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4 Identification and Use of Process Safety Metrics
Pages 26-36

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From page 26...
... Since the mid-1990s, these American Institute of Chemical Engineers' Center for industries have used major unplanned releases of Chemical Process Safety Metrics chemicals or energy as a primary process safety metric. Trade associations, including the American Chemistry In 2006, the Center for Chemical Process Safety Council and the American Petroleum Institute (API)
From page 27...
... tee used the opportunity to make minor modifications The CCPS Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics to metric definitions based upon lessons learned from expanded the discussion of metrics by describing the early implementation by users of the original CCPS processes that a company or organization should use metrics. See Box 4-1 for definitions of Tier 1-4 process safety events from API RP 754.
From page 28...
... U R E D N C E C O N H Unsafe behaviors or insufficient S A E Z Q A operating discipline U R E D N C E Legend: Barriers OR Layer of Protection or layer of protection Mitigation and emergency & Emergency preparedness measures Preparedness Measures Failure of a barrier or mitigation measure FIGURE 4-1 Hierarchy of leading and lagging metrics illustrated by the James Reason barrier model (left) and the Pyramid model of incident categories (right)
From page 29...
... published a methodology for estab overflow or overpressurization of a specific vessel, the lishing metrics, Developing Process Safety Indicators: HSG 254 approach to metrics might call for specific A Step-by-Step Guide for Chemical and Major Hazards lagging metrics that serve as a track record for keepIndustries (HSG 254) , based on specific processes.6 ing that vessel within safe operating limits, or leading This document recommended that facilities examine metrics that serve as an track record for maintenance of their specific process details or their particular process the vessel's instrumentation that measures the content's unit and develop leading metrics that are specific to level or pressure.
From page 30...
... The Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives should Human factors, which include "human error," "mindadopt the definitions of Tier 1-4 process safety events set," and "improper technique," altogether accounted in Recommended Practice 754, Process Safety Perfor- for approximately 37 percent of the causal factors. Again, metrics derived from training activities and mance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries, a joint recommendation of the American job cycle checks can be useful in developing actions National Standards Institute and the American Petro- to mitigate these causal factors and to identify areas leum Institute, with the exception that the reporting where regular annual, or more frequent, training should threshold for chemical agents should be defined as any be improved or changed.
From page 31...
... • ercentage of near misses and incidents identified P Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives should as being caused by unsafe acts or shortcuts. take into account the causal factors in past process safety incidents at chemical agent disposal facilities Equipment malfunction was the second most preva- when devising process safety metrics for the Pueblo lent causal factor (19 percent)
From page 32...
... The Pueblo Chemical Agent "subtle" changes are often labeled as "not replacement Destruction Pilot Plant and the Blue Grass Chemical in kind." Agent Destruction Pilot Plant should adopt the met Each change should be reviewed and assessed for rics listed below and develop process-specific leading its impact on operations and on safety, health, and and lagging metrics. The ACWA program should also the environment.
From page 33...
... Agent and MPT offgas energetics treatment access Washout water Drained agent Agent Washout storage water Caustic ANR Hot water Sampling tank Agent hydrolysate storage Agent-laden fluids Agent hydrolysate Offgas FIGURE 4-3 Process flow diagram for agent neutralization. SOURCE: Chris Haynes, Blue Grass Design Build Manager, Bechtel Parsons, "BGCAPP MDB intermediate design," presentation to the BGCAPP intermediate design review executive overview, February 15, 2005.
From page 34...
... ," presentation to the Committee to Assess Designs for the Pueblo and Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants, September 22, 2004. Figure 4-4
From page 35...
... PROCESS SAFETY COMPETENCY Recommendation 4-4. Given that the two facilities The chemical, petroleum, and related industries have are pilot facilities and make extensive use of first-of-a- learned that maintaining a staff of trained process safety kind equipment, the Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruc- professionals is vital to the avoidance of process incition Pilot Plant and the Blue Grass Chemical Agent dents.
From page 36...
... Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives should Examples of metrics for process safety competency are maintain process safety expertise at the programmatic available from CCPS and can be tracked. In addition level to ensure effective implementation of process to tracking the proportion of positions key to process safety metrics.


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