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OCR for page 63
5
OPPORTUNITIES FOR AND OBSTACLES TO CHANGE
~ .
IN THE U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT FLEET
The committee's analysis of the status and manning of the U.S.-flag
merchant fleet and of manning innovation in Northwest Europe and Japan
enables a number of comments to be made on the potential for
introducing manning innovations in the U.S.-flag fleet.
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The most comprehensive manning changes have entailed both technological
and organizational alterations. However, manning changes also have
been accomplished by technological or by organizational innovations
alone. For example, an unattended engine room can be operated with a
lesser number of traditionally organized engineering personnel--a tech-
nological innovation alone; or a shipboard management team approach can
be introduced on conventionally equipped vessels--a purely organiza-
tional innovation.
Technologically based manning reductions are likely to be less
effective if not supported by concurrent organizational changes; for
example, a lesser number of ratings works best if the ratings serve as
a general purpose crew. Organizational changes, to be most effective,
r equire technolog ical adaptations .
There is a general belief among ship operating management that
the typical 40-man crew on container strips and 30-man crew on tankers
could receive its biggest reduction by diesel conversion, automated
engine room, and h igh technology for navigation and deck operations .
They feel that with improvements along these lines, and with reductions
in the steward's department, containership crews could be cut almost
in half, and tanker crews between 30 and 35 percent. An indication of
what can be and is being accomplished in the United States is provided
by a Mar itime Administration study, Lumbar ized in Table 10 .
A ma jor bar r ier to the introduce ion of automation technolog ies
into the IJ. S . -f lag f feet is cost. Another tear r ier has been the
difficulty of reaching company-union agreement on manning issues.
63
OCR for page 64
64
TABLE 10 Alternative Manning Levels of a Container Ship
Master
Pos ition A L T E R N A ~ I V E
A B Cut
1
Radio Officer 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Purser 1 a a a
Deck Officer 4 3 3 3
Unl. Deck 11 6 6 6
Chi ef Eng . ~ 1 1 1
Eng . Of f icer 5 4 2 3
Unl. Engineer 8
5
3
3
Steward 8 6 5 3
TOTAL 4 0 2 7 2 ~ 21
.
a MarAd recommended that duties of purser be transferred partly
ashore and partly to other members of the crew.
b Based on a permanent crew with the except ion of entry personnel .
Alternative A: Present vessel--steam turbine with watchstand~ng
engine room. Present manning.
Alternative B: Present vessel equipped with a watch call system,
bridge sanitary and messing facilities, labor saving
devices for mooring, and automatic radar plotting aid.
Alternative C: Present vessel with equipment as in B and changing
engines to diesel classed for an unattended engine
room.
Alternative D: Latest slow-speed diesel vessels with navigational
aids and an unattended engine room.
SOURCE: U. S . Maritime Administration.
OCR for page 65
65
Technologies that permit reduced manning have not been adopted to the
same extent in the u.s.-tlas fleet as they have in some Northwest
European fleets, primer fly because of cost considerations and the age
of the U.S.-flag fleet. By and large, it is more cost effective to
introduce automation technologies on new ships than to retrof it. Some
of the newer U. S . vessels are equipped with state-of-he-art
automation technolog ies that make them technolog ically comparable to
the most effectively manned vessels of Northwest Europe.
Shipboard Innovations
There is already a degree of intradepartmental flexibility in the
U. S . -flag fleet. Some [1. S . operators now employ chief steward/cooks,
second cook/bakers, steward utilitymen, QMEDS, and watchstanding chief
mates. Additional opportunities are constrained only by the absence
of investment in supporting technological innovations, and by the lack
of management and labor support to date for exper imenting with changes
and implementing those that are successful.
Innovations that further, interdepartmental flexibility--general
purpose ratings and semi-integrated officers--must spring from
management and labor suppor t and cooperation for change. This coop-
erative atmosphere has been lacking in the United States. However,
business conditions are such that labor unions are increasingly open
to considering changes in this area, at least in new ship construction,
in the interest of preserv ing jobs .
The crossover provision of 46 USC 8104 (e) (673), may prohibit
interdepar tmental ar r angements, but these depar tments ar e ne ither
created nor limited by the law. A court has already accepted the
concept of a maintenance and repair department (see Appendix C}. The
way seems open, if the form of a Certificate of Inspection is altered
and the appropriate rating designations used, to avoid having deck
departments and engine departments, or at least to minimize them by
also recognizing a maintenance department and using properly
designated and identif fed general purpose seamen. The concept of mate
is traditionally linked to deck duty. While an engineerless ship is
not out of the question, the expansion of the Seaters duties to include
eng ineer ing duties would possibly require statutory change. The
current licensing laws may not permit the Coast Guard to create a
dual-purpose license by rulemak ing .
An innovation that can be introduced unilaterally by management
is the shipboard management team. The outstanding obstacle In this
instance is not external to the ship operating company, it is internal
--the corporate culture policies of central author ity. Shipboard
management teams require that headquarters personnel share their
responsibilities with the seagoing work force. Mile there have been
few studies made of the subject in the United States, it may be that
OCR for page 66
66
the culture or tradition of U.S. ship operators is more centralized
and directive than that of their counterparts overseas because U. S.
Operators have not always enjoyed the stability of employment of
officers that has been coTmnonplaca overseas.
As with shipboard management teams, the innovation of work
planning is not discouraged by legislation, regulation, or union
contract. However, participative work planning usually is introduced
only in connection with other more basic changes, such as shipboard
management teams and interdepartmental flexibility.
Supporting Innovations
Changes in maritime employment leading to longer-term association of
employees with ship operating companies and with vessels, and also
redef inition and reorganization of jot, content, are essential elements
of effective manning. Achievement of such changes hinges on
cooperation and agreement between management and labor.
The unions f ind it cliff icult to approve those portions of changes
that lead to reduced manning because of the large number of seafarers
willing to work who cannot find billets. The unions, understandably,
want to spread the work over the membership. Even in an environment
of balance between labor supply and demand, greater continuity of
employment may be viewed by the unions as weakening the ties between
the union and its meters. However, unions readily support manning
innovations that assure job survival or promise growth in billets.
Outside of the above understandable and manageable union concerns,
there are no legal, policy, or technical obstacles to greater employ-
ment or vessel ass ignorant continuity in the O. S . -f lag f leet. Nor are
there any obstacles, outside of union or corporate culture, to the
reorganization of shipping offices and union organization. in support
of effective manning. However, if for no other reasons than communica-
tion and representation, the relatively large number of industry
entities compared to the small nether of union members or ships is a
considerable obstacle to change. This fragmentation complicates the
formation and execution of manning innovation projects, and the
reorganization of shipboard work.
MANNING RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION, AND TE:CENOL~GY TRANSFER
Effective manning of the U.S.-flag fleet has been the object of
several studies, including job satisfaction surveys, manning-level
task analyses, and projects directed towards defining The ship of the
future. ~ A kind of research, which has been key to the development
and implementation of manning innovations in the effectively manned
fleets of Northwest Europe and Japan, and which has been absent in the
U.S.-flag fleet, is action research.
OCR for page 67
67
Action research is organizational development research that has
as its objectives both ache development of new knowledge and simul-
taneously the promotion and implementation of organizational change.
In action research, the project participants {i.e. ~ seafarers,
corporate managers, union and government off icials) participate in the
planning and execution of the exper iment and the implementation of
results . ~ - - ~
hands-c~n
in -
The European exper fence with ef festive manning demonstrates
exper indenting ~ including a structure for doing so and for
transferring experimental results to other users} is an important
aspect of innovation, especially if the innovation is to be adopted by
other users.
Moreover, action research allows each user the opportunity to
participate in the development and implementation of innovations. The
European experience has shown that changes tailored to one workplace
may fail in another without the molding and shaping that results from
action research. Stated another way, the most successful organiza-
tional changes have been the product of action research.
While action research is absent from the U.S.-flag maritime
industry, it has been an element of organizational change in other
sector s of U. S . industry. The introduction of quality of work life
and ocher employee involvement programs into the automobile, communi-
cations, rubber, and other U. S. industr ies has been facilitated through
action research. The elements of union and management agreement to
cooperate for technological and organizational change In these
instances have been:
o Common statement of ob jectives;
o Joint plan for change, respecting the organizational integr ity of
each party;
o Joint committee for approving and monitoring change projects; and
o Joint and also separate education and training for union and
management personnel.
In addition to the absence of action research in the U.S.-flag
fleet, mechanisms for technology transfer in the United States are not
being adequately used. Unlike overseas, the United States lacks a
single technologically oriented ship operators' association which could
document and disseminate information on developments to members. The
existing organizations are concerned primarily with government policies
and also are fragmented, being organized around issues of protection,
subs icy, and trade .
There is also no established ship operating research program in
the United States. However, a framework for such a program exists
within the Mar itime Administration; also, a report of the National
OCR for page 68
68
Research Council (National Research Council, 1983) has recommended
that industry sponsor such a program. Since no U. S. companies are
engaged in formal effective manning projects comparable to those
undertaken in Northwest Europe and Japan, it is no surpr ise that there
are no informal networks of such companies sharing the results of
their trials. That inhibition may be exacerbated by the antitrust
laws of the United States, which, whether for fear or fact, have a
chilling effect OR industrial cooperation. Overseas, there are enough
experimenting companies, unions, researchers, and interested parties
to sustain a number of workshops, conferences, publications, and other
forums for technology transfer.
TRAINING
Through training programs designed to give officers and unlicensed
mariners multiple technical skills, U.S. maritime training centers are
contr ibuting to setting the stage for ef fective manning innovation in
the IJnited States. The training centers are often The product of
union-shipping industry cooperation; usually union operated and
company funded. The decline in billets has reduced the annual
contr ibutions of operators to the training centers, and the use made
of them. Thus, while the U.S. training centers are progressive and
have good facilities, they are also underutilized and underfunded.
Nevertheless, the industry-labor cooperation that is evident in the
training canters provides a basis to extend cooperation to other
sectors of mar itime industry, especially manning innovations.
Any further modif ications to training curr icula that may be
necessary In support of effective manning are not likely to cause
problems with accreditation boards or to extend the course of
instruction; the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy already graduates
dual-licensed officers in 4 years. Training for expanded managerial
responsibilities can be developed and provided by existing management
training or continuing education programs. Training in organizational
devel opment processes, both for shipboard and shoreside personnel,
could be obtained Through a number of organizations in the United
States which have conducted such training for other industries; or
existing mar itime training centers could provide such training .
GOVERNMENT RUNES
With certain exceptions explained in the text and in Appendix C,
minimum manning levels are determined administratively by the Coast
Guard. The Coast Guard performs that duty by means of policy
guidelines which are implemented in the field through issuance of
Certificates of Inspection. The flexibility of this approach
contrasts favorably with that of Norway and elsewhere, where manning
levels are prescr ibed by law. There are, however, several legal
impediments and observations:
OCR for page 69
69
Specific manning requirements such as for a radio officer may no
longer be necessary in light of technological advances and
state-of-the-art equipment installed on U.S.-flag ships.
The situation of conflicting statutes and judicial interpretations
concerning the three-watch law (46 USC 8104 (673) and related
laws (46 USC 8301(a) (223); 46 USC 8301(a)(5) (404)), has become
even more confusing as a result of technology advances which have
obviated the necessity of many wa~chs~anding duties, especially
in the engine department.
The Crossover Law. (46 USC 8104 (673), which stipulates that the
seafarer may not serve in both deck and~engine departments in a
single voyage, and the statutory division of deck and engine
licenses may no longer be productive or necessary in light of
technology advances and shipboard organizational developments
that have been demonstrated overseas.
Updating of the designation of seafarers' ratings in regulations
and on Certificates of Inspection would seem to be required as
the result of the recent revision of Title 46 of the U.S. Code.
The revised law requires That seafarers' documents specify the
ratings in which the seafarer is authorized to serve. The law
requires further that the seafarer be authorized for service in
the capacity in which he is employed.
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES FOR SEAFARERS
Certain patterns of involvement are common to both some European
experimental ship projects and some U.S. manufacturing plant
pro jects. The two groups most likely to become involved and positive
about changes are the unlicensed mariners/shopfloor workers and vessel
masters/plant managers. The two groups likely to be most threatened
and therefore least actively involved are the junior officers/lower
and middle managers in plants and shore staff/division staff. The
patterns were reflected in the Hoegh Mistral-Mul~ina sequence, when
the second project attempted to remedy the problems of involvement,
which had been encountered in the first. It also was reflected in
Sealife' s containership pro ject ( 1976-1978 ) which focused on the
ratings and was followed by three pro ject ships within the same
company deco pursue shipboard delegation to junior off icers.
Manning changes that redef ine work conten~c, promote involvement
in decision making, and increase the continuity of crew members have
complex implications f or the development and utili cation of ski Its .
Such changes can be developed in a way that takes into account the
interests of both mariners and ship operators. Properly formulated
and implemented, these changes can enhance both economic performance
and human satisfaction.
OCR for page 70
70
However, other manning changes often reduce billets and sometimes
increase workloads. These kinds of changes have led mar iners' unions
and their members to negotiate compensation for their concurrence and
participation. Compensation has taken the form of compensating pay-
ments or retraining. A major obstacle in the United States to union
concurrence with reduced manning is the unfunded pension liabilities,
which- increase when manning is reduced. Compensation arrangements
will have to take pension liabilities into account as well as the
needs of participating near iners. However, unfunded pension liabilities
may in the future exceed the ability of ship operators to pay.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
shipboard management
