Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles Workshop Summary (2011) / Chapter Skim
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2 Policy Makers' Perspectives on Key Nonproliferation Issues Associated with the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
2 Policy Makers' Perspectives on Key Nonproliferation Issues Associated with the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Pages 13-38
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From page 13... ...
Following Mr. Poneman's briefing, Edward McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Secretary in DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, and Mark Whitney, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation and International Security in DOE's National Nuclear Security Adminis tration's (NNSA)
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policy has swung from a highly positive view of civilian nuclear energy worldwide (in the 1970s) to a more negative view of nuclear energy, discouraging nuclear fuel cycle facilities abroad and abandoning some projects (e.g., breeder and reprocessing projects)
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(Eisenhower, 1953) In 1974, however, India's test of a "peaceful nuclear explosive" chal lenged the previous assumption that civilian nuclear fuel cycle technology could be safely shared.
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If these nations received an assurance that fresh fuel would be reliably provided and used fuel reliably managed, reasons for pursuing fuel cycle facilities -- with their concomitant proliferation risks -- would be reduced. This arrangement would allow countries to freely pursue peaceful nuclear aspiration without increasing proliferation risks.
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, and the Office of Science to discuss fuel assurance, and other approaches for controlling proliferation, particularly modified fuel cycles and the use of small modular reactors (SMR)
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY'S PERSPECTIVE ON PROLIFERATION RISK AND NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES Edward McGinnis There is a grand challenge facing the world right now: Ensuring that a global expansion of nuclear power does not increase the proliferation risk associated with nuclear weapons technology.
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international frameworks and institutions; and (4) proliferation risk assessment and risk management.
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On the other hand, such assessments have limitations, including: • The involvement of complex phenomena, including an intelli gent, adaptive, and determined adversary; • Sparse data; • Limited models; • Large uncertainties; • Challenges associated with effective risk communication; and • Dangers associated with misinterpretation or misuse of results. DOE-NE is considering many potential future research directions for proliferation risk assessment, such as: • Leveraging university-based innovative research in the field of risk assessment, through Nuclear Energy University Programs (NEUP)
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if proliferation risk is likely to increase, then whether nuclear energy's other benefits (e.g., climate change and economic benefits) are significant enough to justify managing these risks.
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U.S. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY'S PERSPECTIVE ON PROLIFERATION RISK AND NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES Mark Whitney DOE-NNSA's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS)
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From page 23... ...
More often than not, decisions about whether or not to proliferate are based on specific and often dynamic political situations. While there is value in examining nuclear fuel cycle technologies for characteristics that could make proliferation more difficult for a host state, work to date has shown that there is no technology that can completely eliminate the risk of proliferation by host states, although many tech nologies may have a significant impact against sub-national threats.
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Whitney if he judged that proliferation resistance assessments should examine all elements of a nuclear energy sys tem, including the entire fuel cycle and its implementation.
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funding and policy decisions related to increasing the proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. NIS has prepared numerous nonproliferation impact assessments for proposed government actions and is regularly involved in major nonproliferation policy decisions.
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When proliferation and fuel cycle facilities are discussed, the terms "proliferation risk" and "proliferation resistance" are often used.7 Proliferation resistance, rather than a quantity to be measured, can be con sidered as a goal of U.S. nonproliferation policy: Specifically, to make proliferation technically more difficult, time consuming, and detectable.
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From page 27... ...
It could also be useful to consider the breakout risk associated with the transfer of nuclear technology and know-how as part of the analysis. The results of proliferation risk analyses also need to be both useful and understandable to policy makers charged with risk management.
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Perspective on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Related Proliferation Risks John Harvey As noted in several of the previous discussions, the goal of strengthening nonproliferation is at the top of the President's agenda, as is prevent ing terrorism related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
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From page 29... ...
Building nuclear power plants at military installations also has the potential to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Previous government experience and knowledge of next generation nuclear plant designs will be helpful in developing a nuclear plant that could meet these needs and, in particular, could enable the development of a compact and safe design with good security and reliability characteristics.
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From page 30... ...
The State Department -- and the Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation in particular -- works to determine how to keep pro liferation risk as low as possible while still doing what is necessary to sustain the nuclear fuel cycle. The essential message of U.S.
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From page 31... ...
In this briefing, a sequence of examples are provided, both outlining the history of U.S. nonproliferation policy related to the nuclear fuel cycle and illustrating the types of day-to-day issues that policy makers face in this area.
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From page 32... ...
. The Obama Administration determined that, in order to approve a nuclear cooperation agreement with the UAE, there would need to be a legally binding commitment to not have enrichment or reprocessing plants on UAE soil even if the plant in question did not use 12 An Additional Protocol is "a legal document complementing comprehensive safeguards agreements.
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From page 33... ...
The attributes that will be used to make these decisions include: uranium availability, cost, technical maturity, physical security impacts, environmental impacts, repository availability, and also, proliferation risk impacts. He stated that it is important to be cautious regarding the proliferation risk impacts of domestically-deployed technologies for two key reasons.
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From page 34... ...
Jon Phillips (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) observed that much of the discussion during the panel was about quantification, but that in his view, it would be more valuable to -- in whatever way necessary -- standardize the approach to assessing proliferation risk among different agencies and among different problems.
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From page 35... ...
For example, it must be considered whether it would be better to have a nation with significant energy needs -- such as India or China -- build 50 new nuclear plants, or instead, 50 new coal plants with their attendant greenhouse gases. Innovative approaches for proliferation risk assessment.
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From page 36... ...
When proliferation risk or resistance is discussed, one must consider the likelihood that a terrorist team or a host state actor might go down a particular proliferation route as opposed to other routes. The value of quantitative analysis is that it is structured, and the assumptions can be transparent.
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. However, this discussion will focus on the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, more specifically, on low-cost uranium centrifuge enrichment.
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From page 38... ...
The international community will need to use all means to enforce the IAEA and United Nations Security Council efforts. Finally, it is possible that embarking on nuclear cooperation could change the narrative of future nuclear discourse.
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