Principal-Investigator-Led Missions in the Space Sciences (2006) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix I Excerpt from the National Academy of Public Administration Report Principal Investigator-Led Missions in Space Science
Appendix I Excerpt from the National Academy of Public Administration Report Principal Investigator-Led Missions in Space Science
Pages 109-120
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From page 109... ...
The cost caps, schedule caps, funding constraints, and review cycles can reflect the desired science return and the imposed management conditions. Second, they can use unbiased external reviewers with relevant science, engineering, and cost estimating experience to provide the critical insights needed to make informed decisions during the project's life cycle.
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From page 110... ...
However, the specific rules set up by NASA in the AO work against proposers providing NASA with proposal cost estimates for the baselined mission content that have a higher probability of being successfully executed without reliance on project cost reserves. · First, the proposers must satisfy NASA's emphasis on the amount of reserves included, where higher levels of reserves in the estimates are evaluated as "a strength." The AO specifies a percentage of "unencumbered reserves" at the time of confirmation for development of at least 25 percent of all development costs in phases C and D; if the unencumbered reserves are lower than 25 percent, the projects "are likely to be judged as having an unacceptably high cost risk and, therefore, not confirmed for further development."22 As a consequence, the proposers are encouraged to prepare estimates that ensure the required level of reserves can be displayed.
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From page 111... ...
There is little incentive for proposers to alter the initial cost estimates to reflect their sense of "realism" unless the proposers view implementation of a descoping option as viable. The Academy study team concluded that the only way the project team can achieve, without penalty, a higher level of formulation phase expenditures sufficient to permit design trades to be undertaken to refine the design or to develop engineering testbeds is to do so without NASA funding.
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From page 112... ...
As a consequence, the Academy team concluded the objective intent of the proposed change could be met by requiring the three point estimate as a product of the Concept Feasibility Study. If NASA evaluated the risks as acceptable and approved the proposal for the phase B definition and design studies, NASA could also work with the PI's team to ensure the schedule and funding resources expended during the preliminary design studies were tailored to reduce the areas of greatest cost estimating uncertainty.
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From page 113... ...
However, the number of proposals submitted to NASA in response to the AO is high enough to be concerned about the additional time required for a review and clarification cycle. A better approach appears to be the use of an approach that requires each proposal team to respond to a specific list of "cost risk subfactors." The JPL cost estimating group published a set of such cost risk subfactors in its December 2003 study of contributing factors to underestimates of baseline cost estimates and insufficient levels of reserves.
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From page 114... ...
While the Academy team believes that the JPL list may not be suitable as the standard for each AO, the NASA cost estimating community could work with the AO science proposal evaluation team to generate a list that could be tailored for a given AO. The responses by the proposers and the evaluations of them by the team would provide a consistent basis of comparison of the cost risks for each step 1 proposal.
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From page 115... ...
However, NASA does not ask the proposer in this post-selection period for even a rough order of magnitude estimate of the costs of preparing the proposal and of investments in independent research and development funds to advance the technologies. The Academy team believes the collection of this data could provide NASA officials with feedback on the level of investments made by proposal teams and areas where NASA investments in advancing technology could reduce the time required before an attractive mission concept is mature.
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From page 116... ...
* The Mission Development Process Finding 5: The processes used by NASA to prepare for the confirmation review provide decision officials with a good appreciation of the key technical risks remaining for the development phase.
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From page 117... ...
* Finding 6: NASA has adopted quality assurance process controls, risk management practices, and documentation, reporting, and review requirements that have cost consequences that need to be carefully considered in establishing probable cost estimates for future mission proposals.
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From page 118... ...
For future missions, the Academy team believes there is merit in NASA focusing special attention on how these new requirements are factored into the basic cost estimates, starting with the evaluation of the proposal estimates and following through to the confirmation review. Based on the Academy team's interviews, NASA project officials and PIs question whether an appropriate balance has been found between the benefits of the additional processes and requirements and their cost.
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From page 119... ...
This is particularly the case when the spacecraft systems operate in poorly understood environments, when the scientific instrumentation represents a change in the state of the art, and when the computational systems are similarly advanced. Recommendation 7: NASA should focus on providing decision officials with a range of estimates and should augment its reliance on detailed engineering level estimates with estimates derived from cost modeling and parametric estimates, particularly for mission elements where the accu racy of the cost estimates is uncertain.
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From page 120... ...
NASA managers should be aware of the amount of total labor and not assume that contributions of labor will continue indefinitely. The other problem relates to the record of costs that cost estimators and managers rely on to determine the reasonableness of cost estimates for future missions.
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