Naval Analytical Capabilities Improving Capabilities-Based Planning (2005) / Chapter Skim
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3 Review of the Navy’s Analytical Processes and Methods
3 Review of the Navy’s Analytical Processes and Methods
Pages 30-58
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From page 30... ...
The capabilities in question are to be outputs -- measures of the ability actually to execute tasks, missions, and operations. These capabilities should also be conceived as joint capabilities, even though in some instances a particular joint capability may effectively be a Service capability (e.g., undersea surveillance)
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From page 31... ...
; · The development and assessment of options for providing needed capabilities, including options that maintain the overall funding level specified by fiscal guidance; and · The assessment of options and trade-offs in an integrative portfolio-management structure suitable to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) -level review.
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From page 32... ...
Naval Institute Proceedings, June. 2 ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen Michael Hagee, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
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From page 33... ...
) , which involves functional capa 3 CAPT Terry McKnight, USN, N70, "Naval Capabilities Development Process," presentation to the committee, July 27, 2004, Woods Hole, Mass.
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From page 34... ...
This is perhaps not surprising, since the Navy and Marine Corps have traditionally emphasized these qualities to a greater extent than have the Army and Air Force, which became more captive to planning for particular war scenarios. In contrast, the committee was not persuaded that the translation of higherlevel intentions into lower-level processes and practices is going well, as discussed below in the subsection "Operational Analysis for the Department of Defense and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations" and in the next major
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From page 35... ...
The Navy leadership will wish to review issues of balance over time. 8Patrick McLaughlin, NAVAIR, "Naval Analytical Capabilities and Improving Capabilities-Based Planning," presentation to the committee, July 28, 2004, Woods Hole, Mass.
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From page 36... ...
These problems are discussed more fully in the next section. THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK Understanding Needs at Mission and Operation Levels Description of Analytic Approach at Mission and Operation Levels The Department of the Navy's core documents include useful decompositions from high-level components (e.g., Sea Strike)
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From page 37... ...
Unfortunately, the committee's assessment was that many problems exist at the next level of analytical detail, as discussed below. Assessment of Analytic Framework for Mission and Operation Levels In assessing the Navy's mostly implicit analytic framework, the committee drew on its experience and looked for generic problems that often beset analysis that is intended to, but actually does not, support capabilities-based planning.
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From page 38... ...
NOTE: SOF, Special Operations Force; CBRNE, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives; C2, command and control; AFSB, afloat forward staging base; PNT, precision, navigation, and timing.
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From page 40... ...
40 Terry slide te Whi CAPT Mass., from Hole, Good Gray; Woods Adapted 2004, 27, Marginal SOURCE: July black; areas. Poor committee, capability the Key: the to of Force.
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From page 41... ...
· Trivializing exploratory analysis, which is a core element of CBP, by conducting only a few excursions with one or a few assumptions changed (typically in organizationally comfortable ways) , while other assumptions are held constant as though certain.11 · Focusing on scenarios preferred by an organization through emphasis on detailed scenario assumptions that stress the particular organization's issues and dramatize its role, without presenting a more holistic representation of how the organization fits into a larger enterprise and its activities.
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From page 42... ...
On the other hand, OPNAV analytic work looked more like business as usual: narrow and isolated from joint analytical efforts. The causes of this disconnect are not clear to the committee.
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From page 43... ...
They are also the problems for which strategic planning guidance is intended to be both helpful and, yes, directive. The Navy needs to provide objective analysis that describes sharply the potential consequences of overly optimistic assumptions about the early use of massive Air Force assets, but that analysis also needs to describe clearly (1)
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From page 44... ...
Whittemore, N4, "Fleet Response Plan and the Integrated Readiness Capability Assessment (IRCA) ," presentation to the committee, July 28, 2004, Woods Hole, Mass.
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From page 45... ...
This can be done, for example, by reporting mission outcomes in an exploratory analysis across cases rather than reporting the mission outcome for some allegedly representative point case. An example for a naval application might be that of assessing the distance required to stop an enemy's maneuver force with a combination of aircraft and 16See Charles Kelley, Paul Davis, Bruce Bennett, Elwyn Harris, Richard Hundley, Eric Larson, Richard Mesic, and Michael Miller, 2003, Metrics for the Quadrennial Defense Review's Operational Goals, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif.
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From page 46... ...
, see Paul K Davis, Jimmie McEver, and Barry Wilson, 2002, Measuring Interdiction Capabilities in the Presence of Anti-Access Measures: Exploratory Analysis to Support Adaptive Planning for the Persian Gulf, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif.
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From page 47... ...
Figure 3.5 illustrates this type of effort with a purely notional, spider-chart depiction. It characterizes the Navy's capabilities along several axes: "Control seas," "Assure early access," "Maintain presence," "Project force inland," "Defend homeland from missile attack," and "Defend allies and deployed forces from missile at Control seas 100 80 Defend allies and deployed 60 Assure early access forces from missile attack 40 20 0 Defend homeland from missile Maintain presence attack Project force inland FIGURE 3.5 Notional capabilities-based planning depiction of present Navy capabilities (heavy dashed line)
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From page 48... ...
That would require additional emphasis on ballistic-missile defense, early access, and the ability to project force inland even in difficult circumstances. General Attributes of Rigorous Analysis Another major concern of the committee relates to the need for first-rate analysis to be rigorous, documented, transparent, and as objective as possible.
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2004. The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
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This broad analysis is in the realm of strategic planning and policy analysis. Current personnel requirements for OPNAV analysis are predominantly limited to capabilities and experience possessed by operations-research-oriented personnel (and even those requirements are often not met)
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From page 51... ...
Recommendation 1: The Chief of Naval Operations should reiterate principles of capabilities-based planning and ensure that they are truly assimilated in Navy analytic processes. The criteria for implementing Recommendation 1 include the following: The work accomplished should be joint and output-oriented, with the ability to actually execute operations as output.
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From page 52... ...
Problems are likely to occur, however, such as that of allowing important future building-block innovations to slip away when funding becomes tight. For example, funding the full contingent of carrier strike groups and raising their readiness for rapid deployment (up to eight strike groups within a specified number of days)
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From page 53... ...
Organization The committee's conclusions about organizational problems are as follows. The logic for the responsibilities assigned to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO)
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From page 54... ...
Generically, however, the good characteristics include the following: · The ethic of getting the problem straight, even if it revisits guidance or assumptions; · Loyalty to the boss -- the CNO -- but also to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the nation, rather than to Navy warfare areas, platforms, and so on; · Integrity; · The mind-set to think joint, but also having the ability to do superb competitive innovation and analysis for the Department of the Navy; · The mind-set to seek broad, complete analyses rather than analyses to support a superior's talking points; · Respect and energetic search for empirical and expert information, whether it is obtained from people in the field, through experiments, by augmentation of staff, or from other mechanisms; · Rigor in everything (but not always in numbers or precision) ; · A good process that includes (not always linearly: problem definition, identification of assumptions, a plan for analysis, appropriate tools, and so on)
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From page 55... ...
The committee's basic recommendation on this question is presented below, followed by a discussion of possible models for the Navy to use in addressing the issue. Recommendation 3: The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy should develop a clearly delineated concept of the Navy's future senior-level analytic support organization and define goals for its composition, including multidisciplinary orientation and officers appropriate for high positions.
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From page 56... ...
those preparing resource-allocation decision packages is that the analysts are grounded in the reality of the issues and types of decisions that must be made each year. However, a potential disadvantage of a direct tie to the resource-allocation staff is that the analytic staff members can get so caught up in the immediate issues that they are not provided the opportunity to build analytic capital and focus on larger, longer-term issues that may be much more important to the future of the Service (a matter of analysis production with available tools versus long-term analytic development with the anticipation of essential issues)
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From page 57... ...
The committee believes that the Navy needs to change some current manpower and personnel policies in order to enhance its ability to build a longerterm, high-quality OPNAV staff with enhanced potential for performing excellent capabilities-based planning and analysis. A key element of those changes should involve creating assignment patterns for future leaders to introduce such individuals early to the discipline of analytical thinking in a real-world context (e.g., the analysis for, preparation of, and review of the Navy Program Objective Memorandum and/or equivalent parts of the overall DOD program)
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From page 58... ...
Actually obtaining such support would take time even if a decision to do so were made immediately. Thus, the committee suggests the following: Recommendation 4: In the short term, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy should go outside their organizations to sharpen concepts and requirements, drawing on the external community of expert practitioners in analysis.
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