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Protecting Building Occupants and Operations from Biological and Chemical Airborne Threats A Framework for Decision Making (2007) / Chapter Skim
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2 Factors That Influence Building Protection
Pages 15-25

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From page 15...
... . In other words, DOD buildings vary in type, procurement, and mission, all of which influence the design and implementation of building protection from biological and chemical airborne threats.
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From page 16...
... Generally, particles larger than 10 μm are less likely to reach the lungs, but they could be lodged in the mucosa of the nasal passage or the pharynx or simply settle out of the airstream and contaminate the area. Biological threat agents include disease-causing microorganisms and protein or low–molecular weight toxins.
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From page 17...
... . Infectious biological threat agents that are transmissible complicate response and recovery because the impact of their release can reach beyond the building attacked.
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From page 18...
... . Chemical threat agents include traditional military blister and nerve agents and toxic industrial chemicals (TICs)
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From page 19...
... Impact of Chemical Threat Agents The vapor pressures and volatilities of the various chemical threat agents are particularly relevant to their detection as airborne vapors. The volatility of sarin is comparable to that of water or volatile organic compounds such as limonene and cyclohexanone (24,000 to 28,000 mg m–3)
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From page 20...
... Therefore, keeping certain illicit chemical threat agents out of a building through physical and operations security might be easier than keeping out biological threat agents. Delivery of Threat Agents There are numerous methods through which threat agents could be delivered to the inside of a building to harm humans and disrupt operations.
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From page 21...
... For example, the B anthracis release in the former Brentwood Postal Facility was unnoticed until the first victim became ill and manifested clinical signs, after which a definitive diagnosis was made.
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From page 22...
... Second, if the elimination of a threat agent released inside the building cannot be ensured, compartmentalization of the facility could limit the number of humans exposed to the ricin powder. MISSIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN BUILDINGS In planning to deploy building protection from chemical and biological airborne threats, the missions executed in a specific building need to be considered to ascertain the requirements of building protection and the importance of the mission relative to the life-cycle costs of a protection system.
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From page 23...
... Because the personnel typically have other utility outside of the building, the primary vulnerability to biological and chemical threats to the missions of this building type is the secondary impact on other operations. The operations affected by an attack vary in importance, and their importance determines whether building protection should be installed to prevent loss of asset at all times (incapacitation or deaths)
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From page 24...
... If a new or existing facility is only partially leased for government operations, some lease restrictions and other limitations could pose challenges to the required protection of DOD personnel and operations in the facility. In the October 2002 report Building Security, Security Responsibilities for Federally Owned and Leased Facilities released by the U.S.
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From page 25...
... The ability to achieve different levels of protection depends on the building type. A highly cellular building has a reduced risk of exposing a large number of occupants to a threat agent in the event of an interior release because the threat agent can remain localized.
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Key Terms

  • threat agents
  • chemical threat
  • threat agent
  • building type
  • building types

  • biological threat
  • operational response
  • operational responses
  • clinical signs
  • building procurement

  • building design
  • threat types
  • protection options
  • protection strategies
  • air intake

  • physical security
  • government operations
  • private tenants
  • vapor pressure
  • airborne threats

  • vapor pressures
  • released inside
  • warning properties
  • pulmonary edema
  • protection building

  • building air
  • building compartmentalization
  • leased building
  • appropriate building
  • specific building


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