Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Pages 217-228
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 217... ...
Despite the colossal efforts made over the NPT's lifetime to end the nuclear arms race, and despite the radical geopolitical changes in the world over the last 15 years – changes that have ended the global military confrontation between the two political systems – the situation regarding preserving and strengthening the non-proliferation regime remains tense. This is reflected in particular in: the gradual nuclear proliferation that has taken place (nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, a de-facto nuclear Israel, the situation with the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs)
|
From page 218... ...
Moreover, other countries still continue their attempts to join the ‘nuclear club.' All of the unresolved issues affecting the non-proliferation regime's effectiveness traditionally emerge in most concentrated form during the NPT review conferences. A program adopted by the conference in 2000, 13 Steps Towards Nuclear Disarmament and NonProliferation, has still not been implemented.322 The most recent conference in New York in 2005, failed to produce a single document containing concrete recommendations for strengthening the NPT.323 The deep-running contradictions that have built up between nuclear states and developing countries over many years have led to a situation where these conferences become bogged down in discussing organizational issues instead of concentrating on matters of substance, namely the NPT signatories' commitment to the Treaty's three main principles: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
|
From page 219... ...
The Russian position is that considerable progress in nuclear disarmament has been achieved over the last 10-15 years, and it supports continued development of this process. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on November 13, 2000, that, "We see no reason why further strategic offensive arms reductions should not be carried out.
|
From page 220... ...
• The current situation with cruise missiles is as follows: they are not subject to restrictions under existing agreements and the United States opposes the introduction of any restrictions on them, citing the difficulties or even impossibility of carrying out control as the main reason. The problem is that if restrictions and reductions are imposed on some types of strategic offensive weapons, but others – long-range sea-based cruise missiles – are not subject to any 327 To read the text of the START I Treaty, see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/index.html; accessed April 6, 2008.
|
From page 221... ...
Alternatively, a sub-limit could be set for the number of nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Control measures could include restrictions on deploying cruise missiles on particular types and classes of vessels, distinguishing signs for nuclear and non-nuclear cruise missiles, on-site inspections, the use of radiation control apparatus, the implementation of confidence-building measures, in which the parties already have considerable experience, and the organization of demonstrations of arms.
|
From page 222... ...
The positive experience already built up by the parties and reflected in the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles, signed on September 26, 1997, in New York, could serve as a concrete base upon which to build in this area.329 Under this agreement, the parties inform each other of test grounds, other test sites and launches of interceptor missiles, organize voluntary demonstrations of their missile defense systems and components and the observation of their tests, and provide information on the parameters of the missile defense systems and components. Settling on confidence-building and transparency measures that would be then drawn up as an agreement would help to assuage the concerns arising from the deployment of missile defense systems as part of efforts to counter the strategic ballistic missile threat.
|
From page 223... ...
would not be the right approach. Cooperation could extend to a wide range of areas, including the formation of a common database on potential means of attack, the development of the European missile defense system's concept, definition of the procedures, scale and deadlines for potential deployment of the system's formations, creation of its information field and pool of weapons resources, organization of command-headquarters exercises, and so on.
|
From page 224... ...
. The cessation of the ABM Treaty means that one of its most important aspects related to legal regulation of military activity in outer space, namely, the ban on the creation, testing and deployment of space-based missile defense systems and components, is no longer covered by legal provisions.
|
From page 225... ...
When drafting the CTBT, the participants in the negotiation process were aware that if all countries are involved, the treaty can provide reliable barriers not only to the efforts of ‘threshold states' to develop nuclear weapons, but would also make it more difficult to improve existing nuclear arsenals. In this sense, the aim of the CTBT was not only the general goal of saving humanity from the possible environmental consequences of nuclear tests, but it would also make an important and in some ways unique contribution to non-proliferation efforts and would create favorable conditions for further nuclear arms reductions.
|
From page 226... ...
. At the same time, lowering the combat readiness level of strategic nuclear forces would deprive nuclear weapons of their main function – the deterrent function – and this could negatively affect strategic stability.
|
From page 227... ...
The country that first restores its strategic nuclear forces to full combat readiness could be tempted to make use of the opportunity for a first strike, and this could create an extremely unstable and dangerous situation. Objectively speaking, proposals for reducing the combat readiness level of strategic nuclear forces are not in the interests of strengthening strategic stability and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.