Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy (2004) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
Appendix E: Abstracts Prepared by Workshop Participants
Appendix E: Abstracts Prepared by Workshop Participants
Pages 53-78
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 53... ...
The Augustine Committee tract a very broact charter: to advise the nation on "the future of the civil space program," including management issues and program content. The committee did its work over the course of a very intense 120-clay period, conducting more than 300 interviews, clelivering its final report to Vice President Quayle, who was, at the time, chair of the National Space Council.
|
From page 54... ...
There was no realization that space science funding would not hoist up if the human exploration program ctisappearect. This is no longer the case.
|
From page 55... ...
The obvious target for such exploration is Mars, and the obvious question is, Is a Tong human expedition to some destination like Mars possible and sensible, or must we do it only with robots with teleoperator supervision? If we could start again, the appropriate space station would be more like a submarine or a "construction shack" than an all- and every-purpose laboratory.
|
From page 56... ...
It appears that perhaps two funclamental errors were made with regard to the space shuttle and space station programs. With regard to the space shuttle, it is clear that attempting to unify the cargo-lifting capability and the delivery of crew in one reusable vehicle has lect to an exceedingly complicated and vulnerable system.
|
From page 57... ...
a recent NASA depiction of the human spaceflight program as "science-c/riven" and a capability provider and (2) significant but unclerutilizecl progress in robotic technology and information systems since the clays of Apollo and the space station.
|
From page 58... ...
The result has been a suboptimization of the science and an unnecessary aciclect expense to human spaceflight, sometimes with little relevance to the advance of the basic goal of enabling Tong-cluration human space exploration. The reports of the NRC Committee on Human Exploration discuss this in cletaiT and recommenct optimum ways to incorporate science into human spaceflight programs.
|
From page 59... ...
Nonetheless, when a decision is macle to continue human exploration beyond Earth orbit, it will provide a tremendous opportunity for scientist-explorers and, unlike in the past, science should be a motivating force in defining human space exploration goals. Geopolitical factors have been triggers for crucial events in the evolution of space exploration, the most famous being Apollo and, most recently, the salvation of the space station.
|
From page 60... ...
l he human exploration program needs to go somewhere! I believe that the nation should aclopt a Tong-term policy to establish a permanent presence in the solar system beyond Earth orbit and specifically to establish a human outpost on Mars by the micictle of this century.
|
From page 61... ...
Any new space policy goal for the nation's civil space program should be: . Understandable The "why" of any space goal should be clear to both the taxpayer and the politician.
|
From page 62... ...
space program, the institutional requisites of space exploration continue to make remarkable clemancts, for they imply very-long-term institutional management of both the unmanned and manned aspects of space exploration and possibly commercial and security exploitation. When seen from an organizational perspective perspectives that variously color the views of political decision makers and the public the institutional design challenge is to provide mission structure and institutional processes and incentives in such ways that they assure highly reliable operations over the very Tong term perhaps up to a hunctrects of years in the context of continuously high levels of public trust and confidence.
|
From page 63... ...
a. Internal processes: Strong sense of mission and operational goals, commitment to highly reliable operations, both in production and safety.
|
From page 64... ...
civil space program, political leaders have been willing to allocate the resources required to carry out a program of human spaceflight for two reasons usually not publicly articulated national power and national pride. As the United States debates the future of its space program, and particularly of its human spaceflight component, it is important to assess whether these rationales remain a sufficient basis for undertaking a risky and costly activity.
|
From page 65... ...
Simply put, the Apollo program had a real, definable, and exciting goal, while the shuttle/station era did not. The latter was not a human space program with a goal.
|
From page 66... ...
2015. Set a firm clate for the retirement of the space shuttle and the space station of not later than Do not buiTct an orbital space plane with the principal mission of ferrying astronauts and supplies to the station and Tow Earth orbit.
|
From page 67... ...
In essence, partisans of human spaceflight were encouraged to proceed incrementally, one step at a time, without official reference to Tong-term goals. Obliged to choose between competing endeavors, NASA leaclers cleciclect to pursue a reusable space shuttle and clefer its Tong-stancting vision of an orbiting space station.
|
From page 68... ...
To win support for the space shuttle, NASA officials promised to construct a vehicle that would serve many functions. The shuttle program was clesignect to provide a vehicle that could transport commercial payloads, deliver military reconnaissance satellites, establish a short-cluration orbital laboratory, repair and return satellites, transport civilians, increase reliability, cut the cost of spaceflight "by a factor of ten," and produce a fleet of spacecraft that would fly 500 missions over 20 years.4 The original 1984 space station was conceived as a multi-functional facility from which astronauts could service and repair satellites, observe Earth and the heavens, conduct life science and materials research, undertake military research and development, manufacture alloys and pharmaceutical products, welcome international partners, and prepare spacecraft for missions beyond Earth orbit.
|
From page 69... ...
China will continue to pursue human spaceflight programs and has reportedly expressed an interest in cooperating with the United States. The Arab world poses another challenge.
|
From page 70... ...
Acictitional attention is paid to NASA's organizational structure and the role of the International Space Station (ISS) ; these two topics need to be acictressect in any near-term space policy if the United States is to realize any future Tong-term goals for space exploration.
|
From page 71... ...
commitment to human exploration of space, which for many years has been fragile at best, appears to be in mortal danger. Prospective federal budgets are unlikely to look kindly on new initiatives for NASA, such as the space plane, much less serious planning for human exploration beyond low Earth orbit.
|
From page 72... ...
important biological research that can oniv be done in the context of snacefli~ht 7 7 1 ~7 ~ 1 ~7 and, specifically, long-durahon spacell~ght, even ~t human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not a goal for the civil space program? The answer is certainly yes.
|
From page 73... ...
The human exploration of Mars would clearly expand the physical frontier for human spaceflight and could serve as a Tong-range goal in determining the value of specific investments in the human spaceflight program. With proper planning and preparation, the human exploration of Mars would also expand the science frontier.
|
From page 74... ...
Moreover, the first four components have concluded for valid technical reasons that manned participation in their missions is not only unnecessary but also undesirable. The result is that NASA's manned space program now rides exclusively on the shuttle and space station, which in turn must provide all of its financial support.
|
From page 75... ...
, 2. Other military space programs (approximately $8.5 billion in 2003)
|
From page 76... ...
NASA's science programs have lect the world in exploring our solar system and the universe, yet it seems like they have always been a poor cousin to human exploration initiatives. There is still so much that can be done in the space and Earth sciences.
|
From page 77... ...
President Nixon would only approve the shuttle, while the space station tract to wait for the Reagan Administration. NASA sought to make the shuttle the centerpiece of the entire space program and aggressively sought a monopoly grant to carry all U.S.
|
From page 78... ...
Yet this approach floes not provide a compelling case for the manned spaceflight program as we know it today. To put it differently, if the American people want a challenging and exciting program, the space station plus shuttle is not it.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.