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1 Review of Sea Basing Concepts
Pages 10-16

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From page 10...
... For the purpose of this study, the committee chose to base its analysis on the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations, which was issued by the Navy and Marine Corps Service chiefs jointly. This document defines Sea Basing as- the foundation from which offensive and defensive power are projected, making Sea Strike[1]
From page 11...
... For example, U.S. Army forces are not configured or conceptually designed in a sea 4ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen Michael W
From page 12...
... For example, absent Army input, Navy planners might assume an incorrect or inappropriate Army force mix. If sea base vessels and support systems were configured to deliver a Stryker Brigade and the Army desired to use or assumed delivery of an Air Assault Brigade, considerable mismatch would result.
From page 13...
... The level of implementation has profound implications for the types of vessels that will comprise the sea base. The most critical of the questions regarding the level of implementation involve the aviation capability and the ability to move cargo between ships in sea states as high as Sea State 4, but the effect of the ultimate capability desired will reverberate throughout the entire design process.
From page 14...
... For example, it would provide off-load and sustainment support of the Army Regional Flotilla prepositioning ships, use as a temporary Afloat Forward Staging Base for the Army, Special Operations Forces support and employment, C3 for a Joint Task Force commander, port and airfield opening capability, and planning and coordination for joint fires. At Level Three, the sea base would constitute a naval capability.
From page 15...
... Army as well as for Sea Basing, and their ability to support the Army Regional Flotilla should be a threshold requirement. 9The lengthy assembly/disassembly time of the CH-53E is due to interoperability limitations with current strategic lift platforms and is a significant pacing factor in meeting required deployment time lines.
From page 16...
... This office should be responsible for carrying out the necessary studies for the design and operation of the sea base and the airborne and seaborne connectors and for guiding the experimentation with one or more testbeds, as needed. At some appropriate stage of planning, as the studies and experimentation and related Service programs mature, this office could grow into a Joint Program Office for the Sea Base.


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