Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation Recommendations for Action (2005) / Chapter Skim
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Scientific and Technical Cooperation
Scientific and Technical Cooperation
Pages 27-32
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From page 27... ...
Over time, the two space programs developed scientific collaborations based on THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL this exchange of data, which naturally led to collaborations COOPERATION involving the development of joint, or in any case coordi The first step toward understanding the potential roles of nated, instrumentation. What began in the realm of science scientific cooperation and technical cooperation in the U.S.- moved over time into the realm of engineering, culminating Russian relationship is to understand the distinctions be- today in Russia's essential participation in the International tween them.
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From page 28... ...
It is important that future programs be structured to take advantage of this talent pool before it beUNDERVALUING OF SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION BY comes irretrievably lost to nonproliferation efforts, specifiRECENT PROGRAMS cally, by providing the participants from both countries with Unfortunately, it appears that after an initial creative burst an appropriate degree of flexibility and autonomy regarding of laboratory-to-laboratory interactions in the early 1990s, technical decisions in both the project definition and the scientific cooperation has rarely met the sustainable coop- project execution phases. The joint committee recomeration requirements outlined above, and there has been a mends that in future projects agency leaders and project significant cost in missed opportunities.
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From page 29... ...
programs contribute substantially to nonproliferation goals.5 · The International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) were established in 1992 by an agreement among the Some possible future cooperative activities, especially unEuropean Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the der the WSSX and MPC&A programs, are natural extenUnited States to support nonproliferation efforts.
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From page 30... ...
The GROWING NEED FOR A NEW SCIENCE AND United States can bring to a cooperative effort its particular TECHNOLOGY FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT strengths in environmental simulation, digital mapping and From the Russian perspective, there is a growing need for databases, and instrumentation development, whereas Rus a new formally recognized science and technology relationsia can brings its traditional strengths in areas that require ship. During discussions in Moscow, Russian experts whom fundamental ideas in physics and chemistry to be scaled into the joint committee consulted argued that it would be desirlarge engineering efforts.
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From page 31... ...
Achieving that goal, however, will require a its American and Russian members, has come to believe that long and complex process. Russia and the United States, as there are in fact serious unanswered technical questions re- the world's leading nuclear powers, could take the initiative garding the nonproliferation potential of various nuclear and work with IAEA to strengthen its role -- particularly in technologies and proposed economic regimens and that the implementation of the Additional Protocol6 -- to develop progress in answering these technical questions may well be essential if one wants to move the U.S.-Russian political 6IAEA member states have the option to supplement their existing safedialogue from the single-word level to a more nuanced guards agreements with the IAEA by adopting an additional protocol to discussion.
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From page 32... ...
In addition to the preof a joint technical working group on risk assessment and vious recommendations regarding information exchange on mitigation relating to nuclear energy projects in non- legal issues and a new government-to-government agreenuclear-weapons states under the charter of the Joint ment on cooperation against radiological terrorism threats, High-Level Commission. the joint committee recommends the establishment of a bilateral scientific and technical working group on com bating radiological terrorism under the charter of the OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREATS7 Joint High-Level Commission to guide this cooperative effort.
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