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Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Russia APPENDIX E MPC&A Program Guidelines Mission The mission of the MPC&A program is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism by rapidly improving the security of all weapons-usable nuclear material in forms other than nuclear weapons in Russia, the NIS [Newly Independent States], and the Baltics. Goals and Strategies Reach Agreement for WC&A Cooperation with all Sites in Russia, the NIS, and the Baltics Containing Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material in Forms Other than Nuclear Weapons: Overcome mutual cold war suspicions, lack of technical working relationships, security issues at closed nuclear cities, and language and cultural differences. Establish contracts or other agreements to upgrade WC&A at all facilities within these sites, which store, process, or transport Pu of HEU. Implement Systematic and Rapid MPC&A Upgrades at all Sites: Concentrate MPC&A efforts on the most attractive materials for nuclear weapons, namely, HEU (20% and greater) and Pu (excluding Pu in irradiated fuel). Install comprehensive, technology-based MPC&A systems that are consistent with international standards, such as IAEA INRFCIRC/225 and the IAEA Guidelines for State Systems for Accounting and Control (SSAC), which are appropriate for the unique conditions at each site and effective for securing nuclear material against insider and outsider threats.
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Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Russia Use proven MPC&A methods and technologies. Use both indigenous (Russian, the NIS, and the Baltics) and foreign technologies, depending on the technical merits. Indigenous technologies, when available, may have advantages in terms of cost, maintainability, and acceptance, and other factors. Foreign technologies, on the other hand, may have advantages in terms of uniqueness, availability, reliability, track record, and other factors. Decisions on using these technologies is to be made jointly, taking all relevant factors into account. Transfer full responsibility for the long-term operations of upgraded MPC&A systems to our partners after the completion of cooperative upgrades and provisions of associated manufacturer guarantees. Assist guard forces with radiocommunications, investigative techniques, and other mechanisms/capabilities to improve guard force operations, without providing training in the use of force or purchasing weapons. Ensure Long-Term Effectiveness of Improved MPC&A Systems: Establish MPC&A training programs. Strengthen national nuclear regulatory systems and national standards for MPC&A. Foster indigenous production and maintenance of MPC&A equipment. Conduct annual reviews of vulnerabilities and hardware to determine if additional MPC&A upgrades are required to meet changing conditions. Achieve Technical Integrity and Openness Carefully protect sensitive information and technologies in all facets of the program. Sustain MPC&A program as a multilaboratory program operating under DOE guidance and oversight. Ensure U.S. experts (DOE, laboratory, and contractor personnel) work together as a unified team committed to common objective. Ensure that the basic operating principle of the MPC&A program aligns with capabilities and responsibilities. Assign work according to demonstrated capability and capacity in accomplishing program objectives. Follow a disciplined approach in planning and executing projects. Assess proposed work in terms of is it needed; is it timely; is it cost effective; have all unnecessary activities and costs been eliminated?
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Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Russia Frequently Used MPC&A Upgrades Physical protection systems: locks, fences, barriers, gates, badging systems, and interior and exterior sensors, including video cameras and motion detectors. Alarm systems and computers to process data from sensors, such as closed-circuit television and communication systems to improve response to alarms. Nuclear material detectors installed at pedestrian and vehicle portals, which detect attempts to remove nuclear material, including hand-held detectors for random guard-force checking. Tamper-indicating devices to prevent unauthorized removal, computerized MPC&A systems, including barcode systems, to track nuclear material inventory. Perimeter clearing and structural improvements to improve physical protection. Computerized material accounting systems to maintain physical inventory and non-destructive assay measurements. Source: DOE, MPC&A Program Strategic Plan, pp. 8–9.
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