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1—
Introduction

On April 22, 1995, FBI agents took custody of Abdul Hakim Murad from Philippine authorities. He had been arrested after a fire broke out in a Manila apartment where he, Ramzi Yousef, and another associate were living and where officials found explosives and bomb-making materials (FBI, 1995). The fire may well have prevented the worst terrorist attack against civil aviation in history. Yousef was later indicted for the 1994 bombing of Philippine Airlines Flight 434, which was determined to be a test run for a plot to blow up 11 American planes simultaneously (Zuckerman, 1996). Although it is horrifying to speculate on what might have happened if the fire had not broken out in Murad's apartment, it is more constructive to focus on what has been done—and what is being done—to improve aviation security.

Arguably the greatest progress in the last 30 years in the fight against terrorist attacks on aircraft has been made in the 10 years since the devastating bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 (Figure 1-1). Although it is difficult to prove a cause-and-effect relationship between government action and the reduction in bombings, three laws passed by Congress (Box 1-1) have undoubtedly had an impact.

The three laws passed by Congress have facilitated the development and deployment of security equipment and procedures, which have improved aviation security. In 1997, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was directed by President Clinton and authorized by Congress to deploy 54 FAA-certified explosives-detection systems1 (EDSs) and more than 400 trace-detection systems in airports around the country. The FAA created the Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT) to manage this deployment. The SEIPT assessed the availability of explosives-detection equipment and formulated a plan to deploy this equipment in airports throughout the United States. In a separate program, the FAA began testing hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs) designed to contain an explosive blast. Several HULDs are now undergoing operational testing by commercial air carriers.

Although substantial progress has been made, opportunities remain for the development and deployment of technologies that will make commercial aviation in the twenty-first century even safer. In the future, explosives-detection equipment must have higher throughput rates, lower false-alarm rates, and greater flexibility to detect different types of threat materials. HULDs must be proven to be airworthy and their tare (empty) weight reduced. Even if all of these challenges are met, these technologies must be deployed in a manner that provides maximum protection from terrorist attacks against commercial aircraft.

Deployed Technologies

Aviation security equipment and procedures include the following: bulk2 explosives-detection equipment, trace explosives-detection equipment, HULDs, computer-assisted passenger screening (CAPS), and positive-passenger bag matching (PPBM) (Table 1-1).

The congressionally mandated deployment of bulk explosives-detection equipment began with the installation of the first FAA-certified EDS (the In Vision CTX-5000) and continued throughout 1998. The installation of trace explosives-detection equipment and the implementation of CAPS and PPBM were scheduled for the same time period. Two HULD designs (both LD-3 size) that conform to

1 The following terminology is used throughout this report. An explosives-detection system (EDS) is a self-contained unit composed of one or more integrated devices that has passed the FAA's certification test. An explosives-detection device is an instrument that incorporates a single detection method to detect one or more categories of explosive material. Explosives-detection equipment is any equipment, certified or not, that can be used to detect explosives.

2 In this report, the term bulk explosives includes all forms and configurations of explosives at threat level (e.g., shaped explosives, sheet explosives, etc.).



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Page 7 1— Introduction On April 22, 1995, FBI agents took custody of Abdul Hakim Murad from Philippine authorities. He had been arrested after a fire broke out in a Manila apartment where he, Ramzi Yousef, and another associate were living and where officials found explosives and bomb-making materials (FBI, 1995). The fire may well have prevented the worst terrorist attack against civil aviation in history. Yousef was later indicted for the 1994 bombing of Philippine Airlines Flight 434, which was determined to be a test run for a plot to blow up 11 American planes simultaneously (Zuckerman, 1996). Although it is horrifying to speculate on what might have happened if the fire had not broken out in Murad's apartment, it is more constructive to focus on what has been done—and what is being done—to improve aviation security. Arguably the greatest progress in the last 30 years in the fight against terrorist attacks on aircraft has been made in the 10 years since the devastating bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 (Figure 1-1). Although it is difficult to prove a cause-and-effect relationship between government action and the reduction in bombings, three laws passed by Congress (Box 1-1) have undoubtedly had an impact. The three laws passed by Congress have facilitated the development and deployment of security equipment and procedures, which have improved aviation security. In 1997, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was directed by President Clinton and authorized by Congress to deploy 54 FAA-certified explosives-detection systems1 (EDSs) and more than 400 trace-detection systems in airports around the country. The FAA created the Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT) to manage this deployment. The SEIPT assessed the availability of explosives-detection equipment and formulated a plan to deploy this equipment in airports throughout the United States. In a separate program, the FAA began testing hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs) designed to contain an explosive blast. Several HULDs are now undergoing operational testing by commercial air carriers. Although substantial progress has been made, opportunities remain for the development and deployment of technologies that will make commercial aviation in the twenty-first century even safer. In the future, explosives-detection equipment must have higher throughput rates, lower false-alarm rates, and greater flexibility to detect different types of threat materials. HULDs must be proven to be airworthy and their tare (empty) weight reduced. Even if all of these challenges are met, these technologies must be deployed in a manner that provides maximum protection from terrorist attacks against commercial aircraft. Deployed Technologies Aviation security equipment and procedures include the following: bulk2 explosives-detection equipment, trace explosives-detection equipment, HULDs, computer-assisted passenger screening (CAPS), and positive-passenger bag matching (PPBM) (Table 1-1). The congressionally mandated deployment of bulk explosives-detection equipment began with the installation of the first FAA-certified EDS (the In Vision CTX-5000) and continued throughout 1998. The installation of trace explosives-detection equipment and the implementation of CAPS and PPBM were scheduled for the same time period. Two HULD designs (both LD-3 size) that conform to 1 The following terminology is used throughout this report. An explosives-detection system (EDS) is a self-contained unit composed of one or more integrated devices that has passed the FAA's certification test. An explosives-detection device is an instrument that incorporates a single detection method to detect one or more categories of explosive material. Explosives-detection equipment is any equipment, certified or not, that can be used to detect explosives. 2 In this report, the term bulk explosives includes all forms and configurations of explosives at threat level (e.g., shaped explosives, sheet explosives, etc.).

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Page 8 Figure 1-1 The distribution of aircraft bomb blasts between 1971 and 1997. NAS-3610-2K2C airworthiness criterion have passed the FAA blast and shockholing3 tests. Ten of these HULDs have been delivered to three different airlines for operational testing over the next year. The FAA/SEIPT is behind schedule in the deployment of aviation security equipment (GAO, 1998; DOT, 1998). When Congress provided $144.2 million for the purchase of commercially available security-screening equipment, the FAA/SEIPT planned to deploy 54 certified EDSs and 489 trace-detection devices by December 1997 (GAO, 1998). The FAA also planned to have CAPS fully implemented by December 1997. When it became clear that these goals could not be met, the FAA set a new goal of deploying 54 certified EDSs, 22 noncertified bulk explosives-detection devices, and 489 trace explosives-detection devices by December 31, 1998, and of implementing CAPS by November 1998. As of January 1, 1999, more than 70 certified explosives-detection systems, six noncertified bulk explosives detection devices, and 366 trace-detection devices had been installed in airports. Total Architecture for Aviation Security Protecting civil aviation against terrorist threats is a complex systems problem that has no perfect solution. Significant compromises have to be made in security systems to achieve the highest level of security at an affordable cost while at the same time maintaining the efficiency of air travel. Improvements in aviation security can best be quantified by a security enhancement factor (SEF) that measures improvements in security compared to a baseline level of security in a given year. However, SEF is an exceedingly complex measure because the threats to aviation security, and the available security technologies, are variable and time dependent. In fact, many different detection and protection techniques are being used to counter several different threats, which in turn are influenced by many factors, including geographic location, weather conditions, and the political climate. The U.S. Department of Defense has been faced with similarly complex systems problems and, through experience, has come to address them in a system-of-systems (SOS) framework. An SOS is a complex of systems, each of which is characterized by measures of performance against threats and costs for acquisition and deployment. The SOS concept can be used to optimize a complex system by providing a top-level perspective. For example, instead of optimizing a particular system A for performance and cost, the optimization of the performance and cost of the SOS as a whole (which might consist of systems A, B, C, and D) may require that performance requirements for system A be reduced or even that system A be eliminated. An SOS concept would enable FAA management to mount a layered defense against a dynamic threat. A well 3 A shockholing (or fragmentation) test measures the ability of a HULD to prevent perforation of its walls by a metal fragment traveling at a relatively high velocity.

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Page 9 BOX 1-1 Public Laws on Aviation Security since 1988 Public Law 101-604. After the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, a Commission on Airline Security and Terrorism was created by President Bush, which led to his signing of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-604). This act directed the FAA to accelerate and expand the research, development, and implementation of technologies and procedures to counteract terrorist acts against civil aviation; determine the amounts and types of explosives that could cause catastrophic damage to an airplane; and established the position of assistant administrator for civil aviation security. Public Law 104-264. In 1996, President Clinton established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. The recommendations of this commission led to a directive in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 instructing the FAA to deploy certified and noncertified explosives-detection equipment. Public Law 104-208. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 provided $144.2 million for the FAA to purchase and assist in the installation of advanced security equipment. This act was a significant departure from previous policy, under which air carriers were responsible for purchasing and deploying aviation security equipment. TABLE 1-1 Selected Aviation Security Equipment and Procedures Technology Description Computer-assisted passenger screening (CAPS) CAPS is a system that utilizes a passenger's reservation record to determine whether the passenger can be removed from consideration as a potential threat. If the passenger cannot be cleared (i.e., determined not to be a threat), CAPS prompts the check-in agent to request additional information from the passenger for further review. If this information is still insufficient to clear the passenger, the passenger's bags and the passenger are considered "selectees" and are routed through additional security procedures. Positive passenger-bag match (PPBM) PPBM is a security procedure that matches the passenger's checked baggage with the passenger to ensure that baggage is not loaded aboard an airplane unless the passenger also boards. This security measure is implemented for all outbound international flights and for some domestic flights. FAA-certified explosives-detection systems (EDS) An EDS is a self-contained unit composed of one or more integrated explosives-detection devices that have passed the FAA's certification test. As of April 1999 only computed-tomography-based technologies have passed the FAA bulk explosives-detection certification tests (e.g., In Vision CTX-5000, CTX-5000 SP, and CTX-5500 DS). Bulk explosives-detection equipment Bulk explosives-detection equipment includes any explosives-detection device or system that remotely senses some physical or chemical property of an object under investigation to determine if it is an explosive. This equipment, primarily used for checked baggage, consists of quadrupole resonance and advanced x-ray technologies, including radiography and tomography. Trace explosives-detection devices (TEDDs) TEDDs involve the collection of particles or vapor from the object under investigation to determine if an explosive is present. TEDDs are being deployed for several threat vectors: carry-on baggage (especially electronic devices), passengers, checked baggage, and cargo. TEDDs employ a variety of techniques for detecting vapors, particles, or both, which include chemiluminescence, ion mobility spectroscopy, and gas chromatography. TEDDs do not indicate the amount of explosive present and hence do not reveal the presence of a bomb, except inferentially. Hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs) A HULD is a specially designed baggage container that can contain the effects of an internal explosion without causing damage to the aircraft. A design by Galaxy Scientific passed the FAA blast test in March 1998. A second Galaxy Scientific design passed the FAA blast test in January 1999. To study operational performance and reliability, the FAA deployed 10 Galaxy HULDs in 1999.

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Page 10 defined SOS framework enhances communication among interested parties, even if the analysis is only semi-quantitative. A well understood measure (e.g., SEF) of the efficacy of the SOS would also provide a credible basis for allocating budgets for system improvements. The SOS approach would enable the FAA to describe and assess the deployment of explosives-detection equipment, HULDs, CAPS, and PPBM, as well as other security equipment and procedures—including the performance of human operators. Equipment, procedures, and human operators work hand in glove with other units in the overall airport security system and should be measured and assessed in that framework. In the panel's opinion the only way to assess an inter-twined system with feedback or feed-forward control loops is through an SOS approach. Therefore, the panel adopted an SOS approach to devise a total architecture for aviation security (TAAS) as a framework for assessing aviation security. Report Organization This report presents an SOS approach to assessing aviation security, introduces an SEF, and describes the FAA's progress in deploying aviation security equipment and procedures. Recommendations are also made for future deployments of security equipment and implementations of security procedures. The TAAS and SEF are introduced and described in detail in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 defines the roles and responsibilities of the FAA, air carriers, airports, and independent security contractors in the deployment and maintenance of the performance of security equipment and procedures. Chapter 3 also describes a management framework for the deployment. Cargo and baggage handling are discussed in Chapter 4, providing a context for the implementation of security equipment and procedures described in Chapters 5 through 8. Explosion-resistant containers, or HULDs, are described in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the FAA's progress in the mandated deployment of bulk explosives-detection equipment is described, as well as the results of performance testing, including detection rates, false-alarm rates, and throughput rates. The FAA's progress in deploying trace explosives-detection equipment is discussed in Chapter 7, which also includes the panel's rationale for recommending that tests be developed to measure the performance of these devices. CAPS and PPBM are discussed in Chapter 8, including a timeline for their deployment and a description of how they can be used together. Chapter 9 is a discussion of human factors in the operation of security equipment. Evaluations of airport architectures and their relationships to TAAS are presented in Chapter 10. The panel's overarching high-level conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter 11.