Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks Implications for National Security Emergency Preparedness (1989) / Chapter Skim
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4 Regulation
4 Regulation
Pages 33-45
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From page 33... ...
The integrated Bell System no longer exists, and its component parts have undergone organizational transformations that preclude reassembly of the original entity, even assuming that such a policy decision were made and could lawfully be implemented. Corporate goals have changed: Companies that formerly perceived themselves as passive providers of common carriage now regard themselves as active marketers of telecommunications and information services.
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From page 34... ...
The court has established as a prerequisite to ending its superintendence over the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) the introduction of genuine competition in the local loop, that is, competition sufficient to make available to residential subscribers meaningful alternatives to obtaining basic telephone service from their local exchange carrier.
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From page 35... ...
The goal of ONA is accepted by all: that is, equal, user-transparent access via the public networks to network services provided by network-based and nonnetwork enhancedservice providers. But the specifics of ONA implementation are complex, and any solution must prove acceptable to many competing industry groups.
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From page 36... ...
A positive aspect is that ONA should provide the flexible network intelligence needed to meet NSEP requirements notably, out-of-band signaling. But ONA could have a serious adverse impact on NSEP: As network software becomes increasingly accessible, the potential increases for hostile users to disrupt the public switched networks.
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From page 37... ...
At this writing, the FCC is considering modifying the rules that limit telephone company participation in cable television franchises. The existing rules are premised upon the limited bandwidth available to telephone users; the introduction of optical fiber into the local loop will eventually obviate the need to retain the current restrictive rules.
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From page 38... ...
Those channels could then become available for radio access for NSEP purposes. PRICING Background Traditional telephone pricing was designed to foster "universal service": basic voice telephone service at rates that virtually all potential subscribers could afford.
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From page 39... ...
Because nonservice specific network enhancements are no longer automatically includible in the carrier rate base, an alternative method of financing emergency backup is needed. BYPASS Background There are, as defined by the FCC, two types of bypass: "facilities bypass" and "service bypass." Facilities bypass is the use of facilities that are physically separate from the embedded public network.
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From page 40... ...
National Security Emergency Preparedness hnplicatione As private networks proliferate, many with robust packet switching capabilities, they will constitute a resource for augmenting network redundancy. The committee recommends that efforts be made to exploit the capabilities of private networks for message transmission, mail-box storage, and more robust signaling.
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From page 41... ...
Already, inquiries on advanced network services are under way in New York and Florida, and the California PUC has also expressed interest in the subject. Another problem in local exchange carrier regulation is ensuring that NSEP personnel have access to the public networks.
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From page 42... ...
National Security Eknergency Preparedness Implications Because the mainstay of Nationwide Emergency Telecommunications Service (NETS) and NSEP needs will be voice communications, regulation, by conditioning deregulation on retention of "last-resort" voice, will serve NSEP purposes by maximizing network connectivity.
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From page 43... ...
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, the committee makes the following recommendations. Recommendation: Assure Sufficient National Petrel National Security Emergency Preparedness Resources light of society's growing reliance on information and telecommunications networks and the resulting increase in risk to national security emergency preparedness, the National Security Council should review whether the resources available to the National Communications System are sufficient to permit it to fulfill its responsibilities for planning, implementing, and administrating programs designed to decrease communications ~nerabilities for national security emergency preparedness users in an environment of proliferating public networks.
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From page 44... ...
Without emplacement of adequate network assets in advance, it will not be possible to implement NSEP plans in event of a crisis. Recommendation: Establish Emergency Plans As crisis management skins are critical In making emergency assets work effectively, the National Comllmnications System should establish additional emergency plans, tailored to the evolving public networks, that use simulated disaster and recovery scenarios to develop falIback strategies for network use during emergencies.
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From page 45... ...
In this regard, experience with recent disasters will help provide a blueprint for developing future contingency plans. Finally, as a truly practical endeavor the NCS should commission the analysis of scenarios that postulate the destruction of a megaswitch and enumerate the steps that would be currently undertaken to restore communications along with the problems that would likely be encountered, including estimates of costs, time required to restore communications, the level of the restoration, telecommunications service priority adherence, and network management obstacles.
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