regional roadway utilities would clearly not occur for a long time. The growth in privatization, both for individual facilities and broader networks of roads, involves many uncertainties about the potential efficiency gains, winners and losers, liability, and political feasibility. These would be fruitful topics for further research.

During the current period of small-scale experimentation, a variety of institutional forms is likely to emerge, each suited to the specific legal and political conditions in the areas where proposed (Olson, Vol. 2). For regional or areawide congestion pricing, it is clear that some form of regional institution is required because of the many interjurisdictional issues that are raised. Metropolitan special districts or state transportation agencies may work in some areas. The considerable variation in customs, administrative arrangements, and law from locale to locale almost dictates that different institutions emerge. Although no single institutional form appears perfect, there are sufficient existing models to suggest that satisfactory arrangements could be achieved.

A shift from the current approach to highway finance and management to a congestion pricing approach would represent a significant—even radical—change. The political feasibility of achieving such a change is therefore difficult to assess. Three issues appear paramount in determining political feasibility: the general acceptance by the public of paying for facilities at the time and place used as opposed to paying in the form of taxes on gasoline, sales, and property; the distribution of winners and losers (which includes revenue uses designed to minimize the adverse impacts); and the conditions influencing local coalition building in support of or in opposition to congestion pricing.

American motorists are accustomed to using roads without paying for use at the time. Although motorists would be expected to resist increased tolling of any kind, opinion polls suggest a willingness to pay by users confronted with congestion. A national opinion poll found that two-thirds of motorists who experience congestion say they would pay to avoid delay (Apogee Research, Inc. 1990). About 4 in 10 would pay at least $2.00/day

Front Matter (R1-R10)

Executive Summary (1-15)

1 Introduction (16-26)

2 Theory and Experience (27-38)

3 Possible Effects (39-57)

4 Technical and Political Feasibility (58-80)

5 Design, Evaluation, and Research (81-96)

6 Summary (97-103)

Appendix A: Traffic Congestion (104-116)

Appendix B: Theory, Experience, and Estimated Effects (117-139)

Study Committee Biographical Information (140-146)