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5. Preparing for Potential Future Chemical Events at Baseline Chemical Demilitarization Facilities
Pages 44-50

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From page 44...
... Given the inherent complexity of the chemical demilitarization task at the assembled weapons stockpile sites, it is almost certain that new problems will continue to arise, particularly from aging and deteriorating weapons and the challenges of demilitarization plant closure and decommissioning. There will be future chemical events, and serious consequences to both plant personnel and surrounding communities cannot be ruled out.
From page 45...
... Plant operating requirements may change, and changes need to be viewed in the light of the risk assessments. Several lessons can be learned about risk management from thinking about possible responses to certain kinds of chemical events.
From page 46...
... A criticism that is easily voiced but difficult to respond to is the general acceptance of the status quo by chemical demilitarization operating people and management. Changes are made in response to chemical events or obvious operating difficulties, but based on the committee's site reviews, a culture of questioning processes and constantly improving operations does not seem to exist.
From page 47...
... Trial burns with surrogate feeds and with the pollution abatement system in full operation, as well as disassembly trials with blank munitions, should provide substantial operating experience before any chemical agent is fed to the process. It is fairly common experience in industry to include design people on start-up teams for new facilities.
From page 48...
... Beyond addressing the immediate health and environmental concerns posed by a chemical event, frequent and open dialogue can alter perceptions of risk and trust, influence demands for policy change, and mitigate undesirable effects on local economic growth and property values. As discussed in Chapter 3, the agents in the demilitarization process (regulatory agency officials, the Army, and contractors at the chemical demilitarization facilities)
From page 49...
... The suggested study teams noted above would represent a step in that direction. Restarts After a Chemical Event Major chemical events can impose further shutdowns with unpredictable shutdown times.
From page 50...
... Finally, as noted in Chapter 3, effort spent on the multiple investigations of the May 8-9, 2001, Tooele chemical event probably extended the post-event shutdown associated with that event unnecessarily. Preagreement at each demilitarization site on the composition of a joint event investigation team, representing all regulatory and operational stakeholders and chartered to produce a single, comprehensive investigation report, could save significant shutdown time and clearly focus all parties on the steps necessary to achieve safe restart of operations after future chemical events.


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