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Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security First Report Panel on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security National Materials Advisory Board Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems National Research Council Publication NMAB-482-5 National Academy Press Washington, D.C.
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Page ii NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competencies and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is President of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce Alberts and Dr. William Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council. This study by the National Materials Advisory Board was conducted under Contract No. DTFA03-94-C-00068 with the Federal Aviation Administration. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. Available in limited supply from: National Materials Advisory Board 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. HA-262 Washington, D.C. 20418 202-334-3505 email@example.com Additional copies are available for sale from: National Academy Press Box 285 2101 Constitution Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20055 800-624-6242 202-334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area) http://www.nap.edu International Standard book Number: 0-309-06787-1 Copyright 1999 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.
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Page iii Panel on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security THOMAS S. HARTWICK (chair), consultant, Seattle, Washington ROBERT BERKEBILE, consultant, Leesburg, Florida HOMER BOYNTON, consultant, Hilton Head Island, South Carolina BARRY D. CRANE, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia COLIN DRURY, State University of New York at Buffalo LEN LIMMER, consultant, Fort Worth, Texas HARRY E. MARTZ, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California JOSEPH A. NAVARRO, JAN Associates, Bethesda, Maryland ERIC R. SCHWARTZ, The Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington ELIZABETH H. SLATE, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York MICHAEL STORY, Thermo Instruments Systems, Santa Clara, California Technical Consultants RODGER DICKEY, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Authority, Dallas, Texas MOHSEN SANAI, SRI International, Menlo Park, California National Materials Advisory Board Liaison JAMES WAGNER, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio National Materials Advisory Board Staff SANDRA HYLAND, senior program manager (until June 1998) CHARLES T. HACH, staff officer JANICE M. PRISCO, project assistant RICHARD CHAIT, NMAB director
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Page iv National Materials Advisory Board EDGAR A. STARKE, JR. (chair), University of Virginia, Charlottesville JESSE BEAUCHAMP, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena FRANCIS DISALVO, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York EARL DOWELL, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina EDWARD C. DOWLING, Cyprus Amax Minerals Company, Englewood, Colorado THOMAS EAGER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge ALASTAIR M. GLASS, Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, New Jersey MARTIN E. GLICKSMAN, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York JOHN A.S. GREEN, The Aluminum Association, Washington, D.C. SIEGFRIED S. HECKER, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico JOHN H. HOPPS, JR., Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia MICHAEL JAFFE, Hoechst Celanese Corporation, Summit, New Jersey SYLVIA M. JOHNSON, SRI International, Menlo Park, California SHEILA F. KIA, Ceneral Motors Research and Development Center, Warren, Michigan LISA KLEIN, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick HARRY LIPSITT, Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio ALAN MILLER, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Seattle, Washington ROBERT PFAHL, Motorola, Schaumberg, Illinois JULIA PHILLIPS, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico KENNETH L. REIFSNIDER, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg JAMES WAGNER, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio JULIA WEERTMAN, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois BILL G.W. YEE, Pratt and Whitney, West Palm Beach, Florida RICHARD CHAIT, director
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Page v Preface This is the first of four reports assessing the deployment of technologies (i.e., equipment and procedures) by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This assessment of the 1997–1998 deployment of technologies by the FAA to improve aviation security was conducted by the Panel on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security under the auspices of the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Commercial Aviation Security. This is the first part of a four-part assessment that will be completed in fiscal year 2001. The subsequent parts of this study will be continued by a new committee that will be convened by the NRC in 1999. The form of this report reflects the panel's understanding of this study as part of a larger project and carefully distinguishes the issues and topical areas that could be completed in the first year from those that would require further study. Based on the experience of the Committee on Commercial Aircraft Security and in anticipation of further queries from the FAA or other government entities deliberating on the continuation and deployment of equipment purchases in the coming fiscal year, the panel has endeavored to make a rapid assessment and generate a timely report in 1999. Therefore, the panel considered the major issues and overall effectiveness of the deployed technologies, postponing detailed descriptions and detailed discussions of less urgent topics until later. The panel was greatly assisted by the cooperation of the FAA, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), and several airport and airline officials. Approach and Scope of This Study This study was conducted in response to a congressional directive (Section 303 PL 104-264, 1996) that the FAA engage the NRC to study the deployment of airport security equipment. The FAA requested that the NRCthe operating arm of the National Academy of Sciencesassess the operational performance of explosives-detection equipment and hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs) in airports and compare it to performance in laboratory testing to determine how to deploy this equipment more effectively to improve aviation security. As requested by Congress, the study was intended to address the following issues: 1. Assess the weapons and explosives-detection technologies available at the time of the study that are capable of being effectively deployed in commercial aviation. 2. Determine how the technologies referred to in paragraph (1) could be used more effectively to promote and improve security at airport and aviation facilities and other secured areas. 3. Assess the cost and advisability of requiring hardened cargo containers to enhance aviation security and reduce the required sensitivity of bomb-detection equipment. 4. On the basis of the assessments and determinations made under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), identify the most promising technologies for improving the efficiency and cost effectiveness of weapons and explosives detection. The NRC responded by convening the Panel on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security, under the auspices of the Committee on Commercial Aviation Security of the National Materials Advisory Board. Interpretation of the four points presented by Congress and subsequent discussions between the FAA and the NRC led to the panel being asked to complete the following tasks: 1. Review the performance in laboratory tests of the explosives-detection technologies selected for deployment by the FAA's Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT). 2. Assess the performance of the explosives-detection equipment deployed in airports in terms of detection capabilities, false-alarm rates, alarm resolution, operator effectiveness, and other operational aspects.
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Page vi 3. Recommend further research and development that might lead to reduced false-alarm rates and improved methods of alarm resolution. 4. Recommend methods of improving the operational effectiveness of explosives-detection equipment already deployed or about to be deployed in airports. 5. Assess different combinations of explosives-detection equipment and recommend ways to improve their effectiveness. 6. Review and comment on the FAA's plans for gathering metrics on field performance based on certification requirements of the explosives-detection equipment. 7. Assess the effectiveness of combining passenger profiling and passenger-bag matching with explosives-detection techniques. 8. Review the technical approach used to develop hardened aviation-cargo containers. 9. Review the results of tests of hardened cargo containers that have been used operationally by the air carriers. 10. Assess the overall operational experiences of air carriers in deploying hardened cargo containers. 11. Recommend scenarios for implementing hardened cargo containers to complement other aviation security measures, such as the deployment of explosives-detection equipment and passenger profiling. 12. Recommend further research and development that might lead to more effective hardened cargo containers. Since this is the first of four reports assessing the FAA's deployment of technologies to improve aviation security, not every task item is fully addressed in this report. Furthermore, it is difficult to state definitively to what degree each individual task has been covered in this report because information obtained during the continuation of this study may lead to the task being revisited and/or revised in a later report. In this report, the panel has addressed, at least in part, tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, and 12. Methodology The Panel on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security developed this report based on: (1) panel meetings and technical literature provided by the FAA and the NRC staff; (2) presentations by outside experts on explosives-detection technologies, HULDs, passenger profiling, bag matching, airport-flow models, and the status of the deployment of equipment and implementation of security procedures; and (3) site visits by select panel members to John F. Kennedy International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, San Francisco International Airport, and the FAA HULD test facility in Tucson, Arizona. Several factors were used in selecting these airports for site visits. All three are large "Category X" airports with international flights. Because Category X airports were the first to receive explosives-detection equipment, the panel was assured that the equipment would be operating and available for viewing. Because of the size of these airports, the panel was able to see deployed equipment in different installation configurations at one airport. During these visits, the panel studied the configurations of the deployed equipment and interviewed equipment operators and other security and baggage-handling employees. Some panel members were invited to visit the FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and InVision Technologies in San Francisco, California, and to attend the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) meeting on air cargo and ground equipment in New Orleans, Louisiana. Finally, some members of the panel participated in a conference call with representatives of domestic air carriers. All panel members were selected for their expertise in technologies for explosives detection, operational testing, human factors and testing, structural materials and design, and air carrier and airport operations and design. Panel Meetings The panel met four times between January and August 1998 to gather information for this report. In the course of these meetings, the panel received briefings and reviewed technical literature on various aspects of security technologies and their deployment. Information was provided by experts from the FAA, as well as by outside experts. Site Visits A group of panel members visited San Francisco International Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, and Los Angeles International Airport to observe the operation of security equipment, including the FAA-certified InVision CTX-5000, several trace explosives-detection devices, and noncertified bulk explosives-detection equipment. Panel members were also able to meet with personnel from the airlines, airports, and private security contractors to discuss baggage handling, the use of containers, and security procedures. Local FAA personnel were also available to answer questions. Following the site visit to San Francisco International Airport, the panel members visited InVision Technologies in Newark, California, where they were informed of InVision's technical objectives and planned improvements to their explosives-detection systems. In addition to the airport site visits, one panel member attended the FAA test of the Galaxy HULD, which passed the FAA blast criterion. This test took place at the FAA test facility in Tucson, Arizona. This visit provided a firsthand account of the FAA's test procedures and test results and provided an opportunity for a panel member to interact with members of the HULD design team. This site visit was followed by attendance at an SAE meeting on air cargo and ground equipment, at which current and former airline representatives, designers, and engineers described their
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Page vii perspectives on the potential deployment of HULDs. Finally, one panel member visited the FAA Technical Center to discuss human-factors issues pertaining to the deployment and operation of bulk and trace explosives-detection equipment. During this visit, the panel member was informed of progress on the development of the threat image projection system for testing operators of security equipment. Philosophy The deployment of security equipment is not just a technical issue or an airport operations issue or a funding issue. Effective deployment is a complex systems-architecture issue that involves separate but intertwined technical, management, funding, threat, and deployment issues. The panel was unanimous in its characterization of deployment as a total systems architecture and in its agreement to conduct this study from that perspective. This systems approach is the foundation of this report. THOMAS S. HARTWICK, CHAIR PANEL ON ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES DEPLOYED TO IMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY
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Page ix Acknowledgments The Panel on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security would like to acknowledge the individuals who contributed to this study, including the following speakers: Michael Abkin, ATAC; Jean Barrette, Transport Canada; Leo Boivan, Federal Aviation Administration; Jay Dombrowski, Northwest Airlines; Tony Fainberg, Federal Aviation Administration; Cathal Flynn, Federal Aviation Administration; Frank Fox, Federal Aviation Administration; Dwight Fuqua, TRW; Ken Hacker, Federal Aviation Administration; Trish Hammar, DSCI; Mike McCormick, Federal Aviation Administration; James Padgett, Federal Aviation Administration; Ron Pollilo, Federal Aviation Administration; Fred Roder, Federal Aviation Administration; Roshni Sherbondi, Federal Aviation Administration; and Alexis Stefani, U.S. Department of Transportation. The panel is also grateful for the contributions of the contracting office technical representatives, Paul Jankowski and Alan K. Novakoff. In addition, the panel is appreciative of the insights provided by Nelson Carey, Federal Aviation Administration; John Daly, U.S. Department of Transportation; Howard Fleisher, Federal Aviation Administration; Lyle Malotky, Federal Aviation Administration; Ronald Polillo, Federal Aviation Administration; and Ed Rao, Federal Aviation Administration. This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC's Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report: Jon Amy, Purdue University; Albert A. Dorman, AECOM; Michael Ellenbogen, Vivid Technologies; Arthur Fries, Institute for Defense Analyses; Valerie Gawron, Calspan; James K. Gran, SRI International; Robert E. Green, Johns Hopkins University; John L. McLucas, Consultant; Hyla Napadensky, Napadensky Energetics (retired); Robert E. Schafrik, GE Aircraft Engines; and Edward M. Weinstein, Galaxy Scientific Corporation. While the individuals listed above have provided constructive comments and suggestions, it must be emphasized that responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the NRC. For organizing panel meetings and directing this report to completion, the panel would like to thank Charles Hach, Sandra Hyland, Lois Lobo, Janice Prisco, Shirley Ross, Teri Thorowgood, and Pat Williams, staff members of the National Materials Advisory Board. The panel is also appreciative of the efforts of Carol R. Arenberg, editor, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems.
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Page xi Contents Executive Summary 1 1 Introduction 7 Deployed Technologies 7 Total Architecture for Aviation Security 9 Report Organization 10 2 Grand Architecture 11 Total Architecture for Aviation Security Concepts 12 Total Architecture for Aviation Security Subsystems 13 Security Enhancement 13 Analysis Techniques 15 The FAA's Deployment Strategy 15 Conclusions and Recommendations 16 3 Roles and Responsibilities 17 Federal Aviation Administration 18 Airports 18 Air Carriers 20 International Civil Aviation Organization 21 4 Baggage Handling 22 Movement of Baggage and Cargo 22 Unit-Loading Devices 26 5 Blast-Resistant Containers 28 Onboard Explosions 28 Hardened Containers 28 Conclusions and Recommendations 34 6 Bulk Explosives Detection 36 Application of Bulk Explosives-Detection Equipment to Possible Threat Vectors 36 Deployed Bulk Explosives-Detection Equipment 37 Test Data 38 Conclusions and Recommendations 39
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Page xii 7 Trace Explosives Detection 41 Principles of Trace Detection 41 Deployment 42 Testing and Evaluation 43 Conclusions and Recommendations 44 8 Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening and Positive Passenger-Bag Matching 46 Positive Passenger-Bag Matching 46 Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening 46 Conclusions and Recommendations 47 9 Human Factors 48 Models of Bulk and Trace Screening 48 Factors That Affect Human and System Performance 48 Deployment Issues 51 Conclusions and Recommendations 52 10 Evaluation of Architectures 53 Security Enhancement 53 Architectures for Aviation Security 54 Conclusions and Recommendations 57 11 Response to Congress 60 Bulk Explosives-Detection Equipment 60 Trace Explosives-Detection Devices 61 Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening and Positive Passenger-Bag Matching 61 Progress in the Deployment of Aviation Security Equipment 61 Operator Performance 62 Measuring Operational Performance 62 Measuring Security Enhancement 62 Five-Year Deployment Plan 62 References 64 Biographical Sketches of Panel Members 67
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Page xiii Tables, Figures, and Boxes Tables ES-1 Selected Aviation Security Equipment and Procedures 3 1-1 Selected Aviation Security Equipment and Procedures 9 3-1 Airport Categories in the United States 19 3-2 Aviation Industry Trade Associations 21 5-1 Characteristics of HULDs Tested 31 5-2 Summary of HULD Test Results 33 5-3 Panel's Estimated Costs for the Procurement and Operation of 12,500 HULDs 33 6-1 Planned and Actual Deployments of Bulk Explosives-Detection Equipment 38 6-2 Location of Deployed Bulk Explosives-Detection Equipment (April 1999) 39 6-3 Summary of Open Testing of CTX-5000 SP at San Francisco International Airport 40 7-1 Most Effective Techniques for Sampling Explosives for TEDDs 41 7-2 Status of TEDD Deployment (as of January 31, 1999) 43 9-1 Factors That Affect Operator and System Performance 50 10-1 Potential Improvements in the SEF for Detection-First and Throughput-First Aviation Security Systems 58 Figures 1-1 The distribution of aircraft bomb blasts between 1971 and 1997 8 2-1 Threat vectors 11 2-2 A top-level total architecture for aviation security (TAAS) 13 2-3 Notional airport security configuration for international flights prior to the 1997–1998 deployment 14 2-4 Notional aviation security configuration for international flights during the early stages of the 1997–1998 deployment 14
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Page xiv 3-1 Responsibilities for civil aviation security 17 4-1 Vectors for introducing explosives and screening tools 22 4-2 Baggage flow and screening for a passenger with only carry-on baggage for a domestic flight 24 4-3 Baggage flow and security screening for a passenger with a carry-on bag and a checked bag for a ticket counter check-in for a domestic flight 24 4-4 Baggage flow and security screening for a passenger with a carry-on bag and a checked bag for a gate check-in for a domestic flight 25 4-5 Baggage flow and security screening for a passenger with a carry-on bag and a checked bag on an international flight 25 4-6 Typical LD-3 container 26 5-1 Cargo hold for blast testing HULDs 31 5-2 Galaxy HULD in test position prior to blast test 32 5-3 Galaxy HULD after blast test 32 7-1 Operational steps of a trace explosives-detection device 42 7-2 A process for measuring the effectiveness of the operator/TEDD system 44 9-1 Role of the human operator in explosives detection 49 10-1 Comparative contributions (notional) to the SEF of detection-first and throughput-first systems 54 10-2 Schematic diagram of throughput-first and detection-first aviation security systems 55 10-3 Hypothetical performance of detection-first and throughput-first aviation security systems for 100 MBTSs 55 10-4 Notional values of the SEF as a function of the efficiency of CAPS in combination with other security measures 59 Boxes ES-1 A Recent Attempt to Attack U.S. Commercial Aircraft 2 1-1 Public Laws on Aviation Security since 1988 8 4-1 Baggage Distribution 23 5-1 FAA 1997 Solicitation for Hardened Containers (DTFA03-97-R-00008) 30 5-2 Standard HULD Requirements 30 6-1 FAA Conditions for the Use of Explosives-Detection Equipment 40 7-1 Operating Principles of Chemical-Analysis Techniques Applied to Trace Explosives Detection 42 10-1 A Notional Example of the Impact of a Detection-First System on the Security Enhancement Factor 56 10-2 A Notional Example of the Impact of a Throughput-First System on Security Enhancement Factor 58
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Page xv Acronyms and Abbreviations ATA Air Transport Association O&S operational and support CAPS computer-assisted passenger screening PPBM positive passenger-bag matching CT computed tomography PRA probabilistic risk assessment DF detection first SAE Society of Automotive Engineers SEF security enhancement factor EDS explosives-detection system SEIPT Security Equipment Integrated Product Team SOS system of systems ST simulated terrorist FAA Federal Aviation Administration FAR Federal Aviation Regulation TAAS total architecture for aviation security TEDD trace explosives-detection device HULD hardened unit-loading device TEDDCS TEDD calibration standard TIPS threat image projection system IATA International Air Transport Association TPF throughput first ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ULD unit-loading device MBTS modular bomb test set Pd probability of detection NRC National Research Council Pfa probability of false alarm
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