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3. Responses to Chemical Events at Baseline Chemical Demilitarization Facilities
Pages 26-36

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From page 26...
... These communications have important implications, since they affect how political leaders, regulators, and the general public view the chemical demilitarization program. FORMAL EVENT REPORTING PROTOCOLS Formal protocols for reporting a chemical event establish a communication network designed to alert the chemical demilitarization facility staff and plant workforce and the surrounding community to any imminent danger and to mobilize emergency assistance in case of a major event.
From page 27...
... Indeed, although the chemical event report states that the bin was placed under engineering controls as soon as the analysis was reported (at 0220 local time) , it also notes that the bin was outside engineering controls until 0800 local time.
From page 28...
... The multiplicity of reports is an example of overlapping investigations that create the potential for lost time for the mission of the program. It is also an indication of communication problems within the chemical demilitarization program.
From page 29...
... Time requirements for verbal reporting and follow-up written reports are not unique to chemical demilitarization facilities. Furthermore, the regulatory process is not staticit evolves.
From page 30...
... Consolidating the investigation process can still ensure that the facilities are operating with the highest margin of safety, while at the same time ensuring that procedures are in place that will minimize plant shutdown time following chemical events or other safety infractions. MODELING POTENTIAL POPULATION EXPOSURE When chemical agents are released into the atmosphere, a key challenge is to predict the affected population's exposure.
From page 31...
... D2-Puff includes the following new features and capabilities: · A Lagrangian puff model that allows concentrations and dosages to be calculated when meteorological conditions change in time or vary over a region · The calculation of concentrations and dosages within enclosed structures, such as buildings used as shelters · The ability to handle multiple release locations · The ability to simulate dosages received by individuals who are exposed to only a portion of a plume · The ability to include meteorological observations from multiple locations · The ability to include data from weather forecasting models (assuming that a suitable meteorological data assimilation capability is attached to D2-Puff) · The ability to model the effects of complex terrain on plume motion · The ability to compute dispersion based on measurements of the variance of wind direction · The ability to compute for acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs)
From page 32...
... Perhaps the most serious limitation of the D2-Puff/D2PC methodology for chemical hazard prediction arises from the neglect of the variation in wind speed with height. Because both the D2-Puff and D2PC models assume that the wind speed measured at 10 m above ground level is representative of the transport wind speed at all downwind distances, they tend to overestimate transport speeds for low-level releases at short range and underestiAEGL-1: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic nonsensory effects.
From page 33...
... One of the important components of this comm~ttee's examination of the emergency response to the two JACADS and TOCDF incidents has been a review of the preparedness of the emergency management system when required to function during stressing events. Relevant to the examination of emergency preparedness are a recent GAO report that examined FEMA's and the Army's efforts to prepare states for chemical weapons emergencies (GAO, 2001)
From page 34...
... However, the DCD EOC then failed to pass on the notice to the Tooele County EOC and relevant State of Utah agencies. It is impossible to determine how the CSEPP portion of the emergency management system functioned as it was not provided timely notification of the events.
From page 35...
... entrusted with implementing the program, reinforcing negative messages about the technology being utilized and leading the public to question reports and official statements about progress in meeting program objectives. Understanding how chemical events might initiate the "social amplification" process is facilitated by elucidating critical aspects of the trust relationship engendered by activities such as the chemical weapons demilitarization pro7Almost by definition, the communication process includes the local news media and interested citizens' groups.
From page 36...
... 36 EVALUATION OF CHEMICAL EVENTS AT ARMY CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL FACILITIES The substantial costs in terms of resources and time required for multiple investigations of chemical events involving environmental releases, such as those that occurred in the TOCDF May 8-9, 2000, event, might contribute to a defensive mentality on the part of the operating personnel. At the same time, it is essential that local officials and local citizens have trusted representatives involved in these investigations both to ensure that they are competently undertaken and to facilitate effective communication of the results.


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