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6
Conclusion
Technological links between the United States and Japan are growing
rapidly, resulting in an increasingly apparent interdependence of the two
countries in industrial R&D. This report has dealt with some of the motivat-
ing forces, mechanisms for collaboration, and the problems and opportunities
associated with this collaboration.
It is striking that many of those with first-hand knowledge of U.~.-Japan
collaboration in industrial technology find reasons for optimism. From a
Japanese perspective, there are at least two related and relevant themes that
seem to indicate that collaboration will increase. One relates to a concept
familiar to technology policy experts in Japan "technology fusion." The
analysis that underlies this concept is the observation that technological
breakthroughs in particular industries depend increasingly on breakthroughs
in other industries and on the fusion of technologies developed in many
industries. Mechatronics, a term used widely in Japan, is an example. Here
the emphasis is on the combination of mechanical and electronics technolo-
gies.45
If the combination of technologies originating in different industries is
overtaking industry-specific know how as the driving force of industrial tech-
nology innovation, the argument goes that the effect will be to increase the
impetus for cooperation among rival firms. Considering the high cost of high
technology-oriented R&D and the limited resources of individual companies,
technology fusion may be extended across national borders. Furthermore,
because of the very nature of technology fusion, cooperation is more likely in
32
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33
high technology among firms from different industries. According to this
line of argument, the future of international cooperation also may see firms
from a variety of industries acting together. Japanese participants at the U.S.-
Japan workshop on industrial R&D noted that significant participation by
Japanese industry is, in practice, a prerequisite for any meaningful intema-
tional cooperative effort involving Japan.46
There are, however, a number of questions that complicate an assessment
of future prospects for U.S.-Japan collaboration. Not the least of these
derives from differences in the organization of industrial R&D in the two
countries. Whereas in Japan rival firms have been able, sometimes with the
encouragement of government, to join forces, in the United States antitrust
restrictions and weaker linkages among firms in the same industry have made
such cooperation rare.
Cognizant of weaknesses in Japan's university research, Japanese govern-
ment and industry see international consortia as potential vehicles for foreign-
ers to gain access to Japanese technology. A number of Japanese consortia
now are open to foreign researchers.47 From the U.S. industry perspective,
however, there are a number of factors that must be considered in determin-
ing whether to participate in industrial R&D consortia in Japan. First, the
cost of full membership (and full access to the research results) can be pro-
hibitive. Also, it may be difficult to make an evaluation about the benefits of
joining as a non-Japanese "outsider." Many U.S. firms suspect that they will
end up losing more technology than they gain in this environment. Additional
factors that tend to limit foreign participation are the language barrier and the
culture or structure of many U.S. corporations that leave them ill equipped to
make use of foreign-acquired information.
Regardless of how individual U.S. and Japanese firms judge the potential
gains and problems associated with technological collaboration, there are
larger questions of what the impacts will be on the national economy and
technology base. So far, large international consortia have been the purview
of government-to-government efforts to facilitate collaboration primarily in
basic science and, to a lesser extent, in technology transfer. Japanese govem-
ment ministries attempt to promote cooperation with their U.S. government
counterparts through such projects, normally under the auspices of the U.S.-
Japan Agreement for Cooperation in Science and Technology and related
agreements. Official efforts to promote cooperation, however, often are con-
strained by political pressures to show short-term results; concern that the
United States may give more technology than it gets; limits on funding; and,
especially in the United States, by inadequate channels for effective commu-
nication with industry. As a result, efforts to structure U.S.-lapan collabora-
tion in industrial R&D are proceeding slowly. Nevertheless, company-to
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34
. . . .
company activities in
joint venture licensing and technical exchanges are
expanding significantly.
The discussions at the workshop on "Industrial R&D in the United States
and Japan" documented successful technology transfer through company-to-
company vehicles provided by joint ventures; licensing; offshore facilities;
and, in some cases, consortia. Although these discussions suggest evidence
of mutually beneficial U.S.-Japan cooperation in industrial R&D at the com-
pany-to-company level, it remains to be seen whether the experiences of
large, well-established multinationals can be shared by small- and medium-
size firms that have fewer resources and less experience to devote to intema-
tional cooperation.
It may be necessary to consider new approaches, in view of concerns that
have been raised in public policy debates, particularly in the United States,
about whether international technological linkages work to the advantage of
the U.S. partners and the United States as a country. In this context U.S. and
Japanese industry leaders may need to take on additional responsibility in
improving the climate for technological cooperation.
A suggestion was made that an unofficial, private sector forum be estab-
lished by industry leaders from both countries, with the purposes of resolving
problems that inhibit collaboration in industrial R&D and communicating to
policy makers.48 This suggestion is based on the assumption that the private
sector has, in practice, already taken the lead in expanding technological link-
ages and that those with first-hand experience are in the best position to
resolve problems and share lessons about which approaches work best to
ensure that partners from both countries benefit. Working groups of experts
from both countries would have to meet relatively frequently to address such
issues as standards, guidelines for licensing and joint ventures, harmonization
of approaches to intellectual property protection, institutionalization of mech-
anisms for exchange of researchers among corporate laboratories, and struc-
turing of cooperative projects in generic R&D involving firms from both
countries. The question is whether industry leaders from both countries can
make the considerable commitment of resources to take the initiative in prob-
lem solving or whether problems will continue to be addressed primarily at a
governmental level once they have become the topics of controversy.
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Endnotes
1 In 1985 Japanese expenditures for nondefense R&D amounted to 2.8 per
cent of GNP whereas similar U.S. expenditures amounted to 1.9 percent
of GNP.
Kagaku Gijutsu Cho (Science and Technology Agency), Kagaku Gijutsu
Yoran (Indicators of Science and Technology), 1989, 6-7.
See National Science Foundation, The Science and Technology
Resources of Japan: A Comparison with the United States, NSF 88-31S,
1988, p. 18. By 1986 lapan's industrial R&D expenditures were one-half
U.S. company-funded expenditures. Comparisons were in constant 1982
dollars. Note that Japanese R&D expenditures in 1965 were only about
$2.5 billion, whereas, U.S. R&D expenditures amounted to more than
$40 billion.
See Science and Technology Agency, White Paper on Science and
Technology, Summary, 1989, 4. Id real terms and with 1982 as a base,
Japanese R&D expenditures funded by industry grew to 160 percent by
1987, whereas similar expenditures by U.S. industry grew in real terms to
120 percent of the 1982 level.
U.S. industry carries out more than 70 percent of all R&D in the United
States; Japanese industry carries out about 66 percent of the total.
6 During the 1980-1985 period, company-funded R&D grew at a rate of
8.2 percent annually, but the National Science Foundation (NSF) esti
mates that there was a real decrease in 1989 of 0.9 percent although it
35
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36
was expected that there would be a slight increase in the 1990 funding
levels of 1.1 percent. This information is based on mail responses to an
annual NSF inquiry for its Industrial Panel on Science and Technology
and on interviews with R&D officials in major it&D-performing compa-
nies.
7 Some examples of major international research programs promoted by
the Japanese government include the Human Frontier Science Program,
the Intelligent Manufacturing Systems Program, the Human Genome
Project, the Exploratory Research in Advanced Technologies (ERATO)
Program, the International Superconductivity Technology Center, and the
Frontier Science Program of STA.
8 In the presentation "Corporate R&D Climate in Japan: Partnership
Between the U.S. and Japan" (at the U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working
Environment for Research: Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine,
California, March 2, 1990), Dr. Michiyuki Uenohara, executive advisor
to the NEC Corporation, stated that 10 years of R&D investment often is
required to develop a market-ready product. According to Dr. Uenohara,
there is a 5- to 10-year period, or up to 5 years prior to market introduc-
tion, where firms can collaborate on precompetitive research without risk
of losing competitive advantage.
9 See, for example, D. Eleanor Westney and Kiyonori Sakibara, "The
Organization and Careers of Engineers in the Computer Industry in Japan
and the United States," MIT Working Paper, 1985.
10 In the past many U.S. firms also have done this. The difference seems to
be that such funding is not increasing-and in some industries is declin
ing-in the United States.
11 Tatsuya Kimura, "The Organization of Industrial R&D at Nippon Steel
Corporation," U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working Environment for
Research: Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2,
1990.
12 This is primarily goal-oriented basic research work not usually defined
as basic research in the U.S. context.
13 The Engineering Development Departments are carrying out short-term
research (1 to 3 years) in fields such as lap-top computers and 4 Mbit
DRAMs, whereas the Development Laboratories are working in fields
such as large-capacity digital PBXs, flat panel displays, and HDTV on
medium-term research (3 to 5 years).
14 The information on Toshiba Corporation contained in this report was
obtained from the presentation "Corporate R&D in Toshiba" by Dr.
Kiyoshi Nagai, Statutory Auditor, Toshiba Corporation, at the U.S.-Japan
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37
Dialog on the Working Environment for Research: Workshop on
Industrial R&D, Irvine, California, March 2, 1990.
15 Marv Sullivan Taylor, "A Transaction Cnst Analv.s
:1
, is of Japanese
Employment Relationships," PhD Dissertation, University of
Washington, 1989. The study, based on a survey of 550 R&D engineers
and scientists, provides empirical evidence of the preference for general-
ists, the homogenization of rewards across functions in Japanese firms,
and the movement of Japanese researchers out of R&D and into other
functions within the corporation.
16 Udo Axen, remarks at the U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working
Environment for Research: Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine,
California, March 1-2, 1990.
17 Some U.S. firms, such as Upjohn, have found that the dual ladder system
is not as powerful an incentive for scientists to remain in R&D as are
other more traditional rewards, such as recognition for accomplishment
from the professional scientific community and increased resources for
the laboratory.
18 Japan Productivity Center, Organization and Administration of R&D
Personnel in Japan, 1988, 76-81.
19 Ibid.
20 Japanese corporations seem more likely to retrain researchers, although
the hiring of some important key outsiders often is an important compo-
nent of the process.
Kiyoshi Nagai, "Corporate R&D in Toshiba," US-Japan Dialog on the
Working Environment for Research: Workshop on Industrial R&D,
Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990.
22 Kimura, op. cit.
23 Ibid.
24 F. Peter Boer, remarks at the U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working
Environment for Research: Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine,
California, March 1-2, 1990.
25 Ibid.
26 Data from "Cooperative R&D Ventures Under the National Cooperative
Research Act," U.S. Department of Commerce, March 1990. This figure
comprises ventures (mostly private, joint R&D projects) that have regis-
tered with the Department of Justice under the terms of the Cooperative
Research Act.
27 Congress attempted to provide a mechanism to counteract the disincen-
tives to consortia formation created by antitrust concerns by passing the
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38
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984. The act provides a shield
from potential treble damage liability under current antitrust law to coop-
erative ventures who register with the Department of Justice.
28 Michael Mintz, paper on consortia presented at the U.S.-lapan Dialog on
the Working Environment for Research: Workshop on Industrial R&D,
Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990.
29 National Academy of Engineering, Assessment of National Science
Foundation's Engineering Research Centers Program, 1989. See also
National Research Council, Learning the R&D System: National
Laboratories and Other Non-Academic, Non-Industrial Organizations in
Japan and the United States, Washington, D.C., 1989, 32-33 and Cross-
Disciplinary Engineering Research Committee, Commission on
Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, The
Engineering Research Centers and Their Evaluation, National Academy
Press, 1988, and other work of the committee.
30 Ibid., NRC, Learning the R&D System, 27-28.
31 Fumio Kodama, "Rivals' Participation in Collective Research: Its
Economic and Technological Rationale," Workshop on Expanding
Access to Precompetitive Research in Japan and the United States,
January 22-23, 1990.
32 Reiichi Iokibe and Morio Ikehara, "Research Consortium on Protein
Engineering," U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working Environment for
Research: Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2,
1990.
33 Tokuta Inoue, "Consortia in the Japanese Auto Industry," U.S.-Japan
Dialog on the Working Environment for Research: Workshop on
Industrial R&D, Irvine, Califomia, March 1-2, 1990.
34 Ibid.
35 Iokibe and Ikehara, op. cit.
36 Most of the information on MCC in this report was obtained directly
from the presentation made by Barry Whalen of MCC at the U.S.-lapan
Dialog on the Working Environment for Research: Workshop on
Industrial R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990. Note that partici-
pants in MCC projects cannot transfer technology developed in MCC
projects to third parties.
37 Some Japanese companies believe that if they are invited to join a gov-
ernment-sponsored consortium, they are obliged to accept in order to
maintain goodwill with government bureaucrats and to show responsibil-
ity toward government policies.
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39
38 Most of the information for this case study was obtained from a presenta-
tion by Donald Hammond, Director, Hewlett Packard Labs (retired) at
the U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working Environment for Research:
Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990.
39 Presentation of Tsuneo Nakahara of Sumitomo Electric Industries, Inc.,
at the U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working Environment for Research:
Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990.
40 This discussion is based in part on comments by Mary L. Good of Allied-
Signal, Inc.
41 Presentation of Satoshi Imai of Honda America at the U.S.-Japan Dialog
on the Working Environment for Research: Workshop on Industrial
R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990.
42 Presentations by Hubert Schoemaker and Harvey Berger of Centocor,
Inc., at the U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working Environment for Research,
Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990.
Presentation by Justin Bloom, Technology International, Inc., at the U.S.-
Japan Dialog on the Working Environment for Research: Workshop on
Industrial R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990.
44 Evan Herbert, "Japanese R&D in the United States," in Research
Technology Management 32-6 (1989~: 11-20.
45 See the work of Fumio Kodama, including the paper "Rivals'
Participation in Collective Research," discussed at the U.S.-Japan Dialog
on the Working Environment for Research: Workshop on Industrial
R&D, Irvine, California, March 1-2, 1990. See also MITI, Industrial
Technology White Paper, 1988.
46 Presentation by Tsuneo Nakahara, "Prospects for U.S.-Japan
Collaboration in Industrial R&D," U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working
Environment for Research: Workshop on Industrial R&D, Irvine,
California, March 1-2, 1990.
47 Examples cited include the Human Frontier Science Program, the
International Superconductivity Technology Consortium, and a Japanese
proposal for an Intelligent Manufacturing System (IMS) project involv-
ing the United States, Europe, and Japan.
48 Comments by Justin Bloom on "Prospects for Collaboration," at the
U.S.-Japan Dialog on the Working Environment for Research: Workshop
on Industrial R&D, ~vine, California, March 1-2, 1990.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
japanese industry