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4 Co Offender Influences on Criminal Careers Albert I. Reiss, Jr. INTRODUCTION Offender histories ordinarily are char- acterizec! by a mix of different types of offenses and by a mix of offenses commit- ted alone and with accomplices. Group or accomplice offending is more characteris- tic of juvenile than adult careers. This paper reviews the current state of knowI- ecige about co-offending in juvenile and adult criminal careers to illuminate how and when co-offencling is relevant to strat- egies of intervention in criminal careers, particularly strategies to reduce crime rates. The paper begins with a brief cle- scription of the major policy questions that will be acIdressec3 and then summa- rizes the knowledge about co-offending that is relevant to them. Selective Incapacitation of Offenders One of the major strategies proposer! to reduce the crime rate is to incapacitate Albert J. Reiss, Jr., is the William Graham Sumner professor of sociology and in the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, and lecturer in law, Yale Law School. The reader is referred to the Acknowledgments section at the end of this chapter. 72z career criminals selectively, i.e., to re- move from society those offenders who have high individual rates of offending. In theory one expects to reduce the num- ber of crimes, and correlatively the num- ber of victims involvecI in those crimes, by the amount of crime the incapacitates] offender wouIcT have committed were he or she not incarcerated. Within limits, that seems to be a reasonable presump- tion, provi(led the crimes are committee! by a single offender. But whether one actually prevents those crimes from oc- curring when incapacitating an offender will (lepenc3 also on the group status of the offender and the behavior of co-offend- ers and their affiliatecl offending groups. For unless an offender's accomplices are (leterre(1 from offending by the offen~ler's incapacitation, no crimes may be saved. The accomplices may continue to commit the offenses alone, with one another, by recruiting new accomplices from within their group, or by recruiting new mem- bers to their membership network either as new participants in offending or at increased rates of offending. Group or- ganization and affiliation will facilitate the search for accomplices, and indeed,

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122 Reiss (1980:1~16) has argued that inca- pacitation can increase the crime rate if it leads to a marginal increase in the num- ber of offenders and their individual rates of offending. It is important, conse- quently, to know to what extent patterns of recruitment into offending as well as changes in individual rates of offending may limit the capability of an incapacita- tion policy to reduce the crime rate. Age of Intervention It is well known that a substantial pro- portion of all offending, including offend . . . . 1ng in serious crimes, occurs at young ages and that the age of onset of offending is quite young. Moreover, a serious juve- nile career record appears predictive of high-rate offending in serious crimes as an adult (Chaiken ant] Chaiken, 1982:871. It is also recognized that, while a great many young people participate in crime, many drop out fairly early in their career (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972:~), often without any official intervention to deter them from offending. Yet, at an early age a sizable minority of youthful offenders have high indiviclual rates of offending (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972:1041. This raises the question of whether high-rate offenders can be iden- tifiect at an early age so that they can be selected for special treatment in a juve- nile or criminal justice system. Related to the issue of the early cletec- tion and selection of career offenders is whether group affiliation is critical in on- set, persistence, and clesistance from of- fending. Of particular interest is the role that groups play in these phases of a juvenile criminal career. Were one able, for example, to identify high-rate offen(l- ers who recruited a large number of per- sons into committing clelinquent acts or persons who hac] a substantial effect on the individual crime rate of a large nu~n- ber of offenders, one might want to select CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS those offender-recruiters for special treat- ment in a criminal justice system. Target of Intervention Strategies Many intervention strategies aim to in- tervene in the life of an offender to pre- vent offending either by incapacitating the offender or encouraging Resistance when the offender is allowed to remain in the free society. The latter are usually called individual-change strategies. Yet, other strategies are possible, such as al- tering group and other social structures or intervening in collective activity. If groups are important to the onset, persis- tence, and Resistance from offending, one may want to intervene directly in group relationships or alter group structure so as to reduce the propensity for delinquent or criminal behavior. Or, recognizing that networks facilitate the search for accom- plices, one may want to intervene in those networks to increase the costs of search behavior. The discussion that fol- lows of the role of group offending in criminal careers will address the implica- tions for intervention strategies. THE NATURE OF GROUP OFFENDING There is no commonly agreed-on defi- nition of a group in research on delin- quent and criminal behavior. Offending groups often are treated in writings on delinquency as synonymous with gangs, the gang being a territorially organized, age-graded peer group engaged in a wide range of activities and having a well- defined leadership (Miller, 1975:9~. Em- pirically, most persons who engage in group delinquency are not members of such highly structured groups (Klein and Crawford, 1967; Morash, 1983:329), and in most aggregates of 20 or more peers, persons are only loosely associated with one another, leadership is unclear, and

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS membership turnover is fairly high. Yablonsky (1959) refers to these peer ag- gregates as "near-groups." Following Lerman (1967:63), group offending is treated in this paper from the perspective of social networks macle up of pairs, tri- ads, and constellations of four or more persons. The extent to which networks and relationships within them are bounded organizationally, behaviorally, and territorially is left problematic. SOME PRELIMINARY ISSUES Before examining the basic parameters of group offending and their relationship to criminal careers, a few issues that affect concepts and measures of group offencI- ing should be consiclered. These are the relationship of offending to crime events; defining ant! measuring lone, as con- trasted with group, offending; and the effects of criminal justice processing on parameters of group offending. Crime Incidents, Their Victims, and Their Offenders Any crime event or incident involves one or more crimes or offenses, one or more offenders, and, consenting and pub- lic-order crimes excepted, one or more victims. One expects to find a number of relationships among a population of crime events and their offenses, victims, and offenders. For example, the ratio of victims to events clepencis on the rate of multiple victimization in events and the rate of victimization ofthe same person in different events. And the population of offenders relative to the population of events depends on the size of the of- fending group in an event and individual rates of offending by group members. It is ordinarily assumed, moreover, that the prevalence or participation rate of offend- ers is well below the aggregate incidence of their offenses and charges and that the |23 differences are clue primarily to variation in both individual rates of offending and the size of offending groups in crime events. The above relationships between of- fen~lers and events can be illustrated quite simply using data on residential burglary and robbery. The Peoria (Illi- nois) Crime Reduction Council (1979), for example, undertook a study of all ju- veniles taken into custody for residential burglary from 1971 to 1978. There were 467 juveniles who accounted for 306 sep- arate burglaries during this period. The group composition of both the burglary incidents and the offenders involved in them is shown in Table 1. In regard to burglary offenses commit- tec3 by apprehended juveniles cluring this period, single offenders accounted for one-half of all residential burglaries. In regard to offenders involves! in these bur- glaries, however, the one-half of the resi- clential burglaries with two or more offenders involved two-thirds of all of- fenders, and the great majority of multi- ple-offender burglaries involved two of- fenders. How the size of offending groups af- fects the size of an offender population is seen even more dramatically for robbery offenses. Just over one-half of all robbery TABLE 1 Group Composition of Burglary Incidents and Offenders Group Composition Number Percent Burglary Incidents With one offender only With two or more offend- ers Total burglary incidents Burglary Offenders Single offender in incident 155 151 306 155 Two or more offenders in incident 312 Total burglary offenders 467 50.6 49.4 100.0 33.2 66.8 100.0 SOURCE: Peoria Crime Reduction Council (1979).

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124 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS TABLE 2 Group Composition of Robbery Incidents and Offenders Percent Distribution by Size of Offending Group Total Four or Number One Two Three More Robbery Incidents 1,149,000 51.5 24.2 14.3 10.0 Robbery Offenders 2,215,272 26.7 25.1 22.3 25.9 SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics (1984:Tables 52 and 62). victimizations in the United States in 1982 involved a single offender (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1984:Table 621. Nonetheless, as seen from the clistribu- tion in Table 2, only one-fourth of all robbery offenders in those events of- fended alone, and there were about equal proportions of groups of two, three, and four or more offenders. Note that for about one-half of all rob- beries, the same robbery is part of the criminal history of more than one of- fender. Although there are on the average two offenders per robbery, in about one- fourth of all robberies, the same incident enters the criminal history of three or more offenders. If one knows the number of co-offenders in each offense in a crim- inal history, one can weight offenses ac- corclingly and estimate more precisely the "crimes saved" by incapacitating that offender. The larger the size of any par- ticipant's offending group, the less, on the average, that individuaT's absence should diminish the population of events. Lone and Group Offenders in Criminal Careers There is a firmly held view that most offenders are group offenders and that the career Tone offender is uncommon. These views are not based on the analysis of criminal careers or histories, however, but rather on the group composition of offending, especially of juvenile offencI ing. The statistical basis for the conclu- sion ordinarily is the individual and group composition of crime events rather than histories of offending for the offend- ers involved in those events. Quite commonly the group-size distri- bution for a population of events is used to estimate the participation rate of Tone offenders in a population. What is re- ported is a distribution of events by num- ber of offenders, and the proportion of single-offender events is taken as an esti- mate of the prevalence of lone offenders in a population. Such estimates are mis- leacling because events rather than per- sons are counted. Corrections can be made by weighting the events by the number of offenders reported for them and using an appropriate population as the base for the rate. Percentage distributions of the size of offending groups by crime type (the up- per halves of Tables 1 and 2) reflect the aggregate risk of being victimized by a group of a given size, including a single individual. By way of contrast, percent- age distributions of the number of of- fenders involved in those incidents by the size of the offending group (the Tower halves of Tables 1 and 2) are offender- based statistics and state the probability that a randomly selected offender will commit that crime alone or with a given number of associates. The latter statistics are more appropriate in relating events to criminal careers or to offenders to be

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS processed. When the interest lies in the rate of Tone or co-offencting crimes, state- ments should be made about a population of crime events, but when the interest lies in Tone- or group-offender participation rates, statements must be macle about a population of offenders. When all the events in a criminal his- tory are considered, a large proportion of offenders exhibit neither exclusively Tone nor exclusively group offending. Rather, most offender histories are characterized by a mix of offending alone and with accomplices. Although information on the number of accomplices in each event of an offender's criminal history is gener- ally lacking, some idea of the mix of Tone and accomplice offending can be gained by examining the criminal history of the juvenile offenders in the stucly by the Peoria Crime Reduction Council (1979~. The 467 Peoria juveniles apprehended for at least one burglary during a 7.5-year period were involved in 2,820 offenses for which 3,426 charges were filed. Con- sidering only co-offending among the 467 juveniles, 79 (16.9 percent) always com- mitted their offenses without accomplices from the study population, and 91 (19.5 percent) only actec] with accomplices from the study population. The large ma- jority (63.6 percent) sometimes actecl alone and sometimes with others from the study population.) Unfortunately, good estimates are not available of the variation among criminal histories in the mix of Tone and group offenses, of variation in the number of accomplices, and of the consistency and variation of co-offending in an individu- al's history. With that information, one might weight individual-offencler rates by their partial contributions to crime iSince the co-oending data in the criminal his- tories were tabulated only for offenders included in the study population, these are probably underesti- mates for lone offending. 12S events, especially when estimating the expected crimes saved by incapacitation. One might wish to use such a weighted indiviclual rate as a criterion for selective incapacitation. Effects of Criminal Justice Processing on Estimates of Group Offending Self-report studies of mate delinquent behavior disclose a higher rate of Tone offending than clo official records of ap- prehension for the same offenders (Erik- son, 1971; Hindelang, 1971, 1976b). The question arises, therefore, as to whether an apprehension hazard is associated with violating the law win others (Erikson, 1971:1211. For if violating in groups increases the likelihood of being apprehended, the prevalence of Tone of- fencling will be underrepresented in of- ficial records. Several attempts have been made to test whether there is a group-apprehen- sion hazard by comparing self-reported and officially reported offenses in an of- fender's history. Erikson (1971:125) con- cludecl that, although there is a greater risk of apprehension for offenses that are officially known rather than self-reported, the selection bias is consiclerably less for the most serious offenses. Subsequent re- search by Hinclelang (1976b:121) casts doubt on the group-hazarcl hypothesis. While exclusively group offenders have a higher risk of apprehension per crime than do those who always offend alone, those with a mix of Tone and accomplice offending have comparable risks in both types of events. What does seem apparent from Hinde- lang s work is that those engaging in illegal behaviour in groups are likely to engage in this behaviour more frequently than those engaging in the illegal behaviour alone" (1976b: 1221; incleed, the largest proportion of solitary offenders was found in the group with the lowest

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126 individual rates of offending and the smallest proportion of solitary offenders in the group with highest indiviclual rates. This supports Eriks on' s (1971) con- clusion that among offending youths, sol- itary offenders are more likely to engage less frequently in crimes and to commit less serious crimes than group offenders. Unfortunately, data are unavailable to determine whether adult solitary offend- ers are also disproportionally involved in the less serious offenses or have lower individual rates of offending. Since major crimes against persons involve higher rates of solitary offending, it is possible that adult solitary offending, in contrast to that of juveniles, is disproportionally con- centrated on the more serious offenses. BASIC PARAMETERS OF GROUP OFFENDING Despite the fact that a number of major longitudinal studies of criminal careers have followed samples of youths into their adult years (Glueck and Glueck, 1930, 1937, 1940, 1943, 1946; Shannon, 1978; Wolfgang, 1978; Elliott et al., 1983), none has examined patterns of co-offend- ing into adulthood. Thus, this discussion of the parameters of group offending must depend primarily on research on juvenile delinquency. Even that research, how- ever, pays relatively little attention to individual rates of offending or the role of co-offending in careers so that often a single study or source of data must be relied on. Offending and Group Size Breckinridge and Abbot (1917) were among the first to point out that most delinquent offenses are committed with at least one other person and that even most youths regardecl as Tone offenders occasionally engage in clelinquency with a companion. Somewhat later, Shaw and CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS Meyer (1929) and Shaw and McKay (1931) estimated in juvenile court sam- ples that less than 20 percent of the juve- nile offenders before the court committed offenses alone, that the modal size of an offending group is small (two or three participants), and that most delinquency is not committed by well-organizec3 groups. Shaw and McKay concludecI, moreover, that while such offending two- somes and threesomes commonly are combinations from a larger group, a whole group is rarely involved in the same delinquent or criminal act. Large networks that link by association up to 200 youths ordinarily consist of fewer than 30 or 40 active members orga- nized into smaller cliques of ~10 mem- bers (Klein and Crawford, 1967~. In a cohort study of delinquency in a Swedish community, a youth gang was defined as a group of juveniles who were linker] to- gether because the police suspected them of committing crimes together (Samecki, 1982: 144-145~.2 There were well over 100 of these gangs in the study. Membership varied from 2 to 30 boys; the mean size was 5 boys (Samecki: 151~. What was most evident, however, is that groups were constituted by co-offending relationships. These relationships con- sisted of links of co-offen(ling to form chains of association. One such chain in this Swedish city involved 260 boys and a few girls and constitutes! about 45 percent of the study population. Together they accounted for 86 percent of the crimes 2The study population was located in a southern Swedish industrial community of about 50,000 in- habitants. The records of the local police on all crimes whose suspects were under 15 years old and from the police register (PBR) for all juveniles 15 years and older were the main source of information on offenses. Additional data sources included re- ports from police hearings, from police interviews with juveniles suspected of crimes, and from social service authorities (Sarnecki, 1982:54~5~.

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS reported cluring the study period (Sar- necki: 14~1451. Although accomplices in delinquency are drawn more often from smaller cliques than from their larger network, the number of accomplices in any delin- quent act is much smaller than the num- ber in the clique (Short and Stro~tbeck, 1965; Klein and Crawford, 19671. Consic3- ering only those offenses committed by two or more offenders, the mocial size of an offending group from age 12 onward is two participants. Groups with four or more participants are relatively uncom- mon after age 14 or 15. The majority of offenders have accomplices until their early 20s, after which the majority commit their offenses alone (Hood and Sparks, 1970:87-881. There is some variation in Tone and group offending rates by country and considerable variation by type of of- fense (Sveri, 19651. The distribution of group size within an offending history has consequences for intervening in that career. A majority of most common crimes are committed by two or three offenders, and most offend- ers will have a substantial and continuing history of offenses in which their associ- ates change from crime to crime. The larger the offending group, the more likely it is to be confined to a single event unless the group specializes in specific targets of offending, as in terrorism or in some kinds of white-colIar offending in which continuing use of organizational power is integral to committing offenses. Age of Onset There is much controversy concerning whether the onset of delinquency is a consequence of induction by co-offencl- ers. Glueck and Glueck (1934a, b, 1937, 1943, 1950) contended that pre-clelin- quent and delinquent behavior began at an early age in family and school social- ization. They claimed that those with de 127 linquent tendencies associate with one another rather than being led into their joint clelinquent behavior by their associ- ations. Their definition of delinquency is quite broacI and includes behavior la- beled as "antisocial" and also "clelin- quent tendencies" (Glueck and Glueck, 1950:421. Moreover, their conclusion is not based on collecting information about the group composition of specific behav- ioral acts committed by offenders in their sample. Rather, their contention is based on their observation (Glueck and Glueck, 1950:41) that the onset of delinquency for their institutionalized delinquents oc- curred before age 10 and consequently, in their view, before the time that groups play a significant role in a boy's life. Challenging this conclusion, Eynon ant! Reckless (1961) founct that the me- dian age of first contact with juvenile authorities was 13 for incarcerated juve- nile offenders and that there were no significant differences in age of onset or the presence or absence of companions at the first officially recorded (lelinquent act (Eynon and Reckless:169~. The meclian age of onset for the first self-reported delinquent act ranged from 11 to 14 years clepencling on the type of offense. Self- reports on whether one hac3 companions for each of seven offense types ranged from 56 percent of those who ran away from home to a not surprising 100 percent of those engaging in gang fights (Eynon and Reckless: 170~. They concluclec! that the "presence of companions is a major component of male delinquency, regarcI- less of the age of delinquency onset" (Eynon and Reckless:1681; companion- ship is present at early as well as at late onset. But, as they note, what we still lack is information that tells us whether com- panionship experience relevant to the on- set of delinquency causes delinquent be- havior (Eynon and Reckless:168~. Most investigators seem to have missec! this obvious point that companionship

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128 begins among children at a fairly early age. Although Thrasher (1927), in his classic stucly of what he called "youth gangs" in Chicago, was well aware of the fact that the kinds of groupings in which he was interested were found at quite young ages, he focused on territorial groupings. Subsequent work focused on "organizer! gangs" rather than on "com- panionship." These groups were largely territorially organized anct regarded as a phenomenon of aclolescent and young aclult ages. Recruitment and induction into these peer groups were macle prob- lematic but without any explicit attention to prior delinquent histories. This was partly because Thrasher devoted a great deal of attention to official records of de- linquency, ant] a clelinquent act was rarely enterer] as an official record prior to age 12. In any case, what is at issue is whether the onset of delinquency involves primar- iTy Tone offending or whether it is linked primarily to companionship or accom- plice relationships. With answers to this key question, one may begin to unravel the problem of the role of groups in launching a continuing offending career, since there must be consiclerable clesis- tance from offending, even at very early ages. It is difficult to assess the role that companionship plays in the onset of cle- linquency because of the weak cross- section designs of most etiological studies and the failure to specify a testable causal model. A longitudinal design that follows members of a birth cohort as well as all their accomplices who are not members of the cohort is necessary to test causal hypotheses about onset. Unfortunately, up to now cohort studies have not exam- inec3 the role of co-offending in criminal careers. Olson's (1977) multiple regres- sion analysis of the personal interview data for a subset ofthe Racine birth cohort study (Shannon, 1978) found that first police contact at a very young age was CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS associated only with being mate and hav- ing friends in trouble with the police. Yet those two variables accounted for at most one-fourth of the variance, inclicating that the personal interview variables did not include the most important determinants of age at first police contact (Petersilia, 1980:349~. Group Affiliation and Individual Rates of Offending Individuals vary considerably in their rates of offending. Most young offenders also have co-offenclers in their offending and associate in other group activities with still other offenders. An interesting question is how an indiviclual's rate of offending is related to the offending rate of the affiliatec3 group. Morash (1983:319) concludes that the clelinquencY rate of one's peers is a strong predictor of an individuaT's rate of delinquency. Boys who belonged to peer groups with a be- low-average rate of clelinquency had be- Tow-average rates of clelinquency and boys with peers who had high indiviclual rates of clelinquency hacT an above-ave , ~ , rage indiviclual rate of delinquency (Morash:3211. Juveniles with high rates of offending typically commit those offenses with a large number of accomplices. Sarnecki (1982) found that the 35 most delinquent juveniles in the Swedish community he studied were linkecl to one another by membership in the largest gang and two smaller gangs. These were among the most criminally active gangs in the com- munity. The 35 juveniles were involves! with 224 accomplices in crime. Almost 3 in 10 of the 799 other delinquents in the community committed at least one crime win 1 of these 35 high-rate offenders (Sarnecki: 171,2091. The accomplices of these 35 were usually selected from the criminally more active part of the total offending population (Sarnecki:144-1451. High-rate juvenile offenders affiliate

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS with one another.in peer groupings. The 35 most active members were but 6 per- cent of the delinquents in Sarnecki's study population. They belonged to the three largest membership gangs, in which the mean number of suspected crimes per gang member was 22.3 during a 3-year period a rate that was three times that ofthe delinquent population as a whole. The members of the largest gang made up only 13 percent of the popula- tion of offenders, yet they accounted for 42 percent of all suspected crime (Sarnecki: 1741. Duration of Accomplice Relationships Most pairings in committing delin- quencies are of short duration. Sarnecki (p. 140) found that only 13 percent of the 1,162 juvenile clelinquency pairings in an offense in the Swedish community per- sisted beyond 6 months. Only 4 percent of the pairs were still committing crimes together after 1.5 years, but 1 of the 1,162 offending pairs was committing offenses together after 3.5 years, roughly half the 6 years the stucly tracked offenders. The short life of any pairing in delinquency partly reflects the fact that most delin- quent careers are short. Almost 6 in 10 youths in the Swedish cohort were known to the police cluring only one 6- month period ofthe 6-year study (Sarnec- ki:l411. Among those persisting in delin- quency, the modal pattern was to change associates in committing offenses. Sarnecki (pp. 142-143) also found that the most criminally active usually commit their crimes in pairs and that they pre- serve particular pairings longer than (lo those who are less active. The most active and seriously delinquent juvenile sus- pects were 45 times more likely to com- mit crimes with the same associates than were less active juveniles from the study population. Quite clearly, accomplices in offending change quite frequently in juvenile ca 729 reers. The larger the number of offenses committee! by an offender, the larger the number of different accomplices linked to that offender's career. One's accomplices as a juvenile are likely to be drawn from cliques or constellations of cliques with which one is affiliatecl. Or(linariTy, these cliques are part of a network. Adults are perhaps more likely than juveniles to be Inked in loose networks, ones in which they are linked by weak rather than strong ties (Granovetter, 19731. Stability of Group Affiliation An important issue is how shifts among cliques of peers and co-offenclers occur en c] how affiliation with cliques and larger networks is stabilized, on the one hand, and disconnected and terminated, on the other. These issues are not clealt with systematically in the research on crime and clelinquency.3 Thus, empirical studies on clelinquent gangs and street- corner groups are used here to explore these issues. It was quite evident in the Swedish community stucliecl by Sarnecki (1982) that most gangs, as well as pairings, ex- isted for only short periods of time. Only one gang persisted for the entire 6-year period and towards the end of that period it split into two separate groups. Yet a third was spun offin the final 6 months of Similarly, little is known about the stability of group affiliations among a population of nonoffend- ers. The stability of pair and group affiliations seems to vary by age and to be more stable during the pre- adolescent than the adolescent years. Still, it seems that all youths frequently change companions for conforming acts, such as walking to school, dating, going to the movies and shopping. Much more needs to be known about pair and group affiliations for nondelinquent or all youths to assess the relative stability of delinquent affiliations. It is possible that delinquent pairings show greater stability than non- delinquent pairings. Choosing different compan- ions for different activities, moreover, may simply be a characteristic of both youthful and adult behav ~or.

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130 the stucly. The original gang was still the largest of the three at the close of the study period, however, despite its losing members to form two others (Sarnecki: 153~. Although gangs can (livi(le by schism, merge with other gangs, or join a network of gangs, their durability has consequences for individual careers. Ca- reer termination may result simply from the short duration of groups and the loose links that bins! members, especially for those who rely primarily on group affili- ation for accomplices and support in of- fending. Suttles's (1968) study of street-corner groups in Chicago allows us to explore the stability of affiliations with o~encling groups. He identifiecI 32 named street- corner groups in the Aciciams area of Chi- cago (Suttles:1571. With one exception, they were made up exclusively of mates and averaged from 12 to 15 members in size. Some had as few as 8 members and one had 29. Each of the groups had some members who lived outside the Addams area ranging from 4 to 17 percent; 12 percent of the members of all the groups lived outside the area (SuttIes:157-1671. Outsiders were youths who either for- merly lived in the area or were relatecI by kinship to one of the group members (Suttles: 1651. Although Suttles (1968) floes not pro- vicle detailed information on the duration of the 32 groups, he reports that one laster! but 1 year and that some lasted 2 or 3 years (pp. 161, 1661. All were subject to considerable turnover in membership, partly because of resi(lential mobility.4 Of those known to have quit membership in 4Klein and Crawford (1967) similarly reported high turnover in the black Los Angeles gangs they studied. They reported that "many members af- filiate with the group for brief periods of from a few days to a few months, while others move out of the neighborhood or are incarcerated for periods some- times exceeding a year" (p. 661. CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS groups, 41 percent moved to another area of Chicago (SuttIes: 1671. One additional fact is worth noting. A substantial proportion of all boys in an area never affiliate with these larger groups (Short and Stro(ltbeck, 1965:56- 57; Suttles: 1731. Suttles reports that most of the unaffiliated are boys who regularly "bane! together" in small cliques (p. 1691. Few boys, then, are isolates. The role of affiliation with territorial delinquent groups in accounting for differences in individual rates of offending is unclear, however. SuttIes (p. 220) reports that ar- rest rates were about equal for the affil- iated and unaffiliated boys. Yet others, especially Short and Strodtbeck, report much higher individual rates of offending for gang-affiliated boys. The stability of territorially based groups is threatened by three major con- tingencies: transiency, incarceration of members, and shifts to conventional ca- reers. Slum neighborhoods especially are characterized by high residential tran- siency of families. That transiency has three major consequences for territorial youth organizations. For one, it makes the membership of any group volatile. From the perspective of the group, to survive substantial annual turnover in member- ship, it must obtain new members. From the perspective of the individual mem- ber, it means transitory affiliations with some group members and adapting to the exodus of former members and an influx of new members. Recruitment and re- placement are age graded, and there is some preference for older rather than younger boys (Suttles:163~. Even associ- ations between gang boys appear age graded. Klein and Crawford (1967:74) re- port that younger gang members are sel- dom seen in the company of older gang members. Another consequence of transiency is that it spreads the network and influence of the group beyond the confines of its

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS territory, always linking some former res- idents to it. Chicago appears similar to Sarnecki's (1982) Swedish community in that some youths who move into other areas affiliate with other territorial groups (Keiser, 1969; Short and Moland, 1976:1681. Transiency thus both expands the choice of accomplices and links terri- torially based groups. lust how widely such individual contacts spread across territorially based groups is unclear but some of the most active and serious of- fenclers are transient and use this larger network to search for accomplices. Transiency also has important conse- quences for the temporal continuity of territorially based groups. To survive, the group must continually invest in replac- ing members. The more formally orga- nized a group and the more provision it makes for replacement of members, the more likely it is to survive, as studies of Chicago's black conflict gangs demon- strate. The Vice Lords, which incorpo- rated as a not-for-profit organization, gained as many as 8,000 members in 26 divisions (Sherman, 1970), while the in- formally organized Nobles barely sur- vivec] (Short and Moland: 1681. The higher the residential transiency of an area, the more likely its youths are to be organized into a loose confederation and the fewer and less stringent are the crite- ria for entry and continuing affiliation with its territorial groups. Moreover, the combination of transiency and the aging of members, with replacement confiner] to a narrow range of age-mates, suggests that recruitment is limited to newly en- tering residents or, in a few cases, by mergers among gangs (Sherman, 1970; Short ant! Moland: 168~. The combination of these contingencies suggests that un- less youth groups are formally structured to deal with turnover, they should have fairly high death rates. The second important source of insta- bility in gang membership is the rate of ]3] incarceration of gang members. The more seriously delinquent the members of a gang, the more likely they are to be incar- cerated for substantial periods of time. Short and Molanct (p. 168) report that nearly all the Vice Lords had been in correctional institutions at one time or another, and Short and StroUtbeck (1965) draw attention to the disruptions causer] by incarcerating gang leaclers. Unfortu- nately, they do not provide estimates of the rate of incarceration for any time in- terval. A third important source of turnover in street-corner group membership is the shift to more conventional career affilia- tions by some members. At least one-half of Suttles's (p. 167) Addams-area group dropouts left because Key married, went into the service, joined a job training program, or worked regularly in a job. Relatively few were lost to jail. The general impression is that delin- quents are organized into loose federa- tions rather than highly organized groups. The federation is characterized by loose ties among inclivicluals and cliques or clusters. Members are linked by a variety of activities in addition to delinquent of- fencling. Inclivicluals are not tightly bound either to large groups or to partic- ular pairings within groups. Accomplices change quite frequently. According to Olofsson (1971), Swedish male juvenile delinquents are less selective of compan- ions ancl their choices are less stable than are those of youths in the general popu- lation. It perhaps is reasonable to con- clucle that, while there are some highly structured territorial gangs that persist for periods of time (Miller, 1958, 1975; Clinard and Ohlin, 1960; Spergel, 1964; Klein and Crawford, 1967), associates in most delinquency offenses are drawn from much less structured networks in which nuclei of offenders are linked as nodes in that network. Territorial gangs (Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1943) are per

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150 sitory. Some confirmation for this pattern of shifting to lone offending with aging was found in a major study by Sveri in Sweden (19651. Group Processes in Selective Attrition from Criminal Careers The concern in this section is to ac- count for the selective attrition of group offenders. In doing so, explanations of how group and network processes ac- count for Resistance from criminal careers are posited. Three archetypes of desis- tance are presented. Desistance of group offenders can be attributed to specific deterrence, to status transactions, and to disruption of group affiliations. Specific Deterrence This archetype assumes that punishing an offender not only leacis the offender to desist but has consequences for other group members as well. It assumes. moreover, that an individual is inducted into offending by others, as a member of a group, and continues to offend with one or more group members until appre- hendecI. The sanction of being caught (particularly if reinforcer] by parental or other sanctions) leads that individual to desist from offending. The experience of being sanctioned has a specific deterrent effect on the offender. Apprehending and punishing a member of a clique may increase the likelihood that other mem- bers, especially accomplices who are not punishecl, will also desist. The percep- tion of the risk of being caught is in- creased by apprehension followed by punishment. This is a special kind of specific (leterrence whereby the punish- ment of some specific and significant other leads to Resistance. What is critical in this deterrence is that one knows the person who is being punished and conse- quently has a more (lirect basis for vicar CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS iously experiencing the punishment and calculating one's risk. This archetype probably accounts for much of the Resistance at young ages ant! early in an offending career. The (lesis- tance rate is greatest following the first apprehension (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972:871. Status Transitions Adolescence is characterized by the substitution of peer for parental relation- ships and control, especially for males, in American society. As boys grow up, peer groups lose some of their influence and control over those affiliated with them. This Toss of influence is closely tied to status transitions, particularly those con- necte(1 with the transition to adult status. But from early adolescence on, indiviclu- als make transitions to more conforming affiliations. Such transitions decrease the influence of nonconforming peers. This archetype can account for the cle- sistance of in(livicluals with low rates of offencling. Such offenders usually offend! with accomplices. They are recruited by others to participate in offenses others initiate, an(1 they rarely, if ever, initiate offending. They are at most peripheral members in a group and offend as occa- sional recruits. With marginal affiliation to a group, they desist after one or a few such experiences because they find con- forming activities more rewarding and less risky or because they are not selectecI as accomplices. These low-rate offenders normally clesist in the early adolescent years. This second archetype is especially germane, however, for persons who par- ticipate in delinquency as part of cliversi- fied peer activity. This is generally char- acteristic of groups of young mates, such as athletic teammates and street-corner gangs. Here one gradually is drawn into the cultural life-styTe of one's class

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS wherein delinquency is part of that life- styTe. With aging, members turn to court- ship, marriage, and having children as well as securing regular employment to fulfill family responsibilities. They may withdraw from their peer group to as- sume these adult roles. Women and fam- iTy may play a role in weaning the mate delinquent from his gang. Desistance in this archetype is a function of movement to an adult status. This pattern probably explains the Resistance of many Tower- cIass ethnics in the United States in their young adult years. The Resistance of group offenders may result not only directly from the cleclining influence of peers on a member's behav- ior but also from the indirect effect that has on group cohesiveness and the selec- tion of co-offenders. With Reclining cohe- siveness, groups become vulnerable to dissolution. There appears to be some discontinuity between the individuaT's maturation and group adaptation to the changing requirements of its members. Since such transitions do not occur at the same rate for all members, the group experiences selective attrition that gradu- ally weakens it. Most cannot recruit re- placements since the pool of those eligi- ble also declines with transition to adult status. Failing to recruit enough members to maintain its status quo, the group dis- integrates. Much Resistance of group offenders and offending may be tied to the fate of the particular groups to which they be- Tonged. Individuals who depend primar- iTy on co-offending with accomplices af- fiTiatect with a particular group or network are particularly vulnerable to its clemise. Inasmuch as the demise of delinquent peer groups is most commonly associated with the transition of their members from juvenile to aclult status, group clemise should account for at least some of the Resistance of group offenders in their late teens. Desistance in this second arche 151 type does not clepencl on apprehension and punishment. The archetype is consis- tent with explanations of selective attri- tion of group offenders. Disruption of Group Affiliation Indivicluals are particularly vulnerable to the disruption or dissolution of group ties. Where such ties are primarily re- sponsible for or play a major role in rein- forcing one's delinquent or criminal be- havior, breaking them may lea(1 to Resistance. This is especially likely to occur when the incliviclual is unable to replace those bonds with others that per- mit continuation of the behavior. The three major ways that group bonds and affiliations that reinforce offending are dissolved are through residential mobil- ity of an offender, affiliation with a total institution, and the dissolution of the re- inforcing group itself. Resi(lential mobility breaks group ties en c] makes problematic reincorporation into a new group in the area to which one moves. Those who are unlikely to offend without group support drop out if they cannot affiliate with a new offending group or find accomplices. Residential mobility often is combined with other forms of social mobility, such as getting aclvanced schooling or a job or joining a military organization. Total institutions also may affect clesis- tance from careers. Two types of total institutions can have important conse- quences for Resistance from criminal ca- reers: prisons and the military. Incarcera- tion affects one's position in a group and, if it still exists on release, one may have (lifficulty reentering. By (lisrupting pat- tems of search for co-offen~lers, incarcer- ation may also shift offenders from pre- clominantly group to predominantly solo offending. Apart from (lisrupting co- offending patterns, incarceration also may have specific deterrent effects, especially

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1S2 for young group offenders. If so, incapac- itation at young ages may be a viable strategy to bring about Resistance from offending.9 Another major source of Resistance through entry into a conventional total institution is the military. Some criminal careers obviously go on in the military but many appear to be broken. As noted previously, Mattick (1960) found that 87 percent of the Illinois inmates paroled to the army were given honorable dis- charges and their recidivism rates were far below those of civilian parolees. Re- search is necessary to examine the effect of military, merchant marine, and other forms of service on interrupting and ter- minating contemporary criminal careers since Mattick's research was on parole to the World War II army (Mattick, 1958, 19601. Service in conventional total insti- tutions is a potential alternative source of intervention in criminal careers. This third archetype suggests that breaking group bonds and relationships may be a critical factor in Resistance from offending. The breaking of ties is facili- tated by forming new relationships or movement to new environments. Such ties are most likely to be broken in the late teens or early adult years. Offenders who continue to offend after these years may be those who usually commit of- fenses alone or who select different ac- complices, often strangers, for each of- fense. The adult career offender, then, is characterizes] by transient relationships with other offenders. Relationships with co-offenders are instrumentally contrived 9Impr~sonment also introduces one to new of- fenders and networks. Just how influential such ties are on one's offending after leaving prison is not known. Such ties may not be as important as com- monly assumed because inmates win close ties are usually not released at the same time and such ties and prison attitudes become less influential as re- lease nears (Wheeler, 1961~. CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS rather than by-proclucts of group affili- ation. INTERVENTION ISSUES AND GROUP OFFENDING Group offending is most characteristic of what we think of as juvenile delin- quency and characterizes juvenile ca- reers. Characteristically, the juvenile court clears with a group of co-offenders rather than a solo offender when consid- ering a particular offense for which the juvenile is apprehended. Moreover, the juvenile career is more likely to be char- acterized by a predominance of group offending when compared with adult ca- reers. Ad~litionally, the juvenile court is better able than is a criminal court to consider co-offenders in dispositions be- cause it is less bound by many of the proceclural safeguards attending criminal proceedings and by the obligation to try fact without knowledge of the prior record and current status of the offender and co-offenders. The juvenile court has greater latitude to investigate ant] dispose of matters involving joint offending and joint careers. When siblings are involved in juvenile offending, there is greater op- portunity for family intervention. Given this greater latitude in investigating, ex- amining, and disposing of juvenile cases and the fact that most adult criminal ca- reers are initiated in the juvenile years, serious consideration must be given to identification of and intervention in those juvenile careers most likely to lead to adult careers. A number of issues relating to such interventions are examined be low. Probability of Being Caught in Co-Offending Earlier, attention was drawn to a possi- ble apprehension selection bias in con- junction with membership in a group

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS (Erikson, 1971). Specifically, the question is whether there is evidence that group offenders are more likely to be caught than are solo offenders ant] whether one's risk of apprehension increases with the size of an offending group. Also, the prob- ability of being apprehended as either a juvenile or an adult may well be a func- tion of the prior record of a current co- offender. It seems reasonable to conclude that one's risk of apprehension is a function both of one's indiviclual rate of offending ant] that of one's co-offenders. And it is apparent that, at least for juveniles, high- rate offenders with accomplices are more likely to engage in crimes than are those who commit the same acts alone (Hindelang, 1976b:1221. One may also expect interaction effects between one's rate of offending, the group mix of one's offenses, and the offending rate of one's co-offenders. Inasmuch as one of the major ways of estimating an individual's rate of offend- ing is from official records of apprehen- sions, it is important to know whether the probability of apprehension is substan- tially greater for group than lone offend- ers who have the same indiviclual rate of offending. One expects, however, that this could vary by age so that the risk of apprehension is a function of whether one offends alone or with others at older as well as younger ages. It is important also to know whether apprehension is more likely to occur for a co-offending than a solo offense, even for those careers characterized by a substantial proportion of solo offenses. If so, using official rec- ords of apprehension will underestimate substantially the individual rate of of- fencling for those who engage predomi- nantly in solo offenses and overestimate the rate for group offenders if the two are not distinguished. Just how much the individual rate of offending, in comparison with the group 753 status of an offense, increases one's risk of apprehension is most problematic for of- fenses against the person. A predomi- nantly solo pattern of offending may be disproportionally constituted of non- stranger crimes against the person, since that arrest rate is a function of victim identification et the time ofthe complaint. In brief, the rate of apprehension for solo offenses against persons who are strang- ers as well as against property may be substantially lower than that for others at risk. This suggests that it is important to separate solo from group offending rates by type of offense in assessing apprehen . sion r1s Is. Early Identification of Career Criminals One of the barriers to early identifica- tion of adult criminal careers has been the high apprehension rate of juveniles such that the population of offenders for dispo- sition is large. Moreover, it is commonly presumed that at young ages it is clifficult to distinguish high-rate offenders from low-rate offenders. The Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin (1972) retrospective cohort study supports this conclusion by report- ing probabilities of committing a next offense by offense number and transition probabilities based on number and prior offense type. These probabilities were based on the entire juvenile career with- out respect to annualized indiviclual rates of offending or of the time between of- fenses. This may be important informa- tion that may help to separate high-rate juvenile offenders from the population of all offenders at a fairly early age. There is, of course, the possibility that many early high-rate offenders desist from a criminal career well before adult- hood. There is no strong evidence that this is the case, however, and there is evidence that high-rate adult offenders can be identified by their juvenile of

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154 fencling rates (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982). It has been suggested here that there is an important subset of juvenile offenders that should be identified for special adju- ctication. These are the high-rate offend- ers who can have high rates of recruiting co-offenders. They would appear to be easily identified by both their high incli- viclual rates of offending and the number of offenses they commit with a large num- ber of different co-offenders. One shouIc] be able to distinguish between those high-rate co-offenders whose rate is pri- marily dependent on affiliation with a small number of co-offenders ant] those who are continually involved with new associates. Moreover, there is some evi- dence that these recruiters affect the par- ticipation rate of their co-offenders as well as the co-offenders' rates of offend- ing. If that is the case, they are especially opportune targets for early intervention. In any event the evidence presented sug- gests that the recruiter population for ju- venile offenders is a small enough subset to warrant considering early intervention in their careers, perhaps even with strat- egies of incapacitation, since their inca- pacitation may have a marked effect not only on the aggregate crime rate but on participation and Resistance rates of co- offenders as well. Investigation into these early intervention possibilities and their effects would add appreciably to our un- derstancling of early criminal careers ant] the possibilities for intervening in them. Sanctioning Group Offenders Our adult system of justice is to a sub- stantial degree based on preserving the individual integrity of co-offenders as they are processed in the criminal justice system. This means that not only must their individual history of offending be disregarded when trying a current set of charges but also inclividuals involved in CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS the same offense can be treated cliffer- ently based on their role in the charged offenses and that differences in their prior offending or personal histories can be taken into account at sentencing. The particular doctrine of sentencing will de- termine what will or may be taken into account, but there is a general presump- tion that the disposition for one offender need not be contingent on that of another so Tong as equals in all respects under law are treated equally. As noted above, the juvenile court has not been bound as tightly by these considerations and hence may have considerably more latitude to consider alternative strategies for sanc- tioning accomplices in an offense. Unfor- tunately, very little evidence about the effects of differences in sanctioning co- ofFenders is available to guide such choices. One ofthe important issues in juvenile sanctioning is the extent to which early sanctioning may be a specific and a gen- eral deterrent to offending. It has been suggested here that punishment of one's co-offenders increases the sense of risk. Worth considering is whether early sanc- tioning of all co-offen(lers increases the Resistance rate. Of special interest also is whether differential sanctioning for of- fenders in the same offense has different specific deterrent and Resistance effects for co-offenclers. Where offenders are linked in the same networks, one expects to find overlap in offending careers. Each of these careers can be treated inclependently to deter- mine the extent to which sanctioning in- terventions affect each career. Yet, each may also be regarcled as affected by the interventions in the careers of co-of- fenders. Desistance may be influenced as much by the sanctioning of co-offenders as ofthe individual offender himself. Sim- ilarly, one's pattern of offending with oth- ers may be influencer! by interventions in their careers or by their clesistance. Is one

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS more likely to desist if one's co-offenders have desisted? These seem questions worthy of investigation. Intervention Strategies and Group Offending Intervention strategies disrupt the lives of individuals ant! affect their criminal careers. Although many interventions are individual-change strategies, some aim to change the external conditions believed to cause the behavior of individuals. Klein ant] Crawford (1967:6~66) con- cluded that "elimination of external sources of cohesiveness of gangs, in most cases, wouIcI be followed by clissolution of a relatively large proportion of gang membership." They reached this position by observing that the internal sources of gang cohesion are weak and that the gang is maintained by strong external pres- sures (Klein and Crawford:661. From this perspective, juvenile gangs are rather fragile entities. They lack the internal stability of internally generated group goals, have high turnover in membership, generate few unique group norms, and lack a lasting identity with a group name (Klein and Crawford:66~. There is also considerable evidence that these inter- nally unstable gangs are kept together by external pressures, such as conflict with other groups (Klein and Crawford:65~6) or political activity ( lacobs, 1976; Short and MolancT, 19761. Disrupting the intemal structure of such gangs to diminish their members' delinquency is not likely to be successful. Klein and Crawford (1967) concluded that interventions by group workers in black clelinquent gangs in Los Angeles tencled to increase the social cohesive- ness of the gangs, thereby resulting in increaser! indiviclual rates of offending. Similarly, Short and StroUtbeck (1965) concluded that disrupting the gang lead- ership in the black gangs they studier! l5S failed to disrupt the gang and may actu- ally have contributed to increased rates of minor delinquent acts. Although the group workers' interven- tion strategies that aimec] at disrupting group structure and processes may not have achieved their intended result, other strategies of intervention aimed at disrupting networks may nonetheless be consequential for individual careers. Klein and Crawford (1967) suggested that strategies that weaken group cohesion may have that effect. Incapacitation of offenders similarly does not necessarily disrupt gang struc- ture. Jacobs (1976, 1977, 1983) described the U.S. prison of the 1960s and 1970s in our most urbanized states as organized around an inmate system that was an extension of the gang organization and the conflict relations from which the prison population was drawn. He sug- gested, moreover, that the prison society tencled to increase the cohesion of those gangs and their importance to their mem- bers because they performed a wicle va- riety of functions for them. The gangs also recruited members within the prison, es- pecially as the inmate system became politicized (Jacobs, 1976, 1977: 14~1491. On release a substantial minority of the recruits and many of the former members of the supergangs (which include juve- nile and adult divisions in the community and in juvenile and adult correctional institutions) retained ties with at least some former gang members. The prison of this period appeared to extend the network of a(lult co-offenders through in- mate recruitment into the gangs while incarcerated and sustained at least some of them on release. Group Recruitment and Replacement Processes When more than one incliviclual is in- volvecl in offending, incapacitation of one

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156 of the offenders will not necessarily affect the crime rate. Much depends on what happens to the individual rate of offend- ing of his co-offenders. The current prac- tice is to discount the "crimes saved" through incapacitation of an offender by weighting the individual's contribution to the incident, using the mean size of of- fending groups for that offense. If the mean size of offenders is two, for exam- ple, an individuaT's crime saved is caTcu- lated as one-half. Yet, there is no empiri- cal evidence to conclude that individuals recluce their crime rate, on the average, in this way. There is some reason to believe they might not. One wouIc! expect that the incapacitation of recruiters, for exam- ple, would have a far greater impact on the crime rate than would the incapacita- tion of followers or many of their co- offenclers, even granted equal rates of offending. What is neecled is a comparison of over- lapping criminal careers to determine whether incapacitation in the career of any offender has any effect on the indivicl- ual rate of offending of his co-offenders subsequent to incapacitation. Given the fact that the more organized gangs of career criminals are more adept at recruit- ing replacements for incarcerated mem- bers, incarceration may save only those crimes that are solo offenses. If so, one should not only aim to incapacitate incli- viduals with high solo offending rates but one should expect little impact from inca- pacitating individuals who have high co- offencling rates as accomplices. If this were to be verified empirically, one would also expect to gain less from inca- pacitating juveniles than adults, since their solo offending rates are on the aver- age Tower. One might also expect to gain more by disrupting processes of recruitment and replacement of co-offenders in juvenile than in adult populations, since juvenile CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS networks that facilitate offending are seemingly based more on soliciaristic and personal relationships than on rational choice and impersonal contact. For most juveniles, the selection of co-offenders is far more restricted than it is for adults, being limited to a territorial neighbor- hood and its environs. We need to know more about how adults recruit their co- offenders and the extent to which their co-offenders are dispersed rather than concentrated in space and time. We clearly need both ethnographic and net- work studies of adult offending popula- tions to explore these issues of co-offend- ing and their effects. CONCLUDING NOTES It should be abundantly clear that re- search on group offending not only is disproportionally concentrated on juve- niles but that it has focused almost exclu- sively on documenting how pervasive it is and on speculating on its role in the etiology of delinquency. The etiological question therefore remains murky and the consequences of groups for criminal career development remain unexplored. We need, therefore, to devote far more attention to detailed studies of offending careers and to pay special attention to the group composition of offending in those careers, treating each individual's career in terms of its intersections with others. Not only do such investigations provide sociometric information so that such tech- niques as block-modeling (White, Boor- man, and Breiger, 1976) can isolate par- ticular networks, but also they permit us to examine how criminal justice interven- tions have consequences for the offend- ing of all individuals in the same network. Examination of the consequences of solo and co-offending is but part of a larger need to order over time the life events of offenders with their offending history so

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CO-OFFENDER INFLUENCES ON CRIMINAL CAREERS that we may determine their conse quences. Furler study of group offencI ing requires far more information on how juvenile and adult careers are linked. That information must be obtained from prospective longitudinal cohort studies that approximate more closely the design of the Swedish community study under taken by Sarnecki (19821. That design is based on a social-network approach and expands the study population to inclucle all co-o~enders who are not initially part of the cohort. It is well to bear in mind that in a dynamic society there is consicI erable movement into and out of commu nities and that individuals are drawn into different networks over time. The artifi cial divorcement of the cohort from a changing environment and its reduction to a population of individuals unrelated in time and space restrict considerably what can be learned about individual careers. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The persons who have assisted me in different ways in the preparation of this paper number well over 100 scientists in this country and abroad who responded to my requests for information. I am much indebted to them. I owe special thanks also to those who took the time to read and provide help in revising one or more drafts. Numbered among them are some of my colleagues on the Panel on Re search on Criminal Careers. Those to whom I owe this special debt include Larry Baron, Alfred Blumstein, Shari Di amond, David Farrington, Malcolm 1970 Postscript. In A. Manocchio and J. Dunn Klein, Richard Lempert, Lloyd Ohlin, lames Parker, Elizabeth Piper, Brent Shea, lames F. Short, Ir., Marvin Wolf gang, Stuart Wright, and Frank Zimring. I owe a special debt also to Jerzy Sarnecki, who discussed his Swedish study win me, and to Denise Galarraga of Me Na 157 tional Criminal Justice Reference Service for a partial translation of Mat study. REFERENCES Blakely, R., Stephenson, P. S., and Nichol, H. 1974 Social factors in a random sample of juvenile delinquents and controls. International Journal of Social Psychiatry 20:20~211. Blumstein, A., Farrington, D., and Moitra, S. 1985 Delinquency careers: innocents, Resisters, and persisters. Pp. 187-219 in M. Tonry and N. Morris, eds., Crime and Justice: An An- nual Review of Research, Vol. 6. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Bordua, D. J. 1961 Delinquent subcultures: sociological inter- pretations of gang delinquency. Annals of the American Academy of Political ~ Social Science 338:120-136. 1962 Some comments on theories of group delin- quency. Sociological Inquiry 32:24~246. Bottoms, A., and Wyle, P. 1986 EIousing tenure and changing crime careers in Britain. In A. J. Reiss, Ir., and M. Tonry, eds., Communities and Crime. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Breckinridge, S. P., and Abbot, E. 1917 The Delinquent Child and the Home. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Bureau of Justice Statistics 1984 Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1982. A National Crime Survey Report. NCI-92820. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office Chaiken, I., and Chaiken, M. 1982 Varieties of Criminal Behavior. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation. Clinard, R. A., and Ohlin, L. E. 1960 Delinquency and Opportunity. Glencoe, N.Y.: Free Press. Elliott, D. S., Ageton, S. S., Huizinga, D., Knowles, B.,andCanter,R.J. 1983 The Prevalence and Incidence of Delinquent Behavior: 197~1980. Boulder, Colo.: Be- havioral Research Institute. The Time Game. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. Erikson, M. 1971 The group context of delinquent behavior. Social Problems 19:11~129. Eynon, T. G., and Reckless, W. C. 1961 Companionship at delinquency onset. Brit- ish Journal of Criminology 2:162-170.

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