|
Items in cart [0] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 9
1
~ Introduction
THE CALL FOR DISPOSAL
The United States has maintained a stockpile of
highly toxic chemical warfare agents for more than half
a century. These chemical agents are lethal and, as com-
ponents of obsolete munitions in storage, they present
an unnecessary risk to surrounding communities.
Destruction of the U.S. chemical stockpile has been
a concern for more than a decade. In 1985, Public Law
99-145 mandated an "expedited" effort to dispose of
one particular type of chemical munition, the M55
rocket, because this munition could self-ignite during
storage if the stabilizer were depleted. This mandate
soon expanded into the U.S. Army's Chemical Stock-
pile Disposal Program (CSDP), whose mission is to
eliminate the entire stockpile of unitary chemical
weapons. The CSDP developed the current "baseline"
system, which uses incineration to destroy agents, en-
ergetic materials, and packing materials known as dun-
nage. The baseline system also uses incineration to de-
contaminate the residual metal parts. In 1997, after
having set several intermediate goals and dates for
completing the destruction of the U.S. chemical weap-
ons stockpile, Congress ratified the President's signing
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
mandates that destruction be completed by April 29,
2007.
iThe term unitary indicates a single chemical loaded in munitions or
stored as a lethal material. More recently, binary munitions have been pro-
duced in which two relatively safe chemicals are loaded into separate com-
partments to be mixed to form a lethal agent after the munition is fired or
released. The components of binary munitions are stockpiled in separate
states. They are not included in the present CSDP, but they are being de-
stroyed in a separate program.
THE CALL FOR ALTERNATIVES TO
INCINERATION
The CSDP currently has two operating baseline in-
cineration systems one on Johnston Atoll in the Pa-
cific Ocean and one at the Deseret Chemical Depot near
Tooele, Utah. Together, these chemical agent disposal
facilities are expected to destroy approximately one-
half of the total U.S. stockpile, the remainder of which
is dispersed among seven other storage sites in the con-
tinental United States. Because federal law prohibits
the cross-country shipment of these weapons for dis-
posal, the Army planned to construct similar incinera-
tion systems at the other sites. However, the choice of
incineration as the disposal technology has met with
strong public and political opposition. In response to
this opposition, "neutralization" processes (based on
the hydrolysis2 of chemical agent in water or in sodium
hydroxide solution) have been developed to destroy the
chemical agents stored in bulk containers at Aberdeen,
Maryland, and Newport, Indiana. The design of these
2Hydrolysis is a reaction of a target compound with water, an acid, or a
_
base in which a chemical bond is broken in the target and OH- or H is
inserted into the bond cleavage. The destruction of chemical agent via hy-
drolysis is often referred to as chemical neutralization. This term is derived
from the military definition of neutralize: to render something unusable or
nonfunctional. Technically, neutralization is a chemical reaction between
an acid and a base to form a salt and water. Chemical agents are neither
acids nor bases, however, and the use of the term neutralization for two very
different processes is somewhat confusing. Nevertheless, in the literature
on chemical demilitarization in aqueous systems, the terms neutralization
and hydrolysis have been used interchangeably. Therefore, unless other-
wise specified, neutralization will be used to refer to the destruction of
chemical agent via hydrolysis. The word decontamination is used to indi-
cate the destruction of chemical agents that are impregnated into a matrix or
adsorbed onto surfaces.
9
OCR for page 10
10
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
facilities is well under way. For the remaining sites,
where explosively configured, "assembled" chemical
weapons are stored, incineration is the planned ap-
proach for disposal. However, in late 1996, Congress
enacted Public Law 104-201, which instructed the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) to "conduct an assessment
of the chemical demilitarization program for destruc-
tion of assembled chemical munitions and of the alter-
native demilitarization technologies and processes
(other than incineration) that could be used for the de-
struction of the lethal chemical agents that are associ-
ated with these munitions." The law required that the
assessment be conducted by a program manager not
associated with the Army's CSDP.
Through Public Law 104-208, $40 million was ap-
propriated by Congress for the program manager for
Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA)
to "identify and demonstrate not less than two alterna-
tives to the baseline incineration process for the de-
militarization of assembled chemical munitions." In
addition, this law prohibited any obligation of funds
for the construction of incineration facilities at two stor-
age sites Richmond, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colo-
rado until the demonstrations had been completed
and an assessment of the results submitted by DOD to
Congress.
Public Law 104-201 also required that the program
manager for ACWA conduct the assessment "in coor-
dination with the National Research Council." The
National Research Council (NRC) currently has a
standing committee charged with oversight of the
CSDP, including the proposed neutralization facilities
in Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana. This
standing committee, referred to as the Stockpile Com-
mittee,3 could have been assigned to oversee the
ACWA program, as well. However, in the spirit of
PL 104-201, the program manager requested that the
NRC establish a separate study committee to conduct
an independent evaluation of the alternative technolo-
gies. In response, the NRC formed the Committee on
Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for
Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons
(ACW Committee). This report provides the results of
the study performed by the ACW Committee.
3More formally, the Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Army
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STOCKPILE
Agents
The principal unitary chemical agents in the U.S.
stockpile are two nerve agents (GB and VXi4 and three
re~atecr forms ot blister, or mustarc`, agent (H. HD, and
HT). All of the agents are stored under ambient condi-
tions primarily as liquids. Nerve agent VX is a non-
volatile, high boiling-point liquid that adheres to sur-
faces for days or weeks. Nerve agent GB (sarin) is a
liquid that has a volatility similar to water and, there-
fore, evaporates relatively quickly. Blister agent (mus-
tard) is a skin vesicant that evaporates very slowly,
although somewhat faster than VX. The original stock-
pile contained 30,600 tons of unitary agents (U.S.
Army, 1996) stored in a variety of munitions and con-
tainers. The stockpiles at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific
and at Deseret Depot in Utah are in the process of be-
ing destroyed by incineration, so the amount currently
in storage has been reduced somewhat.
The nerve agents GB and VX, which are highly toxic
and lethal in both liquid and vapor forms, can kill in a
matter of minutes by interfering with respiratory and
nervous system functions. In pure form, these nerve
agents are practically colorless and odorless. GB is rela-
tively nonpersistent in the environment, whereas VX
can persist for a long time under average weather
conditions.
Bis(2-chloroethyl) sulfide is the proper chemical
name of the blister agent mustard.5 Mustard has a gar-
lic-like odor and is hazardous both on contact and as a
vapor. Because it is practically insoluble in water, mus-
tard is very persistent in the environment. Table 1-1
lists some of the physical properties of GB, VX, and
HD; Figure 1-1 shows the structural formulas of these
chemical agents.
Containers and Munitions
Unitary chemical agents are .~torer1 in .snrav tanks
bulb storage (ton) containers, and a variety of mumtlons,
fir- He
. .
4Nerve agents are organophosphonate compounds. GB is O-isopropyl
methylphosphonofluoridate; VX is O-ethyl-S[2-(diisopropyl amino) ethyl]-
methylphosphonothiolate.
5Names such as mustard gas, sulfur mustard, and yperite have also been
applied to this agent. The term mustard "gas" is often used, but the chemical
is a liquid at ambient temperature.
OCR for page 11
INTRODUCTION
TABLE 1-1 Physical Properties of Chemical Warfare Agents
11
Agent Characteristic Nerve GB Nerve VX Blister H/HD
Chemical formula C4H~oFO2P C~H26NO2PS C4H~C12S
Molecular weight 140.10 267.38 159.08
Boiling point, °C 158 298 217
Freezing point, °C -56 <-51 14.45
Vapor pressure, torr (mm Hg)
Volatility, mg/m3
Surface tension, dynes/cm
Viscosity, cS
Liquid density g/cm3 at 20°C 1.0887
Solubility, g/100 g of distilled water
2.9 @ 5°C
22,000 @ 25°C
26.5 @ 20°C
1.28 @ 25°C
100; soluble in organic
solvents
0.0007 @ 25°C
10.5 @ 25°C
32.0 @ 20°C
12.256 @ 20°C
1.0083
5 @ 25°C; best solvents
are dilute mineral acids
Heat of vaporization, Btu/lb (call") 144 (80) 141 (78.2) 190 (94)
Heat of combustion, Btu/lb (call") 10,000 (5,600) 15,000 (8,300) 8,100 (4,500)
0.072 @ 20°C
75 @ 0°C (solid), 610 @ 20°C (liquid)
43.2 @ 20°C
3.95 @ 20°C
1.2685
0.92 @ 22°C; soluble in acetone,
carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloride,
tetrachloroethane, ethyl benzoate, ether
Source: Adapted from NRC, 1993; U.S. Army, 1988.
including land mines, rockets, bombs, and artillery and
mortar projectiles. Some munitions contain fuzes,
boosters, bursters, and/or propellants. These compo-
nents, referred to collectively as energetic materials, or
energetics, incorporate a variety of chemical com-
pounds that must also be eliminated as part of the
CSDP. The term assembled chemical weapon is used
to describe munitions that contain both chemical agent
fH3
GB: H3C P O CH
F CH
CH3`
VX:
CH 3CH 20
3
\ . .
P S CH2 CH2 N
/
HD: Cl CH2 CH2 S CH2CH2CI
FIGURE 1-1 Structural formulas for GB, VX, and HD.
and energetic materials in an assembled configuration.
Rockets, mortars, and land mines are typically stored
with their energetic components in place; projectiles
may or may not contain bursters or fuzes. Alternative
means for disposing of these four types of munitions
are the focus of the ACWA program (and this NRC
evaluation). Additional details on assembled chemical
weapons are provided in Appendix A.
Geographical Distribution
The chemical stockpile is located at eight continen-
tal U.S. storage sites (see Figure 1-2) and at Johnston
Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, about 700 miles southwest
of Hawaii. Table 1-2 identifies the composition of the
stockpile at each continental U.S. site by type of con-
tainer or munition and by type of agent. All sites except
Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana, contain
assembled chemical weapons.
CH (CH3 )2
' CH (CH3 )2
HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE NRC IN CHEMICAL
DEMILITARIZATION
As the CSDP has evolved over the past 15 years, the
NRC has provided extensive independent oversight and
technical advice to the U.S. Army. This section pro-
vides a brief history of NRC activities related to this
OCR for page 12
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Original stockpile: 31,495 tons
Current stockpile: 27,435 tons
Tons destroyed: 4,060 tons
Percent destroyed 12.89% Newport,
~As of: 3 January 1999 VX -TC
U mati I la, Oregon ~= ~ ~ ~ ~ ; Abercleen,
VX - P. Rat M, ST ;\ ~ - ]/' MHaDYlaTnC~
in, ~ ~; ~1,625 tons
Tooele, Utah2_ \ ~ ~ ~ Blue Grass
GB - C, P. R. B TC~_: | | ~ Be stocky
VX - P. R. M, ST, TC~ ~ ~ l . )- ~ GB - P. R
11 113 tons -\ ~ ~ ~ VX - P. R
*13 616 tons hi-<,, Hawaii ~ ~ ~ \\` 523 tons
- 3\ ~ ~
,
Pueblo Colorado ~
~Anniston, Alabama
HT/HD - C, P Johnston Atoll H
2,611 tons ( ADCACDSp) P'ne Bluff, T/HD C, P. TC
VX - P. M, TC HT/HD - TC VX P. , M
473 tons GB - R
*2,030 tons VX - R. M
3,850 tons GB, VX, H. HE, AT= Chemical agent
TC = Ton container B = Bombs
R = Rockets C = Cartridges
- M = Mines P = Projectiles
ST = Spray Tanks
* Original inventory
FIGURE 1-2 Types of agent, quantities of agent, types of munitions, and percentage of total agent stockpile at each storage site.
Source: Pecoraro, 1999.
program, including previous evaluations of alternatives
to incineration.
In August 1983, the NRC Committee on Demilita-
rizing Chemical Munitions and Agents was formed to
review the status of the stockpile and technologies for
disposal. The committee examined a range of technolo-
gies and, in its final report in 1984, endorsed incinera-
tion as an "adequate" technology for the safe disposal
of chemical agents and munitions (NRC, 1984~. The
committee also concluded that the stockpile was well
maintained and posed no imminent danger, but it ex
pressed concern about future risk from stockpile
deterioration.
In 1987, at the request of the Undersecretary of the
Army, the Committee on Review and Evaluation of the
Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal (Stockpile Com-
mittee) was established under the aegis of the NRC
Board on Army Science and Technology to provide the
Army with technical advice and counsel on specific
aspects of the disposal program. Under this charter, the
Army has to date received 18 reports from the Stock-
pile Committee evaluating progress and assessing spe-
cific aspects of the program.
In March 1991, growing public concerns and oppo-
sition to the baseline incineration system, as well as the
rising cost of the CSDP, led the Stockpile Committee
to suggest, with the Army's agreement, that a new study
of alternatives to incineration for the destruction of the
stockpile be undertaken. In January 1992, the NRC, at
the request of the Army, established the Committee on
Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies
(Alternatives Committee) to develop a comprehensive
list of alternative technologies and to review their po-
tential as agent and munitions disposal technologies. In
June 1993, this committee published its report, Alter-
native Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical
Agents and Munitions (NRC, 1993).
In February 1994, the Stockpile Committee, based on
the report of the Alternatives Committee and on its own
knowledge of the baseline system and disposal require-
ments, formulated recommendations regarding the
destruction of munitions and the further investigation of
potential alternatives to incineration in Recommenda-
tions for the Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions
(NRC, 1994~. The Stockpile Committee concluded that
the baseline system was adequate for disposal of the
stockpile and that the storage risk would persist until
disposal of all stockpile materials is complete. The re-
port recommended that the CSDP proceed expedi-
tiously to minimize total risk to the public at each site.
OCR for page 13
INTRODUCTION
TABLE 1-2 Chemical Munitions Stored in the Continental United States
13
Chemical Munitions (Agent)
APG ANAD BGAD NECA
PEA PCD TEAD UMDA
Mustard agent (H. HD or HI)
105-mmprojectiles (HD) X X
155-mmprojectiles (H. HD) X X X X
Agent GB
8-in. projectiles
MSS rockets
500-lb bombs
X X
X X
X
X
X
Agent VX
155-mm projectiles
8-in projectiles
MSS rockets
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X X
Miscellaneous
Ton containers (L)
Ton containers (GA)
X
NOTE: APG, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; ANAD, Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; BGAD, Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky; NECA,
Newport Chemical Activity, Indiana; PEA, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; PUDA, Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado; TEAD, Tooele Army Depot,
Utah; UMDA, Umatilla Depot Activity, Oregon
Source: NRC, 1996a.
The Stockpile Committee also found, after exami-
nation of all the technologies brought to its attention by
the Alternatives Committee and others, that four neu-
tralization-based systems showed the most promise for
agent destruction (NRC, 1994~. In view of the increas-
ing risk associated with delays in the disposal program,
and recognizing that public opposition to incineration
technology might further delay the program, the Stock-
pile Committee recommended that alternative tech-
nologies be developed promptly. The committee also
recommended that the Army continue to monitor re-
search programs and developments that could lead to
possible alternatives.
By the summer of 1995, the Army had decided that
a reexamination was warranted of specific alternatives
for use at two sites the Aberdeen, Maryland, and
Newport, Indiana, sites where only bulk agent was
stored. In August 1995, the Army advertised in the
Commerce Business Daily for alternative disposal tech-
nologies other than the two already being evaluated by
the Army. The purpose of this announcement was to
determine if any other technologies were capable,
within the CSDP schedule, of meeting chemical de-
militarization requirements for the two sites where bulk
agent was stored. The announcement requested pro-
posals from industry on nonincineration technologies
that were sufficiently developed to meet the needs of
the CSDP. In November 1995, the Army selected three
technologies for review and evaluation by the NRC-
gas-phase reduction with molecular hydrogen, molten
metal catalytic extraction, and electrochemical oxidation
with silver(II) in addition to the two processes, neutral-
ization and neutralization followed by biodegradation,
that were already being developed by the Army.
OCR for page 14
14
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
At the request of the Congress and the Army, the
NRC formed the Panel on Review and Evaluation of
Alternative Chemical Disposal Technologies (AltTech
Panel) to evaluate the five technologies. The results of
the study were published in Review and Evaluation of
Alternative Chemical Disposal Technologies (NRC,
1996a). The panel recommended that aqueous neutral-
ization of HD followed by biodegradation of the result-
ing hydrolysate be used at Aberdeen. The panel further
recommended that neutralization of VX with sodium
hydroxide followed by off-site treatment of the result-
ing hydrolysate be used at Newport. The Army is now
developing hydrolysis processes to destroy the agents
at Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana. How-
ever, the Army will not treat the VX hydrolysate off
site as recommended by the NRC AltTech Panel. In-
stead, it is developing supercritical water oxidation
(SCWO) technology to treat the hv~rol~sate on site
prior to disposal.
More recently, the Stockpile Committee issued a
report on SCWO technology entitled, Using Super-
critical Water Oxidation to Treat Hydrolysate from V7(
Neutralization (NRC, 1998~. The findings and recom-
mendations in that report are pertinent to the ACWA
program because two of the proposed ACWA technol-
ogy packages include the use of SCWO.
EVOLUTION OF THE ACWA PROGRAM
Congress created the ACWA program (separate
from the CSDP) to investigate alternatives for dispos-
ing of assembled chemical weapons (i.e., rockets, pro-
jectiles, and mines) in the face of continuing opposi-
tion to the baseline incineration system. The program
manager for ACWA implemented two initiatives for
identifying and demonstrating candidate alternative
technologies. In the primary initiative, a request for
proposal (RFP) for "a total system solution" was placed
in the Commerce Business Daily (U.S. Army, 1997a).
Proposals submitted in response to this REP described
technology packages that could replace the baseline
system in its entirety for at least one munition/agent
combination. The other initiative involved publication
of a broad agency announcement (BAA) in the Com-
merce Business Daily (U.S. Army, 1997b). The BAA
is seeking technologies that do not represent a total re-
placement of the baseline system but that accomplish
one or more portions of the total process (e.g., the dis-
posal of energetic material). By using this dual ap-
proach, DOD hoped to identify total solutions as rap-
idly as possible while still providing an avenue for
furthering the development of promising component
technologies. However, funding constraints have so far
prevented the program manager from investigating any
of the proposals submitted under the BAA.
ACWA Program Organization
The program manager for ACWA established a
three-phase program to bring at least two technologies
to demonstration as mandated by the Congress.
Phase 1. Evaluation criteria for assessing the tech-
nologies were developed and an REP issued soliciting
industry proposals for technologies to destroy the
ACWs without using incineration.
Phase 2. The proposed technologies were assessed,
and the most promising ones selected. This phase was
performed in four steps with three sequential contrac-
tual awards, labeled Contract Line-Item Numbers
(CLINs) 0001, 0002 and 0003. The program manager's
policy was to bring as many technologies that met the
criteria to demonstration as possible with the available
resources.
Phase 3. The selected technologies had to demon-
strate that they could destroy assembled chemical mu-
nitions by means other than incineration. However, the
word demonstration was not specifically defined by the
Congress. Because the total program had to be com-
pleted in approximately two years,6 the time available
for the demonstrations was severely limited. Eventu-
ally, the program manager for ACWA defined demon-
stration as "a series of tests conducted to prove Ethat]
each critical process step meets the Program Evalua-
tion Criteria; the results are repeatable; and each pro-
cess step can be incorporated into an overall system
[i.e., a] 'total system solution' " (Richmond, 1998~.
The demonstrations would characterize the major
feeds, intermediate materials, and final products and
effluents of the processes, including any hazardous and/
6This deadline was eventually extended, but the schedule was still
challenging.
OCR for page 15
INTRODUCTION
or toxic compounds formed during the process. This
would enable the evaluation of proposed environmen-
tal control systems and lay the groundwork for future
permitting. During the demonstrations, the analytical
methods proposed by the technology providers would
also be validated.
The program manager established four teams to
carry out the program. The technical team performed a
detailed assessment of the proposed technologies based
on the evaluation criteria. The environmental team
identified the applicable environmental regulations and
assessed the impact of these regulations on the tech-
nologies and on the demonstration schedule. The busi-
ness team was responsible for procurement and legal
activities. The public outreach team provided tools and
information for communicating and interacting with the
public.
To ensure public involvement in the program, DOD
enlisted the Keystone Center, a nonprofit, neutral fa-
cilitation organization, to convene a diverse group of
interested stakeholders, called the Dialogue on ACWA
(or simply the Dialogue), who would be intimately in-
volved in all phases of the program. The 35 members
of the Dialogue included representatives of the affected
communities, national citizen groups, state regulators,
tribal representatives, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the DOD staff, including the pro-
gram manager for ACWA, his deputy, and the deputy
assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Chemical
Demilitarization. All non-DOD members of the Dia-
logue were volunteers and received no remuneration
from DOD (except for travel expenses). Ground rules
were developed for the involvement of the Dialogue
which met regularly and participated in all phases of
the assessment (Keystone Center, 1997~. However, all
decisions remained the responsibility of DOD.
In response to a request from the Dialogue for inde-
pendent advice on technical issues throughout the pro-
gram, the program manager for ACWA agreed to fund
a consulting firm, SBR Technologies from South Bend,
Indiana, to meet with a four-member liaison team. To-
gether with representatives of SBR, these four Dialogue
members formed the Citizen's Advisory Technical
Team (CATT) to represent the Dialogue in procure-
ment-sensitive matters. Once the members of CATT
had signed nondisclosure agreements with all technol-
ogy providers, they were given access to all proprietary
15
information, and they participated as nonvoting mem-
bers in DOD's procurement, evaluation, and selection
processes.
Phases of the ACWA Program
Phase 1. The Development of Criteria and
Preparation of the Request for Proposals
Prior to completing the REP, the evaluation criteria
for selecting the technologies at each of the three award
steps and for evaluating them at the conclusion of the
program had to be established and prioritized. The Dia-
logue was asked to help DOD develop and rank three
sets of criteria:
1. Threshold (go/no-go) criteria established whether
a technology package met the most basic require-
ments for supporting test data and could be accu-
rately characterized as a nonincineration process.
The threshold criteria were applied by DOD to
determine the awarding of CLIN 0001 contracts.
2. Demonstration selection criteria focused on the
potential of the proposed technology package for
successful demonstration. Major factors included
process efficacy, safety, human health and the en-
vironment, and business considerations. The cri-
teria were applied by DOD prior to the award of
CLIN 0002 contracts (with business factors omit-
ted) and again before the award of CLIN 0003
contracts (with business factors included).
3. Implementation evaluation criteria focused on the
potential of the proposed technology package to
move into pilot-scale and full-scale implementa-
tion. These criteria were similar to the demon-
stration selection criteria but included more de-
tailed process efficacy, safety, and human health
and environment factors. The business factors
were replaced by factors more relevant to imple-
mentation (e.g., life-cycle cost). DOD will use
these criteria in its evaluations of the results of
the demonstrations (CLIN 0003) and as a basis
for recommendations to Congress at the end of
the program.
All of these criteria were adopted with consensus from
the Dialogue in July 1997. After three Dialogue meet-
ings, DOD also held two technical workshops and a
OCR for page 16
16
=
\~ received Jig
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Proposals '
eliminated
Step 2: Initial Assessment/Data-
Gap Resolution
· Demonstration selection criteria
- process efficacy
- human health and
environment
- safety
Initial
assessment
to identify
data gaps
Data gaps
Contractors prepare
data-gap resolution
work plan
Contractors resolve
data gaps
10 Dec '97
Contractors
prepare
technical
report on
data-gap
resolution
1 7 Feb'98
r Technologies
eliminated
A.......
Step 4: Development/Review of
Demonstration Work Plan
· Demonstration selection
criteria
- process efficacy
- human health and
environment
- safety
- business factors
Contractors I /
Award of
~ ~ \ CLIN 0003
prepare Evaluation of ~ demonstration
demonstration~ demonstration
work plan\ work plan /
\ / Work plans
\ / selected for
' demonstration
. testing
^;^
( plans not )
29 May '98 29 Jul '98
... .. . ~ .
testing
FIGURE 1-3 Schedule for the assessment and evaluation phase of DOD's ACWA Program. Source: Denved from U.S. Army,
1997a.
presolicitation conference for industry. Phase 1 culm~-
nated on July 28, 1997, when DOD issued the REP.
Twelve firms submitted proposals by the deadline, Sep-
tember 15, 1997.
Phase 2. Assessment and Evaluation
The ACWA assessment and evaluation phase was
divided into a complicated four-step process during
which technology providers would be selected and pro-
vided with funds at three stages, labeled CLIN 0001,
CLIN 0002 and CLIN 0003. The steps in this process
are summarized, with schedules, in Figure 1-3.
In Step 1, the go/no-go evaluation, the proposals
were evaluated against the threshold criteria established
by DOD and the Dialogue. On October 6, 1997, DOD
announced that seven technology providers had passed
the go/no-go evaluation. These technology providers
and their teaming partners are listed in Table 1-3, and
brief descriptions of their technology packages are
listed in Table 1-4.
During Step 2, initial assessment/data-gap resolu-
tion, the technical team, together with the CATT, iden-
tified data gaps in the seven proposals and categorized
them as mandatory, program, or demonstration gaps.
Mandatory gaps had to be resolved in the data-gap reso-
lution step (this step) before the provider could pro-
ceed to Step 3. Program gaps could be resolved at this
time or during the demonstration phase, at the discretion
TABLE 1-3 Seven Technology Providers Selected in
the ACWA Go/No-Go Evaluation Step
Team Lead
Partner(s)
AEA Technology
ARCTECH
Burns and Roe
General Atomics
Lockheed Martin
Parsons
Teledyne Commodore
CH2M HILL
ICE Kaiser, Inc.
Foster-Miller
Startech
none
SAIC
Kvaerner John Brown
Foster Wheeler Corporation
Eli Eco Logic International
E1 Dorado Engineering, Inc.
Aerojet General Corporation
Illinois Institute of Technology Research
Institute
AlliedSignal
Mason & Hanger
Stone & Webster
Southwest Research Institute
University of Kentucky
OCR for page 17
17
o
4=
En ~
o v,
o
.5
.=
·_.
o
Ct
Ct
Ct
C)
Ct
o
o
C)
V)
o
o
=
· 5 -
1
¢
o
~ ca
~ ·=
En
o
4=
En ¢
ca
4=
ca
4.;, -
¢ ~
;^
o s.
o
_ . ~
·0 =4
ca ~
· ~ U.
o
¢
;^ ~
. ~_
< 5!
~ ~ so
~ o ~
· ~ o o
ca 4= ~
o ~ ~
~ ca
rip
¢
·_4
ca
·_4
ca
;^
;^
<; ~
O
I ~
~ ca
~ ~ .
U:)
~0 .O
~ ~ ca
~',=
;^
ca
ca
ca
s~
~0
V
E~
~V
¢
·_4
;^
o
ca
. ~
O
~5
V
V~ V~
^ O
ca 4=
· ~ 4._,
;^ c,;)
;^ ~
o
V
V,
ca
·_4
ca
;^
;^
~ ^
~ O
C) ~
·= :5
·R ~
~ O
ca · -
.^ ~
. ca ~
~ O
o s-.
;^ ~
. ~ .
;^ ca
~ .
ca S~
t004
4=
O
>0 ~
ca
C)
.~
¢
4=
4=
4=
s~
E~
4=
o
.0
ca
·_4
ca
;^
;^
8
o
.0
. ~
ca
· ~
;^
o
;^
;^
~ ~ o
~ t,.4 o
s~ c)
4= c)
·=
·~
o ~ ~
ca
o
ca
s~
'o
ca
o
s~
oo
o
o
¢
. .
c)
o
v,
OCR for page 18
18
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
of the technology provider. Demonstration gaps were
not expected to be resolved until the demonstration
phase. Each technology provider was awarded $60,000
on November 3,1997, to prepare a data-gap resolution
report to be submitted to the program manager by Feb-
ruary 17, 1998 (CLIN 0001~. During Step 2, the techni-
cal team, with participation from the CATT, made site
visits to all seven technology providers.
In Step 3, final assessment/technology ranking, the
data-gap resolution reports submitted by the technol-
ogy providers were reviewed in detail. Using the first
three categories of the demonstration-selection criteria
(process efficacy, safety, and human health and envi-
ronment), DOD, with the help of the CATT, ranked the
seven technology packages. DOD announced on April
28,1998, that six of the seven had passed this step, and
the six technology providers were awarded $150,000
each to prepare demonstration work plans and purchase
items for demonstration that required long lead times.
During Step 4, development of the demonstration
work plan, DOD met informally with the six providers
to finalize the portions of the technology packages that
required demonstration and to clarify the information
that would be provided in the demonstration work
plans. The work plans had to be submitted to DOD by
May 29, 1998, at which time they were evaluated ac-
cording to all of the demonstration-selection criteria,
including business factors. The business factors in-
cluded the demonstration schedule, past performance
of the technology provider, socioeconomic factors, and
technical and management approach. All six technol-
ogy packages were found to be technically acceptable.
Final selection for CLIN 0003 contracts was made on
the basis of a technology provider offering the "best
value" to the government within the available program
resources. The announcement of the demonstration
awards was delayed while the ACWA program man-
ager attempted to obtain sufficient funds to award more
than two contracts. On July 29, 1998, Burns & Roe,
General Atomics, and Parsons-AlliedSignal were se-
lected7 to proceed to the demonstration phase. The
7 The Army originally scheduled CLIN003 to be awarded on July 6,
1998. However, award announcements were delayed until July 29, 1998,
while the program manager attempted to obtain additional funds to award
more demonstration contracts. After the three contracts were awarded, one
technology provider filed a protest with the General Accounting Office
(GAO), and a stop-work order was announced. The protest was dismissed
on September 15, 1998, and the stop-work order was rescinded two days
program manager stated that if additional funds became
available in fiscal year (FY) 99, more demonstrations
might be funded. The awards were based on the require-
ments of the demonstrations and available funding.
Phase 3. Demonstrations
For demonstration, DOD identified the unit opera-
tions in each technology package that were the least
mature and the most likely to be problematic. Detailed
characterization of both major and trace constituents of
the effluent streams was given high priority. The unit
operations to be demonstrated and the quantities of
agent and energetics involved are given in Tables 1-5
through 1-7. The deadline for completion of the dem-
onstrations was May 7,1999, and the deadline for sub-
mitting the reports describing and analyzing the results
was June 21, 1999. The program manager for ACWA
will submit his recommendations to Congress on Sep-
tember 30, 1999.
ROLE OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
The Congress instructed DOD to conduct its assess-
ment of these alternative technologies "in coordination
with the National Research Council." At the request of
DOD, the NRC ACW Committee conducted an inde-
pendent evaluation of the technology packages that had
passed the go/no-go criteria.
Statement of Task
The NRC reached agreement with DOD on the
ACW Committee's Statement of Task in March 1997,
and the study officially commenced on May 27, 1997.
The Statement of Task is reprinted below:
The National Research Council (NRC) will provide an
independent scientific and technical assessment to the
Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons
Assessment (PMACWA) of alternative disposal tech-
nologies, identified through the Department of Defense
(DOD) screening process, for assembled chemical weap-
ons located at U.S. weapon storage sites. The NRC study
will address the alternative technology research and
later. The protest was subsequently reinstated on December 1, 1998, but no
new stop-work order was issued. On March 5, 1999, after a detailed evalu-
ation, the GAO again dismissed the protest. These events delayed the
completion of the program from April 1, 1999, to September 30, 1999.
OCR for page 19
INTRODUCTION
19
TABLE 1-5 Technology Demonstrations Performed by Burns and Roe
Location Unit Operation Test Material Quantity
APGa Energetic- deactivation chamber
APG Plasma-waste converter
Energetics
Composition B (Comp B)
Tetrytol
Energetics
Comp B
Tetrytol
M28 propellant
Simulated mortar with 10% GB heel
Agent
HD
GB
VX
Dunnage
Wood pallets (spiked with PCP)
Carbon
DPEb
Fiberglass firing tubes
Decontamination solution
0.2 lb
0.2 lb
2.1 lb
2.1 lb
20 lb
60 mortars
400 lb
400 lb
136 lb
600 lb
600 lb
800 lb
600 lb
600 lb
aAPG = Aberdeen Proving Ground
bDPE = demilitarization protective ensemble
Source: Adapted from Eissner, 1999.
TABLE 1-6 Technology Demonstrations Performed by General Atomics
Location Unit Operation Test Material Quantity
CAMDSa Energetics rotary hydrolyzer Energetics
Fuzes
Comp B. tetrytol, and tetryl bursters
M28 propellant
7 fuzes
7 bursters each
7 sections
DPGb Shredder/hydropulper Dunnage
DPE, wood, carbon 5,000 lb shredded
4,600 lb hydropulped
DPG Supercritical water oxidation
Agent HydrolysatesC
HD hydrolysate
VX hydrolysate
GB hydrolysate
VX simulant
Energetic/Dunnage Hydrolysates
Comp B/M28 propellant
hydrolysate and dunnage
slurry
Tetrytol hydrolysate and
Dunnage slurry
1,760 lb
1,760 lb
1,760 lb
4,400 lb
1,760 1n
1,760 lb
aCAMDS = Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System
bDPG = Dugway Proving Ground
CHydrolysate = by-product of the agent or energetics neutralization reaction
Source: Adapted from Eissner, 1999.
OCR for page 20
20
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
TABLE 1-7 Technology Demonstrations Performed by Parsons-AlliedSignal
Location Unit Operation Test Material Quantity
DPGa Rocket cutting and fluid mining M60 1 lSmm rockets (inert) 10 rockets
M61 1 lSmm rockets with agent simulant 10 rockets
APGb Immobilized cell bioreactor
Agent/energetic hydrolysates
HD hydrolysate and tetrytol hydrolysate
20,100 lb
CAMDSC Immobilized cell bioreactor Agent/energetic hydrolysates
VX hydrolysate, Comp B hydrolysate, 22,400 lb
and M28 hydrolysate
GB hydrolysate and Comp B Hydrolysate 13,000 lb
CAMDS Metal parts treater Metal Parts
M2A1 4.2-inch mortar spiked with HD
M2A1 4.2-inch mortar spiked with VX
M2A1 4.2-inch mortar spiked with GB
Dunnage
DPE with butyl (spiked with HD)
Wood pallets (spiked with HD and PCP)
Carbon (spiked with HD)
Fiberglass firing tubes
64 lb
64 lb
64 lb
64 lb
64 lb
64 lb
64 lb
aDPG = Dugway Proving Ground
bAPG = Aberdeen Proving Ground
CCAMDS = Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System
Source: Adapted from Eissner, 1999.
development program for assembled chemical weapons,
looking especially at ensuring maximum protection for
the general public, the environment, and the personnel
involved in the demilitarization program.
The specific tasks to be performed are to:
· Gather data and analyze information on stakeholder
interests at the assembled chemical weapons stor-
age site locations through site visits (U.S. and for-
eign) and meetings with residents and concerned
citizens, state and federal regulators, and advocacy
groups, in addition to necessary briefings by DOD
officials and managers;
Identify critical technology factors that should be
considered in the selection criteria for advanced de-
velopment and demonstration of selected alterna-
tive technologies;
· Perform in-depth, technical assessments of a set of
technologies that are chosen by DOD and provided to
the NRC by the PMACWA. These technical assess-
ments will include: (1) conducting industrial site visits,
as appropriate, to evaluate the status and maturity of
the technologies; (2) assessing technical aspects,
strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvan-
tages of each technology; and (3) ensuring that all as-
pects of chemical demilitarization and disposal are con-
sidered, e.g., disposal of all waste products; and
.
.
Provide to the PMACWA the results of the assessment
in the form of an NRC approved report. This publicly
released report will contain an evaluation of the cur-
rent status of each technology (including advantages,
disadvantages, knowns, unknowns, and potential for
implementation). Information and data generated as
part of DOD's ACWA efforts will be used to the fullest
extent possible.
Scope and Approach of the Study
At the initial meeting, August 25-27, 1997, the com-
mittee found itself confronted with a unique task. A1-
though previous NRC studies had focused on destruc-
tion technologies for chemical agents, the ACW
committee had been asked to evaluate complete de-
struction systems, including the disassembly of a vari-
ety of munitions, the nonincineration destruction of
energetic materials, and the decontamination of metal
parts, dunnage, and other wastes. Moreover, the tech-
nologies were still evolving as technology providers
were filling data gaps and improving their systems. In
addition, four of the technology providers the commit-
tee evaluated did not proceed to the demonstration
phase in 1999.
OCR for page 21
INTRODUCTION
The committee, therefore, decided to evaluate the
seven technology packages separately and not to com-
pare them directly. The committee also agreed to
develop criteria (see Chapter 2), identify gaps in the
technologies, and comment on the maturity of the tech-
nologies and their potential for implementation. The
committee decided not to rank technologies. recom
~. . ~
O-- - 7 - - - - - __
menct a nest technology, or compare technologies to
the baseline incineration system. There are two primary
reasons for this approach:
.
.
The Statement of Task called for the NRC to con-
duct an independent assessment of the technolo-
gies identified through the DOD screening process.
To ensure independence, the committee decided
that all seven technology packages that passed the
basic threshold criteria should be evaluated, re-
gardless of subsequent eliminations by DOD.
The ACWA program was conceived in Public
Law 104-201 as separate from the baseline incin-
eration program. The goal of the ACWA was to
demonstrate alternative technologies, not to com-
pare those technologies with each other or with
incineration. In keeping with the intent of the law,
the committee decided to evaluate each technol-
ogy package on its own merits and not to compare
them with incineration.
A freeze date for accumulating data (March 15,
1999) was set so the report could be submitted to exter-
nal review by May 1, 1999, and published by Septem-
ber 1, 1999. Although this meant the committee did not
have the benefit of the final demonstration results, in-
terim demonstration progress reports were available.
The committee established seven working groups,
one for each technology provider, to perform in-depth
evaluations of each technology package. The composi-
tion of the working groups was based on the expertise
required for each technology package and included two
technical experts, one expert on risk and one expert on
energetic materials. Site visits by the groups proved to
be very helpful in assessing the maturity of the tech-
nologies and the technical foundations of the designs.
The committee also made site visits to the Aberdeen
Proving Ground, the Dugway Proving Ground, and the
Deseret Chemical Depot during the demonstration
phase. (Dates and locations of these visits and of other
committee meetings are given in Appendix B.)
21
Sources of Information
Because of the evolving nature of the ACWA pro-
gram and the technologies, the committee had to be
flexible about accepting information as it became avail-
able. The wide variety of information sources used in
this evaluation can be grouped into the following 11
general categories:
Materials Submitted in Response to the REP. The
committee reviewed, in detail, the documents sub-
mitted by the technology providers in response to
DOD's REP. These documents included propos-
als, data-gap reports, and demonstration work
plans.
Briefings by DOD. Representatives of the ACWA
program provided briefings at each committee
meeting. The briefings included general updates
of the program, as well as detailed descriptions of
certain aspects of the program (e.g., specifics of
the demonstration plans, sampling and analysis
methods for residual energetic material, etc.~.
· Briefings by Technology Providers. The technol-
ogy providers came to three committee meetings
to give briefings and answer questions about their
technology packages. These meetings took place
in October 1997, December 1997, and March
1999. (See Appendix B for more information
about these meetings.)
Other Briefings. The committee also received
briefings by individuals not directly associated
with DOD or with the technology providers. Ex-
amples include briefings by the Dialogue CATT
and a briefing by Dr. David Kosson, the chair of
the NRC Stockpile Committee, on that com-
mittee's recent SCWO report (NRC, 1998~.
Visits to Technology Providers. Representatives of
the working groups visited each technology pro-
vider to speak directly with experts about the tech-
nology packages and to examine existing equip-
ment or systems. (See Appendix B for the dates
and locations of these visits.)
Questionnaires for Technology Providers. On sev-
eral occasions, the committee sent written ques-
tions to the technology providers requesting addi-
tional information. A list of questions was sent
before each site visit, and other questions were
transmitted as they arose.
OCR for page 22
22
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF ASSEMBLED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
.
.
· Visits to Storage Sites and Public Meetings. The
committee visited the Blue Grass Army Depot in
Richmond, Kentucky, and the Pueblo Chemical
Depot in Pueblo, Colorado, to meet with the per-
sonnel responsible for the storage of munitions and
with local citizens to discuss the proposed alterna-
tive technologies. In Richmond, Kentucky, the com-
mittee attended a Citizens' Advisory Commission
meeting; in Pueblo, members of the committee
manned an information booth at the depot summer
festival (part of their public outreach activities).
· Discussions with Regulators. The committee re-
viewed the existing federal regulations and con-
ducted informal telephone discussions with state
regulators in Colorado, Kentucky, and Utah. The
purpose of these discussions was to identify major
issues regulators thought might affect the permit-
ting of each technology. The discussions were held
with the full knowledge that these individuals were
expressing personal opinions and could not render
formal judgments.
Demonstration Visits. Representatives of the com-
mittee visited each demonstration site to discuss
the tests and to examine the equipment firsthand.
Dialogue Meetings. Representatives of the com-
mittee attended all of the Dialogue meetings, and
the committee chair updated the Dialogue mem-
bers on the committee's activities. Committee
members solicited the views of Dialogue mem-
bers on the proposed alternatives and their inter-
pretations of the public response to them. The
ACW Committee and the Dialogue also held a
joint meeting early in the process (October, 1997)
to establish lines of communication.
· Review of the Open Literature. NRC staff and
committee members reviewed the open literature
on topics relevant to the evaluations (e.g., hydroly-
sis of agent and energetic materials, plasma tech-
nology, public response to waste-disposal tech-
nologies, etc.~. Previous NRC reports on the
chemical demilitarization program and alterna-
tives to incineration were included in this review.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
This report has been organized in the following
fashion. Chapter 1 provided background on the CSDP,
the ACWA process, and the NRC's role in that pro-
cess. Chapter 2 describes the criteria the committee
used to evaluate each technology package. Chapters 3
through 9 are devoted to the seven technology pack-
ages. Each chapter includes a description (without
proprietary information); an evaluation in terms of
the criteria described in Chapter 2; identification of
information gaps; and a discussion of the requirements
for implementing the package. Chapter 10 is a discus-
sion of issues that affect public perceptions and ac-
ceptance of the technologies. Finally, Chapter 11 in-
cludes a summary of the technology packages in
tabular form, as well as general findings and recom-
mendations.
For the benefit of readers who may not be familiar
with chemical weapons and the technologies used in
demilitarization, the report includes eight appendices.
The assembled chemical weapons are described in
some detail in Appendix A. Appendix B lists the com-
mittee meetings and site visits. Because several tech-
nology providers proposed using (1) the baseline dis-
assembly method, (2) hydrolysis to destroy chemical
agents, and (3) hydrolysis to destroy energetic materi-
als, a general description of these three technologies is
given in appendices C, D, and E, respectively. Because
two technology packages included SCWO, Appendix
F contains a short description of SCWO, as well as the
findings and recommendations from the recent NRC
report on SCWO. Two technology packages also in-
volve the use of fluidjet cutting, so Appendix G pro-
vides a description of the fundamentals of jet cutting
and a brief review of its use in the demilitarization of
ordnance. Potential environmental permitting issues
identified during informal discussions between the
committee and state regulators are described in Appen-
dix H. Biographical sketches of the committee mem-
bers are provided in Appendix I.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
assembled chemical
