Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles Workshop Summary (2011) / Chapter Skim
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3 Technical Assessment of Proliferation Resistance
3 Technical Assessment of Proliferation Resistance
Pages 39-58
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From page 39... ...
Five technical experts presented briefings at the workshop: • William Charlton, director of the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University, associate pro fessor of nuclear engineering, and workshop committee member; • Christopher Way, associate professor of government at Cornell University; • Robert Bari, senior physicist at Brookhaven National Laboratory; • Bartley Ebbinghaus, staff scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and • Olli Heinonen, senior fellow at Harvard University Kennedy School of Government Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
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From page 40... ...
OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND: TECHNICAL EFFORTS ON PROLIFERATION RISK William Charlton The first technical assessments of proliferation resistance and risk associated with nuclear facilities date back to the early 1970s. Since then, significant progress has been made in using technical analyses to inform nuclear safety, but less progress has been made in assessing security and nonproliferation.
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From page 41... ...
.4 Most current attempts at understanding proliferation risk focus on Pn; Cn and Ln are very difficult to understand and to estimate. Since the 1970s, progress has been made in assessing the proliferation resistance of nuclear facilities, and several methods have become fairly well-developed.
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From page 42... ...
A single figure of merit has both benefits and costs -- the decisionmaker is provided with a single value, which is clearer; however, some fidelity and information content is lost by merging the various elements of proliferation risk into a single number. Even though a range of proliferation resistance assessment methods are currently under investigation, none of them are likely to be easily used to answer many of the questions that were discussed by the policy makers in Panel 1 of the workshop (see Chapter 2)
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From page 43... ...
METRICS AND METHODOLOGIES FOR ASSESSMENT OF PROLIFERATION RISK Robert Bari Technical assessments have the capability to inform a number of nonproliferation policy questions. For example, technical assessments can inform decisions related to: (1)
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From page 44... ...
With the use in mind, the results then must be communicated in an understandable way to each of a broad range of specific users, including policy makers, nuclear fuel cycle facility designers, and other stakeholders, not all of whom will appreciate a highly technical response. In addition, for a proliferation risk or resistance analysis to be effec tively used, it would be useful to have clearly structured interactions between the technical experts performing the analysis and the policy makers who would use the results of the analysis.
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From page 45... ...
For a proliferation risk scenario occurring at a nuclear facility, "challenges" are threats to the nuclear facility, such as diversion, misuse, breakout, or the establish ment of a clandestine facility. System responses to the challenge are then evaluated, for example, whether there are physical and technical design features that would combat or slow this particular attempt or safeguards in place that would alert the international community.
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From page 46... ...
are evaluated to identify any additional potential vulnerabilities. A number of knowledge gaps remain that are associated with PR&PP and with proliferation resistance assessment more generally.
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From page 47... ...
POLITICAL SCIENCE APPROACHES AND FUEL CYCLE CHOICES Christopher Way At present, there is no significant political science research agenda on proliferation risk and the nuclear fuel cycle. There has been considerable work done on drivers and intent for proliferation, but not much on the narrow focus of the workshop (i.e., the relationship of fuel cycle choices to proliferation)
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From page 48... ...
Khan network. Although, as noted previously, little political science research has focused directly on the issue of proliferation risk and the nuclear fuel cycle, other political science research exists that could be helpful in analyzing these issues.
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From page 49... ...
Some additional research on extrinsic barriers and likely compliance with treaties and restrictions could be of value for this purpose. HOW MATERIALS ATTRACTIVENESS ESTIMATES ARE DONE AND HOW THEY CAN BE USED AS PART OF A PROLIFERATION RISK ASSESSMENT Bartley Ebbinghaus The overall goal of estimating materials attractiveness11 is to communicate clearly about how attractive different nuclear materials are for use in a nuclear weapon.
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From page 50... ...
can be assessed to better understand some aspects of the relative proliferation risks associated with these fuel cycles. Fourth, good materials attractiveness estimates can quantify the relative attractiveness of existing nuclear materials.
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From page 51... ...
Material attractiveness is just one of several important measures of proliferation risk, as mentioned previously. In addition, material attractiveness to the adversary is subjective -- the choice to proliferate and the determination of how attractive a material would need to be for it to be usable depends strongly on the adversary's goals.
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From page 52... ...
. FIGURE 3-4 Materials attractiveness, expressed as FOM, as a function of fuel burn-up, expressed as megawatt-thermal-days per kilogram of uranium.
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From page 53... ...
At the same time, the proliferators are progressively gaining new capabilities: for example, they are now able to use cyber technology -- including Internet hacking and surveillance -- to advance their goals. However, the current world situation needs to be kept in mind when 14 A significant quantity is defined by the IAEA as the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear device cannot be excluded.
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From page 54... ...
One solution is the smart use of in-field efforts combined with all-source analyses. The smart use of in-field efforts might combine unannounced inspec tions with remote inspection techniques, enhance design information verification, use information analysis to direct in-field inspection activi ties, and make the best possible use of risk assessment to understand the proliferation risk and the likelihood of detecting the proliferation attempt.
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From page 55... ...
However, a number of obstacles make effective information analysis difficult: • Overlap between the equipment, knowledge, and materials required to develop nuclear weapons and to conduct civilian nuclear research; • Overlap between defensive and offensive nuclear military activities; • Nations' use of secrecy to protect commercial, proliferation-sen sitive, and national security related information; • The limited number of signatures indicating a military program; and • The complexity of assessing a nation's intentions and the possibil ity of making mistakes. Intelligence information provides another source of increased information; however, there is a cultural divide within the IAEA regarding whether intelligence information should be used.
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From page 56... ...
Heinonen, first, what role proliferation risk assessment tools play in the IAEA's efforts to strengthen safeguards, and, second, whether he believes that there are truly surprise IAEA inspections. Regarding the first ques tion, Dr.
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From page 57... ...
Another possibility is if an enrichment facility design is changed to create HEU. He stated that the IAEA, within a month's time, should be able to identify a change in facility design, but undeclared enrichment or diversion of plutonium from a reprocessing plant is more difficult to detect.
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