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3 NASA's Safety Process for the National Space Transportation
Pages 15-32

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From page 15... ... Reaciers who are already familiar with the structure anct purposes of NASA's present safety process may wish to skip over this "orientation" section and begin reading at Section 4. The measures taken to ensure safety follow basic NASA policyrissuect at the Administrator level. Read the entire page →
From page 16... ... Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) , in Alabama, is responsible for the propulsion elements of the STS: the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Read the entire page →
From page 17... ... Center SR&QA staff are cletaile`1 to programs such as the NSTS Program, where they develop functional units of staff dedicated to various aspects of Safety, Reliability, anc! Quality Assurance.7 Their role is to provide oversight of the engineering design and clevelopment activities, and to advise the Project Manager and the various configuration control boards on the safety and other relevant aspects of systems under review. Read the entire page →
From page 18... ... In a: Is es at a ~ ~ o Z I In at ~ C] Read the entire page →
From page 19... ... MANAGf R WHITE SANDS TEST fACllllY of STS design and development that are crucial to the safe functioning of the overall system. These include: systems integration and interface design between the different STS elements, analyses of integrated structural loads and thermal effects, software requirements and configuration control, and ground systems and operations requirements. Read the entire page →
From page 20... ... , described in Section 3.4.3 below. 3.4 SAFETY ANALYSES 3.4.1 The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Critical Items List At the heart of NASA's effort to ensure reliability of the Shuttle system is the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Read the entire page →
From page 22... ... Sources of information used to identify hazards include the FMEA/CIL, as well as various design reviews, safety analyses, crew procedures clevelopment, flight anomaly reports, ant! other sources. Read the entire page →
From page 23... ... is the Element Interface Functional Analysis, prepare(1 by the NSTS Engineering Integration Office with the support of Rockwell International. ElFAs are analyses of various functional failure mocles that can occur at element-to-element interfaces as a result of a har(lware failure in either element. Read the entire page →
From page 25... ... In a briefing to the Committee, Rockwell International presented its view of this interaction, summarized in Figure 3-~. The FMEA/CTE, ElFA, and other safety analyses feed into the various hazard analyses in a one-way flow culminating in the Mission Safety Assessment. Read the entire page →
From page 26... ... 2 O ~4� O E" ~ ~ ~e 3 a ~ ~ 0 z ~ 0 0 s" c~ u~ Q ~ O ~ eC � -; O ~ U! ~ 8 0 ~ ~ ~u, _ FIGURE 3-8 Excerpt from a sample Space Shuttle preliminary hazard analysis report (NASA) Read the entire page →
From page 28... ... it :r cD ~ / ~m J Z D I ~ - Z LIZ 28 o o Q Cat O ~ O Q ~ O > ~ � cn \ 0 cn \ a' ~ \ � O \ \ ~ a) Read the entire page →
From page 29... ... . Space Shuttle Main Engine Rockwell International, Martin Marietta, Denver Aerospace Division (MSFC) Read the entire page →
From page 30... ... Lu al so c at, o z l at L LU 5 C:) Read the entire page →
From page 31... ... Each hazard analysis assessment is being conclucted in accordance with the guidance provided in a new document, NSTS 22254, "Methociology for Conduct of NSTS Hazard Analyses." This document defines the policy ant] procedures required for preparing hazard analyses, Hazarc! Read the entire page →
From page 32... ... � Failure Reports The PRACA system is a large, distributed ciata base (one for each STS element and one for KSC ground support equipment) that contains all of the reports listed above, along with ciata on corrective actions taken. Read the entire page →

From page 15...

... Reaciers who are already familiar with the structure anct purposes of NASA's present safety process may wish to skip over this "orientation" section and begin reading at Section 4. The measures taken to ensure safety follow basic NASA policyrissuect at the Administrator level.

3 NASA's Safety Process for the National Space Transportation Pages 15-32

3 NASA's Safety Process for the National Space Transportation
Pages 15-32