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National Policies for Science and Their Implications for Materials Technology
Pages 7-33

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From page 7...
... it enables the concerted achievement of tasks beyond the capacity of its individual human components; and (3) its lifetime is independent of the life span of its human components.
From page 8...
... Some might believe that national strategies in the materials field are carefully thought out as sectors in the broader strategies for science and engineering as a whole and that these, in turn, are logically redated to generally-agreed national goals or policies. It is much more likely, though, that where materials strategies exist, they have been only loosely related to broader science policies, if at all.
From page 9...
... As to the second, questions need to be resolved as to the nation's determination to influence global diplomacy, to effect changes in the economies of developing countries, to achieve specific patterns of international trade, to respond to the economic and technological prospects of the principal competing nations, to advance the United States at the expense of other nations or as a part of a general program of international advance, to aim at universal superiority in science, technology, and industrial achievement or to choose areas in which our superiority in resources gives us an automatic precedence, leaving other nations to surpass us in field where they are potentially stronger. Is it politically feasible to make these decisions?
From page 10...
... U) ~rl General Science and Technology Preeminence Science Preeminence Technology Preeminence Economic Growth Exclude Economic Influence of Some Other Nations Increase Diplomatic Influence Enlarge Military Strength Catch Up Technologically With An Adversary Environment Quality Improve Terms of Trade Raise Living Standards Reduce Unemployment Control Inflation Reduce Extent of Government Intervention Increase Extent of Government Intervention Improve Internal Economic Balance x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x l
From page 11...
... strategy might be to strive toward a general condition of flexibility so that when stresses appear they can be tolerated or overcome. National Strategies and Tactics in the Materials Field In the United States, no agency appears to have responsibility for the total job of formulating materials policy or goals for the materials geld e Thus, it is not surprising that there is no well-formed strategy for achieving national goals in the materials field, including materials science and engineering.
From page 14...
... What are the opportunities for trying something quite new, and what would that require us to give up? Techniques or tactics employed to implement a national materials strategy are virtually infinite in scope.
From page 15...
... Some types of tactics and their perceived status in various countries are indicated in Table 8.5. Before concluding these general introductory remarks, it should be noted that just as every different kind of materials strategy implies a different set of implementing tactics, so too each set of implementing tactics implies a different set of ad hoc organizational arrangements.
From page 16...
... Export teachers H Planned academic cohorts to meet forecast requirements Industry-subsidized training to meet requirements Other (specify)
From page 17...
... Emphasis on fields involving local comparative advantage H Emphasis on fields of high international economic competition 8-17 TABLE 8.5 (Cont'd)
From page 18...
... J Accept environmental limits on production Emphasize high technology Large variety of slightly-differing product forms Standardize on few varieties G
From page 19...
... Some Examples of National Policies in Science and Engineering There are, according to Robert Gilpin,3 three alternative national strategies for science and technology: (1) to support scientific and technological development across the broadest front possible; C22 scientific and technological specialization; and (3)
From page 20...
... In a world where nuclear weaponry has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a nation's technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems." Until recently, the U.S. has shaped its national policies in science and technology largely as a reflex to military threats, real or imagined.
From page 21...
... However, the British have often been somewhat embarrassed by their apparent inability to optimize the coupling of development and engineering to their strong basic research programs. It is almost as if, to every attempt by the government to push or pull technology and thereby improve the international trade balance and the standard of living, there is a reaction in the opposite direction by the British people that tends to negate the governmental efforts.
From page 22...
... Academy of Sciences was transformed into a coordinating center for most fundamental research and much applied research, with an extensive network of research establishments employing a large scientific staff. The position of the Academy at the heart of the Soviet scientific effort was consolidated during the second World War.
From page 23...
... This led ministries to skimp on the resources allocated for experimental work; if these could be squeezed, more would be available for extending basic production facilities. Similarly, factory managements tended to resist innovations proposed by research establishments, because any major change in the pattern of output would disrupt the flow of production, and so the diffusion of existing innovations were slowed down.
From page 24...
... Industrial R&D is divided among a number of ministries between which administrative barriers prevent easy communication; (5) Within each ministry, the administrative separation from the face tories of the large research institute and its attendant design bureaus inhibit the introduction of new products and processes.
From page 25...
... It is very important that, wherever expedient, every institute have the resources to see its theoretical scientific developments through to practical fruition. To this end it is necessary, in our opinion, that organizations involved in scientific research be able to call upon well-equipped design offices, prototype production facilities, and -- if its staff is working on some radically-new technical innovation -- an adequate team of instructors capable of giving on-the-spot production assistance at plants and factories.
From page 26...
... "The rate of scientific-technical progress is affected by a variety of factors. One of the principal deficiencies in many scientific establishments is insufficient attention to the development of new experimental methodologies for the discovery and analysis of natural phenomena.
From page 27...
... "With regard to the second part of the question, about the manufacturing plant, thus far there is, regrettably, no manufacturing plant, although our own in-house production facilities are limited and unable to satisfy even the internal demand. "What should be done?
From page 28...
... But the nation's corporations retain great tactical operational autonomy for achieving national goals, and they compete vigorously for profits with one another within Japan. To a remarkable extent, the entire system operates by consensus -- a sort of national participative management.
From page 29...
... Components of the policy include international trade, imports and exports of technology, level of education, degree of technological independence, and the country's role in the world techno-economic system. Until recently, such policy in Japan has focussed primarily on the problem of catching up, technologically and economically, with the most advanced countries.
From page 30...
... The external tool is the system of control of the access to enter national markets: imports of technology, licensing agreements between Japanese and foreign firms; direct investment by foreign companies and all foreign payments are tightly controlled by the government. The internal tool is the peculiar, and probably unique, partnership between private industry and government.
From page 31...
... Scant attention is given to the fact that the overall process of innovation draws very heavily upon imported innovations, brought into the country through foreign firms, licensing agreements, transfer of scientists, personal contacts, and imitation. Japan is probably the only country where imported innovation is treated as a major dimension of technological policy.
From page 32...
... (7) To attach greater importance to international cooperation in science and technology to raise Japan's status -- particularly aid to developing nations and exchanges with other advanced nations.
From page 33...
... It is now increasingly evident that there has to be enhanced coordination among the departments and sectors responsible for conducting a nation's scientific and technological progress, but that coordination is not the same as central control. In relating scientific policies to national goals, there has to be a continuing dialogue between the scientific community and society at large.


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