taken to deal with them more forcefully and effectively. This report addresses challenges in three areas: (1) achieving interoperability, (2) ensuring security and systems availability, and (3) evolving the military culture and business processes to enable what is required in tomorrow's world. First, C4I systems must be interoperable so as to support joint and combined operations and the necessary interaction with government and non-governmental organizations in an environment in which the sophistication of C4I systems available to various units (or coalition partners) will surely span a spectrum of capability. Achieving this level of interoperability poses technical as well as cultural and process challenges. Significant technical dimensions include design tensions between immediate and future needs; tensions between applications-specific needs and the needs of the entire system of systems; inability to anticipate all relevant scenarios for use, resulting in an inability to anticipate which systems need to interoperate; extent of backward compatibility to be designed into systems; difficulties of anticipating a sustainable technology environment; inherent difficulties of system integration; and synchronization of interdependent programs. A number of cultural dimensions also affect efforts to achieve C4I interoperability, including the profound differences between peacetime and wartime missions, rapid management turnover that
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--> is characteristic of most government organizations, use of service-based acquisition, doctrine for interoperating with heterogeneously equipped forces, a lack of resources to pursue C4I integration as a high-priority budget item, line-item budget accountability, and the need to operate in coalitions that are quickly assembled and cannot be anticipated. Second, C4I systems must be secured against information attacks. With increased reliance on C4I systems as well as an increased use of commercial technologies to build these systems comes a new and increased set of risks associated with the vulnerability of these systems to attack. Here, too, there are technical and cultural dimensions. Technical dimensions include the need for good automated tools for checking and inspecting network and system configurations and tools that allow the rapid and high-confidence identification of a cyber-attacker and retaliation against such attackers. A distinction must be maintained between the attacker whose intent is to disrupt or corrupt the C4I system and one whose intent is to monitor and collect information from one. Cultural dimensions include the need to promulgate a defense-wide awareness of information security (ranging from accountability to providing good information security support) and a legal constraint and military tradition of refraining from involvement in domestic security affairs. Third, the base technologies of C4I evolve at such a rapid rate that cultural and technical challenges arise with respect to how, when, and what aspect of the technology can best be exploited to significantly increase the leverage of information systems in military operations. Infusion of technical skills in the military workplace will be required along with bringing doctrine abreast of the advances in technology. Also, leadership skills will need to be honed to take account of the technical and doctrinal shifts brought about by the potential inherent in advanced information technology. Indeed, the very fact of revolutionary changes in military operations brought about by advanced C4I systems poses enormous leadership challenges for the U.S. military, which as an institution practices well-justified conservatism. Finally, it is important to highlight the challenge to the whole acquisition process, which must take into account the rapid pace of change in information technology and the dominant role of the commercial sector in driving technological advances. The challenge is exploiting the rapid advances in information technology at a time when many, if not most, of these technologies are available through the commercial market with an acquisition system not designed to exploit rapid acquisition. Each of these three challenges, then, is discussed in the following chapters.
Representative terms from entire chapter: