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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities 3 Integrating Naval Force Elements for Network-Centric Operations—A Mission-Specific Study 3.1 INTRODUCTION 3.1.1 Scope and Approach Network-centric operations (NCO) are performed by a set of networked assets the committee calls an NCO system (shown in Figure 1.1, Chapter 1). The committee has avoided the phrase system of systems because that phrase suggests a process whereby independently conceived and developed systems are somehow integrated. A useful approach to understanding requirements for effectively integrating these assets is to first postulate mission capabilities for the overall system and then allocate requirements among the various components. In considering both the components of the system and the challenge of engineering and acquiring subsystems that will interoperate to perform a military mission effectively, the committee chose to focus on the Navy missions of air dominance and power projection, the first because examples of NCO exist, and the second because Navy leadership has given priority to capabilities that decisively influence events ashore.1 (The four principal missions of the Navy, 1 The committee did not study deterrence, and its examination of sea dominance was cursory. Although much of the surface portion of sea dominance is similar to power projection, current undersea warfare systems are often limited by the range of in situ sensors, and the function of remote sensors may be limited to cueing. In Appendix B, however, the committee acknowledges that there may be significant opportunities to employ networks of short-range sensors in a fully cooperative mode.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities as viewed by the integrated warfare architecture (IWAR) assessment process, are maritime dominance, deterrence, air dominance, and power projection—see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1.) Further, it focused on the naval forces’ assets that interact over significant distances within rapid tactical time lines: the system of commanders and decision aids (tactical information processing); sensors and navigation; and forces and weapons. The committee believes that one or more coherent system designs are needed for NCO in each of these areas, although some systems may share components. Because distribution of components over space is central to NCO, the committee did not examine integration of assets located on a single platform. 3.1.2 Current and Potential Capabilities—What Is Possible It is probably fair to say that the current broad interest in NCO was stimulated initially by the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) in air defense. The CEC (Figure 3.1) provides a robust information infrastructure, the data distribution system, that interconnects sensors at the radar return level. This information sharing permits a level of detection and tracking that can provide detailed engagement control. Weapons can be launched at targets the launcher cannot see, on the basis of shared tracking and target/weapon assignment algorithms. Because its embodiment is dispersed assets fighting as a coherent whole, the CEC network has been called a virtual capital ship by some. FIGURE 3.1 Cooperative engagement capability.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities FIGURE 3.2 Potential future system for hitting moving ground targets. An example drawn on throughout this chapter is the potential system, illustrated in Figure 3.2, that is intended to affect events ashore decisively. The fleet, standing offshore, protects itself via a CEC shield while projecting power ashore via the Marines, aircraft, and ship-based missiles. A number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a JSTARS aircraft provide continuous ground moving-target indicator (GMTI) coverage synthesized from all the distributed sensors as a single view, together with large volumes of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery used for identifying tracks and responding to the moment’s targeting needs. Theater and National signal intelligence (SIGINT) and image intelligence (IMINT) collectors provide data for context, cueing, and classification or identification. All forces (sea, air, land) contribute their geolocations and identity to a common tactical picture (CTP), which is augmented with information about enemy forces and neutral parties in the battlespace, derived in part from the real-time GMTI and SAR information. This CTP is distributed to all friendly forces to allow shared situational awareness. Because, as both these examples suggest, naval planning and equipping are much more advanced for air defense than for land attack, the committee focuses below on discussing network-centric operations in the context of land attack.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities 3.1.3 Opportunities, Dangers, and Challenges—Need for a Total System Approach Network-centric operations are more than just a good idea; they have already begun at the tactical level, and most observers deem further tactical use to be inevitable. The greatly extended range of current and planned weapons has already led to a tight, time-critical coupling between sensors, shooters, and the weapons themselves. Widespread use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) has already given rise to a battlespace in which all friendly elements are precisely geolocated in a real-time “map” that is shared among collaborating participants. There is every indication that such trends will continue and indeed accelerate in the Navy and other Services, even if no explicit action is taken to further this goal at the departmental level. The Department of the Navy’s greatest challenge is that these efforts are currently diffuse and uncoordinated. A wide variety of tactical components are evolving independently toward participation in NCO. There are two principal dangers in the current state of affairs: Incoherent components. There will result a new set of “stovepiped” components that are optimized locally but do not properly internetwork, and an overall set of tactical capabilities that fails to match the Navy’s needs. Such an outcome can be rectified, of course, but at the cost of time and money. Dangerous new vulnerabilities. Modern information networks can be interconnected fairly easily; without proper systems oversight, they may very well be connected in ways that lead to new, unforeseen, and dangerous vulnerabilities. The need for planning of an entire integrated system is a recurrent theme in this chapter.2 3.1.4 Complexity of the Challenge Enabling NCO requires the integration of existing components into a coherent system, and progress toward NCO will surely involve some evolutionary improvements that integrate legacy components planned and built independently. The committee believes, however, that the full power of NCO will be realized only if the sensors, weapons, and tactical information processing networked for NCO are planned and developed as coherent subsystems. Building on the notional example of future power projection operations shown in Figure 3.2, one thread in this chapter’s discussion is the complexity of 2 Chapter 5 discusses controlling vulnerabilities in a common command and information infrastructure (the NCII), but some of the components discussed in this chapter have vulnerabilities of their own.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities the interactions among these system components and the associated tight time lines. In the Figure 3.2 scenario, when the Marines encounter a moving enemy force, they issue a call for fire. This urgent request for aid leads to a high-priority revision of the current weapon-target pairing—a weapon in flight is diverted from its original target to a newly urgent target. More specifically, an already in-flight joint standoff weapon (JSOW) is issued GPS coordinates for the new target; these GPS coordinates are refreshed every few seconds (via a satellite link) to guide the weapon to the moving target, which is then destroyed. This conceptual thread, which is easy enough to describe in general, poses enormous technical challenges for the various tactical subsystems and their linkages. For instance, how is the new target reconciled with the geolocated tracks provided by the UAV’s GMTI system? How is this new information incorporated into the CTP? How does the call for fire interact with the weapon-targeting subsystem and give rise to a new weapon-target pairing? How is the enemy’s ever-changing location continuously extracted from real-time GMTI information and relayed through a satellite to an in-flight weapon? And, most critically, how does all this happen within a few seconds? In considering such questions, the committee found challenges in weapons, sensors and navigation,3 and tactical information processing components of the NCO system on which it focused. Examples of these challenges are listed in Table 3.1. In the committee’s notional land-attack example, these platforms interoperate through a large number of linked components. Each component is complex in itself and involves processes and information flows that are distributed across a number of platforms. Table 3.2 indicates some of the capabilities required for success in this example and should give an idea of the complexity of the components. 3.1.5 Organization of This Chapter The following sections explore some of the challenges to realizing the capabilities required in the four classes of components shown in Table 3.1. The discussions are condensed; fuller versions are found in referenced appendixes. In addition, the committee discusses the importance of system engineering and reiterates the need for a system of coherent components as basic to effective network-centric operations. The chapter ends with a review of the committee’s findings and offers recommendations based on these findings. 3 Navigation devices can be considered as sensors but are discussed separately here because of the crucial importance of gridlock in NCO. Support of commanders is discussed as part of tactical information processing.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities TABLE 3.1 Examples of Leading Challenges in Developing Components of an Effective Network-Centric Operations System Asset Challenge Weapons Responsive, long-range, sustainable, affordable volume of fire for naval fire support; targeting for Global Positioning System-guided weapons Sensors Susceptibility to countermeasures; detection underground and under foliage; georegistration; target recognition Navigation Vulnerability of the Global Positioning System Tactical information processing (decision making) Extracting targeting-quality information from high-volume, multiplatform, multisensor data; coordinated, distributed weapon selection and support; flexible, adaptive software architectures; interoperable littoral operations TABLE 3.2 Capabilities Involved in the Land-attack Example Function Capability Common tactical picture Provides shared situational awareness to all participants in the battlespace—Where am I? Where are my friends? Where is the enemy? This picture as a whole contains all objects in the battlespace, geolocated and annotated with other known information about the objects. Each participant, however, sees only those portions relevant to that observer’s task. Weapons control Provides a prioritized list of targets, weapon-target pairing, authority to fire a weapon at a target, current target information, and means to update target locations for weapons in flight. Distributed ground movingtarget indicator (GMTI), synthetic aperture radar Provides a more continuous, more extensive picture of the battlespace than can be obtained by isolated sensors. Linked unmanned aerial vehicles and a JSTARS could all contribute to a shared, real-time database for GMTI coverage; such a distributed system allows more continuous views in mountainous terrain and the like. Call for fire Provides a mechanism for time-critical requests from Marines or other land troops for weapons to be directed on enemy forces. Cooperative engagement capability Provides a highly effective defensive shield for forces afloat by tightly linking the radars and air defense missiles of multiple ships into one real-time system.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities 3.2 WEAPONS This section presents as illustrative examples the use of weapons in three operations for which better connectivity and better use of networks to fuse sensor information seem desirable. Appendix D presents a broader view of current and near-term naval weapons and launch platforms, their uses, and targets and addresses the command and information support needed to employ them effectively. 3.2.1 Naval Fire Support: Targeting and Weapon Control The Navy currently has little capability to provide prompt, long-range, surface-launched fire support for Marines or Army forces ashore but has a number of initiatives under way to develop longer-range naval fire support (NFS) weapons. The Navy is developing the extended-range guided missile (ERGM) by adding rocket power and combined inertial navigation and GPS guidance to a submunitions-dispensing artillery shell. ERGM will enable accurate fire to a range of 63 nautical miles. In a remanufacturing program, the Navy is adding GPS to convert existing, obsolete standard missiles (built originally for air defense) into the land-attack standard missile (LASM). LASM will enable accurate fire to ranges of over 100 nautical miles. ERGM and LASM will be retrofitted to Aegis ships and are projected to be used on the DD-21. The Navy is also beginning system studies for an advanced gun system that might be a 155-mm weapon and for an advanced land-attack missile (ALAM) intended for use on the DD-21. ERGM’s GPS receiver will have minimal protection against jamming during its range-dependent, 3- to 6-minute time of flight (TOF). The guidance component and the aerodynamic control authority of the weapon do not seem to support the accuracy of delivery that would be required for it to make effective use of a unitary warhead. Although foreseeable propellant upgrades may permit range extensions of this weapon to about 90 nautical miles, greater ranges will require a larger-diameter round. The weapon as currently designed will not support forces that are engaged in combat at ranges (~200 nautical miles) to which they can be delivered by the V-22 tilt wing aircraft. The targeting concept for ERGM appears to be both ill-defined and inadequate. The targeting concept is that a forward observer or a sensor in an elevated platform will identify the GPS coordinates of the aim point. The data link that will be used by the forward observer has not been identified. If the target moves during the weapon’s extended TOF, there will be no means of correcting the weapon’s trajectory. Even if a forward observer can call in corrected target coordinates, the weapon will not arrive at those coordinates for several minutes. Although the launcher is capable of rates of fire up to about
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities six rounds per minute, high rates of fire may not be realized because of the time required for the targeting and aim-point correction processes. To match the operational concepts that the Marine Corps is attempting to develop, NFS weapons will be driven inexorably to longer ranges. Inevitably, the problem of targeting rapid-fire, surface-launched weapons designed to attack targets at ranges beyond the line of sight will become more difficult. The solution will depend on development of closed-loop control to link a forward observer (or sensor) with the weapon and the launch platform. The committee suggests that a robust targeting concept is needed to support the evolution of near-term and future NFS weapons. The concept should identify a doctrine for use of such weapons along with the links, sensors, and data fusion networks required for their employment in network-centric operations. 3.2.2 Air-to-Air Combat: Long-range Target Identification In the area of air-to-air combat the United States has competent air surveillance radars on both the E-2C (airborne warning and control aircraft) and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), well-trained pilots, good tactical doctrine, high-performance aircraft, and good weapons (AIM-9X and AIM-120C). Evolutionary growth in aircraft performance, weapons range and agility, and airborne sensors is both feasible and programmed. The problem of target identification (whether by cooperative or noncooperative means) has, for rules of engagement reasons, driven air-to-air engagements to ranges that are significantly shorter than the full kinematic range of available weapons. Although the AIM-9X is a world-class weapon, the outcome of a short-range air-to-air engagement depends on factors other than weapon performance. If the problem of identifying the target at long range can be solved, it will be desirable to engage the adversary at the longest feasible range even though the short-range weapons may be superior to those of potential adversaries. In principle, the identification of targets at long range can be achieved by the fusion of data derived from theater and National sensors and from databases of commercial aircraft flight plans. These sensors and databases can be used to track hostile aircraft from takeoff. SIGINT may be used to deduce the mission objectives of hostile aircraft. If all available information can be fused together, the constraints imposed by restricted rules of engagement can be relaxed and engagement can be permitted at the maximum kinematic range of available weapons. The committee believes that the expanded use of tactical networks to provide all available information to AWACS or the E-2C, and to the combat aircraft that they support, will enable air-to-air engagements to take place at the full kinematic range of current and future weapons. The advantages of future infor-
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities mation networks that fuse all source data should be exploited to ensure the best possible outcome of future air-to-air engagements. 3.2.3 Attacking Low-signature Targets Low radar cross section (RCS) targets, or targets that employ low and clutter-limited trajectories, are difficult to engage with existing or projected area-defense antiair warfare (AAW) weapons. Similarly, quiet submarines with reduced radiated acoustic signatures or submarines coated to reduce their effective acoustic (sonar) cross section (ACS) have become progressively more difficult to detect. Hostile submarines that are difficult to detect, classify, and localize are difficult to engage with even the best underwater weapons. There is no simple counter to reduced-signature targets. In a general sense, the only way they can be detected is to exploit the fact that a target presenting a low RCS or ACS to a monostatic radar or sonar is likely to have large forward or specular scatter peaks. Also, a target that is buried in clutter when viewed from one aspect may not be obscured when viewed from another aspect. Thus a straightforward way to negate stealth technology is to illuminate a suspected target area with multiple illuminators and to use multiple independent sensors to detect forward and near-forward scatter peaks and specular glints. If the output of multiple sensors can be fused together, the probability of detecting low RCS and ACS targets will increase, along with the probability of successfully engaging them with current and projected AAW and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weapons, in a network-centric operation. 3.2.4 Findings Finding: Although new weapons are being developed for land attack, the range of surface-launched, short-time-of-flight weapons is currently too limited to support ship-to-objective maneuver at reasonable stand-off distances. Better targeting concepts are needed. (See Section 3.2.1.) Finding: Target identification limitations inhibit the use of air-to-air weapons at their full kinematic range. (See Section 3.2.2.) Finding: Weapons that attack low-signature targets will likely depend on guidance from networks of sensors and illuminators. (See Section 3.2.3.) 3.3 SENSORS Effective network-centric operations require a wide variety of sensors ranging from distant sensors located in sanctuary that can provide precise target locations, to weapons sensors that can autonomously recognize targets. Current
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities sensor capabilities and future growth possibilities are treated in detail in Appendix B. Here the committee summarizes general sensor technology trends, fundamental performance limitations, and prospects for both target detection and recognition. 3.3.1 Sensor Technology Trends and Limitations Sensor capabilities are steadily improving through the use of modern electronic technology and the transition to all-digital and all-solid-state solutions. Distributed implementations are increasingly emphasized—both within individual sensors (e.g., radar phased arrays or optical focal plane arrays) and in the form of meta-sensors (e.g., multiple individual sensors operating cooperatively as a larger single equivalent sensor, as in CEC). Multidimensional signatures are collected to assist in classification and detection. Summarized in Table 3.3, these four trends in sensor technology are having an enormous impact on sensor capabilities. These positive trends do not imply, however, that any sensor task or level of performance can be achieved. There are always engineering compromises to be made—trading performance for such practical aspects as cost, size, and weight—and the best possible performance is not always acquired. Even when money and time are available, some sensing tasks are inhibited by the basic physical limitations listed in Table 3.4. Sensors are also susceptible to camouflage and deception, and to electronic countermeasures. All three sensor classes considered here—radar, electro-optics, and sonar—depend on the propagation of waves through various media and the interaction of these waves with material objects. Herein lie most of the basic physical obstacles. For example, electromagnetic waves move at the speed of light, while sonar signals in the ocean move at about 1500 m/s. Sonar data inevitably take a much longer time to collect as compared with data from radar and optical sensors operating at similar distances. The fundamental relationship between the angular spread or beam width of waves emitted by an electromagnetic or acoustic structure is that the beam width is of the order of the wavelength divided by the antenna diameter. Given the frequency band of the sensor, high angular resolution, which translates into small pixels on the target or background, requires a correspondingly large aperture. Optics, with the shortest wavelengths, can achieve very high angular image resolution (mrad to µrad) with millimeter- to centimeter-sized apertures; radar is characterized by much lower resolution (~ 1°), with antennas measured in meters; and sonar, by even less (~3° to 10°), with antenna sizes of meters to tens of meters. Although it limits atmospheric propagation of radar and electro-optics to selected transmission wavelength “windows,” media absorption is particularly troublesome for sonar because the absorption increases more or less quadrati-
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities TABLE 3.3 Trends in Sensor Technology Trends Implications Digital technology Stable, drift-free operation Compact, low-cost implementations Algorithm flexibility Increasing ability to exploit exponential growth of computing capabilities Solid-state devices High performance, e.g., sensitivity, power, and efficiency Miniaturization and low power requirements Low-cost integrated circuitry Compact integral packaging Novel microelectromechanical systems devices Distributed components Phased arrays for radar, electro-optics, and sonar Multiple sensor cooperation and networking, e.g., cooperative engagement capability Data fusion of multiple and diverse sensors for automatic target recognition (ATR) and geolocation Mobile sensors, e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles, and ground robots Multidimensional signatures Multispectral Hyperspectral Enhanced ATR and noncooperative target recognition TABLE 3.4 Physics-based Limitations on Sensor Performance Sensor Class Fundamental Obstacles Radar Poor angular resolution with typical wavelengths and practical antenna sizes Absorption by and reflection from solid materials Frequency dilemma in foliage and ground penetration: low frequencies give poor resolution; high frequencies do not penetrate Electro-optics Serious weather scatter and absorption—electro-optic sensors require fair weather Resolution vs. coverage area dilemma Dimensional limits on electronic scan Sonar Slow, nonuniform oceanic sound propagation Interference from littoral noise and reflection Rapid increase of absorption with frequency Low frequencies imply need for very large antennas
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities must be able to classify a target and associate multiple reports with a single track. With these capabilities a targeting system can then provide a steady stream of reports that enable a tracking filter to estimate speed and heading. The targeting component is characterized by three parameters: the position accuracy, report interval, and data time delay. It can be assumed that a weapon or launch platform that attempts to reacquire the target is successful if (1) the target is inside the sensor or seeker area of regard and (2) the search finds the intended target before a false contact is misclassified as the target. The probability of satisfying these two conditions depends critically on accurately predicting the target’s location. Summarized very briefly here are the results of the analysis. Requirements to target a weapon of intermediate complexity (and cost) are not onerous compared with those to target a complex weapon (e.g., a manned aircraft with capable sensor suite). For the simplest weapon, one that does not reacquire the target, the targeting requirements are difficult to achieve. The analysis showed that system requirements are driven by the environment, principally the density of false contacts. How can one design a system for all likely environments? Design for very dense environments would be overdesign by large margins for less stressing cases and appears to be prohibitively expensive for widespread deployment. The answer may be to provide the commander with the tools to control assets flexibly in order to focus assets and tighten the targeting-system-to-weapon-system loop when necessary. Can networking enable the requirements to be met? The committee believes several networking concepts may help. First, fusion of data from multiple sensors at different geometries can greatly improve the accuracy of the target position measurement; the radars’ precise range estimates provide the accuracy refinement. Second, targeting data can be put into a common navigational coordinate system by communicating among all targeting and weapon system platforms to control the specific GPS satellites they all track. To summarize, hitting moving targets will require a tight network of distributed sensors, processing facilities, command and control facilities, weapon launch platforms, and weapons. In many circumstances, weapons with simple, inexpensive seekers and links for in-flight targeting updates may provide the best balance in distributing the burden of performance between targeting and weapon components. In the more distant future, networking concepts may permit the use of low-cost weapons without seekers. A network-centric operations system that is both affordable and yet effective in all likely situations will have to be flexible and adaptable to the commander’s tasking, and it will have to make available for use in the most challenging high-density traffic scenarios some means of target recognition on the weapon or on the platform controlling it.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities 3.6.2 Coordination of Component Development Figure 3.9 diagrams some of the interactions among components involved in hitting land targets by indirect fire for the case in which the weapon receives no external guidance after launch. The required ATR false-alarm rate is a function of the area to be searched. That area is a function of target location error and navigation error. Target location error is a function of targeting sensor accuracy and latency, target motion, and weapon time of flight. Navigation error is a function of resistance to GPS jamming and the performance of the IMU that guides the weapon, after GPS guidance has been lost, to the vicinity of the target. Although a system analysis can be performed to allocate requirements among the components, opportunities and challenges arise during the course of component development. An increased GPS jamming threat could be addressed by investing in some combinations of better IMUs and ATR. A breakthrough in ATR could ease requirements on weapon time of flight. The +20 dB spot beam proposed for future generations of GPS satellites would reduce the effective range of a terminal jammer by a factor of 10, easing the requirements on IMU drift rate or ATR coverage by a similar factor. For an open-loop attack on a fixed target, the probability of hit is determined by target location error, navigation error, and ATR performance; time delay is not an issue. However, for an ephemeral target, that is, one that is detectable and stationary for only a limited time, the weapon must arrive before the target moves. The sum of the delays in sensing, decision making, and weapon time of flight must be smaller than the FIGURE 3.9 Component performance interactions (no external guidance after launch).
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities FIGURE 3.10 System factors in delivering firepower ashore against moving targets (in-flight updates from an external sensor). period the target will remain stationary. For a moving target, the case shown within the dashed lines in Figure 3.9, there will always be uncertainty about the target’s location, and short times of flight and excellent ATR will be needed to hit it. Complex as these interactions are, the situation analysis becomes even more complex when the weapon receives in-flight updates from an external sensor, the case that is analyzed in Appendix C. Figure 3.10 displays these interactions. Absent a breakthrough in ATR, the committee believes that closed-loop control will usually be required to hit moving targets. This belief motivated the recommendations to provide control links to weapons and to consider developing and deploying organic sensors that could provide near-staring control of the weapon’s endgame. The committee had the opportunity to hear from many officials responsible for the development of components that will be used to constitute the NCO systems. These officials were uniformly knowledgeable about the challenges implicit in meeting the specifications laid down for their components, but, as focused program managers, were less interested in the derivation of these specifications or the possibility of network-wide trade-offs. The committee found that coherent analysis and development were best exhibited in antiair warfare (AAW), perhaps because a single organization per-
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities forms the system engineering and program execution, or perhaps because AAW has occupied the Navy’s attention for many years. The least coherence was found in strike and over-the-horizon naval fire support—perhaps because diverse, independent program offices are developing the component subsystems; perhaps because the Navy and the Marine Corps do not have common doctrine for naval fire support; and perhaps because the Navy’s focus on decisively influencing events ashore is relatively new. The committee is aware of ongoing work in land-attack targeting, for example, the activities of the land-attack targeting integrated process team and of the DD-21 program office. Its comments are not intended to be critical of these activities, but rather to indicate that additional resources, scope (e.g., involvement of the air community), and authority are needed. Among the problems the committee found in strike and over-the-horizon naval fire support were the following: Need for responsive, long-range, low-cost, high-volume weapons for compatibility with stand-off distances imposed on naval platforms by antiship missile or other threats, and for Marine Corps plans for ship-to-objective maneuver; Inadequate targeting for naval surface fire, including lack of an agreed-upon method, backed by program actions, for transmitting target coordinates from a deep inland forward observer to an over-the-horizon firing ship; and Inadequate capability to detect, identify, track, and engage moving targets. One reason for this lack of overall system engineering is clear: the Navy has undertaken a new mission—to influence events ashore decisively—and has not fully adapted itself to execute that mission. Of course, organizing to perform end-to-end system engineering over a sphere of activity as large as naval strike and surface fire is a daunting challenge. But the Navy has done exactly that, twice in past decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Navy faced a formidable submarine threat posed by the Soviet Union. Meeting the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) challenge required system improvements on aircraft, surface ships, and submarines and in surveillance systems. In response, the Navy established an office, PM-4, in the Naval Materiel Command, and gave it responsibility and authority for development of the Navy’s ASW capabilities. PM-4 performed end-to-end system analysis, trading among ship, submarine, aircraft, and surveillance system components, and enabled communication among programs so as to accomplish the end-to-end system engineering needed to develop an effective ASW capability. Another important factor in the Navy’s success was an OPNAV sponsor responsible for the entire ASW capability. The OPNAV sponsor directed operational and system analyses to support funding allocations.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities In the 1990s, the Navy faced another challenge—a spectrum of air threats, ranging from low-flying, stealthy cruise missiles to theater ballistic missiles, being acquired by a large number of potential adversaries. The Navy responded by forming the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Theater Air Defense, then consolidated that office with the PEO for Surface Combatants to form the current PEO for Surface Combatants and Theater Air Defense. This consolidation allows the Navy to conduct end-to-end system analysis, trading among the multiple layers of air defense, and, most relevant to the topic at hand, develop systems that cross platforms, including the CEC system that is the exemplar of NCO. Here again, the Navy is well served by an OPNAV sponsor responsible for the entire capability. In the first decade of the new century, the Navy’s challenge will be to build the capability to influence events ashore decisively, particularly by projecting power ashore. The Navy’s two successful examples demonstrate what will be required. Future naval strike and surface fire will encompass naval air, surface, and subsurface platforms, air- and sea-launched weapons, and associated command, control, and communications components. Even if development of components is decentralized, someone must be responsible for the development of the overall system and must have the status and resources to manage interfaces with other Services and with National sensor systems. The CNO must clarify responsibility in OPNAV for the power projection mission. The development of new warfighting concepts and doctrine and the rebalancing of the materiel components must coordinate throughout the evolution of the system. 3.6.3 Finding Finding: Hitting ephemeral, relocatable, and moving targets is a vital capability that will require improvements in sensors (e.g., platforms for surveillance in high-threat areas), processing (identifying targets and maintaining tracks on targets moving through high-density traffic), command systems (capability for frequent and rapid decisions on weapon-target pairings), and launch platforms and weapons (e.g., affordable communication links and simple seekers). Many trade-offs can be made among system components, and many network concepts can be brought to bear to improve performance and reduce overall system cost. (See Section 3.6.1.) 3.7 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS A network-centric operations system comprises a number of subsystems, each designed and engineered to accomplish a military function. The subsystems are networks of components—such as sensors, weapons, command elements, and mission-specific information processing—tied together by the NCII that is described in Chapter 4.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities The sections above describe the characteristics of the components and illustrate the interdependencies among element performance and their effects on subsystem performance as required for power projection, the Navy mission chosen by the committee for study because this mission has only recently been emphasized by Navy Department leadership and because much work will be needed to realize the potential of NCO in this mission. In particular, concepts are needed for the targeting of short-time-of-flight weapons from adequate standoff. Consideration of what is needed for effective power projection—in terms of weapons, sensors and navigation, and tactical information processing—revealed a number of potential trade-offs across elements for effective operations, for example, GPS jam resistance against ATR performance, guidance accuracy against warhead lethality, and sensor latency against weapon time of flight. The complexity of the interactions led to the committee’s conclusion that the design and development of new subsystem components must be coherently managed so that the trade-offs can be continually reexamined to account for developmental difficulties and breakthroughs. Attacking moving targets with an in-flight link from the targeting sensor would require either warheads that are lethal over large areas or excellent ATR performance. While recommending further development of ATR, the committee also recommends that sensors, weapons, and the NCII should be designed to support the use of such a link. Sensors have physical limitations and are subject to camouflage, deception, and information operations. Diversity in location and phenomenology, together with the ability to form ad hoc networks, can overcome some of these challenges. The committee’s consideration of sensors showed some promising ATR work to which the Department of the Navy’s technical community is not strongly coupled. The high potential value of theater and National sensors able to interface with Navy platforms is not receiving high Navy Department priority. 3.7.1 Principal Recommendations Based on the findings presented throughout the chapter, the committee’s principal recommendations are as follows: Recommendation: The Naval Warfare Development Command and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command should formalize their relationship and ensure joint development of littoral NCO concepts. In particular, they should reach agreement on the need for a family of short-time-of-flight over-the-horizon weapons from adequate stand-off distances and concepts for their targeting.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Recommendation: The Department of the Navy should design and engineer, as a coherent whole, the mission-oriented subsystems of the NCO system, trading off performance goals across components to achieve required mission performance. Some reform of the acquisition community from platform-centric to mission-centric should be considered, especially for the power projection mission. Recommendation: The Department of the Navy should facilitate the power of networks of sensors at disparate locations and employ disparate phenomenologies by moving more smartly to connect to National and theater sensors and by designing new sensors to permit cooperative behavior in ad hoc networks. Recommendation: The Department of the Navy should seek the capability of in-flight guidance of new weapons designed to be fired from over the horizon against ephemeral, relocatable, and moving ground targets. In addition, the Department of the Navy should work to enhance connectivity to joint moving-target indicator (MTI), synthetic aperture radar, and electro-optics sensors and consider the acquisition of organic airborne near-staring MTI sensors to provide closed-loop endgame weapon control. Recommendation: While participating in endeavors to increase the jam resistance of Global Positioning System receivers in naval platforms, the Department of the Navy should continue to seek technology for better long-range target identification (including ATR) and should interact more strongly with the relevant DARPA programs. 3.7.2 Summary of Findings and Associated Recommendations The following subsections repeat the findings presented in the text of this chapter and offer, in addition, individual recommendations based on those findings. 126.96.36.199 Weapons Finding: Although new weapons are being developed for land attack, the range of surface-launched, short-time-of-flight weapons is currently too limited to support ship-to-objective maneuver at reasonable stand-off distances. Better targeting concepts are needed. (See Section 3.2.1.) Recommendation: Examine targeting concepts before specifying weapons. Finding: Target identification limitations inhibit the use of air-to-air weapons at their full kinematic range. (See Section 3.2.2.)
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Recommendation: Pursue technology for reliable, long-range identification. Finding: Weapons that attack low-signature targets will likely depend on guidance from networks of sensors and illuminators. (See Section 3.2.3.) Recommendation: Provide capability to accept in-flight guidance. 188.8.131.52 Sensors Finding: Sensor capabilities are improving through exploitation of digital and solid-state technology. (See Section 3.3.1.) Recommendation: Continue basic technology and advanced sensor development. Finding: Adversaries can exploit fundamental physical laws and make detection by sensors difficult in certain situations. (See Section 3.3.1.) Recommendation: Investigate new physical phenomena that exhibit different physical limitations while continuing to explore the existing technology for design concepts that can extend performance limits. Finding: Deployed Navy sensors span a ranges of types, but most were designed for platform defense, are stovepiped, and exhibit a mix of old and new technologies due to the budget-limited practice of incremental upgrades over a long period. (See Section 3.3.2.) Recommendation: Develop and acquire all new sensors as a consequence of NCO top-down systems engineering. Build in enablers for cooperative behavior of dissimilar sensors, accommodation of new technology, and participation in ad hoc networks. Finding: The Navy has no organic sensors capable of guiding its precision, long-range weapons to ground targets. Emerging doctrine assumes access to joint or National resources in the battlespace, but the Navy is only beginning to invest in such connectivity. (See Section 184.108.40.206.) Recommendation: Address the nature of the Navy’s mix of organic and joint or National sensors. Consider the acquisition of a Navy synthetic aperture radar/ ground moving-target indicator sensor for unmanned aerial vehicles. Finding: Multisensor cooperation offers significant performance advantages. (See Section 220.127.116.11.)
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Recommendation: Design all future sensors to accommodate flexible data exchange and cooperative behavior. Finding: Temporary sensor-shooter-weapons teams are natural in network-centric operations but offer flexibility and quality-of-service challenges for the communication infrastructure. (See Section 18.104.22.168.) Recommendation: Impose flexibility requirements on sensors and their information links. Factor this requirement into the initial design and engineering of the Naval Command and Information Infrastructure. Finding: Geolocation in the same absolute or relative coordinate system of the sensors and targets in the battlespace is mandatory. Use of the Global Positioning System is often assumed to be the sole technique employed but may not always be available. (See Section 22.214.171.124.) Recommendation: Develop protection for and alternatives to the Global Positioning System. Finding: Automatic target recognition avoids overload of communications and of image analysts, may be necessary for remote attack of moving targets, and provides a hedge against GPS jamming. Model-based vision may overcome the limitations of template matching. However, more general capabilities for automatic information extraction continue to be elusive and must remain the subjects of continuing R&D. (See Section 126.96.36.199.) Recommendation: Support R&D on automatic target recognition and related information extraction approaches as well as image-compression algorithms. 188.8.131.52 Navigation Finding: No single technique will make GPS-aided weapon navigation invulnerable to GPS jamming. Practical solutions are likely to involve a combination of cheaper, precise IMUs, better ALR and ATR, improved satellite signals and receiver signal processing, and the use of spatial processing. (See Section 184.108.40.206.) Recommendation: Perform analysis to determine what combinations of improvements would be required to overcome foreseeable Global Positioning System jamming. Fund technology base work to determine whether these improvements are attainable.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities Finding: Available antiradiation weapons do not solve the GPS jamming problem because the jammers can be easily replicated and the weapons cost many times more than the jammer. Suitably modified HARMs could be used to attack aircraft carrying high-power jammers, and the presence of such HARMs in inventory might demoralize crews operating GPS jammers. (See Section 220.127.116.11.) Recommendation: Do not depend on physical attacks against jammers as a general solution to Global Positioning System vulnerability. Finding: Although navigation through the use of satellites not designed for that purpose is possible, the difficulties of using these techniques in weapons are formidable. Nevertheless, European interest in these techniques will cause the difficulties to be assessed and perhaps overcome. (See Section 18.104.22.168.) Recommendation: Monitor European and commercial progress in navigation through incidental satellite transmissions. Finding: Passing control of a weapon forward to a sensor that holds the target in view is a plausible means of reducing or eliminating dependence on GPS and similar systems. (See Section 22.214.171.124.) Recommendation: Design weapons and sensor platforms so as not to foreclose the possibility of endgame control of the weapon directly from the sensor. 126.96.36.199 Tactical Information Processing Finding: There is no mechanism to coordinate the development of Navy and Marine Corps doctrine and apparatus for littoral operations, or to coordinate such functions as tracking and network control. (See Section 188.8.131.52.) Recommendation: Formalize and institutionalize the relationship between the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the Navy Warfare Development Command with regard to NCO innovation, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and doctrine in the littorals. Finding: There is no mechanism for coupling NCO research, experimentation, and development with the refinement of doctrine and then assessing the military value of the proposed improvements. (See Section 184.108.40.206.) Recommendation: Develop an analytic capability and measures of effectiveness to support the evolutionary improvement of NCO tactics, techniques, and proce-
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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities dures and tactical information processing. Continue experimenting; emphasize experimental design and measurement. Finding: To achieve NCO, research and technology development, experimentation, and development and deployment of tactical information processing capabilities are required. (See Section 3.5.4.) Recommendation: Maintain Navy Department technology programs underlying tactical information processing. Finding: The Navy needs to position itself to exploit the fruits of DARPA investment in technology that can provide tactical information processing capabilities. (See Section 3.5.4.) Recommendation: Interact more strongly with DARPA and offer strong candidates for leadership of appropriate DARPA program offices. Finding: To project power at long ranges ashore, the Navy must be able to use nonorganic sensors and so should pursue connectivity to some of these sensors as vigorously as possible. (See Section 3.5.4.) Recommendation: Establish a continuing 6.3 nonacquisition program for prototyping and experimentation. Recommendation: Move smartly to ensure connectivity from nonorganic sensors to Navy control and firing platforms and to ensure the ability to process data from these sensors. 220.127.116.11 System Engineering Finding: Hitting ephemeral, relocatable, and moving targets is a vital capability that will require improvements in sensors (e.g., platforms for surveillance in high-threat areas), processing (identifying targets and maintaining tracks on targets moving through high-density traffic), command systems (capability for frequent and rapid decisions on weapon-target pairings), and launch platforms and weapons (e.g., affordable communication links and simple seekers). Many trade-offs can be made among system components, and many network concepts can be brought to bear to improve performance and reduce overall system cost. (See Section 3.6.1.) Recommendation: The Department of the Navy should engineer the capability to hit ephemeral, relocatable, and moving targets as an end-to-end system.
Representative terms from entire chapter: