A Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Reduction Regime Interim Report (2001) / Chapter Skim
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From page 2... ...
The purpose of this study is to discuss the technology and policy/challenges of the issues associated with an arms reduction regime that could limit all categories of nuclear warheads and eventually all weapons-usable nuclear materials as part of that r~sk-reduction effort. The initial focus of the study is on the United States and Russia, but part of the design process includes consideration of how the 2 Committee on International Security and Anns Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (1991)
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At the same time, there is concern that weapons-usable fissile materials or nuclear weapons, especially in Russia, could be stolen. A recent report to the Secretary of Energy, A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, 3 concludes: The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material 3 Russia Task Force, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, chaired by former Senator Howard Baker and former Presidential Counselor Lloyd Cutler, A Report Card on the Department of Energy 's Nonproliferation Programs With Russia, January 10, 2001.
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Work toward a comprehensive regime for monitoring and reducing warheads and fissile materials could also rightly be portrayed as partly fulfilling the obligation of the nuclear weapon states, as defined in Article V} of the APT, to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament. Enhance protection, con*
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From page 5... ...
Currently, each nuclear weapon state creates its own standards for the protection, control, and accounting of its nuclear warheads and fissile materials. The nuclear weapon states afford their nuclear weapons varying levels of protection against then or unauthorized use.
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Excess silos and SEEM launchers must be verifiably eliminated, and excess bombers must be verifiably converted to conventional use or eliminated, but this is not true for the nuclear warheads they were intended to carry. Placing limits on the total number of warheads and requiring the verified dismantling of excess warheads and the disposal of excess fissile material would make reversal of nuclear arms reductions more difficult, costly, and time consuming.
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From page 7... ...
A comprehensive reduction regime would also facilitate efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals across the globe. The 1997 CISAC report considered an interim limit of 1,000 total warheads (all warheads, regardless of type, function, status, or basing mode)
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Cooperative verification and transparency measures on warhead inventories and dismantling would give additional assurance. Verifiable restrictions on nonstrategic warheads will become more important as the number of strategic warheads is reduced, particularly because some nonstrategic warheads could either be adapted for use on strategic delivery vehicles or used in a strategic manner.
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From page 9... ...
A nuclear weapon could also be built ~ 'CA New Era of Reciprocal Arms Reductions: Texts or President Bush's Nuclear Initiative and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's Response," Alms Control Today 21, 3-6 (October 1991~. C`Bush and Yeltsin Press New Nuclear Cutbacks," Anns Control Today 22, 38, 48-49 (January/Februa~y 19921.
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The secondary stage is imploded and heated by the exploding primary, sufficient to fuse isotopes of hydrogen into helium and produce a thermonuclear weapon. Since a stand-alone secondary cannot explode, it might not be considered to be a nuclear warhead.
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The history of arms control negotiations - and unilateral measures to enhance stability - suggests that reductions in nuclear weapons stocks and the fissile material that is essential for their production are likely to come relatively slowly and in careful steps. Verification and transparency measures have become the reliable building blocks of such nuclear arms reductions and will continue to serve that function in the future.
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NTM could be enhanced to provide improved monitoring and surveillance capabilities that will keep up with the demands. The building blocks of the regime should consist of carefully constructed groupings of compliance-observing and compliance-measuring methodologies, including on-site measures, whose purpose is to provide an effective level of assurance that participants in a nuclear weapons reductions regime are, in fact, fulfilling their obligations.
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Such evidence should include the condition of production reactors, the size of the nuclear weapons infrastructure and production complex, and observation of maintenance activities that might be related to nuclear weapons. "Verification in practice." The cooperative elimination of weapon systems under the Cooperative Threat Reductions programs has given considerable on-site experience with elimination of weapon systems, providing for a measure of "flying before buying." These trial runs could give confidence that the building blocks can be used fruitfully' as well as a sense of how best to phase in particular measures.
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From page 14... ...
Task 5 The utility of mutual, non-binding declarations or voluntary transparency measures as compared with formal treaties or executive agreements. The reciprocal-unilateral measures initiated by Presidents Bush, Gorbachev and Yeltsin during 1991-92 were successful in removing significant numbers of deployed, it The concern over Soviet compliance to arms control treaties will be addressed within the context of the presidential reports on compliance.
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The members of the counterpart groups include distinguished current and former government officials and military officers, scientists and engineers with important roles in nuclear weapons matters, and policy analysts with close connections to decision makers. Meetings are scheduled with each of these groups between March and June 2001 and issues related to the creation of a comprehensive arms reduction regime, as they may affect each nation, are on the agenda of each meeting.
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From page 16... ...
For example, it is questionable whether a nuclear weapon state would permit direct monitoring of actual weapon components by inspectors from non-nuclear weapon states. The Committee has also examined the strengthened IAEA safeguards provisions developed after the Gulf War.
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