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Prologue and Executive Summary
Pages 1-18

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From page 1...
... . Its current objectives are outlined in the latest national security strategy of the United States:1 • Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur.
From page 2...
... It is a complex conflict involving many interdependent aspects of political, diplomatic, economic, and military policy. The Committee on the Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror acknowledges that there has been much public discussion of whether the phrases "war on terror" and "Global War on Terror" are appropriate descriptions,5 given the lack of an organized, uniformed, specified hostile force like that experienced in conventional campaigns.
From page 3...
... Thus, the term "naval forces" as used here refers to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.
From page 5...
... The GWOT is expected to be a long war, and there will be an enduring requirement for naval operations. 1 In the committee's view, the GWOT refers to national-security-related conflict, offensive opera tions, and defense tied directly to blunting terrorist threats, whether they are state-sponsored or not.
From page 6...
... The CNO has followed with taskings and decisions consistent with that priority.3 He has reinforced these taskings and decisions with a strategic plan in support of Program Objective Memorandum 08 that lends detail and commitment to such initiatives.4 Fleet commanders are starting to define needed capabilities through their GWOT 2 Chiefof Naval Operations (ADM Michael Mullen, USN)
From page 7...
... They are forward presence, maritime operations, and homeland defense. There are also three critical foundational capabilities necessary to support naval forces engaged in the GWOT: maritime domain awareness (MDA)
From page 8...
... Maritime Domain Awareness, Command and Control, Naval Force Protection FIGURE ES.1 Defense-in-Depth framework for the Global War on Terror in the maritime domain. Naval forces Landscape view
From page 9...
... 6. Operationalize the Navy/Coast Guard "national fleet" concept as a centerpiece of the national maritime security strategy, recognizing that the complementary strengths of partner nations are especially valuable in the GWOT (consistent with the motivation of the emerging "1,000-ship Navy" concept)
From page 10...
... Specific concerns of the committee about the Navy's May 2006 strategic plan are as follows: • The strategic plan is too "Navy" and not enough "naval." The Navy plan conveys only a modest appreciation of how to integrate a Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team to prosecute the GWOT. • The concept of joint forces reflected in Navy strategy is too constrained.
From page 11...
... • Develop GWOT planning scenarios that are analogous to MCOs that guide planning for conventional warfare capabilities and capacities, incorporating concepts of assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence as well as defense and defeat. Assign Responsibilities Finding: The Navy and its Marine Corps and Coast Guard partners have not defined the requirements of success in the GWOT in the GWOT's own terms.
From page 12...
... 2005. National Plan to achieve Maritime domain awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., October.
From page 13...
... The senior Navy officer responsible for interagency representation not only should take an active leadership role within the interagency arena but also should ensure that the Navy input adheres both to its own and to interagency capability and program processes and deliberations.16,17 Strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness Finding:  There are serious MDA capability gaps in terms of plausible, difficult maritime scenarios involving WMD threats to the United States and high-consequence threats to its economic infrastructure. These gaps call for considerable effort to explore and prioritize among solution options.
From page 14...
... should co-sponsor a Navy, Coast Guard, and NORTHCOM effort to address coherence by developing a maritime domain awareness enterprise operational architecture (if this has not already been done by the time this report is issued)
From page 15...
... Using the Navy, the Coast Guard, or other agencies with the right tools to gain access and then leverage future naval focus is critical to long-term success. Major  Recommendation  8:  To shape the maritime security environment, in concert with COCOM TSC plans related to forward-deployed naval forces, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5)
From page 16...
... They should direct the Navy and the Coast Guard to train together for GWOT operations to the maximum extent prudent, especially in tactics involving the new expeditionary command and boarding schools, and patrol boat operations. Current discussions proposing a global Joint Force Maritime Component Commander should be linked in terms of a National Fleet.
From page 17...
... Major Recommendation 11:  The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop a National Fleet strategy to address the GWOT. As part of this strategy, and recognizing fiscal realities, the Navy and the Coast Guard should determine requirements for the littoral combat ship and for high-speed, small patrol vessels.
From page 18...
... 8 ThE ROLE Of NaVaL fORCES iN ThE GLObaL WaR ON TERROR • Define and recruit the civil service talent needed to build an enduring knowledge base for naval forces. N1 should also expand senior officer training to prepare for decision making in the expected complex and ambiguous circumstances of many, if not most, of the anticipated GWOT scenarios.


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