Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles: Second Report (1996)

This is the second report of the National Research Council's (NRC) Standing Committee to Review the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV). The committee was established in July 1994 to conduct independent reviews of the PNGV's research program. To date, two reviews have been undertaken at the request of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). The PNGV program is a cooperative research and development program between the federal government and the United States Council for Automotive Research (USCAR), which comprises Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. The decade-long program, which was initiated on September 29, 1993, by President Clinton, has three major goals:

1. Significantly improve national competitiveness in manufacturing.

2. Implement commercially viable innovation from ongoing research on conventional vehicles.

3. Develop a vehicle to achieve up to three times the fuel efficiency of today's comparable vehicles, while maintaining or improving current levels of performance, size, utility, and total cost of ownership and while meeting or exceeding federal safety and emissions requirements.

For this second review, the committee was charged with performing the following tasks:

• Assess the progress of the PNGV program since August 1994 and the PNGV response to recommendations of the first NRC review.

• Examine ongoing research activities in the PNGV.

• Assess the relevance of that ongoing research and its management to the PNGV's goals and schedule.

• Prepare a second peer review report.

In fulfilling the assigned tasks, the committee took as given the vision, goals, and schedules for the PNGV program that were articulated by the President and agreed to by USCAR in September 1993. The committee also operated under the premise that the program would be seriously supported and pursued by the government and industry partners. Given the lack of quantitative objectives for Goals 1 and 2, as well as the time constraints on conducting the second peer review, the committee chose to focus on activities relating to Goal 3. The current absence of quantitative objectives for Goals 1 and 2 complicates any assessment of progress toward these goals.

This report is based on presentations made to the committee by the PNGV (i.e., by representatives of industry and the government, including the national laboratories) on August 27–31, 1995, in Dearborn, Michigan, and on October 30–31, 1995, in Washington, D.C. These presentations were supplemented by committee member site visits to the engineering development facilities of the USCAR partners (see appendix B). Some of the material was presented to the committee as USCAR proprietary information under an agreement signed by the National Academy of Sciences; USCAR; and the U.S. government, represented by DOC. At the meeting in Washington, D.C., on October 30–31, 1995, the committee also received briefings from U.S. and overseas organizations outside the present PNGV. The information presented allowed the committee to assess the status of various PNGV technology developments from a broad, international perspective.

The PNGV concept is to bring together the extensive research and development resources of the federal establishment, including its national laboratories and network of university-based research institutions, and the vehicle design, manufacturing, and marketing capabilities of both the USCAR partners and suppliers to the automotive industry. Government funding for the PNGV will primarily be used for technology developments that involve high risk (Goal 3 and beyond). USCAR funding will be used mainly to develop technologies with clear, near-term market potential (Goals 1 and 2).

The PNGV program was launched just over two years ago, in September 1993. The first major program milestone is scheduled for 1997, when the PNGV must select technologies for the concept vehicles that will be designed, developed, and fabricated by 2000. The technical challenges are daunting, and, as discussed herein, inventions and breakthroughs are needed before certain technologies can be considered as viable options for selection in 1997. At present the PNGV is diligently pursuing research and development (R&D) programs focused on specified technical targets; however, major

breakthroughs and inventions are difficult to anticipate. For this reason, the committee has not explicitly called for the PNGV to separate likely technologies into “winners and losers” at this time. The committee concluded that classifying technologies in this way would be premature prior to 1997, when ongoing research that provides data for technology selection has been completed.

The committee's major recommendations, including its position on the PNGV response to the Phase 1 report, are presented in this chapter. Additional recommendations are also given in individual chapters of the report.

In its earlier report, issued after the first review of the PNGV research program, the committee offered a number of recommendations for the PNGV's consideration (NRC, 1994). These recommendations are provided in appendix C. Progress, changes in the original program, and material presented to the committee during the current review indicate that the PNGV has resolved many of the issues raised in the Phase 1 report. These issues include:

• development of a technology strategy, as outlined in the PNGV Technical Roadmap (PNGV, 1995)—a document that is still evolving and is subject to revisions

• involvement of suppliers, notably in the development of improved materials and manufacturing processes

• preliminary benchmarking of technology developments abroad

• enhancement of public outreach, primarily through a media education program and the PNGV home page on the World Wide Web

However, the PNGV has yet to address other important issues in a substantive way. Outstanding items of particular concern to the committee are the following:

• the need for a USCAR-PNGV technical director

• the need for more support and involvement in the PNGV research program by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

• the need to analyze technologies in current and post-PNGV categories ¹ and to consider appropriate plans and schedules for further development

As stated previously, the committee chose to focus on activities relating to Goal 3. However, information provided to the committee on research relating to Goals 1 and 2 indicates that progress has been made in these areas, notably under USCAR consortia (appendix D) and Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with the national laboratories. This progress in manufacturing processes is extremely important, and its continuation may be a major factor in determining the viability of several Goal 3 technologies. In general, achievements in the Goal 1 and Goal 2 programs will form an important base on which to build and against which to compare Goal 3 technologies.

From the outset of the PNGV program it was widely accepted that achieving the challenging fuel economy target of Goal 3 would require implementation of new concepts and technologies, some of which are revolutionary relative to the level of technology in conventional vehicles (PNGV, 1995). Two recent reports on automotive fuel economy also highlight the limitations of current automotive technologies and indicate that new concepts and technologies will be required to meet demanding fuel economy targets (OTA, 1991; NRC, 1992). Preliminary studies by PNGV provided an overview of the performance improvements necessary in major vehicle systems to obtain the 80-mpg equivalent fuel economy; tradeoffs were identified between increasing drivetrain efficiency, reducing vehicle mass, and increasing storage of deceleration energy, along with projected improvements in aerodynamics, rolling resistance, and accessory power requirements. Although the PNGV has performed only limited systems analysis of fully integrated vehicle options, several conceptual vehicle configurations were identified that

may have the potential to meet Goal 3 basic vehicle performance requirements. It appears that the leading contenders will be various hybrid electric vehicles.

Most of the technical efforts to date have focused on improving drivetrain efficiency, developing improved energy-storage systems, and reducing vehicle mass through the use of lightweight structural materials. A number of significant achievements have been made, although there are still formidable barriers to meeting the program goals within the PNGV schedule. These barriers are reflected in the PNGV assessment of the status of R&D aimed at meeting Goal 3 technical targets. Fundamental technical barriers and deficiences in resources were also clearly identified by Sloane (1995).

The next major PNGV milestone is narrowing the focus of the program in 1997 by selecting the most promising technologies. In the light of recent technical progress (see below) and the fact that only two years of the ten-year program have elapsed, the committee considers it extremely important that the PNGV be given the opportunity, and flexibility in its research agenda over the next two years, to pursue appropriate developments that could lead to breakthroughs essential for making informed decisions in 1997. However, in assessing the relevance of ongoing research to the PNGV program goals and schedule, the committee identified a number of technical barriers that may affect the 1997 selection process. The committee made a distinction between technical barriers that can be overcome with sufficient resources and technical barriers that can only be overcome with a new invention or a major technical breakthrough. Both types of barrier exist in the PNGV program. The former type can probably be overcome through the allocation of sufficient resources and management attention; however, the latter type of barrier requires inventions or breakthroughs, and barriers of this type create a much higher risk that performance objectives will not be met or completed within the PNGV's schedule.

The committee observed that, given the limitations on existing resources, the technology program must be more focused if PNGV performance, cost, and schedule objectives are to be met. The committee recommends that program funding be reassessed and reallocated in a way consistent with encouraging development breakthroughs but without terminating any of the technology development programs prior to the scheduled 1997 selection process. The following comments are intended to provide guidance for the PNGV in activities leading to a successful technology selection in 1997.

Three primary energy converters or power sources are actively being considered for PNGV Goal 3 vehicles: direct-injection, compression-ignition (DICI) internal-combustion engines; gas turbine engines²; and fuel cells. All of these will operate as hybrids. The further development of spark-ignited internal-combustion engines is being pursued as part of Goal 2.

The DICI engine shows promise of being highly efficient and is arguably the frontrunner of the power-source candidates at this time. Two points are noteworthy in this regard:

1. The DICI engine being considered is very different from traditional passenger car diesels and faces many significant technical challenges. The DICI engine, operating in a hybrid configuration, is currently the most promising candidate for fulfilling the PNGV goals within the specified schedule.

2. Commercialization of an advanced DICI engine will be highly dependent on the ultimate exhaust emission standards that are promulgated. If the standards become more stringent than those for the current ultra low emission vehicle, DICI engines could be eliminated from the marketplace.

It is the committee's understanding that little or no significant research is being performed on DICI automotive engines in the United States, except for investigations of lean-burn NO_x reduction and fuel reformulation. In contrast, in Europe and Asia, where automotive DICI engines using diesel fuel are more widespread and more highly developed, continuing efforts are underway to further improve DICI engine technology. Some of this work is being performed by the European units of U.S. car companies. The committee concludes that substantial resources should be applied immediately to DICI development to redress an imbalance in the PNGV program in accordance with current projections of technology potential.

There have been significant achievements in combining industry and government laboratory efforts to develop commercially viable advanced catalytic converters, notably the Engine Support System Technology program within the USCAR Low Emission Partnership. While substantial reductions in NO_x exhaust emissions have been achieved in the steady-state, the development of an acceptable lean NO_x catalyst for DICI engines remains a significant barrier. Given the progress made in this area in the past two years and the extremely high value of lean NO_x catalysts, the committee believes an aggressive, PNGV-funded, DICI exhaust emission control program, potentially capable of overcoming this barrier, should be initiated.

From the standpoint of automotive applications, fuel cells are the least developed option under consideration for a power source. Not surprisingly, therefore, fuel cells present the most barriers to a commercially viable system. There have been a number of significant PNGV achievements in fuel cell technology, including recent rapid improvements in stack design for optimizing thermal, water, and fuel management and substantial progress in improving membrane performance. Projected costs have also been reduced. Stack power density has been doubled to about 1.0 kW/1 (the PNGV 1997 technical target); potentially low-cost bipolar plates have been successfully built and tested; and a prototype methanol reformer has been successfully demonstrated for a 10 kW proton exchange membrane (PEM) system.

Despite this progress, fuel-related barriers remain. There is as yet no satisfactory method of storing sufficient quantities of hydrogen for hydrogen-powered vehicles onboard, and reformers do not meet acceptable cost, size, and performance requirements for storing hydrocarbon fuels in hydrocarbon-powered fuel cell vehicles. Other barriers include the development of components for ancillary systems (e.g., air conditioning, power steering, etc.) with improved performance and reduced size and weight, further cost reductions in all areas, and a reduction in startup time.

Some barriers can probably be overcome with increased, focused R&D. However, several major inventions are needed for the successful development of hydrogen storage systems and efficient, compact fuel processors for hydrocarbon fuels. Order-of-magnitude cost reductions are also unlikely without significant breakthroughs. These observations are consistent with recent estimates suggesting that a fuel cell drivetrain will require 10 to 15 years of development before it can be mass produced efficiently and within the needed cost range (Klaiber, 1995). In keeping with the outstanding long-term potential of fuel cell technology, the committee strongly supports the continued

development of automotive fuel cells. Depending on progress over the next two years, the PNGV may find it necessary to restructure the fuel cell program, extending the schedule and revising funding priorities.

Gas turbine engines have many potential advantages for hybrid vehicles; notably, very high specific power, minimal vibration, no cooling system other than for oil, and the ability to operate on a wide variety of fuels. The main barriers continue to be lowering the costs to acceptable levels and increasing thermal efficiency.

The thermal efficiency gains needed to meet PNGV goals depend on developments in three technical areas: raising turbine inlet temperatures; recovering a significant amount of waste heat; and increasing component efficiencies. Raising turbine inlet temperatures requires appropriate high-temperature materials. In this context, the successful 1,000-hr rig test of ceramic vanes and rotor blades represents a major PNGV achievement. However, the development of a low-cost, robust manufacturing technique capable of producing structural ceramic components with the necessary strength, toughness, and durability remains a major challenge. Further, there are problems with the aerodynamic design and manufacture of small, high-efficiency compressors and turbines, especially when using ceramic materials. Significant progress has been made in developing heat recovery systems, but barriers remain to reducing the size, weight, and cost of the heat exchangers, as well as to developing desirable seal materials.

Advances have been made in system definition, including the completion of turbo-alternator designs. Barriers that need to be addressed include further reducing NO_x levels, developing more efficient high-speed generator/alternators, reducing packaging volume, and significantly reducing costs.

The research challenges for gas turbines are very demanding, but the PNGV has made some progress in each area of development. In the committee's view, the pace of progress over the next two years will be a critical determinant of whether the gas turbine engine remains a viable PNGV option.

Energy-storage systems capable of high-rate charge and discharge are fundamental to hybrid electric vehicles. They recapture otherwise wasted

vehicle kinetic energy and reduce peak load requirements for the main propulsion system; thus, operating efficiency is increased. Current PNGV support is concentrated on three energy-storage systems —batteries, flywheels, and ultracapacitors.

Battery technologies being investigated include lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, nickel-metal hydride, lithium-ion, lithium-polymer, sodium-sulfur, and zinc-air. The two lithium cells offer promise in terms of both energy and power density and low material costs. However, there are barriers to be overcome in developing cost-effective manufacturing processes; achieving high cycle life, which is dependent on stable electrode morphology; and producing the very thin, large-area plates needed for high power output. Barriers to the use of nickel-cadmium and nickel-metal hydride batteries include high costs.

Substantial progress has been made in virtually all areas of battery technology critical to battery-hybrid vehicles. However, at present, the high-power battery technologies under consideration cannot simultaneously satisfy the power-density, energy-density, and cycle-life requirements for the PNGV energy-storage subsystem, and a combined battery/ultracapacitor subsystem is under consideration (PNGV, 1995). The performance of ultracapacitors has shown significant improvement in laboratory demonstrations, with energy and power densities up to 10 Wh/kg and 2 kW/kg, respectively; greater than 90 percent turnaround efficiency; and greater than 100,000 cycles. Major barriers remain with respect to total energy storage, which is currently limited to less than about 2 kWh, and costs, which must be reduced by about two orders of magnitude to meet PNGV requirements. There are other cost issues associated with integrating batteries and ultracapacitors; notably, the need for expensive power electronics. For ultracapacitors, there are also barriers to be overcome with respect to self-discharge rates and, possibly, safety, in the case of non-uniform cell discharge.

R&D on flywheels has resulted in significant improvements in energy density, reductions in self-discharge, and limited demonstration of containment in compact structures following catastrophic failure (rotor burst). Major barriers remain in the areas of cost and safety. The price of the materials must be reduced by approximately one order of magnitude, and satisfactory mass manufacturing techniques must be developed before the flywheel system can be cost competitive. With respect to safety, it is not clear that a satisfactory solution has been found to the problem of burst containment. It may be that avoidance of catastrophic burst—rather than burst containment—is necessary for industry and public acceptance. Other, less formidable barriers include electrical turnaround efficiency, the high-cost of interface power electronics, determination of possible gyroscopic effects from shock loading, and development of a companion high-speed, high-efficiency motor/generator.

Meeting Goal 3 objectives depends on major improvements in both drivetrain efficiency and reduced vehicle mass. Goal 3 can only be achieved with significant use of lightweight structural materials. Important achievements have been made in identifying and prioritizing developments in materials technology, organizing investigation teams, and effectively communicating the PNGV requirements to the materials supplier community.

Advances in the development of lightweight structural materials have resulted in notable technical achievements applicable to meeting all three PNGV goals. Topics investigated by the PNGV included more efficient use of steel, primarily through improved manufacturing processes; the extensive use of aluminum for body structure, with emphasis on low-cost fabrication methods; and the extensive use of polymer-based composites for body closures and structures.

PNGV achievements of note include the demonstration of a high-volume, structural resin-injection-molding composite process for underbody crossmembers; the fabrication of slab and belt cast aluminum sheets in automotive alloys; and the demonstration of significant progress in resolving forming, joining, and painting issues for new, high-volume applications of aluminum closure panels. The PNGV has also been able to exert its substantial leverage to stimulate investment in research and development by materials suppliers in the United States without recourse to government funding.

Major barriers for the development of lightweight, low-cost materials for body structures and closures remain. These include the production of continuous slab castings of aluminum sheet and the formulation of recyclable composites that have the necessary structural properties (including crashworthiness) and very short processing times. The committee anticipates that these barriers can be overcome if investigations are appropriately focused and resources are applied by effective, integrated USCAR teams.

The committee concluded that the PNGV has made significant technical progress since the Phase 1 peer review, notably in the following areas:

• development of a catalyst demonstrating substantial reductions in NO_x exhaust emissions

• satisfactory completion of a 1,000-hr rig test of ceramic vanes and blades for gas turbine engines

• improvements in fuel cell performance, including the doubling of stack power denisity, and the design and testing of a potentially low-cost bipolar plate

• demonstration of high-volume fabrication processes for lightweight materials

• improvements in the performance of high-power batteries, ultracapacitors, and flywheels

Despite progress, there is still a wide gulf between the current status of major vehicle systems and subsystems and the performance and cost requirements necessary to meet major PNGV milestones³. Some of the technical barriers to achieving PNGV objectives can probably be overcome with sufficient funding and management attention; others require inventions and very significant technical breakthroughs.

The effort currently being expended on candidate technologies and systems is not consistent with the likelihood that each will meet performance goals within the program schedule. Work on some critical systems is inadequately funded, lacks integrated technical direction, or does not adequately leverage relevant activities being conducted within some government agencies.

The assessment of technical barriers to the development of major candidate PNGV subsystems presented in this report was used as a basis for constructing table H-1 (see Highlights). In the committee's view this table provides a summary and an approximate assessment of the broad potential for candidate PNGV elements. The committee made a distinction between systems for which technical breakthroughs are needed to meet PNGV targets and those for which incremental development with adequate resources (funding and staff) is likely to lead to the necessary progress. For each major subsystem, the committee identified the most critical barriers to meeting PNGV performance requirements, as well as the approximate cost and the likelihood of meeting PNGV schedules. These three factors were used to derive a first approximation of the overall PNGV potential regardless of the PNGV schedule and to further highlight program priorities.

For example, overcoming the barriers to composite materials meeting the PNGV performance requirements for lightweight body structure will require significant further development but can probably be successful with

sufficient time and effort. However, the likelihood of meeting PNGV requirements within the specified time frame is low, and the cost of composites is high when compared with the cost of steel or aluminum. Thus, the overall PNGV potential for composite materials is rated medium, indicating that significant resources will be required to take advantage of the promise of composite materials for use in automobiles. In contrast, it is not apparent that the barriers for gas turbines meeting PNGV targets can be overcome without major breakthroughs, even with additional resources. Despite significant R&D effort over the past 20 years—and some limited successes—there is currently no robust, low-cost manufacturing process for producing high-temperature structural ceramics that have the necessary combination of strength and toughness for use in automobiles.

Another approach to assessing the potential of candidate technologies is presented in a recent report from the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which attempts to answer the question, “What happens to a mid-size car in 2005 and 2015?” (OTA, 1995). OTA was generally optimistic about the potential of advanced vehicle technologies providing excellent vehicle performance. However, the OTA was more cautious about the speed with which technologies can be made commercially available and introduced widely into the market. In general, the committee does not take issue with the major findings of the OTA report.

With regard to technology barriers, the committee recommends the following:

Recommendation. PNGV should perform appropriate evaluations to ensure that its program resources and focus are, in general, consistent with the “Basic Needs” column of table H-1. If necessary, program funding should be reallocated to encourage developments.

Recommendation. PNGV should devote substantial additional resources to the DICI hybrid powertrain in view of its relatively high potential to meet Goal 3 objectives.

Recommendation. PNGV should focus ultracapacitor R&D on the most promising technologies, and serious efforts should be devoted to the investigation of a battery/ultracapacitor hybrid storage system.

Recommendation. On a stand-alone basis, batteries still appear to be the best near-term candidates for energy storage, and PNGV should fund development of the most promising battery systems consistent with this potential.

Recommendation. PNGV should continue to develop flywheel and generator technologies.

Recommendation. USCAR should continue to use the process it has developed—incorporating its substantial leverage through integrated industry programs—to pursue the very promising developments in steel and aluminum materials made by materials suppliers and trade associations. The development of innovative manufacturing processes for aluminum and steel should be encouraged and accelerated.

Systems analysis in the PNGV program is critical to the successful development of components, systems, and overall vehicle design. Systems analysis provides the analytical capability to efficiently and accurately assess competing technologies and vehicle concepts against Goal 3 vehicle performance requirements (PNGV, 1995). Systems analysis studies are also essential to provide component designers with performance targets and reasonable tradeoff parameters. The PNGV has established technical teams for systems analysis and vehicle engineering and a preliminary overall plan; however, very little has been accomplished because of a lack of funding. A contractor for developing appropriate system, subsystem, and component models was recently selected, but there was a 12- to 18-month delay in initiating this critical PNGV systems activity. The impact of the delay on the program, and particularly on the technology selection scheduled for 1997, is currently unclear. The absence of, or deficiencies in, systems support for subsystem and component tradeoffs could compromise the effective selection of optimal technologies for the design, fabrication, and assembly of concept vehicles. It would help accelerate the systems analysis activity and make up for lost time if the USCAR partners provided PNGV with their in-house systems models to the extent appropriate.

The committee concludes that the PNGV does not currently have the necessary systems analysis tools to adequately support the technology selection scheduled for 1997. This deficiency constitutes a barrier to meeting the PNGV program goals on time. The PNGV must assess the extent to which this barrier can be overcome without delay and must allocate appropriate resources to correct the deficiencies.

With regard to systems analysis, the committee recommends the following:

Recommendation. The PNGV should assess the impact on the overall program schedule of the delay in implementing systems analysis and vehicle engineering tasks, and the need for remedial action. Priority projects must be identified and implemented by the technical teams as soon as possible.

Recommendation. The PNGV should formalize subsystem evaluation and selection process without delay and provide performance criteria to the PNGV technology teams. The systems analysis must be an iterative process that continually receives new information, updates models, and provides updated results from optimizations and tradeoff studies to system, subsystem, and component designers.

In its Phase 1 report, the committee noted that it would be appropriate for the PNGV to more fully evaluate applicable technology developments outside the United States. Consistent with this observation, the committee received briefings (see appendix B) and reviewed articles on foreign automotive technology programs to assess the competitive status of the PNGV program from a broad, international perspective. Active government-industry partnerships in Europe and Japan—somewhat analogous to the PNGV initiative—are pursuing the development of advanced automotive technologies to maintain or enhance their international competitiveness. The committee noted that there is likely to be fierce international competition to produce highly efficient vehicles for sale on a global basis.

A very preliminary ranking of foreign automotive technology development compared with technology development within the PNGV is presented in table 1-1. This assessment is based on preliminary, limited information presented to the committee by the PNGV (Hardy, 1995). The rankings shown in table 1-1 are judgmental. Nonetheless, they suggest that, compared with its major overseas competitors, the United States is not in a clear leadership position in developing critical technologies for PNGV-type vehicles. It should be noted, however, that automotive companies in Asia and Europe are not necessarily targeting the same vehicle as the PNGV, and they may have different marketing strategies.

With regard to foreign technology, the committee recommends the following:

Recommendation. As a matter of urgency and in accordance with the committee's recommendation in its first report, the PNGV should conduct more comprehensive assessments and benchmark foreign technology developments relevant to the program. If warranted by the results of such analyses, PNGV should reassess its research priorities.

The committee noted that the PNGV Technical Roadmap, developed since the Phase 1 review, does a good job of describing the major technologies being pursued, the target performance levels, and the schedule⁴. The committee assumed that some missing details in the roadmap (identifying

resource requirements and some quantitative performance measures) would be added by the PNGV in future revisions. During the past year, the PNGV has also solidified its technical organization structure, which centers on the technical teams responsible for manufacturing, materials and structures, and systems analysis. Technical oversight and coordination are provided by the vehicle engineering team. These teams appear to be organized effectively and are working toward specific objectives, although the committee was concerned that some key management personnel from USCAR spend only a very limited amount of time on PNGV activities. The committee also observed that the process for program review against specific targets and milestones in the technology development plan was not clearly defined. More specifically, the technology selection process scheduled for 1997 has not been established, despite the fact that this major milestone is less than two years away. This may be due, in part, to the very late start of the formal systems analysis.

PNGV program planning, organization, and management have been influenced by a recent decision by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors not to develop a single USCAR concept car. Each company will now pursue its own concept car (or cars), sharing PNGV and USCAR information as appropriate. The committee noted that this change puts an added premium on good communications among the USCAR partners, as well as between USCAR and government participants in the PNGV, to ensure that there is close coordination between the work of the PNGV technical teams and the needs of the individual automotive manufacturers and that government-sponsored projects have the greatest opportunity of providing the essential technology to meet unified performance requirements. Since the PNGV will not build a concept car, the coordination of PNGV systems analysis and vehicle engineering efforts requires strong, central management control. This could be provided by a single USCAR technical director.

Despite significant improvements in program organization in the past year and the resulting technical achievements, the committee concluded that the USCAR members are not using the leverage of an integrated industry organization in pursuit of PNGV program goals. In the committee 's view, the absence of an integrated working group has had an adverse impact on the program. This lack of integration is reflected in the decision of Chrysler, Ford and General Motors to develop individual concept vehicles, the delay in starting the systems analysis, and the limited amount of time spent on USCAR business by some key management personnel. The committee continues to believe strongly that the industry partners would be well served by having a single technical program director in USCAR to drive and coordinate the program, as was recommended in the Phase 1 report.

The committee observed that the government also lacks an effective program management organization. The program management office at the

DOC essentially operates as an information office. Program managers at DOC and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are not empowered to direct the array of federal PNGV projects that contribute to and are essential to the PNGV initiative. In particular, PNGV management on the government side has little or no ability to redeploy funds from less significant to more important projects in response to budget reductions or following technology selection. The committee considers strong central program management on the government side to be essential to the success of the program, particularly in the absence of a single USCAR technical program director.

The committee noted that, despite the above deficiencies in program organization and management, personnel from the diverse cultures of government and industry are working together effectively while fully embracing the goals of the PNGV, as was the case during the Phase 1 review. In the committee's judgment, the working relationships that have developed in the PNGV are commendable.

With regard to program organization and management, the committee recommends the following:

Recommendation. The committee still strongly recommends that the partners in USCAR appoint a single technical program director as a way of benefitting from the leverage of an integrated organization in pursuit of PNGV goals.

Recommendation. The committee reiterates its earlier recommendation that senior management at DOC and DOE install a management structure with appropriate authority and responsibility as soon as possible and ensure strong, capable staffing. This structure should include a chief technical officer to provide technical direction to the wide array of government technical activities. The role of the chief technical officer is even more critical in the absence of a single USCAR technical program director.

Some of the technologies under consideration for the PNGV vehicle would, if implemented, result in very significant changes in the current highway-vehicle-fuel infrastructure, as well as shifts in the requirements for capital, labor, and natural resources. Thus, in the absence of detailed analysis, it is not clear that all scenarios being considered would meet the objectives of

increasing competitiveness, reducing dependency on foreign energy sources, and lowering energy consumption. In particular, modifications to the current vehicle infrastructure associated with changes in safety criteria, automotive service industries, fuel use, and vehicle-operator interactions have important implications for market acceptance of a PNGV-type vehicle.

A preliminary study of infrastructure issues for the PNGV was completed during the past year by a research team from Argonne National Laboratory (Johnson, 1995); the committee commends the PNGV for taking this first step. The committee sees a continuing need to address infrastructure issues as an integral part of the PNGV program. In particular, careful assessment of infrastructure issues associated with alternative technologies should be an essential part of the selection process scheduled for 1997.

The use of lightweight materials, energy-storage and conversion systems, and alternative fuels will raise numerous safety issues. New vehicle designs, which pose new safety questions, will need to be at least as safe as conventional vehicles. The absence of active participation by DOT in addressing and resolving PNGV safety issues is seen by the committee as a major deficiency in the current program.

With regard to infrastructure, the committee recommends the following:

Recommendation. The PNGV must continue to address infrastructure issues as an integral part of its program. A careful assessment of infrastructure issues associated with alternative technologies should be an essential part of the technology selection process scheduled for 1997.

Recommendation. The PNGV should perform a study to establish the energy balance, in-use environmental effects, and resource requirements, as well as the production and distribution costs, for any fuels other than gasoline or diesel fuel being considered for use in Goal 3 vehicles.

Recommendation. The PNGV should immediately involve the DOT's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in identifying, addressing, and resolving the safety issues raised by Goal 3 vehicles.

The DOE is the largest participant in the PNGV program in terms of research projects, followed by the National Science Foundation. The other partners are the DOC, DOD, DOT and NASA, as well as the U.S. Department of the Interior and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The committee noted that a visible commitment, as well as increased participation by all the partners, is essential to the success of the PNGV program. The fact that DOT has decided on a “zero” contribution to PNGV in fiscal year (FY) 1996 and that NASA's contribution to the systems analysis work are uncertain beyond FY 1996 suggests a lack of commitment to the program within the administration. The committee was particularly concerned that (1) DOT is not playing an active role in addressing and resolving PNGV transportation policy and safety issues, and (2) the Environmental Protection Agency does not appear to be addressing the question of emissions standards for new PNGV technologies.

Given the ambitious scope of the PNGV program and its decade-long schedule, sustained commitment is needed for success. Significant benefits can be anticipated from the program; notably, in economic competitiveness, increased national security, and improved environmental quality. These benefits will, however, accrue over a long period of time and be widely distributed. For these reasons it is unlikely that any group of constituents will be drawn to develop and sustain support for the program. Therefore, the PNGV has an important role to play in providing and disseminating information about the program.

The PNGV program office has made significant progress in this regard in the past year, primarily through a media education effort and the establishment of a World Wide Web site on the Internet. Opportunities may exist for the PNGV to further enhance the effectiveness of its media education effort by instituting strong coordination among the public affairs representatives of all the agencies participating in the program. The PNGV may also wish to consider establishing links with the larger transportation community in the course of further efforts to disseminate information about the program status and achievements.

The FY 1996 federal budget has been altered dramatically by changes in federal government priorities, and budgets for the various federal PNGV programs have been reduced below those requested. Final FY 1996 PNGV budgets were unavailable when this report was prepared; therefore the committee was unable to judge the full impact of the reductions.

Meeting the challenge of achieving three times today's fuel efficiency in a prototype vehicle ready for production in 2004, along with all of the other requirements surrounding Goal 3, is extremely difficult. Without question the recent federal budget reductions will delay the program and increase the risk associated with meeting the technical objectives. Reallocating resources to the most promising candidate subsystems within the PNGV program will be crucial in this austere fiscal environment.

With regard to funding requirements, the committee recommends the following:

Recommendation. To be successful, a complex development program such as PNGV must have well-defined plans and objectives, adequate resources, and be supported by sufficient funding. It is incumbent upon both USCAR and the government to ensure that adequate resources for the PNGV program are provided in a timely manner and used efficiently in overcoming the critical barriers to achieving PNGV goals.

To maintain continued viability of the PNGV program, the committee strongly urges the government and industry partners to address program deficiencies as soon as possible. Members of the PNGV are encouraged to meet with the committee at the earliest opportunity to discuss the findings and recommendations of this report and to develop appropriate remedial action.

If the PNGV program is to be properly focused and vigorously implemented and supported as a national goal, there must be further detailed

reviews of the technical decisions, research results, and organizational structures of the program. The commitee proposes conducting such expanded reviews in early 1996. As part of that process, the committee will assess the actions taken by the PNGV to address the recommendations in this report.

Hardy, K. 1995. Foreign Automotive Technology Development: Electric and Hybrid Vehicles . Presented to the Standing Committee to Review the Research Program of the PNGV at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., October 31, 1995.

Johnson, L. 1995. PNGV Infrastructure Issues. Presented to the Standing Committee to Review the Research Program of the PNGV at the Ritz Carlton Hotel, Dearborn, Michigan, August 30, 1995.

Klaiber, T. 1995. Fuel cells for transport—can the promise be fulfilled? Technical requirements and demands from customers. Presented at the 4th Grove Fuel Cell Symposium, held September 1995 in London, United Kingdom.

NRC (National Research Council). 1992. Automotive Fuel Economy. Energy Engineering Board, NRC. Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press.

NRC. 1994. Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles. Board on Energy and Environmental Systems and the Transportation Research Board, NRC. Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press.

OTA (Office of Technology Assessment). 1991. Improving Automobile Fuel Economy: New Standards, New Approaches. OTA-E-504. U.S. Congress, OTA, October. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

OTA. 1995. Advanced Automotive Technology: Visions of a Super-Efficient Family Car. OTA-ETI-638, U.S. Congress, OTA, September. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

PNGV (Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles). 1995. Technical Roadmap (draft). Dearborn, Michigan: PNGV.

Sloane, C. 1995. Major Barriers and Achievements. Presented to the Standing Committee to Review the Research Program of the PNGV at the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., October 31, 1995.