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OCR for page 80
7
Organizational Aspects of
the Nuclear Industry
The research suggested about the human-system interface,
the personnel subsystem, and human performance win not, by
themselves solve ad the problems. Problems of training, skill
maintenance and enhancement, and motivation and morale still
remain. Dispirited personnel will be likely to use good equipment
carelessly, and poorly trained personnel to use it inefficiently. This
implies a need for research at the outer layers of Figure 1 to com-
plement the program we have described in the previous sections
for the two innermost levels.
The panel recognizes that the focus of human factors in the
nuclear industry has been on people who directly interact with
the machine—operators and maintenance personnel. A complete
treatment of human factors also includes broader questions about
the organization and atmosphere in which these people function.
While recommendations that follow are addressed to the nuclear
industry, much of the needed research is not nuclear specific. In
part this is because research on organizational factors is not as
advanced as, for example, on human-system interface design. Be-
cause most people in the nuclear industry are not farn~liar with
the social and behavioral science fields that address this level, the
discussion of research background and needs is kept at a general
level for the nonspecialist.
The panel's primary concern in the area of organization and
management is the extent to which the organization is able, quickly
80
OCR for page 81
81
and efficiently, to prevent, detect, and react to any threats to over-
all system safety. Within the constraints imposed by regulatory
bodies and standards, management decisions affect many aspects
of plant safety, both directly and indirectly. Managers determine
or are ultimately responsible for the type of equipment employed
and the extent to which that equipment incorporates human be-
havioral knowledge in its design. They determine recruitment,
selection, training, promotion, and compensation policies, thereby
determining membership and placement within the organization.
Management practices are responsible, directly or indirectly, for
establishing and maintaining an organizational culture that rein-
forces safety and the quality of performance. Managers decide
how they will interact with other organizations outside the plant,
including utility groups (e.g., INPO), unions, and state and fed-
eral regulators. And finally, managers are largely responsible for
determining the type of people who are admitted into their own
ranks, which clearly affects the continuity of a given organizational
culture. Management's role is central to the safe functioning of
plants.
Deep understanding of the factors affecting management de-
cisions and the consequences for safety and the quality of per-
formance is essential for effective regulation and operation. Re-
cent examples of the crucial importance of management and or-
ganization include management failures in the Challenger tragedy
(Rogers, et al. 1986) and the well-documented failures in the Three
Mile Island incident and at Chernobyl (NUREG-1250, 1988~. It is
important to note that the ways in which management and orga-
nization affect safety in the context of nuclear power plant oper-
ations are researchable questions (e.g., NUREG/CR-1656, 1980b;
NUREG/CR-3215 volumes 1 and 2, 1983f; NUREG/CR-3601,
1984e; NUREG/CR-3645, 1984c; NUREG/CR-3737, 1984d). An-
swers may result in the reduction of risk and the acquisition of
useful tools (e.g., NUREG/CR-3215, volumes 1 and 2 1983f). We
believe that management and organizational factors have a signif-
icant effect on plant safety as well as productivity and must be
subjected to systematic research.
The topics discussed in this section are not a comprehensive
list of researchable topics in the area of management and organi-
zation. They reflect the panel's judgment as to important areas
of inquiry that are likely to bear fruit in terms of improved safety.
The panel views two topics organizational design and culture and
OCR for page 82
82
the effects of regulatory measures on operating and maintenance
crews- as most unport ant for immediate attention. Other topics
for subsequent, longer-term research are also suggested.
THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS ON
THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT
Rationale and Background
Organizations and entities beyond a utility's boundaries have
a significant effect on its policies and practices. This is particu-
larly true with respect to various regulatory agencies, especially
the NRC, but also state PUCs, and the environmental, health, and
safety agencies of the states and the federal government. Manage-
ment serves as the lens through which the external environment
is focused on the utility. If management is adroit and skilled,
variations in local practices and corporate situations can be taken
into account in applying regulations. If it is not, regulations may
result in inflexibilities in the workplace that hamper control room
operations and maintenance crew performance.
In addition to their relations with regulatory agencies, util-
ities also deal with INPO, EPRT, EEl, and other organizations
supported by utilities themselves, as well ~ union organizations.
How utilities respond to the opportunities and challenges pre-
sented by these organizations bears on their openness to new ideas
and innovative human factors technology, their ability to inde-
pendently evaluate the products of research or consulting, and
their commitment to continual self-improvement. Since utilities
are placing greater dependence on INPO for establishing practices
that result in excellence for individual utilities, it is important to
understand the relation between individual utilities and INPO.
Utilities must also deal on a regular basis with unions. The
unionization of power plant operators and maintenance personnel
may have a positive, negative, or neutral effect on attaining high
degrees of safety.
Research Recommendations
Some regulations must be applied directly and specifically
without modification to local conditions. To what degree does
OCR for page 83
83
specificity have the desired effect? Are there organizational condi-
tions that produce a sense of regulatory overload among operators
or maintenance crews, or evoke informal norms that reduce their
intended effect (Bardach and Kagan, 1982~? Research examining
the responses of management to pressures from the regulatory en-
vironment would shed light on how safety at a facility is enhanced
or impaired by regulatory actions intended to have positive conse-
quences.
What conditions are associated with the contribution of unions
to safety, on one hand, and to high production capacities, on the
other? Are these conditions mutually exclusive? One might ex-
pect unions to stress investment in safety equipment and proce-
dures; however, as pressures for economizing arise, such invest-
ments could be seen as potential threats to the number of jobs in
the plant. What union policies and practices reinforce or erode
emphasis on plant operating safety and quality maintenance? How
can unions and management be encouraged to work cooperatively
to encourage safety?
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND A CULTURE OF
RELIABII ITY
Rationale :'nd Background
The formal structure, procedures, and practices of an orga-
nization bind the behavior of its members and strongly affect
the norms and perspectives they have regarding critical activities.
Utilities vary in scale, diversity, and their legal relation with state
PUCs. Most employ multiple sources of electrical power gener-
ation; nuclear power reactors are not usually the predominant
source of supply. Therefore, corporate policies must take into ac-
count the operating demands of varying mixes of power-generating
technologies. The operating demands of nuclear reactors are more
stringent than other generating technologies. Relations between
corporate and plant management may vary from highly support-
ive, with considerable plant management autonomy, to distant
and distracted, with punitive reactions to problerr~s that may arise
due to unexpected technical developments. The management and
operation of nuclear power reactors present operators with very
demanding circumstances. Failures have serious consequences.
Operator and maintenance crews are effective only if they have
OCR for page 84
84
full knowledge of the appropriate processes and high motivation
to carry them out. A great many of these processes are formalized
in standard operating procedures (SOPs). But SOPs, or informal
operating rules, rarely provide sufficient guides for behavior to
account for all the technical and cooperative skins or motivations
necessary for effective, safe performance. The gaps are filled by an
organization's culture, and motivations sustained by its manage-
rial cInnate.
The culture of management in nuclear power plants is likely to
be colored by an engineering and nuclear navy ethos. Managers so-
cialized in an engineering culture often devalue operational knowI-
edge and knowledge from the field, while managers socialized in
the military often underemphasize the horizontal coordination of
units and overemphasize the vertical chain of command. There
is reason to believe that in some circumstances a strong vertical
chain of command inhibits the flow of information from operating
levels reporting hazards and troubles (NUREG/CR-3737, 19846~.
Researth Recommendations
Given this background, a higher-priority research topic is the
relation of formal structure and practice to the development of
norms and expectations that reinforce safe, reliable behavior by
operators and maintenance crews. To what degree do the stringent
operating demands result in tensions within the corporation? Are
differential rewards and punishments necessary as a function of the
type of generating technology? How do various utilities manage
these differential requirements? ~ this a source of tension for the
nuclear operations? If tensions exist, do they increase the difficulty
of establishing a safe operating environment?
What are the variations in corporate-plant management prac-
tice and style across the several types of utilities? Is there sys-
tematic variation in the level of safety and days of high-capacity
production? What supports are provided by the corporation for
training, quality assurance, and other aspects of operation that
are seen as necessary by plant management?
What group norms are evident within a nuclear power plant
concerning relations among and obligations to group members ant]
to the organization as a whole? What organizational conditions,
practices, and incentives reinforce commitments to production as
well as to very high levels of safety? How does the adversarial
OCR for page 85
85
culture of regulation effect the development of cooperative norms?
It should be emphasized that research on adversarial relations is
extremely difficult and may have to be directed by a third party
rather than those in the adversarial relationship.
To what degree does the employment of operators, super-
visors, and managers trained in the military reinforce patterns
of vertical authority and centralized administration? Does this
lead managers to emphasize mechanisms of vertical integration
and downplay mechanisms of horizontal integration? Under what
conditions does such training result ~ a limited flow of error-
identifying information? How can managers orient changes to
improve their effectiveness if such changes are alien to the culture
from which they come?
In sum, how might managers manipulate organizational design
to meet the challenges of information flow in knowledge-intensive
settings? How do such variables as span of control, vertical height,
horizontal breadth, functional specialization, interunit coordina-
tion, and the linkages between staff and line ultimately affect
safety?
OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING
Rationale and Background
Decision making in organizations' operating technologies based
on sophisticated knowledge presents both managers and operators
with a continuous challenge of reconciling the formal authority
of hierarchical position and the responsibility to make decisions
under circumstances in which non-decision-making operators may
have better information on conditions and consequences than man-
agers. Managers can attempt somehow to command the knowI-
edge necessary to understand operating conditions quickly enough
to set directions, indicate a course of action, etc. Or, if it be-
comes impossible to stay on top of a current technical situation (a
more likely case), managers can, by establishing formal relations
with subordinates, make it possible to delegate decisions to lower-
level participants, trusting that they will inform decision makers
of untoward conditions even if such conditions result from the
operators' own actions.
OCR for page 86
86
Research Recommendations
Relations between plant management and operators vary wide-
ly among utilities. Some are quite satisfactory; others are distant
and strained. Are there systematic differences in the structure
and dynamics of managerial and operator relations? Do they
affect the speed and quality of decision making between opera-
tors, supervisors, and plant management? Are there particular
communication, training, or promotion factors associated with
top performance and nearly "failure-free" operations? What are
the communication patterns between the corporate offices and
power plant management that ensure the information necessary
for timely emergency decision making? Do the conditions that fos-
ter effective communication between supervisors and work teams
in different types of situations vary by type of worker?
T1MI:LY RECOGNITION O1? EMERGENCIES
Rationale and Bacl~gronnd
Most recent research on emergency response has examined
the increasing sophistication of monitoring devices. While these
technical improvements may prove to be valuable aids to operators,
they may also compound the problem of recognizing the patterns
of information necessary to identify an emergency. Recognizing the
onset of emergencies is a process that makes use of complex and
changing channels of information, some of which may be suspected
as unreliable. Hence, identifying an emergency in plant operations
is inevitably a group process.
Research Recommendations
Understanding the ways in which groups evaluate evidence
and reach conclusions under stress is crucial for the design of
emergency operating procedures and the development of better
training methods.
Research is needed on models of organizational design to deal
with emergencies (NUREG/CR-3524, 1984f; NUREG/CR-1745,
1980a), for it is reasonable to assume that an organizational design
well suited to normal operations may not necessarily be equally
effective in responding to emergencies.
OCR for page 87
87
CHARACTERISTICS OF MANAG1:RS
Rationale and Background
Who are the managers whom we entrust with safe and pro-
ductive operations? What type of qualifications, experience, and
training do they receive for these crucial positions? The NRC-
sponsored research on the STA highlights the links between prom
lems of career management and knowledge management (NUREG/
CR-2952, 1983a; NUREG/CR-3396; 1984b; NUREG/CR-3785,
1984a; NUREG/CR-4280, 19856~. Many operators and utilities
were disappointed with the role of the STA and some had difficulty
in filling this position. Engineers who became STAs disliked the
shift work, often lacked operating experience, could not gain the
respect of the operating crews, and often had no meaningful work
to do when the plant was operating smoothly. NRC researchers
note that utilities experimented with or at least considered various
alternative roles to meet the purposes of this function, such as a
shift engineer's getting a license or a shift supervisor's earning an
engineering degree. Such proposed alternatives must resolve two
difficult labor market and career issues: (1) people with engineer-
ing degrees want a career and may tolerate shift work only for the
short run, and (2) the labor market cannot supply many people
who combine both operations and engineering competence.
Upgrading and professionalization' of the work force are re-
shaping the balance between internal and external labor markets.
This poses a substantial challenge to nuclear utilities. Employ-
ees in field or low-level jobs who receive more responsibility and
training yet lack advanced degrees and further technical or general
training at school cannot advance into management ranks. Tradi-
tional "bridge" jobs that linked the bottom of the job ladder with
the middle are disappearing, in part because of automation, while
credential requirements mean that those without degree cannot
advance, even if they are competent.
Knowledge-intensive industries may be developing a new sys-
tem of integrating training, jobs, and careers. Evidence thus
far suggests that people without degrees will be more intensively
trained, while occupying paraprofessional jobs. Such people are
likely to return to school, often taking a new job with another
company. They move in and out of enterprises and colleges more
frequently to shape an upwardly mobile career.
OCR for page 88
88
Researth Recommendations
Analysis of the training, education, and experience of U.S.
nuclear power plant managers is a necessary baseline for tracking
changes over time, as demographic and economic forces change
the profile of this work force. In addition, comparison of these
qualifications to judgments concerning acceptable qualifications
would point the way toward improvements, should any be needed.
Better knowledge of managerial qualities could result in increased
public confidence in nuclear power generation as a safe energy
source for the United States.
There is also a question of whether utilities have an adequate
conception of operators. Are they merely workers, or are they
professionals? If the latter, how can a utility overcome the con-
straints of a tight labor market? Would it be too costly to create
a professional corps of operators who have degrees, operating li-
censes, and welI-defined career paths? Could experience in fields
employing paraprofessionals, such as paralegal, paramedical, and
police personnel, be applied to nuclear power plants? What is the
consequence of this method of competing in today's rigorous labor
market?
The implications for the nuclear industry's personnel and
training programs are likely to be significant and warrant sus-
tained study. What relations with local educational institutions
could be developed? What changes in career structure could be
encouraged by changes in utilities' hiring and promotion practices?
Representative terms from entire chapter:
plant management
