Post-Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management (1988) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 139-145
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From page 139... ...
4. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL ITEMS Using the set of information generated in the previous steps, hardware failure modes could be categorized on the basis of their potential consequences.
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From page 140... ...
6 - <` ^ Z _ aS i_ ~ Z o ~ o en ~ o Z Co Z o IS t, Cat Cat Z Z O Ct: V)
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From page 141... ...
J V, o eS eS C~ =' 0 ~ ~ ~ o Z C~ ~ Z o S C~ C:' ~Q ec "Z o ~o ~ aS S o "Y ~ ~ z ~ — ~ ~S o . FIGURE F-1 Flow diagram of proposed systems safety engineering functions in support of risk assess~nent.
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From page 142... ...
for both the causes and consequences in orcler to provide inputs, both to the overall risk assessment which will guide the final design (or for the current STS, the proposed design changes) , and to the criteria on which the vaTiciation and certification test programs shouic!
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From page 143... ...
For those hazarcis caused by hardware failure modes, these rationales would embody the Critical Items List retention rationales Jeveloped by the various engineering groups and the test-basec] safety-risk assessments generates!
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From page 144... ...
The arguments for retention of prioritizes] critical items wouIc!
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