Defending the U.S. Air Transportation System Against Chemical and Biological Threats (2006) / Chapter Skim
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2 The Chemical/Biological Threat to Air Transportation
2 The Chemical/Biological Threat to Air Transportation
Pages 8-14
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these agents begin displaying symptoms within sec onds or minutes. Examples of such agents include the Fast-Acting Versus Slow-Acting Agents neurotoxic agent sarin, the choking agent chlorine, and the blood agent hydrogen cyanide.
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Hydrogen cyanide (AC) 5,000 2 A common characteristic of biological agents is that they Cyanogen chloride (CK)
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can begin to understand how chemical/biological threat Terminals generally accommodate the large numbers of agents might be dispersed and what strategies might be most the traveling public that move through them with residence appropriate for defending against them. The discussion be- times of about 1 to 2 hours.
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The minimum passenger residence time noted above, only an air release of agent is considered here.3 on an aircraft is about 1 hour, with maximum times stretching to 14 hours for very long distance flights. Well-publi Point Release Versus Attack on the Heating, Ventilation, cized penalties for deviant passenger behavior and for fail and Air Conditioning System ure to obey crew instructions have conditioned passengers to behave in a more compliant manner than can be expected in In a point release attack, the agent would be released in a terminals.
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filters in the ECS of a modern important for the authorities to recognize quickly that an atairliner (Figure 2-4) .4 Nevertheless, in an attack with a large tack had occurred in order to facilitate evacuation, get mediquantity of aerosolized agent, these removal efficiencies cal help for the victims, and limit the access of nonessential personnel to the contaminated area.
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From page 14... ...
and a highly infectious agent might proslow-acting agent in flight would not be an effective way of duce ambient agent levels that are below the threshold of bringing down an aircraft. In the specialized case of very available detection systems, yet sufficient to infect exposed large releases of anthrax spores, the attacked aircraft could individuals.
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