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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 4 Economic Sanctions and Post-Cold War Conflicts: Challenges for Theory and Policy Bruce W.Jentleson The sanctions literature is among the most contentious and inconclusive in international relations. Survey the studies of major sanctions cases—from pre-Cold War ones like the 1935–1936 League of Nations sanctions against Mussolini’s Italy, to Cold War-era ones like the U.S. sanctions against Cuba, the 1960s–1970s United Nations (UN) sanctions against Rhodesia, the 1981–1983 Siberian gas pipeline and the 1980s antiapartheid sanctions, and post-Cold War cases like Iraq, Serbia, Haiti, Libya, and Iran—and one finds some studies that claim success while others of the very same cases conclude that the sanctions were failures. The basic theoretical debate is often cast as traditionalists versus revisionists. Traditionalists see little efficacy in sanctions. “It would be difficult to find any proposition in the international relations literature more widely accepted,” as David Baldwin puts it in his critique of the traditionalists, “than those belittling the utility of economic techniques of statecraft.” Among the works Baldwin cites are studies by Henry Bienen and Robert Gilpin, who accept “the nearly unanimous conclusion of scholars that sanctions seldom achieve their purposes and more likely have severe counterproductive consequences”; Charles Kindleberger, that “most sanctions are not effective”; Klaus Knorr, on their “uncertain effectiveness and decidedly low utility when used for purposes of coercing other states”; Margaret Doxey, that “in none of the cases analyzed in this study have economic sanctions succeeded in producing the desired political result”; Johan Galtung, that “the probable effectiveness of economic sanctions is, generally, negative”; and Donald Losman, that the cases he studied “failed to accomplish their political ends, and it seems unlikely that economic
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War measures alone will fare better in the future.” Among more recent authors, Robert Pape takes this view quite strongly, titling his article “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.”1 In his Economic Statecraft, often cited as the leading revisionist work, Baldwin questions whether sanctions are held to an “analytical ‘double standard’…prone to accentuate the negative and downplay the positive aspects of such measures.”2 Among other studies that are or lean toward revisionism are those by M.S.Daoudi and M.S.Dajani, concluding that sanctions “are useful and effective political weapons in international politics”; Barry Carter, that “there is persuasive historical evidence that sanctions can sometimes be an effective tool for achieving foreign policy objectives”; Lisa Martin, that “sanctions can be a useful foreign policy tool”; Jonathan Kirshner, that “one fundamental conclusion is clear…[monetary sanctions] have demonstrated considerable power”; and Elizabeth Rogers, that “economic sanctions are more effective than most analysts suggest.”3 Perhaps the best example of the inconclusiveness over sanctions is the study Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott; hereafter referred to as the HSE study), which is cited by both traditionalists and revisionists as supporting their arguments.4 Revisionists hail the 34 percent success rate in the HSE study as higher than traditionalists claimed, while traditionalists raise methodological issues about the validity of the 34 percent rate and question, even if it is valid, just how impressive it is. The uncertainties of the sanctions efficacy debate have become even more problematic in the post-Cold War era because of the frequency with which sanctions are used, as a veritable weapon of choice, in many different cases by many different actors. Some cases have involved the United States acting unilaterally; others have involved multilateral action by the UN and regional organizations such as the Organization of American States and the Organization for African Unity; still others have involved other international actors, as with Greece against Macedonia and Russia against various ex-Soviet states. All told, sanctions have been used in pursuit of a broad range of objectives related to international conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution. Yet as one recent study put it, “contemporary scholarship and policy analysis [lag] behind the current plethora of sanctions episodes…[and] scholars and policy makers readily acknowledge that judgments about current sanctions cases are made on the basis of ill-defined generalizations.”5 Of course, there cannot be a single theory or strategy, foolproof and universal. But we can do better in developing middle-range and conditional generalizations that balance the desirability of parsimony of explanation with the complexity of the range of factors that affect the policy utility of sanctions.
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War This study seeks to move toward this goal and to do so in a manner that has the theoretical significance as well as the policy relevance needed to help “bridge the gap.”6 It begins with a discussion of the main conceptual and methodological issues that complicate empirical research and theory development on sanctions. The next section reviews the theoretical debate and Cold War-era record through an analytical framework of sanctions as a coercive bargaining strategy, encompassing both the political economy of the relationships among the major actors and the design of the strategy by which sanctions are imposed. The third section analyzes the use of sanctions thus far in the post-Cold War era in the context of the broader systemic changes—strategic, economic, political—that mark our transitional period. Three major empirical patterns are identified: the increased frequency with which sanctions are being used, the increased economic impact they are having, and their mixed record of policy success and failure. The central dynamic is what I term the “vulnerability-viability” paradox of shifts in the post-Cold War political economy both conducive and counter to sanctions’ efficacy, heightening target state vulnerability on the one hand but making the political viability of sanctions more problematic on the other. The fourth section then considers the challenges this analysis poses for both theory and policy in an effort to move toward greater “sanctions realism” that recognizes both the scope and the limits, the possibilities as well as the requisites, for sanctions to be an effective strategy for international conflict prevention, management, and resolution. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN SANCTIONS RESEARCH As noted, one of the striking aspects of the literature on sanctions is the extent to which there is debate even over what constitutes success and failure, let alone the policy strategies for achieving success and the theories for explaining when and why success is most likely to be achieved. The HSE study sought to resolve these analytical differences with an ordinal scale of “success score” rankings. In the HSE study the two measures were “the extent to which the policy objective sought by the sender state was in fact achieved” and “the contribution made by the sanctions (as opposed to other factors, such as military action).” Each was coded on a scale from 1 to 4: for the policy result, running from failed (1) to successful (4); for the sanctions contribution, from zero or negative contribution (1) to significant contribution (4). The two codings were multiplied and scores of 9 and above were deemed successes and 8 or below failures.7 However, far from resolving the methodological problems, the HSE meth-
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War odology itself has been the subject of extensive debate, with serious questions raised about its own reliability and validity.8 All of this is indicative of a number of inherently difficult conceptual and methodological issues that complicate research on economic sanctions: (a) the lack of a consensual definition of the basic term of investigation, “economic sanctions”; (b) the need to differentiate among the different types of objectives that sanctions can have; (c) selection bias problems in identifying sets of cases for analysis; (d) the problem of establishing reliable and valid criteria for measuring policy outcomes as a dependent variable; (e) the independent variable problem of attributing causality for whatever impact is measured to sanctions vis-à-vis other aspects of the overall foreign policy strategy; and (f) setting a standard for what constitutes an acceptable rate of success. Establishing a Working Definition of Economic Sanctions One of the problems for research on economic sanctions is that there is no common accepted definition in the literature. Some definitions are broad and encompassing; some are narrow; some, as Kim Richard Nossal laments, are “idiosyncratic, often sloppy.”9 The most useful working definition in my view is of sanctions as the actual or threatened denial of economic relations by one or more states (sender[s]) intended to influence the behavior of another state (target) on noneconomic issues or to limit its military capabilities. The key elements this definition seeks to convey are that (a) this is a coercive act, as distinct from inducements and other more positive influence efforts; (b) that the instrument is economic, most often trade relations but also monetary relations, investments, credits, foreign aid, and foreign assets; and (c) that the objective is impact on noneconomic policy, such as foreign policy behavior or domestic politics, but excluding trade disputes and other economic bargaining objectives. As such this is a narrower definition than some, such as Baldwin’s “economic statecraft,” which holds to element b but by including positive inducements among the instruments and trade and other economic bargaining cases among the objectives not to elements a or c.10 On the other hand, it is broader in its scope of objectives than those, such as Pape’s, that principally focus on whether sanctions can achieve the same goals as military force.11 Objectives of Sanctions Here, too, as with the definition of sanctions, and even within the noneconomic parameter of point c above, there is huge variation in the literature in the terms of conceptualization of the objectives of sanctions.12
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War TABLE 4.1 Typology of Sanctions’ Objectives Limited Extensive Containment Military capabilities Economic warfare Antiaggression Policies (e.g., terrorism, proliferation) Wars, invasions Domestic Political Influence Democratization, human rights Regime change Consistent with the purposes of this paper, my focus is on those objectives that pertain most directly to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and conflict management—on “‘what works’…for preventing, mitigating, resolving, or nonviolently managing conflicts of concern to the international community.”13 Table 4.1 sketches a typology based on the purpose and scope of sanctions’ objectives. The principal distinctions are among three different purposes: containment, limiting the target state’s military and other relevant capabilities so as to constrain its capacity for causing conflicts; anti-aggression, deterring or compelling the target state to refrain from or cease military or other aggressive actions; and domestic political influence, coercing change in the target state’s domestic politics or policies. The sub-distinctions in each of these between limited and extensive objectives are consistent with the more general literature about the need for proportionality between means and ends.14 Containing a target’s military capabilities is a more limited objective than broader economic warfare; coercing change in aggressive policies such as terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is more limited than deterring it from launching or compelling it to end a war or invasion; pressuring for democratization or protecting human rights is more limited than forcing a change in the governing regime. Case Selection The question of what constitutes a sanctions case is important for both comparative case analyses and aggregate data studies. Even within the definitional parameters set above, there are three other methodological issues about how and what to count. One is the problem of how substantial the action must be to constitute a case. We know to include “big” cases like Iraq, Cuba, Haiti, and Serbia. But what about instances that involve more limited measures? For example, in May 1998 Turkey suspended a $145 million arms purchase with France because of a resolu-
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War tion passed by the French National Assembly recognizing the Armenian “genocide” of 1915. Was this a sufficient action to be considered a sanctions case? There is no definitive answer. Second is the question of what to do about cases in which sanctions were invoked but did not have to be imposed because the threat sufficed for the desired coercive effect. The problem here is akin to that for general studies of deterrence, when the standing deterrence posture may have impact even if no explicit threats are made. While such cases are inherently harder to identify empirically, their exclusion can bias the sample from which conclusions about efficacy are drawn.15 Third is the question of how to count cases like the U.S. sanctions against Cuba that have gone on for many years. Is this a single case? Should it be analytically split over time? These questions are important as we need to know the time frame in order to know at what point(s) to take the measures of success or failure. Dependent Variable Measurement: Assessing Policy Outcomes Consistent with the HSE approach we can cast the dependent variable as a measurement of the extent to which the sender achieves its objectives at an acceptable cost. The operationalization of such terms, though, in a methodologically sound manner is more complicated than their 1 to 4 ordinal scale depicts. Three factors are key—differentiation, net assessment, and relativity—each of which has its own problems to be overcome. Differentiation: The measure of success and failure needs to be differentiated in two respects. One is that multiple objectives often are pursued, with some achieved to a greater degree than others. The objectives in Table 4.1 are not at all mutually exclusive; many sanctions cases involve more than one of these types of objectives. Objectives thus need relative weights on a case-specific basis. And this must be done despite the frequent discrepancy, and at times even inverse relationship, between the emphasis on an objective in public rhetoric and its genuine policy importance. The other is the need for the measure to be cast in nondichotomous terms even as applied to success/failure on a particular objective. It is hard enough to find cases of total victory in war, let alone with a less directly coercive policy instrument like economic sanctions. We thus need to have measures that pick up on degrees of success/failure and that work with ranges and not strict yes/no conceptions of outcomes. A caveat, though, is that too minimalist criteria must be avoided. While our analytical measures must be gauged to register whether something is achieved even when everything is not, too low a bar should not be set. It is one thing to acknowledge degrees of success, but some
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War midpoint needs to be defined, a threshold established, so that a claim of some degree of success is not necessarily sufficient for a positive bottom line. Net assessment: Net assessments take into account costs incurred as well as gains made. It would be of sufficient concern if the only consequence of ineffective sanctions were nonpositive—that is, that they simply did not achieve the objectives for which they were intended. However, they also can be not just nonpositive but also net negative in terms of the costs they end up carrying in one or more of four respects: backfiring and having a politically integrative effect strengthening the will of an embattled people to resist; misfiring and inflicting a humanitarian crisis on the civilian populace, making the “civilian pain” much greater than any “political gain”;16 cross-firing, straining relations with key allies; and shooting in the foot with high self-inflicted costs. The argument that costs incurred can actually have a beneficial effect as a show of resolve is often made.17 It is said to be part of U.S. leadership responsibilities to be willing to bear costs to take actions that, even if others do not join in, convey a message of resolve. Or in the Wilsonian version of the argument, it is holding high the mantle of democratic values. Credibility, though, is not just about resolve; it also is about judgment. It therefore cannot be too readily assumed that incurring costs will be a credibility-enhancing demonstration of fortitude. Incurring costs can deter, but it does not necessarily do so. It also may convey weakness, damage prestige, and erode credibility. Relativity: The assessment must be relative to other available policy options. What sanctions did or did not achieve and at what cost must be compared to the pros and cons of available alternative policy strategies. As Baldwin rightly stresses, “policy making involves making decisions, and decision making involves choosing among alternative courses of action. The advantages and disadvantages of various policy options acquire significance primarily by comparison with the options.”18 This also is a point to which policy makers give great emphasis. If not sanctions, then what? Business as usual has a derogatory ring to it, both strategically and within domestic politics. The caution here is that sanctions not become a default option, resorted to based more on the negatives of other options than any systematic or convincing analysis of the probable efficacy of sanctions themselves. If an American president’s choice genuinely is between sanctions and a policy response with a high likelihood of war, the relative merits of the sanctions option are obvious. But while the sanctions option often gets justified in this way, the reality is often more complicated. As Alexander George argues with respect to coercive diplomacy, the relative attractiveness of a particular policy option compared to others must not be confused with an assessment of its
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War own feasibility and utility.19 Thus, the question regarding relativity to other policy options should be asked but the answer not assumed a priori. In addition to the methodological complexity that these factors add up to, there are rigorous data requirements if analytical reliability and validity are to be achieved. This is another of the methodological problems with the HSE study. The empirical evidence on which the HSE authors base their case codings is exceedingly limited, quite unsystematic, often very selective, and mostly from secondary sources. Independent Variable: Attributing Causality Once we have a measure of impact, the next question is the extent to which sanctions get credit for the success or blame for the lack thereof relative to other components of the sender state’s overall strategy. Here too the HSE construct (“the contribution made by sanctions”) has significant empirical and analytical deficiencies that leave two main problems that can undermine the validity of the causal analysis. One is a false positive reading—that is, cases in which success is achieved but mistakenly attributed to sanctions rather than one of the other policies involved in the situation. This is one of the main bases for Pape’s critique of the HSE study—that the principal or even exclusive credit for many of the HSE study’s successes should go to the use of military force, covert action, and other such policies rather than to sanctions. While some of Pape’s criticisms are stronger than others, the problem remains that many outcomes are overdetermined in their causality, making it hard to reliably establish where the credit lies. Moreover, part of the problem here as well is the data quality one, with much more systematic data gathering and analysis required if we are to have the empirical base needed to determine how and why key policy decisions were made. The bigger problem is with false negatives. Here there are two sub-types: (1) cases of policy failure in which sanctions did their job, but other policies that were part of the overall strategy did not, and (2) cases in which sanctions did fail but could have worked had mistakes of strategy and implementation not been made in the ways in which they were used. Sensitivity to reaching falsely negative conclusions and keeping analytically open to the possibility that sanctions may have worked had they been done right, whether in themselves or as they fit into an overall foreign policy strategy, is a no less crucial consideration for drawing appropriate policy lessons from certain failure cases than is caution about reaching premature analytical closure around a false positive. I come back to this point later with regard to some key post-Cold War cases.
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War This does get into the realm of counterfactual analysis, of trying to make claims and offer explanations about what could have happened. While there is no strict singular method for doing counterfactual analysis, as Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin state, it must be done substantively and according to explicit criteria if we are to be able “to distinguish plausible from implausible, insightful from vacuous arguments.”20 These are methodological challenges worth tackling, both with regard to sanctions and other areas of foreign policy strategy, because important insights and policy lessons can be gained.21 Reasonable Expectations for the Success Rate of Sanctions Even once all these conceptual and methodological problems are worked out and one has confidence in the success rate that is measured, the question is: Measured against what? What are “reasonable expectations” for the percentage of successes needed for sanctions to be considered an effective strategy?22 In baseball a batter who hits .300—that is, three successes out of 10 tries—is considered to have had an excellent year. But in football a quarterback needs a passing completion rate of more than 50 percent to be considered as having had even a good season. In gymnastics a 9 out of 10 is actually a little low. Even taking the HSE study’s 34 percent success rate on its face, there are differing views of whether it meets expectations. Elizabeth Rogers sees it as “respectable” compared to other coercive foreign policy strategies, such as military intervention and covert action.23 Others, though, see a one in three success rate for a strategy that carries such significant costs as much less acceptable. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: SANCTIONS AS A COERCIVE BARGAINING STRATEGY The working definition given earlier conveys a conceptualization of economic sanctions as a coercive bargaining strategy. There are strong similarities with Alexander George’s concept of coercive diplomacy, as well as with Thomas Schelling’s work on political-military bargaining.24 All these strategies have coercive components but are used in ways and kept at levels that entail inducing rather than fully and forcefully imposing compliance. For sanctions this means both having economic impact and conveying political credibility. Sanctions need to hurt. The target state needs to feel their economic impact if and when imposed or, if still at the stage of a threat, be convinced that it will. The HSE study showed a differential in the average level of economic impact between success (2.4 percent of
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War TABLE 4.2 Sanctions as Coercive Bargaining: An Analytical Framework Main Factors Dimensions Political economy of sanctions Alternative trade partner cooperation Target state defense Sender state constraints Design of sanctions’ strategy Objectives Targeting Enforcement Broader policy context gross domestic product [GDP]) and failures (1.0 percent). In addition, T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie Schwebach subjected the HSE data to more rigorous analysis and found their own relationship between costs imposed and effectiveness.25 This is not to say that the efficacy of sanctions neatly correlates to economic impact. Kirshner’s comparison of the 1960– 1962 U.S. sanctions against the Dominican Republic and the 1987–1989 sanctions against Panama is an example of greater political influence in the case with lesser, albeit still significant, economic impact.26 It stands to reason, though, that if a target state has to take into account significant economic impact, whether felt or anticipated, this will affect its political decisions. In addition, beyond the immediate material impact of sanctions, political credibility comes into play as a matter of conveying a strong sense of the sender state’s will and capacity to do what is necessary to gain compliance. It must be clear that the sender state will stay the course of the sanctions as imposed and ratchet them up to an increased level if need be, as well as take other coercive actions as necessary. Nor is it enough for the sender to claim credibility; the key is the target state’s perceptions. Two main sets of factors are key to the efficacy of sanctions as a coercive bargaining strategy: the political economy of the relationships among the key actors and the design of the strategy by which sanctions are imposed (Table 4.2). Each is discussed along with illustrative and substantiating Cold War-era examples. The Political Economy of Sanctions Here there are three dimensions: (1) the alternative trade partner dilemma and the likelihood of multilateral cooperation, (2) the target state’s “sanctions defense” capacity, and (3) the domestic constraints on the sender state.
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War The Alternative Trade Partner Dilemma Historically, the most frequent cause of the failure of sanctions has been other states acting as alternative trade partners for the target state. “A country menaced with an interruption of trade with a given country,” as Albert O.Hirschmann stated as the general proposition in his classic 1945 work, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, “has the alternative of diverting trade to a third country: by so doing it evades more or less completely the damaging consequences of the stoppage of trade with one particular country. The stoppage or the threat of it would thus lose all its force.”27 There are two main reasons why the need for multilateral cooperation from prospective alternative trade partners is so important. First, even if a premium must be paid or some efficiency is lost, the ability to trade with an alternative partner substantially reduces the economic impact that sanctions can have. This has been true even in cases of extreme economic dependence, as in the Cold War-era Soviet-Yugoslavia and U.S.-Cuba cases.28 Second, alternative trade partners also can have a political effect that plays into the political credibility and influence conversion problem. If, as in the Yugoslavian and Cuban cases, the alternative trade is provided by states that are adversaries of the sender, the target can feel it has the safe haven of a protector. From this more secure position there is less pressure to be compelled into submission or even to be deterred from future provocations. And if the alternative trade comes from the sender state’s own allies, the threat to sustain the sanctions or escalate the level of confrontation loses much of its credibility. The message of resolve is much less credible if other states, especially allies, do not show solidarity.29 Multilateral cooperation on sanctions can be achieved in three ways: shared interests, sender state leverage, and institutionalized cooperation. “Identity of interests,” as the old adage from Thucydides has it, “is the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals.”30 The surest of bonds, perhaps, but not the most common, not even among Cold War allies, as was evident in the 1981–1983 Siberian gas pipeline case with the major intraalliance differences and disputes stemming from divergences between the United States and key Western European allies over both the economic interests at stake and divergent foreign policy strategies for relations with the Soviet Union.31 In this and other cases sender states resorted to imposition of secondary sanctions, claims of extraterritoriality, and other modes of leverage seeking to coerce cooperation. An interesting contrast in this regard is between the 1962–1963 “Friendship” oil pipeline case, when the United States was able to coerce its European allies to reduce their oil trade with
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War most relevant, both the economic impact and the political credibility of the sanctions can be sufficient to have an impact (e.g., sanctions by the OAS and Mercosur against Paraguay). For antiaggression objectives the requisite coalition tends to be a bit broader as all the major global powers are likely to come into play in one aspect or another. For military containment the requisites are at once easier and more difficult. As noted, intra-Western cooperation has been more readily achieved. But Russia and China play larger roles. Ultimately, the objective is to prevent the target state from acquiring certain military capabilities. Sanctions with less than universal cooperation still may succeed in slowing the acquisition, imposing additional costs, and even limiting the level of capability, but only with full multilateral cooperation can actual denial be achieved. Economic Strategic Targeting One of the strongest conclusions to be drawn from recent cases is the fundamental flaws in partial incremental sanctions. This was the most frequently used targeting strategy and consistently contributed to the limits and inefficacy of the sanctions. We already discussed the Haiti case and the questions as to whether sanctions imposed comprehensively and decisively might have worked. The 1993 sanctions against Nigeria raise similar questions. Whereas Nigerian oil exports amounted to over $1 billion a year and accounted for 90 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings and 80 percent of government revenue, the sanctions as imposed in a limited fashion by the United States, Britain, and some Commonwealth countries did not include oil. Had comprehensive sanctions been imposed that included oil, would the military regime still have resisted or would it have conceded to the pressure? The Nigerian economy already was in quite bad shape. Unemployment was estimated to be as high as 40 percent in Lagos; inflation exceeded 50 percent; the currency had to be devalued; and debt rescheduling negotiations with the International Monetary Fund were not going well. Given their economic vulnerabilities and with Abiola having demonstrated what noted Africanist scholar Crawford Young assesses as “a remarkably broad distribution of electoral support,”95 there could have been some transmission belt effect of business and other influential groups whose interests stood to be negatively affected by the sanctions reinforcing the political opposition with their own pressure. General Abacha also may not have felt as free to act if he were convinced the international community genuinely intended to impose significant costs. These and other cases strongly support the greater strategic logic of comprehensive decisive sanctions. They are a more formidable threat both
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War economically and in terms of credibility, they hit harder if imposed, and they recognize that time often is not on the side of sanctions. The HSE study and other past studies stressed this, and it is even truer in recent cases where we have seen severe humanitarian crises and a neutron-bomb-like effect of destroying the target’s economy but leaving the regime standing. Moreover, the longer sanctions last the harder they are to maintain as sanctions fatigue sets in. Front-line states grow especially restless because of the costs they must bear. Leakage increases over time. Black markets get organized. To be sure, the main question posed is political: if it is so difficult to get multilateral cooperation with limited sanctions, how could cooperation be expected with comprehensive ones? But there is an argument to be made that the economic costs to sanctioning states may actually be less, not more. If the strategy works and the sanctions achieve their objective more quickly, the larger “unit” costs but for a shorter period of time can end up being less than smaller unit costs stretched out over a much longer period of time through the graduated sanctions approach. Moreover, there is the possibility that the greater credibility of the more decisive threat can actually achieve the goal without ever having to get to the point of actual imposition. Also one of the lessons learned from cases like Haiti and Serbia, in which financial assets were targeted only very late in the game, was the importance of doing this more fully and more quickly. Financial sanctions can be strategically targeted at the assets of the target regime and its principal supporters. They can also be aimed fairly well so as to reduce collateral costs. And they can be more effectively enforced than trade sanctions (although not totally so given banking havens and other money-laundering mechanisms). The key, though, is “quick, decisive action” so as to “prevent the target from moving funds and enlisting the cooperation of banks and governments that are unwilling to make such disclosures.”96 Enforcement The cases discussed above also show the problems entailed in effective enforcement of sanctions. Even in the context of the 1999 NATO war against Serbia over Kosovo, proposals for strict and intrusive enforcement of sanctions were so controversial they had to be scaled back. On the other hand, the Serbia-Bosnia sanctions case shows what can be achieved when there is the will to impose strict enforcement and resources are committed. To be sure, the mechanisms of the “sanctions assistance missions” (SAMs) was far from watertight. Even once they started to be firmed up in 1993, goods got through. There was also the problem of how to allow for humanitarian exemptions yet make sure they were in fact
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War humanitarian and then not diverted to other purposes, including reselling on the black market and using the hard currency for arms purchases. The UN Security Council established terms of reference to guide consideration by the sanctions committees of the individual cases, but the sheer volume of such cases was a problem in itself. Still, the SAMs were effective overall and showed that with enough resources sanctions can be effectively enforced even under very difficult geographic and political circumstances. Broader Policy Context Finally, as to the broader policy context the point here remains what has been emphasized throughout. To the extent that sanctions are seen as a means for evading tougher action in a conflict situation that requires it, their chances for success are reduced substantially. They can be an effective part of a broader coercive strategy, indeed in some situations the lead part, but this needs to be manifested positively and assertively, not resorted to as a default option. A number of examples could be cited here, but the Iraqi case especially makes the point that, even in a case with such extensive multilateral support and such comprehensive sanctions, the overall success of sanctions requires that the other pieces of the overall strategy be sound and functional. Further Considerations for a Research Agenda A number of questions and areas where a stronger understanding of the theoretical dimensions and underpinnings of sanctions would be beneficial already have been stated. Others are implied, and hopefully inspired, by the overall discussion. There are two further points on a research agenda. One is the need to work through the conceptual and methodological issues that have been identified. We will not be able to have better theories about the efficacy of sanctions unless we have sounder empirical bases for developing and testing those theories. Reliability and validity problems plague both the dependent variable assessment of the impact of sanctions and the independent variable analysis of causal attribution. Part of what is needed is an empirical database that allows for what Alexander George calls “process tracing.” We need to have both the quantity and the quality of data to allow for cases to be analyzed in depth and questions about the extent of the impact of sanctions to be answered more systematically.97 Finally, more and better research and theorizing are needed on alternatives to sanctions. It is not enough to just recognize where sanctions will not work when there are issues to be dealt with; what can work also
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War must be identified and acted on. What about incentives, carrots, inducements? To what extent are these alternatives to sanctions? To what extent are they potential complements? If complements, what are the key conditions for tapping their synergy? In more specific terms, what are the possibilities and conditions for such options as voluntary codes of corporate conduct, cooperation between multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations on civil society/democratization programs, and other ideas and strategies that reach out to other areas of study? Conclusions While it is often easier to get action on sanctions when conflicts are active and threats are imminent and the need for policy action is more explicitly evident, sanctions as conflict resolution strategies have the difficulties inherent in all efforts to compel policy change or reverse a new status quo. As with other strategies, sanctions also need to follow more of a conflict prevention approach. Yet doing this with sanctions involves many of the same difficulties as with other forms of preventive statecraft. Most especially there is the problem of political will. Policy makers tend to prefer to act only when absolutely necessary, which usually means later rather than earlier. They are more attuned to the immediate costs that a policy incurs and the short-term risks that it runs than to arguments about longer-term costs and benefits. Bureaucracies are even harder than usual to move when the issue is not clear and present. And that is within each government, let alone adding on the need for multilateral coordination. Yet even in such terms preventive statecraft does have a strong logic, as another study I have been involved with strongly shows.98 Whereas the costs of waiting to act tend to be assumed to be less than the costs of acting preventively, in sanctions cases as well as all too many other post-Cold War conflicts, the costs have proven to be much greater than expected and arguably more than those for preventive action would have been. This also comes back to the basic tenet of compellence being more difficult than deterrence or other forms of prevention. It also is the case that many interests dismissed as being of insufficient importance to warrant action end up cascading to greater importance as their conflicts intensify and spread, thus calling into question this part of the original calculus as well. It is always easiest if either a foreign policy strategy that is difficult is not all that necessary or if one that is necessary is not all that difficult. The use of economic sanctions for international conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era is both difficult and necessary. Heightened target state vulnerability creates opportunities, while more problematic political vi-
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War ability poses challenges. Sanctions realism requires prudent weighing of where the constraints of political viability are so unmalleable as to need to be treated as limiting parameters, combined with strategic assessments of the optimal strategies for maximizing the efficacy of sanctions for conflict resolution within those parameters. It needs to be recognized both that sanctions can be net negative, not just nonpositive, and that inaction and delayed action risk a worsening of the conflicts. These are difficult analyses but necessary ones in a world in which conflict resolution requires as many effective strategies as possible. NOTES 1 David A.Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 55–57. See also Henry Bienen and Robert Gilpin, “An Evaluation of the Use of Economic Sanctions to Promote Foreign Policy Objectives, with Special Reference to the Problem of Terrorism and the Promotion of Human Rights,” a report prepared for the Boeing Corporation, April 2, 1979; Charles P.Kindleberger, Power and Money: The Economics of International Politics and the Politics of International Economics (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 97; Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 205–206; Margaret P.Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 139; Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of Sanctions, with Examples from Rhodesia,” p. 409; Donald L.Losman, International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), p. 140; Robert A.Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, 22 (Fall 1997), pp. 90–136. 2 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p. 144. 3 M.S.Daoudi and M.S.Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience (Boston: Routledge and Kegan-Paul, 1983), p. 12; Barry E.Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 233; Lisa L.Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 250; Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 166; Elizabeth S.Rogers, “Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts,” Security Studies, 5 (Summer 1996), p. 72. 4 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J.Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott (hereafter HSE), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, two volumes (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990). 5 George A.Lopez and David Cortright, “Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations,” in D.Cortright and G.A.Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacekeeping in a Post-Cold War World? (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 4. 6 The term and the approach are based on Alexander L.George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). 7 HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, vol. 1, pp. 41–42. 8 Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” and the two follow-up exchanges, Kimberly Ann Elliott, “The Sanctions Glass: Half-Full or Completely Empty?,” and Robert A.Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work,” International Security, 23 (Summer 1998); and David A.Baldwin and Robert A.Pape, “Evaluating Economic Sanctions,” International Security 23 (Fall 1998), pp. 189–198.
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 9 Kim Richard Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” International Organization, 43 (Spring 1989), p. 304. 10 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, pp. 55–57. 11 Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” pp. 93–97. 12 The variation is in the number of objectives, the basis for differentiation, and other ways. For example: modest policy change, destabilization, disruption of military adventures, military impairment, other major policy changes (HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered); policy change, costs imposition, demonstration of resolve, domestic politics (Baldwin, Economic Statecraft); primary, secondary, tertiary [James Barber, “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument,” International Affairs (London), 55 (July 1979)]; formal, undisclosed, implicit [Sidney Weintraub, ed., Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982)]; instrumental, symbolic-expressive [Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, 19 (April 1967)]; compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, domestic symbolism [James M.Lindsay, “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination,” International Studies Quarterly, 30 (June 1986)]; punishment to compel, to deter, for retribution (Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment”); take or defend territory, change military behavior, change ruling regime or internal political structure (Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work”). 13 National Research Council, Committee on International Conflict Resolution, “Draft Guidelines for Commissioned Papers” (n.d.). 14 Alexander L.George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little Brown, 1971); Thomas S.Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 15 Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?, Occasional Paper #8 (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990). Elizabeth S.Rogers [“Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts,” Security Studies, 5 (Summer 1996), p. 50] makes a similar point regarding sanctions cases. 16 Thomas G.Weiss, David Cortright, George A.Lopez, and Larry Minear, eds., Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). 17 Baldwin draws on conceptual and theoretical work on credibility particularly by Schelling to argue that the willingness to bear costs is “a standard indicator of the intensity of one’s resolve” and thus in certain situations is “a desirable attribute in a policy alternative” (Economic Statecraft, p. 107). Lisa Martin (Coercive Cooperation) also finds a direct and strong relationship between the sender’s self-imposed costs and its ability to gain the cooperation of other states. 18 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p. 15. 19 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, p. 250. 20 Philip E.Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 5,17. 21 See, for example, Bruce W.Jentleson, ed., Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 22 My thanks to Paul Stern for his input on this point, drawing on his work with Daniel Druckman (see Chapter 2). 23 Rogers, “Using Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts,” p. 49.
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 24 George, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Schelling, Arms and Influence and the Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). 25 T.Clifton Morgan and Valerie Schwebach, “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises,” International Studies Quarterly, 41 (March 1997), pp. 27–50. 26 Jonathan Kirshner, “The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions,” Security Studies, 6 (Spring 1997). 27 Albert O.Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 14. 28 NATO nations, which as of 1948 accounted for only 38.5 percent of Yugoslavian imports and 30 percent of its exports, by 1954 had increased their shares to 78.5 and 71.5 percent, respectively. In the Cuba case the Soviet bloc’s share of Cuban trade soared from 2 to 77.4 percent. 29 Thus, for example, in the case of Rhodesia, the passage by the U.S. Congress in 1971 of the Byrd amendment authorizing imports of Rhodesian chrome, and thus defecting from the sanctions initiated by its closest ally Britain and endorsed by the United Nations, led the Rhodesian Herald to editorialize on this “wonderful boost for Rhodesian morale…a signal to the world that sanctions are not important enough to warrant serious sacrifices” [Harry R.Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1978), p. 164]. 30 Cited in Hans J.Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 10. 31 Bruce W.Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986). 32 While “my heart is completely with the iron and steel industry,” as West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder put it, “I must choose here between the interests of foreign policy and the interests of our economy” (Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 118). See also Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955–1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 33 French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson spoke of a “progressive divorce” because “we no longer speak the same language.” West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt angrily pledged that “the pipeline will be built.” Even conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that “the question is whether one very powerful nation can prevent existing contracts from being fulfilled” (Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 195). 34 Following Stalin’s death in 1953, there were major differences over whether to reduce the scope of export controls through the NATO-like COCOM. In August 1954 for the first time since its inception, COCOM cut its embargo lists. It did so at European insistence and over American objections. The number of exports under total embargo was cut from 320 to 226 items, and the number under any form of COCOM control fell from 514 to 315. The most extensive decontrol was in general industrial equipment; the least extensive was of monitors and other items with direct military significance. Interests still coincided on military containment but not on economic containment. Indeed no less a figure than Winston Churchill was pushing for increased trade in response to the “peaceful coexistence” overtures of the post-Stalin Soviet leaders. “The more trade there is through the Iron Curtain,” Churchill argued, “the more the two great divisions of the world mingle in the healthy and fertile activities of commerce, the greater is the counterpoise to purely military calculations. Other thoughts take up their places in the minds of men.” Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, pp. 76–81, and Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: COCOM and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992). 35 The UN Charter’s Article 2(7) has been the touchstone for this view: “Nothing con
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War tained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” 36 Martin, Coercive Cooperation. 37 Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, pp. 86, 90; Losman, International Economic Sanctions, p. 102; R.B.Sutcliffe, “The Political Economy of Rhodesian Sanctions,” Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (July 1969). 38 Kirshner, “Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions,” p. 52. 39 Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, 19 (April 1967), p. 407. 40 Kirshner’s “microfoundations” concept similarly seeks to get at the role of elites and “how groups within the target state are affected differentially” (Kirshner, “Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions,” p. 33). 41 On the internal opposition effect, see Ivan Eland, “Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy,” in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding?, pp. 31–35, and Weiss et al., “Economic Sanctions and Their Humanitarian Impacts: An Overview” and “Toward a Framework for Analysis” in Political Gain and Civilian Pain, pp. 30, 42– 43. 42 Eland, “Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy,” p. 33, and Jennifer Davis, “Sanctions and Apartheid: The Economic Challenge to Discrimination,” pp. 173–184, in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding?; also Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1995), p. 55. 43 Daniel Drezner, “Allies, Adversaries and Economic Coercion: Russian Foreign Economic Policy Since 1991,” Security Studies, 6 (Spring 1997), pp. 65–111. 44 Congressional Quarterly, 2963 Almanac, p. 328, cited in Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 48. 45 Bruce W.Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982–1990 (New York: W.W.Norton, 1994), chap. 2. 46 Among those supporting this view are HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered; Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions; and Rogers, “Using Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts.” 47 International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1973 (London, 1973), pp. 1–2. Japan went so far as to publicly split with the United States, rejecting the basic principles of U.S. Middle East policy and coming out in favor of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as a precondition to peace negotiations. During the Yom Kippur War, Britain embargoed arms and spare-parts sales to all belligerents, a policy that primarily hurt Israel. West Germany protested the American use of its ports for loading military cargo bound for Israel. Only Portugal allowed the United States to use its bases for the airlift. The European Economic Community foreign ministers issued a communiqué adopting a pro-Arab interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The Times of London labeled this policy “a surrender to Arab blackmail,” while OPEC cited it as a reason for canceling the additional oil production cutbacks scheduled for the following month. See also Hans Maull, “The Strategy of Avoidance: Europe’s Middle East Policies After the October War,” in J.C.Hurewitz, ed., Oil, the Arab-Israeli Dispute and the Industrial World (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1976), p. 118. 48 Together Britain and France held a near monopoly over Italy’s oil supply. Yet in their effort to maintain nonadversarial relations with Mussolini to balance Hitler, according to A.J.P.Taylor they “inquired of Mussolini whether he would object to his oil being cut off. When he told them that he would, they successfully resisted oil sanctions.” Anthony Eden later would write in his diary, “Looking back the thought comes again, should we not have shown more determination in pressing through with sanctions in 1935, and if we had, would we not have called Mussolini’s bluff and at least postponed this [second world] war?
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War The answer, I am sure, is yes” [George W.Baer, “Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935–36,” International Organization, 27 (Spring 1973)]; Frederick Hartmann, The Relations of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 369; A.J.P.Taylor, Origins of the Second World War (Hammondsworth, Great Britain: Penguin, 1965), p. 127. 49 According to a “white establishment” figure, as quoted in Allister Sparks, “A New South Africa: The Role of Sanctions,” Washington Post, October 5, 1993, p. A19. The financial squeeze on South Africa was first ratcheted up by the decision by a private-sector actor, Chase Manhattan Bank, not to roll over short-term loans. But the Chase decision itself was shaped by the sanctions being imposed by the U.S. and other governments in that these sanctions were limiting South Africa’s capacity to earn enough hard currency to service its debt. See also Neta C.Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 50 Benjamin J.Cohen, In Whose Interest? International Banking and American Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); see also Cars well, Foreign Affairs (1980– 81), p. 251. 51 John Stremlau, Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1996), pp. 57–58. 52 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), and Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology: An Update (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985). 53 Jentleson, With Friends Like These; Kenneth R.Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991); Alan Friedman, Spider’s Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (New York: Bantam Books, 1993). 54 National Association of Manufacturers, A Catalog of New U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions for Foreign Policy Purposes, 1993–1996 (Washington, D.C.: NAM, 1997); President’s Export Council, “Unilateral Economic Sanctions: A Review of Existing Sanctions and Their Impacts on U.S. Economic Interests with Recommendations for Policy and Process Improvements,” June 1997 (mimeograph); Dianne E.Rennack and Robert D.Shuey, Congressional Research Service, Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law, CRS Report 97–949 F, updated June 5, 1998. 55 “How to Choke Iraq,” New York Times, December 7, 1990, p. A18. 56 Patrick Clawson, How Saddam Hussein Survived: Economic Sanctions, 1990–93 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993); Paul Lewis, “Hussein Rebuilds Iraq’s Economy Undeterred by the U.S. Sanctions,” The New York Times, January 23, 1993, pp. 1, 14. 57 Caryle Murphy, “In Iraq, Every Day Worse Than the Day Before,” Washington Post, July 24, 1994, p. A1; Michael Kelly, “Mob Town,” New York Times Magazine, February 14, 1993, p. 18; Paul Lewis “Iraq Reeling After 4 Years of Sanctions,” New York Times, July 29, 1994; “Data Base,” U.S. News and World Report, August 7, 1995. 58 Eliyahu Kanovsky, “Iran’s Fragile Economy: Problems and Prospects,” PolicyWatch, #201, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 22, 1996; see also Elaine Sciolino, “Fear, Inflation and Graft Feed Disillusion Among Iranians,” New York Times, May 30, 1995, pp. A1, A8. 59 Nora Boustany, “Economic Woes Strain Iran’s Islamic Government,” Washington Post, October 5, 1994, pp. A25, A26; Daniel Southerland, “2-Month-Old Trade Embargo Begins to Take Toll on Iran,” Washington Post, August 9, 1995, pp. F1, F2. 60 Sonja Licht, “The Use of Sanctions in the Former Yugoslavia: Can They Assist in Conflict Resolution?,” in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions, p. 156. 61 Cited in Lopez et al., “Toward a Framework for Analysis,” in Political Gain and Civilian Pain, p. 45.
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War 62 Facts on File, August 11, 1994, p. 561; Chris Hedges, “Isolated and Corrupt, Serbia’s Economy Stagnates,” New York Times, July 8, 1997, p. 10. 63 Werleigh, “The Use of Sanctions in Haiti,” in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding?, p. 169; Sarah Zaidi, “Humanitarian Effects of the Coup and Sanctions in Haiti,” in Weiss et al., Political Gain and Civilian Pain. 64 Stremlau, Sharpening International Sanctions, p. 45. 65 Eric Hoskins, “The Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq,” in Weiss et al., Political Gain and Civilian Pain’, Barbara Crossette, “UNICEF Head Says Thousands of Children Are Dying in Iraq,” New York Times, October 29, 1996, p. A8; UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), “Special Report: FAO/WFP Food Supply and Nutrition Assessment to Iraq,” October 3, 1997, p. 1. 66 Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, “UNSCOM Progress Report,” speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 29, 1997. 67 Eric D.K.Melby, “Iraq,” in Richard N.Haass, ed., Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998), p. 120. 68 See, for example, Con Coughlin, “Russian Weapons Experts Confirm Baghdad Connection,” Sunday Telegraph (London), February 21, 1999; Jamie Dettmer, “Russian Arms Sales to Iraq,” Washington Times, February 22, 1999, and “Russia Becomes Saddam’s Military Superstore,” Insight, March 15, 1999, all available electronically through IRAQ NEWS, firstname.lastname@example.org. 69 Between 1991 and 1995 planned annual arms imports were set at $2 billion per year, but actual figures were only $1.3 billion. The numbers for arms sales agreements as announced compared to actual acquisitions were as follows: 1,000 to 1,500 tanks but only 184 actually acquired; 100 to 200 aircraft versus 57; 200 to 300 artillery pieces versus 106 (Clawson, “Iran,” pp. 94–95, and Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Capabilities, pp. 36–37). 70 Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Capabilities, pp. 90, 93. 71 Susan L.Woodward, “The Use of Sanctions in Former Yugoslavia: Misunderstanding Political Realities,” and Sonja Licht, “The Use of Sanctions in the Former Yugoslavia: Can They Assist in Conflict Resolution?,” in Cortright and Lopez, Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding?, pp. 141–152, 153–160. 72 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), p. 144. 73 See sources in Stedman, “The Former Yugoslavia,” in Haass, Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, p. 196, fn. 42. 74 Rose, “Haiti,” in Haass, Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, p. 61. 75 Ibid., p. 63. 76 Ibid., p. 81, note 33. 77 Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer,” ‘New’ Approaches to Economic Sanctions,” in Arnold Kanter and Linton F.Brooks, eds., U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World (New York: W.W.Norton, 1994), pp. 153–154. 78 See, for example, Stephen P.Cohen, “Nuclear Breakout: How Should Washington Respond to the South Asian Bombs?,” Brooking Institution Policy Brief, June 11, 1998. 79 Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, p. 78. 80 Of 193 countries and territories included in Freedom House’s annual survey, 140 (72 percent) are ranked as either “free” or “partly free.” This includes 36 that are new democracies since 1989, with only eight backsliders in the same period (Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1997–98). 81 Mercosur followed up by amending its charter to suspend any member country that “abandons the full exercise of republican institutions” [Strobe Talbott, “Democracy and the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, 75 (November/December 1996), p. 54]. 82 Jim Golden, “Guatemala’s Counter-Coup: A Military About-Face,” New York Times,
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International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War June 3, 1993, p. A3; see also Francisco Villagran de Leon, “Thwarting the Guatemala Coup,” Journal of Democracy, 4 (October 1993), pp. 115–124. 83 Richard Feinberg, “The Coup That Wasn’t,” Washington Post, April 30, 1996, p. A13; see also Thomas W.Lippman, “Joint Effort Helps Head Off Coup Threat in Paraguay,” Washington Post, April 26, 1996, p. A30. 84 Drew Christiansen, and Gerard F.Powers, “Economic Sanctions and the Just War Doctrine,” in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding?, pp. 101, 104. 85 J.David Richardson and Karin Rindal, Why Exports Really Matter! (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics, 1995), pp. 1, 7. 86 Paul Blustein, “Thinking Globally, Punishing Locally,” Washington Post, May 16, 1997, pp. G1, G2. 87 For a view on the constitutionality issues raised by state and local sanctions, see David Schmahmann and James Finch, “The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar),” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 30 (March 1997), pp. 175–207. 88 See, for example, George E.Shambaugh, “Dominance, Dependence and Political Power: Tethering Technology in the 1980s and Today,” International Studies Quarterly, 40 (December 1996), pp. 559–588. 89 Ibid., p. 40 passim. 90 Christopher C.Joyner, “Collective Sanctions as Peaceful Coercion: Lessons from the United Nations Experience,” The Australian Year Book on International Law 1995, vol. 16, p. 257. 91 National Association of Manufacturers, Catalog of New U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions; President’s Export Council, “Unilateral Economic Sanctions”; Mobil Oil Company, “Sanctions: Our Perspective,” New York Times, September 16, 1997. 92 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (San Francisco: Freeman, 1981), pp. 237–238. 93 The National Association of Manufacturers report goes no further than conceding that sanctions “may be” used in “clearly defined cases of national or international emergency” and even then only if it can be demonstrated that success is likely and that other states and firms will cooperate; NAM, Catalog, p. iv. 94 Mobil, “Sanctions: Our Perspective.” 95 Crawford Young, “The Impossible Necessity of Nigeria: A Struggle for Nationhood” (review of Wole Soyinlea, The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis), Foreign Affairs, 75 (November/December 1996), p. 143. 96 Stremlau, Sharpening International Sanctions, p. 63. 97 In this regard a project recently proposed by David Baldwin for constructing a new, more comprehensive and more systematic dataset on economic sanctions cases is of particular note (David A.Baldwin, “Evaluating Economic Sanctions,” August 1998 proposal currently under development). 98 Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized.
Representative terms from entire chapter: