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OCR for page 29
4
MANNING OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE AND JAPAN
ROOTS OF CHANGE
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the maritime nations of Northwest
Europe embarked on a transition away from their traditional manning
and organizational practices in ship operation. as a result of social
and economic factors.
The social activators for change were felt first, and were both
demographic and cultural in nature. Serious maritime personnel short-
ages appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s throughout Northwest
Europe and in Japan; firms found it difficult to attract and retain
crews, particularly officers. The shortage led to several innovations
in manning and operating practices, including automation of engine
rooms, reorganization of billets, and integration of trade skills in
ratings.
Research efforts were undertaken in the United Kingdom, Norway,
and other countries to find ways to enhance the quality of life at sea.
Measures included such social innovations as permitting families to be
on board. More practical was a movement toward permanent, contractual
employment of seamen and an ef fort to encourage crew continuity through
longer-term vessel assignment. The General Purpose (GP) ratings and
semi-integrated (poly~ralent) off icer concepts were instituted in the
early 1970s to reduce Inning requirements and the boredom of shipboard
duties and, on the part of unions, to increase wages.
The personnel shortage was a direct outgrowth of social changes
including an increase in the level of education, the elevation of
middle-class standards of living, and a further leveling of social
classes and distinctions. These trends directed the work force away
from the isolated life of the seafarer. They also had liberalizing
and democratizing repercussions throughout industry. At sea, social
and professional tear tied between officers and ratings began to
d issolve.
Another set of changes rooted in social trends is a shift toward
decentralized or shipboard management. Management responsibilities
for ship operations are being decentralized from shore to whip. Often
29
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shipboard management teams, usually consisting of ship's officers, have
substantial authority including budgetary responsibility. A related
development is the occasional use of consultative work planning groups
onboard ship.
In the mid-1970s, a worldwide recession brought about a sharp
downturn in shipping, effectively ending an era of manpower shortage
and forcing interest in improved operating efficiencies. In this
economic climate, ship operating companies have focused more intently
on cost-cutting measures. ·Flagging out. and crewing with nationals
f ram low wage, developing nations has become a common practice.
Companies are interested in reducing their crew complements, and have
begun to examine ways to reduce the number of their shoreside person-
nel. Aboard ship, automation and other advanced technologies as well
as labor-saving innovations in design have been increasingly employed.
Companies have supplanted worklife improvement experiments with
efforts that will provide more immediate economic relief. Faced with
the threat of ·flagging out,. unions in all the countries affected
have cooperated we th shipping companies in these billet-cutting
actions to preserve some jobs.
The comparatively high cost of labor in the developed maritime
nations has motivated innovations in operating practices as well as
· f lagging out. ~ As in any setting where high wages prevail, an
ability to succeed in international competition requires that high
hourly wage rates be more than of feet by high labor productivity.
Wi th manning costs an important element of total operating costs,
companies have been continually and increasingly interested in the
cost-cutting potential of manning reduction. Direct labor costs
represent a greater percentage of operating costs on smaller, rela-
t ively low-cost ships. Shif ting into capital intensive shipping does
not offer a general solution to high wages since specialized, capital-
intensive ships account for only 20 to 30 percent of world transport
activity.
Industrial strategies f or counteracting high labor costs involve
tradeoffs, for example, in technical features, maintenance, training,
fringe benefits,.and accommodations. Less tangible costs attendant to
organizational changes include costs of dealing with unions and shore
organizations, for example. The mix of manpower numbers and skills,
management structure and policies, and technology has to be evaluated
in terms of overall costs versus income. This assessment by manage-
ment is interactive and continuous and has characterized much of the
European experimentation in ship manning.
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31
MANNING INNOVATIONS
This section will review changes that have been experimented with and
adopted in the f lee ts of Nor thwest Europe and Japan in the long-term
effort to reduce manning costs. There changes encompass the design,
technology, and equipment of vessels, the shoreside supper t organiza-
tion, and corporate personnel policies.
Changes in Vessel Design, Technology, and Equipment
Unattended Engine mom
The most basic level of engine-room automation consists of remote
control of main propulsion machinery from the br idge, in con junction
with remote sensing of operating conditions and alarm capability.
These provisions eliminate the need for round-the-clock watchkeeping
in engine spaces. With additional automation of engineer ing functions,
24-hour unattended operation is possible, and human intervention is no
longer required except for the few remaining inspection and operation
tasks. Maintenance and repair then constitute the bulk of engineer ing
responsibilities.
Automated engine rooms have proven to be quite reliable. A study
of 300 ships operating with unattended engine rooms revealed that
after an initial breaking-in period, alarms averaged 1 every 5 days
and faults averaged 1 every 10 days, thus enabl ~ ng the vessels to
operate with true unattended engine rooms.
The highest level of eng ire-room automation is found in the
Japanese Super-rationalized container ships. MOL'S CANBERRA MARU
and the NICHIGU MARU of the NYR-MOL-YS consortium have integrated the
engine and cargo control stations on the main deck remote from the
engine spaces, while NYR's ARUBA MARU incorporates nearly all engine-
room function" in the bridge. Both designs incorporate microprocessors
which monitor and log over 300 operating parameters. The status of
operations is displayed on printers or screens in a number of loca-
tions, i.e., control station, bridge, and chief engineer's office.
Malfunctions trigger alarms in var ious locations In the ship. The
systems are interactive in that auxiliary equipment, such as
generators or pumps, is controlled automatically. Central control of
bunker ing has reduced the manpower necessary for that operation.
Maintenance
Vessel manning requirements have been reduced to a great extent by
changes in maintenance. In the deck area, the use of epoxy paints and
special coatings, which require less maintenance, has become common.
it)
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32
Innovative maintenance approaches such as design-for-maintenance
and planned-ma intenance systems have had an even mor e f undamental
effect on shipboard Inning and organization, especially in the engine
area. In the early stages of machinery plant design and equipment
selection, considerable attention is given to equipment types and
conf figurations which will minimize manpower requirements for main-
tenance. Machinery is installed with adequate space for maintenance
and parts removal, significantly reducing the time required for
maintenance and repair . In selection, maintenance intervals and
manpower requirements are considered in addition to life-cycle cost
and owner's preference.
Other practices calculated to reduce maintenance include:
selection of main and auxiliary engines that require the smallest
amount of ancillary operating equipment; the use of shaft-driven
electric generators to reduce operating hours on diesel generator
sets; totally enclosed elects ical equipment; sealed bear ings for all
elects ic motors; the use of fresh water rather than salt water; and
d diesel eng ines with the smallest number of cyl inder s pass ible .
Automatic condition monitoring systems are becoming prevalent as
ad juncts to planned maintenance systems . These monitor ing systems
of ten permi t extended Tea intenance intervals and prov ide the advantag e
that planned repairs may be made before they become cr itically neces-
sary. Therefore they may be undertaken ashore or by a maintenance
gang, and without delaying the ship. In general, much maintenance
that cannot be accompl ished with in the normal wor kday and an accept-
able range of overtime is reserved for shore gangs when the vessel is
in port ~ in shipyard, or in coastwise transit.
Bridge
Manning level adjustments due to automation have not been so
signif icant in the deck department as those proceeding from technical
innovations in the engine room. Microprocessors have been incorporated
into position-f inding and collision-avoidance devices, but for the
most part these have augmented rather than supplanted traditional
navigation practice.
Moor ing and Anchor ing
Mooring and anchoring manpower requirements remain the most resistant
to reduction through technical innovation. Innovations have been
pr incipally mechanical in nature, e.g ., self-stowing line baskets ,
constant tension winches, and smaller and lighter hawsers. Through
careful design and placement of multiple, redundant line-handling
equipment and communication and control stations, the Japanese have
lessened the requirements of brute strength in the handling of lines
and the s ize of the moor ing party .
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33
Cargo Operat ions
Microprocessors have improved the safety and ef f iciency of cargo
operations. These developments extend to loading, ballasting, and
heel corrections (i.e., load calculators, hull stress monitors, and
heel ing sensors ~ . The manpower necessary for deck operating tasks
~ i . e ., the opening and clos ing of hatches and secur ing of cargo} has
been reduced through minimization of the number of hatch covers and
their automation, and innovations in mechanical secur ing devices for
containers. On tankers, cargo control systems permit central control
of valves and pumps and provide tank level and f low rate indications,
along with appropr late alarms .
Communications
Improved shipboard communications, including remote input devices,
displays, and alarms, have been integral to a number of the innova-
tions that have been descr ibed. Information exchange between crew
members has been enhanced by greater use of telephones, public address
systems, and paging systems . Crew communications dur ing deck opera-
tions, such as moor ing where there are no free hands, have been
improved in at least one instance by installing walkie-talkies in
safety helmets.
Satellite systems have made possible dependable, high quality
voice, telex, and computer ship-to-shore communications. There recent
communication advances have made mar iners ' direct communication with
their families more colon, and has made it easier for senior officers
to be involved in the bus iness as well as the technical aspects of
ship operation. Satellite communication enables reversal of the trend
toward centralized shoreside management of vessels begun 75 years ago
with the introduction of marine radio by providing the ship with
current budgetary, stores, and scheduling information from the head
of f ice, and allowing for the timely transmits ion to the of f ice of
s imilar information or iginating from the ship.
Superstructure Design
Just as technical innovations in working spaces have facilitated crew
reductions, so too has the design of living and off ice areas.
The overall quality of accommodations (i.e., space, privacy,
comfort, entertainment, and diversions) has improved steadily,
reflecting industry's presumption that, in spite of fluctuations in
the market for seagoing labor, the expectations of seamen will
continue to rise in parallel with improving living standards ashore.
Perhaps more significant than increased comfort through greater space
per crew member at the same building cost is the varied environment
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34
that ship designer s have sought to provide in new ships to promote
interaction of crew members. The superstructure layout of a vessel
designed for operation by a smaller crew provides greater segregation
of working, recreation, and private areas--as is the case ashore.
Crew cabins are located in the most remote sections of the super-
structure, while food service, lounge, and recreation spaces are
reserved for the intermediate decks. The ship's office, archives,
conference room, and stores are found on or near the main deck.
More attention is being paid to the provision of a good social
environment. The integration of officers and ratings becomes more
desirable with the elimination of billets. Integrated lounges, mess
rooms, and recreational facilities offer a much-needed opportunity for
social contact. Traff to flow within passageways of the reduced-manning
vessel' s superstructure is designed to promote encounters between crew
members by reducing the number of ladders and locating recreational
and other communal spaces centrally. In at least one case, private
cabins have been made only moderately attractive so as to encourage
the occupants to join groups as often as possible. The underlying
pr inciple of these innovations is that the quality of seafar ing lif e
during off-hours can be much mproved by reducing loneliness and
boredom, and that this improvement will yield gains in productivity,
safety, and morale.
Off ices have been placed in a central location, rather than the
traditional location adjoining the staterooms of senior officers. All
of these advantages encourage communication among of f icers dur ing
working hours. At the same time, the segregation of office and living
spaces allows the crew to spatially and emotionally separate themselves
from their work when off duty.
Central meeting rooms also have been provided. In this
arrangement, the shipboard management team works together in one
office; there is central storage of data; and work planning may be
facilitated by central display of tasks to be accomplished and
progress made.
Changes in the Organization of Crews
Intradepar tmental Flexibility
Perhaps the simplest manning reductions from an organizational
perspective are those which are achieved through elimination of
certain billets, accompanied by intradepar~cmental adjustments to the
contents of others. Engineering automation has made possible this
kind of manning adjustment. Engine room watchstanding billets have
been eliminated. Th is instantaneous reduction, so closely related to
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35
specif ic technical innovations, also has been made possible by the
combination of previously separate and distinct responsibili ties into
single job descriptions. Within the engine room, this recombination
of tasks has taken the form of engineering officer/electricians and
dayworking ratings, sometimes retitled mechanics, who are responsible
for operations, maintenance, and repair work previously undertaken by
oilers, wipers, greasers, donkeymen, and fitters.
In the deck department, the number of dayworking ratings has been
reduced as a consequence of less shipboard maintenance work, while
watchstanding billets also have been reduced through the occasional
combination of watch off icer and lookout duties. For deck off icers,
the reduction has taken the form of chief mates returning to watch-
standing and, more recently, some watchstanding by masters. This
latter arrangement has been the sub ject of exper imentation on smaller
vessels in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Salen
~ Sweden ~ is considering a half-time ~ 4-hour ~ watchstanding assignment
for the masters of their supertankers. The West German st~ipowners
have been asking for permission to sail up to 10,000 grt with a master
and two deck officers, and the West German Ministry of Transport has
recently drafted a regulation that will move the limit for such
operations from 1,000 to 4,000 grt. Deck officer and master unions
are uniformly opposed to watchstanding masters, citing as reasons the
likelihood of fatigue and the probable reluctance of junior officers
to call out a master who recently completed a watch. On the other
hand, it has been stated that such an arrangement may reduce accidents
by preventing masters from becoming weary during a long passage with
little to do.
Masters and deck officers have assumed radio communication
responsibilities in the absence of a radio officer billet. As with
the watchstanding master, this is being tried on smaller vessels and
considered for application on larger vessels.
Reductions in the catering department have been accomplished as a
result of diminished hotel services and the smaller size of the total
crew. Additionally, intradepartmental integration of tasks in this
department has taken the form of chief stewards who also cook, second
cooks who also bake, and steward utilitymen whose responsibilities now
include all facets of the department's operation.
Although come additional training may be required for the
expansion of responsibilities within departments of certain billets,
these initial manning reductions have not posed a serious challenge to
the traditional organization of crews.
Interdepartmental Flexibility
Further reductions entail alterations in the traditional structure of
shipboard work. The most rudimentary structural change, one that
maintains for the most part the segregation of departments, is that of
interdepartmental flexibility.
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36
On conventional general cargo ships, the departmental structure
~ i.e., deck, engine, and steward departments} functions relatively
well. However, general cargo ships are being less and less frequently
built; more technologically sophisticated, specialized vessels are
taking the, r place. Changes in technology and trading patterns have
greatly reduced the need for traditional cargo handling skills. The
reduction of time in port brought about by developments in cargo tech-
nology has substantially increased the time spent in basic navigational
watchkeeping . Simultaneously, the need for end ineer ins sk ills has
increased in all aspects of ship operation. Automation has also
increased the demand for knowledge and sk ill in instrumentation and
control systems. These changes have affected the officer ' s role at
the same time as they have led to a reduction in the number of ratings.
Task analyses of shipboard work have revealed that the workload
intensity of the several departments often is not corresponding, and
that r atings of one depar tment might be available and able to ass ist
in the work of another . For example, engineer ing and galley personnel
may assist in moor ing operation.. Such a system allows for further
manning reduction. within the crew as a whole, while still meeting the
peak manpower requirements of the individual departments. Unlicensed
crew members retain their identity with a single department but are
called upon to work occasionally on tasks in other departments.
Occasional department crossover is widely accepted in Norway and
West Germany, and in the United Kingdom was pioneered by e~erimenta-
tion conducted in 1964 by the Br itish Shipping Federation, Cunard Line,
and the National Union of Seamen. The Danish Seamen' s Union proscr ibes
~~~ ~ is a provision in the
the practice for its members, although there
Danish Firemen' s Union for working in alternate departments.
Departmental Integration: General Purpose Ratings
An even greater departure from the traditional structure of shipboard
war k is the introduction of general purpose (GP} crew. In this organi-
zation there is no departmental (deck or engined distinction between
ratings who share operations, maintenance, and repair responsibilities .
GP manning experimentation began in the late 1960s on tankers and bulk
carriers. The roles of senior deck and engine ratings have been
redef ined in con junction with GE exper Indentation. GE crews frequently
are placed under the supervision Of a single Ships foreman" rather
than under the traditional departmentalized billets of Bosh or
~storekeeper. ~
Some GP implementations in Europe have not been very successful.
Experience has shown that ratings who participate in GE arrangements
risk a loss of occupational identity, and, without training , are
qualif fed to do only low-skilled tasks in the alternative department.
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37
The system works most satisfactorily in those crew structures which
are designed to provide meaningful content in these jobs, and in those
organizations that provide the necessary training . Furthermore, the
system of general purpose ratings has been implemented most eff iciently
where mar iners have not previously served in one department or another,
but are trained initially for general purpose service.
In spite of some disappointments with early GP exper iments, the
more serious companies and countries are expending much effort and
money to modify crew organizations and national training schemes to
make GP work as it was intended. Since 1980, only GP ratings have
been produced by the nautical training system of the Netherlands, and
within 5 years, the only entry rating training available in West
Germany will be for GP. The Norwegian training scheme has been turned
toward GP, an evolution that has been accelerated as a result of the
new 1983 manning scales that formally recognize the necessity of GPs
for reduced manning operation. In the United Kingdom, 10 to 15 percent
of ratings are sailing in a GP capacity.
Department Integration: Semi-Integrated Officers
A more recent innovation in crew flexibility is that of the
dual-purpose or semi-~ntegrated of f icer . Still in the exper imental
stage in several counts ies, the inter ~ ion is to license and employ
off icers capable of standing na~riga Lion watches, monitor ing engine
controls, - ~ - - ~ -
repairs.
and undertak ing mechanical, elects ical, and electronic
The ob jective of semi-integrated off icer operation, beyond that
of further manning reduction, in to redistribute the bridge watch-
keeping and technical maintenance and repair functions among more
off icers. The French were the first to train dual-purpose off icers .
In the Dolabella experiment, the French nautical education system was
modif fed to produce off icers equally expert in deck and engine skills .
However, reportedly because of union opposition, few changes were made
in the organization of shipboard work to make use of dual-purpose
officers.
The multiple-sk ill concept of reatr ix manning has been developed
in Northwest Europe. It differs from the polyvalent or dual-purpose
scheme in that the goal is not a homogeneous work force of seafarers
holding identical billets. Rather, a mate ix crew is composed of
individuals, each with ~ specific specialty and varying levels of
competence in a secondary sk ill. These matr ices of sk ills cross
departmental bounder ies--hence the flexibility--but still distinguish
between areas of principal competence. This semi-integrated officer
is one whose predominant training is in one department, with less
background in the other. Officers graduate from nautical college with
both entry level licenses, but are expected to maintain one at
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38
entry-level, while pursuing advancement in the other . In the pr mary
specialization, the officer is responsible for all aspects of a part
of the ship' s operation; his secondary expertise is relied upon by
other specialists to provide assistance as needed. The basic purpose
of the matr ix concept, with its provision of greater versatility in
individuals, is to enable peak var Cations in workload to be dealt with
by fewer officers.
The Norweg fans tested the mate ix of f icer concept in the ear ly
1970s (Hoegh Multina) with success, but for political reasons the
necessary educational reform to diffuse the innovation did not take
place until 1978 . The Dutch turned their attention to semi-integrated
officers at about the same time (Shell in 1978 and Nedlloyd in 1981},
and now have a number of experimental ships sailing under this system.
(Shell has 65 semi-integrated officers--10 percent of their total. ~
The Dutch nautical colleges are designing a 4-year program for semi-
integrated off icers . Both Shell and Nedlloyd hope to convince the
colleges to provide only semi- integrated of f icers in the future .
Shell has announced that in the f utur e th is will be the only type of
off icer they will recruit from the colleges. In addition, the
Japanese are exper imentinq with semi-`ntegrated off icers.
Related to this concept of semi-integrated officers is another
concept which might be labeled ~ semi~off icer . ~ The Japanese are the
greatest proponents of this innovation, in which watchstanding certifi-
cates are awarded to other than fully licensed officers. More than
500 Japanese ratings have now been awarded watchstanding certif icates
after completing a 5-month training course. A similar proposal has
been made to the UoR. Department of Transport by the General Council
of Br itish Shipping (GCBS) . The GCBS had been advised by the Depart-
ment of Transport that the government would prefer that they pursue a
fully dual-licensed officer approach.
One attraction of the ~semi~officer. approach is that it provides
an intermediate billet for individuals moving up from rating to officer
status. That transition is becoming more difficult as the educational
standards of the nautical colleges are being raised. There is some
concern that the educational tear rzer to mobility will work against
efforts to break down the traditional tear r lets between off icers and
ratings .
Decentralization: Shipboard Management Teams
A number of ship operators throughout Europe are transferr ing some
management responsibilities front the head off ice to the ships to
improve the job content of ships officers, to improve the effectiveness
of the shipboard organization, and in some cases to permit reductions
in the stat f of the shore suppor t organization. The management team
consists of the master and department heads and occasionally junior
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39.
off icers and senior ratings. In general, the shipboard management
team has authority over operating expenses and budget, personnel, and
maintenance. Although managers ashore may establish performance and
profit objectives for the ship, the role of the shore office is
rev tented toward supporting rather than directing the ships.
For DENS (Denmark), Shipboard managements begins after the
company selects a master for a ship under construction. The master
assists in the selection of officers. This shipboard management team
then plans jointly for the organization and operation of the new ship,
including recommending a crew size. The company takes this proposed
crew level to the Board of Trade for approval. Hoegh Line (Norway}
sends its full shipboard management team and their families to the
construction site where they have the responsibility to oversee
construction and prepare the whip for operation.
In operation, the shipboard management team may elect to undertake
ma jor engine overhauls or maintenance tasks using the "hip' s own crew,
or to hire shore gangs. Such teams are generally permitted to spend
funds to a certain limit without consulting the head office, and to
oversee shipyard repairs, rather than to depend on engineers from the
home of f ice .
Shell Tanker B.V. intends to employ a Ship manager. on every
ship who will be assisted by five semi-~ntegrated officers. New
constructions include in the accommodation layout an administration
room which is a centrally located grouping of offices where the
management team conducts its daily work.
Shipboard management teams are the maritime expression of
decentralizing, a trend throughout Northwest European industry to push
management decision making to lower levels of organization. The
underlying theory is that the best decisions are made by those
individuals closest to the problem. In the case of ship operation,
this generally means those on board the ship. Not only should this
lead to better, economically sound dec is ions, but it is intended to
produce greater job satisfaction on the part of local managers--which
translates into improved retention, motivation, and overall
per formance .
Decentralization is facilitated by vessel ass ignment continuity
of at least senior off iced. Many companies have adopted this for a
dock-co-dock per iod.
The exper fence of a number of companies reveals that shipboard
management is eas ier to implement onboard than at the head of f ice .
Off icers often are eager to take on added responsibilities while
middle managers ashore typically are reluctant to release control.
Thus, this change requires top management commitment and attention.
If there has been any disappointment in shipboard management from the
shipboard aide, it is that the involvement of junior officers and
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52
therefore about what practices should be promoted or required by
industry-level action. The industry in the United Kingdom is com-
pr ised of a large number of small- to moderate-s ized f irms with no
large, dominating companies. As a result, the U. K. shipowners
association has evidenced less leadership in manning innovations than
i ts counterpar ts in other European counts ies .
Complexity and diversity within the government is also a factor.
Sweden has recently consolidated government responsibility for shipping
matters in one agency. West Germany is moving in the same direction.
Involvement of Participants
Another major factor influencing the success of experiments as well as
subsequent diffusion in the Northwest European ship manning exper i-
ments was the degree to which direct participants, including the crew,
were given an opportunity to discuss, review, and shape proposed or
p ilot innovations .
Norway' s Hoegh f irst learned the lesson when they omitted this
seep in their initial efforts to transfer elements of an experiment to
two other ships. They found that the crews on The nest ships did not
have the commitment required to make the innovation world effectively.
Hoegh concluded that participative planning is art essential step in
organizational change. A further implication of this decision for
Hoogh is that innovations need to be tailored to the conditions on
each sh ip .
A related lesson was learned by Sweden' s Salen. In the mid-1970s,
top management approved a trial in which increased shipboard manage-
ment was delegated to off icers on four ships. When the results proved
encouraging, management made the change a policy and attempted to
implement it throughout the company's fleet of several dozen ships.
They encountered difficulties. The officers for the experimental
ships had been carefully selected and the personnel onshore who served
as liaisons for the exper imental ships had been carefully br iefed and
involved in the planning. However, the company' s program for imple-
meeting the change company-wide overlooked the importance of these two
aspects of the experiment. The company found that many officers in
the additional ships targeted for change were either reluctant or
unprepared to take on the additional responsibility, and many of the
shore personnel were unwilling to transfer authority because to do so
would threaten their current role.
From this failure in dif fusion, Salen management learned that
careful preparation is required to lay the groundwork for diffusion of
organizational innovation. They concluded that preparation must
encompass participative planning by all affected groups to achieve
acceptance, education and training for the new roles, and compliance
mechanisms to ensure that individuals carry out their new responsibil-
ities.
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53
Adequate Information and Evaluation
There has been a general tendency in the diffusion of organizational
innovations for followers to oversimplify. The methods by which new
manning innovations were developed, approved, and monitored influenced
the type of changes that were copied, if they were copied at all.
This can be illustrated by reviewing the Brostrom case.
The Brostro~ manning innovations, which have been extended to
seven Ro-Ro ships over the past several years, have the following
well-publicized aspects: a 16-man crew, 6 general purpose crew
members, and an operational strategy which transfers almost all
maintenance to shc~re-based facilities. It is regarded as successful,
safe, cost effective, and satisfactory to crew members.
When other Swedish managers and government and union officials
consider the gener ~ applicability of the approach, they especially
focus on whether in is practical for other shipping companies to
transfer maintenance functions to shore-based crews. These officials,
however, may be missing important lessons from Brostroms' experience.
When examining less `'ublicized aspects of the Brostroms model and when
one listening close ~ to what Brostroms' management itself considers
to be the basis for i ~ s success, a more complex picture can be
sketched.
The company negotiated the manning innovation initially with
their unions and madly them partners in the monitoring and evaluation
of their early experiences. Crew members, who were required to be
experienced, were recruited from among volunteers. There was a con-
scientious commitment -a give more voice to crew members and to be
more responsive to the. r stated needs. There was greater provision
made for role flexibi;: ty between ratings and officers and for includ-
ing ran ings in the wor k planning. The manager with line responsibility
for these ships emphasized that a major factor in the success of the
innovation was motivate-], spirited crew. This aspect of the success
of the innovation is n i well appreciated by observers, nor is there
an information diffusion mechanism in Sweden which could help other
ship operators understand the many ingredients for success that were
built into the Brostrom' s approach.
There are other il' ustrations of this tendency to fix on an aspect
of an innovation, usually its most controversial aspect, while ne-
glecting the key ingred ents of its success. When in the late 1970s
the Sealife Programme in the United Kingdom attempted to duplicate the
Norwegian manning experiments, the intention was to test several
concepts: general purpose crew, continuity of assignment, and crew
participation. As it happened, the U.K. officers, ratings, their
unions, and many managers were hindered by the question of social
integration. A better g: asp of the Norwegian experience might have
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enabled the participants to see that it is more ap ~ropriate to treat
social integration as a by-product of work role in egration, rather
than as a precondition for other changes or as the central element of
the planned change.
Technology Transfer
Each industry has, as a rule, insisted upon conducting its own
research and trials rather than directly applying the experiences of
other countries. For example, the Sealife Programme in the United
Kingdom explicitly set out to reproduce the Norwegian experiments ·on
O.K. ships with U.K. personnel.. Even within the Netherlands, Shell
experiments were not regarded by the rest of the industry as a basis
f or evaluating the GP concept or the semi-integrated officer.
This repetition served several purposes. :t provided a common
experience which all of the affected parties could evaluate. It
provided a concrete basis f or all of the parties to learn about the
detailed requirements of the change process. The planning and evalu-
ation discussions among parties provided an opportunity for them to
develop a more systematic understanding of the innovations, including
their key ingredients and subtle effects. The_e discussions, like
other instances of participative planning, developed ownership and
commitment.
Much of the reporting on effective manning developments has been
descriptive. There has been little assessment of the innovations,
their strengths and weaknesses, and advantages or disadvantages.
Once several different companies were experimenting in Europe,
the possibility existed for them to interact and influence one another.
The rate of diffusion of change and the quality of the specific models
which evolved were enhanced as networks were created in which partici-
pants in these innovations could meet and exchange their experiences.
Some networks have been formalized, such as the companies participating
in the Sealife Programme Ignited Kingdom), ;.ae Ship of the Fu~cure
Program ~ West Germany ), the Committee on Modernization of the Japanese
Seafaring System, Provo ~ Netherlands), and the Ship Operation of the
Future Pr ogram ~ Norway ~ . Others consist of inf ormal exchange among
those companies that have an interest in the subject. Examples of
informal networks include the 1980s Group (alumni of the Sealife
Programmed, the proposed Advanced Manning Croup of the General Council
of British Shipping, and similar but nameless networks in other
European shipowner associations.
Compared to other industries worldwide, ship operators in
Northwest Europe and Japan have devoted a remarkably large amount of
effort to learning about organizational Innovation. Also impressive
is the very high quality of both the research and policy implications
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~5
drawn from the research efforts. Most of this social science research
has focused heavily, but not exclusively, on the Norwegian and BE itish
exper fences--but it has had broad relevance to all of the counts ies
studied. Moreover, the conferences explor ing organizational innova-
tions in ship operation often have been broadly international in their
content and in their participant roster. The many trade journals and
magazines which track developments in the international ship operating
industry have- reported frequently, and sometimes in depth, on the
status of and trends in manning policies and practices.
Importance of Training
Training has played an important role in the process of change. Most
innovations have entailed training of participants in technical sk ills
related to expanded responsibilities and also in participative organi-
zational change. A number of countries have revised rating and officer
training schemes to support manning innovations in the national fleets.
Norway has expanded its Ship ' s mechanic. training program to f ill the
demand for such ratings. West Germany has modified its national train-
ing program for ratings to the extent that the only entry training
available is for GPs. Japan has revised its national training and
certification scheme for officers to bring it into accord with the
International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification,
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, and also to support the trend toward
semi-integrated officers and certified nonofficer bridge watchstanders.
The most substantial changes in training have been those for ratings
because manning innovations affe<:`c ratings more than officers; a reduc-
tion in the number of crew members leads to an increase in required
skills and qualifications. In addition to changes in national
training programs and requirements, companies have initiated programs
to meet specialized needs. This company training is provided to
recruits emerging from the training schools as well as to upgrade
employees for innovative service. The scope of company training
depends on the scope of the company' s manning innovations. Nedlloyd
in Holland started an experimental program with two project ships in
1978 using the Multi-purpose Crew concept. They provided 5 days of
special training in f iref ighting, safety, f irnt aid, and lifeboat
certif ication; 3 weeks of shoreside training; and 2 months of
on-the-job shipside training in the opposite department. Other
examples of companies engaging in similar exper imentation and training
efforts are Mapag-Lloyd in West Germany (3 weeks of shore~ide and 3
weeks of ship~ide training); Hamburg Sud in conjunction with other
Went German companies; P.A.L. in the United Kingdom with shoreside
schools to improve ratings' skills; and Leif Bough in Norway with
structured training programs for GPs onboard the ship.
Dual competency has brought about major changes in officer
training schemes. Dual competency is now a hir ing requirement in
Shell Tankers Big., with pressure being brought on the Dutch govern-
ment to make such training mandatory in the nautical college. The
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system offers the ~minor. competence through an additional 6 months of
college and 6 months at sea in the opposite department. The goal is
to design a dual-purpose off icer education program of 4 years. For
the future, a fully integrated officer training system is envisioned.
In West Germany, the new system of officer training consists of 13
years of compulsory schooling, 18 months on ship, then 3 years of
theoretical work at a polytechnic school. Attempts on the part of
West German shipowners to have a semi-integrated educational program
implemented have not gained approval by the government, but there is
mounting pressure to include special provisions for such manning in
manning regulations under consideration. Semi-integrated officer
experimentation undertaken by Leif Hoegh in Norway several years ago
was allegedly highly successful, but failure to gain support in the
educational system made it impossible for the company to sustain the
arrangement.
Given the importance of leadership to successf ul innovation, some
training has been directed to the development of leadership skills,
and understanding of participative organizations, among those
involved. Off icers have received training in management and meeting
techniques, so as to be more competent in handling situations resulting
f ram the implementation of shipboard management/matr ix organizations .
Shoreside of f ice staff members have been given training in communica-
tion appropriate to their roles as teachers of skills to be transferred
f rom shore to ship.
While these additional training components may not seem very
significant in and of themselves, they signal a new emphasis on
cooperation and a move towards decentralization and a self-contained
ship.
Government and Union Rules and the Process of Change
Some manning innovations in Northwest Europe have contravened laws or
regulations. Some experiments and trials have required variances from
requ i remeet s . Where exper iments have been successf ul, laws or regula-
tions have had to be modified to enable the innovation's diffusion in
the industry. The two types of laws or regulat ions that bear most
directly on manning innovations are manning scales that specify
numbers and qualif ications of seafarers for specif ic tonnage and power
vessels, and work environment laws which specify maximum numbers of
hour s of allowable war k. The pattern throughout Europe and Japan has
been to move away f ram legislated manning scaler in ache direction of
regulations which can more easily be modif fed and interpreted for
special circumstances. In some cases, industry advisory bodies have
ass isted government agencies in consider ing requests f ram operator s to
crew at levels less than that prescribed by law. Japan has gone so
far as to remove manning from the realm of legislation and now relies
upon regulation for guidance, which provides the legal elasticity to
exper iment .
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For years, Norway had a means of providing for regulatory variance
f or exper imental vessels · In 19 83, a new manning scale law was passed
that permits considerably smaller crews. The size of the crew is
determined by the technological standard of the ship and the type of
organizational innovations implemented.
Just as variances from government rules have been needed for
manning innovation, variances from union rules have also been needed
prior to manning experimentation. In the United Kingdom, there has
been a trend in the direction of individual companies negotiating
separate contracts with the unions whenever they want provisions
unlike those specified in the national agreement. The West German
18-man Containership Experiment operated under the provisions of an
agreement signed by both the German Shipowners' Association and the
two unions. A number of companies and most unions were signatories to
similar agreements in Norway.
Two of the more difficult issues attendant to manning innovation
are watchstanding of captains and the requirements for a radio officer.
The radio officer requirement is increasingly being viewed as obsolete
because of substant ial advances in communications and navigation;
although it is provided for in international law. In the countries
reviewed, resolution of these issues has or will involve statutory
changes.
Compensating Workers for Their Participation
Compensation has been provided throughout Europe and Japan because
some manning changes can have negative consequences for mariners and
their unions. In Norway, an industry-labor agreement provided for
permanent employment, fixed annual salaries, and more vacation time.
In West Germany, the 18-Han Containership Experiment also provided for
continuous employment, additional holidays, guaranteed overtime, and
other fringe benefits. Throughout Europe it is understood that one
compensation to the ratings for shouldering the brunt of billet
reductions is improvement in the status of those that remain. Unions
representing the ratings have attempted to incorporate within manning
experiments provisions for better training, facilities, and social
status for their members.
The All Japanese Seamen's Union, which has cooperated in the
national program to restructure merchant crews, has revised its views
on wage policy as a result of the increasing unemployment and radical
changes envisaged for the seafaring career. The union is now attempt-
ing to obtain a new pay and benefits structure that would provide
lifetime security to the seafarer and his dependents. The union is
also pushing for a selective retirement formula to promote the early
retirement of an aging work force. With a usual retirement age of S5,
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the Japanese seafaring work force has a high proportion of individuals
in the 40 to 54 age bracket. As in the United States, the ratio of
reserve to active seamen In Japan has risen dramatically. The number
of reserve seamen decreases at a far slower rate than the number of
billets eliminated through crew reductions. Thus, savings through
elimination of active shipboard positions is insuf f icient. Early
retirements may alleviate the unemployment problem.
Another means of alleviating unemployment among seafarers has
been retraining for other than seagoing careers. The Japanese have
been most active in this regard, both through the efforts of in.di~ridual
companies and the government. NYK runs a job development program which
assists in f inding NYK seafarers jobs ashore with aff iliate companies
(e.g., steel and shipbuilding). K Line and Mitsui have similar
schemes, and on a broad basis the Japanese Ministry of Transport
established in 19 7 8 a Seamen ' s Employment Promotion Centre. These
voluntary programs are assisted by the fact that these shipping
companies are a part of larger industrial groupings.
RESULTS OF MANNING INNOVATIONS
Reflecting those historical conditions of the industry which led to
effective manning programs, evaluation of innovations has focused
primarily on the economy of vessel operation and the degree to which
changes have improved the quality of working life. The effect of
manning reductions and modif ication of traditional work practices on
sat ety and health also has been an area of concern.
Economy of Vessel Operation
While earliest change efforts were concerned with providing a remedy
to the manpower shortage problem, and were directed toward improving
the quality of work life an sea, economy of operation always has been
a measure of the success of effective manning projects. Cost reduction
has become increasingly important in recent years due to overtonnaging
and severe competition.
Savings in direct payroll costs as the result of billet reductions
has been the primary ob jective of a number of European and Japanese
ship operators. These operators have introduced organizational or
working practice changes only for the purpose of supporting the
primary objective of manning reduction. Problematic in these cases is
the degree to which direct payroll savings are offset by other costs
associated with manning reductions (e.g., additional overtime for
remaining crew members, additional training for remaining crew members,
expanded shoreside maintenance, and declining resale value of the
vessel, especially if it has not been maintained as before).
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The degree to which individual companies have monitored the costs
and benefits of effective tanning projects has varied. There are no
figures available for the industry as a whole, or for any national
fleet. The Norwegian Ship)wners' Association, in a review of that
country's experience with ffective manning experiments, flatly
states: nit is not possibl' :o estimate the cost that has been
incurred in the new equipment, additional training, or savings made..
A number of companies, including DFDS, Bough, and Shell Tankers Bail.,
have made comparisons of developments over time. Whereas costs on
conventionally manned ships rose steadily over a couple of years, the
costs on project ships rose much less sharply. The results were
encouraging both in terms of operational performance and maintenance
costs.
Operators engaged in effective manning programs claim that
reduced and reorganized crews operate project vessels not only without
increasing operational costs ~ n areas other than payroll, but in a
fashion that has reduced these costs as well. In other words,
effectively manned vessels are not only earring payroll costs, but are
providing savings in such area" as fuel economy, economy of equipment
and stores, less days of f-hire, and less illness and accident claims.
Quality of Working Life and Job Satisfaction
During the era of manpower shortage, the companies were insistent that
changes in operating practices should result in the seafarers being
more satisfied with their employment and consequently remain at sea.
With the shift of emphasis to economy of operation, the social goals
or quality of work-life goals have not been lost. Operators still
voice the concern that the quality of work life resulting from
effective manning changes be a positive improvement rather than simply
knot degrading. as manning level-, are reduced and economic working
practices introduced. The most effective innovations are felt to be
those that simultaneously increase productivity and improve working
conditions {e.g., decentralized collision making, participative work
planning, assignment continuity, higher levels of training,
competetence, and responsibility}.
It is widely reported that seafarers employed under effective
manning arrangements en joy a subst antially improved quality of work
life, and are not inclined to reve: t to traditional employment and
working practices.
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Bibby Bros . reports of their pro je At ships that:
Management inspections of the sh ips reveal h igher
levels of achievement in the: ~.ntenance and appearance
of the ships and also indicate improved management and
morale on board. . . In short, bc th the teams themselves,
and company management, think that they have a much
better Or ip on affairs and greater satisfaction in their
work. In essence, we would see the main benef it from
these developments as be ing a much unproved trust and
collaboration between shore and ship management. There
has been a marked departure from traditional attitudes
and a lessening of unproductive conflict. Issues are
still confronted, but in a more constructive and less
status-conscious manner. Tte organization as a whole is
displaying a greater continuity and coherence of purpose
and effort.. (Smith, Gosden, and Elkington, nd.)
The Norwegian Shipowners' Association reports that
ship~to-shore relationships have been remarkably improved, and
that barriers between officers and: stings and between
departments have been broken down, And are in some ships almost
nonexistent. Furthermore, the crew works as a much closer team
than before.
Safety and Health
Concern about safety and health in manning projects has generally
taken the form of precautions that they not deteriorate.
Dif ferent parties have had dif ferent safety and health
concerns in overseas manning exper iments. The ministr ies of
transport and their industry advisory committees have, in
reviewing requests from operators for permission to sail with
smaller crews than provided for by law, considered the possible
vessel safety implications of proposed changes. In same cases,
these agencies and advisory groups have played a further role in
monitoring the performance of vessels granted such variance and
operating with reduced crews. In countries with work environment
laws {e.g., Norway and West Germany), agencies with this respon-
sibility have monitored the hourly work records of experimental
ships.
Operators and shipowner associations generally claim that
effective manning vessels are not only as safe as traditionally
manned ships, but have resulted in better safety records because
the smaller, higher trained ~ be ~ ter motivated crew is more aler t
and attentive to duties. Some of these operators claim to have
quantif fed these safety gains.
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Those union leaders that are cautious with regard to the new
crew structures argue that quantity, in terms of numbers of crew,
is important in addition to quality, and that expanding the
responsibilities of ratings and officers beyond traditional
duties is resulting in seamen less qualified in their principal
departments. Although they have no data to support their claim
that these ships may be less safe than those traditionally
.
manned, one union observed that it is the most modern well-
equipped vessels that are being crewed in the new fashion.
Arguing that such high-~echnology vessels should be safer than
older ships simply from a technical point of view, this union
maintains that effective manning vessels should therefore be
required to show safety gains, and not just the absence of safety
slippage.
Additional Comments on Measurements of Results
Characteristic of company-level efforts in organizational change
in any industry, the results of such projects in shipping are not
well documented. If projects are reported at all, and many are
not, the reports frequently take the form of descriptive case
studies. Few change programs are conducted in a scientific
fashion. There are several reasons for this. Companies are
interested in results, not scientific documentation. They are
not motivated to increase the cost of the project.
Another
reason is that formalization or manning projects in a scientific
mode can reduce the enthusiasm of participants, and therefore the
likelihood of successful changes. Finally, the active participa-
tion of evaluators--managers, union representatives, and seafarers
--in experimental manning projects has provided experiential proof
of results which has been sufficient for corporate purposes.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
manning innovations