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the characteristics of terrorists who have perpetrated attacks against commercial aviation. CAPS separates airline passengers into two groups, high risk and low risk. The carry-on and checked bags of high-risk passengers (called selectees in airline security parlance) are subjected to additional security measures, including either PPBM or screening by an FAA-certified EDS.

All U.S. air carriers were required to implement and use CAPS by December 31, 1998. Airline representatives have indicated that the implementation of CAPS has not created unreasonable difficulties and that CAPS is superior to a manual passenger profiling and tracking system, although most airline officials also believe it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of CAPS. The number of CAPS selectees varies by airline, route, and location but averages from 3 to 8 percent of all passengers (Padgett, 1998). Although CAPS appears to be an effective component of aviation security and is anticipated to be an important part of a TAAS for the foreseeable future, a quantitative means of evaluating its effectiveness has not been implemented.

The issue of civil liberties was raised in the White House Commission Report, which concluded that fundamental civil liberties should not, and need not, be compromised by a profiling system. The commission established a Civil Liberties Advisory Panel to investigate the issue and recommend ways to safeguard civil liberties (White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, 1997). The U.S. Department of Transportation also submitted the profiling elements of CAPS to the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice for review, which determined that CAPS did not violate the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures and did not discriminate on the basis of color, gender, religion, or ethnic origin. The Department of Justice recommended, however, that the FAA periodically review the CAPS program to ensure that it adheres to constitutional requirements and civil rights laws, that airlines seek governmental approval prior to altering the program, and that employees responsible for the operation of CAPS be trained in civil liberties.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The 1997 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended that the FAA implement full PPBM. According to the FAA's interpretation of this recommendation, full PPBM involves matching passengers, either randomly selected or identified through CAPS with their bags (GAO, 1998). The panel concluded that 100 percent baggage matching for domestic flights is not practical and that the combination of PPBM with CAPS—when fully implemented—will improve aviation security further. However, it is not clear that PPBM is continued when a selectee changes planes at a connecting airport or disembarks during a stopover. The panel believes that selectees at originating airports should be considered selectees, and therefore subject to PPBM, on subsequent connections.

CAPS appears to be effective for identifying selectees for further security measures, such as bag matching or bag screening. The panel concluded that CAPS effectively focuses personnel and equipment on high-risk passengers and does not impede the efficiency or productivity of air travel. Nevertheless, the panel believes a means of quantitatively characterizing the effectiveness of CAPS should be developed to ensure its long-term viability.

Recommendation

The FAA and the airlines should extend the computer-assisted passenger screening program to include interairline coordination (sharing of data for connecting passengers) and interfaces with other components of the overall security system (e.g., explosives-detection systems, positive passenger-bag matching).

Recommendation

The FAA should develop a quantitative measure of the performance of computer-assisted passenger screening.

Recommendation

Passengers designated as selectees at the origination of their flights should be considered selectees for all connecting (or continuation) legs of their flights.