APPENDIX A
Recommendations from the 1997 NRC Report Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear And Other Dangerous Materials And Technologies in the Former Soviet Union

  1. Sustain the Program

    • Continue to fund MPC&A efforts in the FSU [Former Soviet Union] at least at the level of fiscal year 1996 for several more years and be prepared to increase funding should particularly important high-impact opportunities arise.

  1. Indigenize MPC&A Capabilities

    • Continue to emphasize the importance of MPC&A as a nonproliferation imperative at the highest political levels in the FSU.

    • Prior to initiating MPC&A projects at specific facilities, obtain assurances at both the ministry and the institute levels that the upgrade programs will be sustained after improvements have been made. Financial incentives, such as support for related research activities, should be considered as a means to stimulate long-term commitments.

    • Involve institute personnel to the fullest extent possible in determining how to use available funds for upgrades.

    • Give greater emphasis to near-term training of local specialists.

    • Reward those institutes that are making good progress in upgrading MPC&A systems by giving them preference for participation in other U.S.-financed cooperative programs.

    • Encourage the establishment of new income streams that can provide adequate financial support for MPC&A programs in the long term, such as earmarking for MPC&A programs a portion of the revenues from Russian sales of HEU.

    • Rely increasingly on domestically produced and locally available equipment for physical protection, detection, analysis, and related MPC&A tasks.



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OCR for page 43
Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Russia APPENDIX A Recommendations from the 1997 NRC Report Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear And Other Dangerous Materials And Technologies in the Former Soviet Union Sustain the Program Continue to fund MPC&A efforts in the FSU [Former Soviet Union] at least at the level of fiscal year 1996 for several more years and be prepared to increase funding should particularly important high-impact opportunities arise. Indigenize MPC&A Capabilities Continue to emphasize the importance of MPC&A as a nonproliferation imperative at the highest political levels in the FSU. Prior to initiating MPC&A projects at specific facilities, obtain assurances at both the ministry and the institute levels that the upgrade programs will be sustained after improvements have been made. Financial incentives, such as support for related research activities, should be considered as a means to stimulate long-term commitments. Involve institute personnel to the fullest extent possible in determining how to use available funds for upgrades. Give greater emphasis to near-term training of local specialists. Reward those institutes that are making good progress in upgrading MPC&A systems by giving them preference for participation in other U.S.-financed cooperative programs. Encourage the establishment of new income streams that can provide adequate financial support for MPC&A programs in the long term, such as earmarking for MPC&A programs a portion of the revenues from Russian sales of HEU. Rely increasingly on domestically produced and locally available equipment for physical protection, detection, analysis, and related MPC&A tasks.

OCR for page 43
Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Russia Simplify the Problem In Russia, encourage consolidation of direct-use material in fewer buildings, at fewer facilities, and at fewer sites. Minimize the Opportunities in Russia to Bypass MP&A Systems Ensure that all stocks of direct-use material are encompassed in the program, including icebreaker nuclear fuel, supplies at naval facilities, and off-specification and scrap material. Encourage rapid development of a comprehensive national material control and accounting system in Russia and the prompt incorporation of all existing direct-use material into that system. In Russia, increase support of GAN as an important independent agency by assisting it in developing MPC&A methodologies, training inspectors, obtaining staff support from research institutions, and procuring necessary equipment for MPC&A inspections. Encourage a system of incentives, possibly including monetary rewards, that will stimulate participants in MPC&A programs to report promptly to the central authorities any irregularities in the implementation of MPC&A systems. Emphasize the importance of developing a culture among MPC&A specialists that does not tolerate shortcuts or exceptions in implementing MPC&A systems. Enhance the Program Emphasize MPC&A approaches that respond to threat scenarios that are appropriate for the FSU, recognizing that they may differ from the threat scenarios used in the United States. Recognize that in the near term it may be necessary to install systems that fall short of internationally accepted standards in anticipation of subsequent refinements. In this regard, use appropriate MPC&A measures, whether they involve high-tech or low-tech approaches. In Russia, give greater attention to MPC&A of direct-use material during transport within and between facilities. Promote greater communication and cooperation among ministries and facilities involved in MPC&A in each of the countries where bilateral programs are being implemented. In Russia, encourage more active involvement of the Ministry of Interior in the planning, testing, and implementation of physical security systems. Source: NRC, Proliferation Concerns, pp. 11–15.