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1 Background
Pages 5-12

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From page 5...
... Nuclear power plants themselves are often considered a lesser proliferation2 risk than other nuclear fuel cycle facilities, particularly those that 1 The global economic crisis and the recent events at the Fukushima nuclear power plants in Japan may change or delay these plans. 2 Defining the point at which a state is considered to have proliferated is complicated.
From page 6...
... The workshop was organized as part of a larger project undertaken by the NRC, the next phase of which (following the workshop) will be a consensus study on improving the assessment of proliferation risks associated with nuclear fuel cycles.5 This study will culminate in a report prepared by a committee of experts with expertise in risk assessment and communication, proliferation metrics and research, nuclear fuel cycle facility design and engineering, international nuclear nonproliferation and national security policy, and nuclear weapons design.
From page 7...
... Many of these themes will be expanded upon in the consensus study. The workshop was organized by a four-member committee with extensive expertise in nonproliferation policy, proliferation resistance assessment, nuclear weapons policy and technology, and nuclear fuel cycle technology.
From page 8...
... stage is often considered to pose a lesser risk than facilities associated with the front end and the back end of the fuel cycle.8 As stated in the 2009 National Research Council report on America's Energy Future, "Nuclear power plants themselves are not a proliferation risk, but nuclear fuel cycle technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing introduce the risk that weapons-usable material could be produced" (NRC, 2009, p.
From page 9...
... Other technologies that have been proposed to produce nuclear material include laser isotope separation, in which the uranium isotopes are separated using laser light to excite the molecules. There are currently no operating commercial-scale laser separation facilities in the world; however, General Electric-Hitachi plans to build a laser separation facility in Wilmington, North Carolina.9 As of 2010, three new commercial enrichment facilities, all using centrifuges, were planned: George Besse II in France, as well as the American Centrifuge Plant and the National Enrichment Facility in the United States.
From page 10...
... . ASSESSING PROLIFERATION RISK AND PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES Whether or not proliferation occurs is based on individual and group decisions.
From page 11...
... As of November 2010, the IAEA, which facilitates the peaceful use of nuclear material and facili 10 This definition of proliferation resistance draws on the International Atomic Energy Agency definition used by William Charlton in his Chapter 3 discussion of proliferation resistance. However, other definitions of proliferation resistance are used, for example, the Generation IV International Forum's Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection methodology uses a definition based on six measures of proliferation resistance ( http:// www.gen-4.org/Technology/horizontal/proliferation.htm)
From page 12...
... Other, related, extrinsic barriers -- specifically, safeguards measures15 -- can be highly technical, and require technical assessments to understand, improve, and maintain their efficacy. Nuclear safeguards measures are applied primarily to non-weapons states and require nuclear facility operators to maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all move ments and transactions involving nuclear material.


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