Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles Workshop Summary (2011) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 59-74
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Second, following the breakout session discussions, a panel of experts was convened and charged with summing up the workshop's major messages. Finally, the floor was opened for free discussion by the participants.
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These presentations and discussions are summarized in this section. Minimizing the proliferation risk associated with maintaining nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world involves using both technical and nontechnical approaches.
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; the full set of conditions and arrange ments for the sale; the recipient national government's level of corruption; and the recipient national government's stability. Beyond this, some participants noted that policy decisions regarding nuclear fuel cycle technologies -- whether domestic or overseas -- may not be solely motivated by proliferation, making proliferation resistance and risk measures inadequate as sole discriminators for policy decisions.
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apply its limited inspection resources to better block particular paths to proliferation in countries of concern? Applicability and Usefulness of Technical Assessments Several workshop participants observed that technical and quantifiable assessments of proliferation resistance might not be the ideal tool to
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Some participants suggested that careful and disciplined assessments of a facility's proliferation resistance could be useful to sharpen the debate on the role of civilian nuclear fuel cycles in proliferation and clarify the underpinnings of decisions taken as a result. On the other hand, others noted that there is a danger of misuse of a comparative risk assessment by foreign nations with an interest in proliferation, as it would allow them to identify the most productive fuel cycle with which to begin their proliferation efforts.1 1 The use and protection of sensitive or classified information is often involved in analysis efforts, and capabilities are often needed to manage and control this information.
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These issues included the following: • Some participants stated that simple judgments, such as one fuel cycle is "good" while another is "bad," are unlikely to be found, and suggested that policy makers and others should avoid seek ing to identify winners and losers among fuel cycle technologies. Rather than asking "Does this technical change result in a more or less proliferation-resistant fuel cycle?
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2 International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles.
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.3 2. Nuclear energy programs lead to nuclear weapons programs.
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When thinking about increasing proliferation resistance, it can be helpful to examine previous failings. For example, in all but one of eighteen cases where nuclear material has gone beyond the control of a state, it has been in bulk form.
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Thus, if a country decides to build a reactor, a proliferation resistance analysis is unlikely to affect that decision; however, an incentive might be offered, such as fuel take-back, to prevent that country from building other fuel cycle facilities. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC)
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These issues are not new. In the 1970s, projected exponential growth curves for nuclear energy drove a great deal of conversation about proliferation and the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, as did the projected growth curves for nuclear energy prior to the events at Fukushima earlier this year.
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There is a real need for a systematic and rigorous analysis of the proliferation risk associated with fuel cycle facilities; a good analytical framework can inform nonproliferation policy decisions. Whichever ana lytical methodology is chosen, the implementation approach will need to be effective, credible, transparent, and cost-effective.
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These comments fell roughly into four categories: intent and choices to proliferate; proliferation in a changing world; addressing the disconnects between the techni cal and policy communities; and opportunities for proliferation risk and resistance assessment. The following sections provide brief summaries of these discussions.
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Paul Robinson (Director Emeritus of Sandia National Laboratories) suggested that it could be futile to attempt to completely halt the spread of new technologies that could be associated with nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
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He suggested that it could be helpful for the technical community to work more closely with the international relations community. Opportunities for Proliferation Risk and Resistance Assessment Some of the comments made during the final discussion session reit erated that there is a need for tools that are useful given policy makers' constraints and interests, which go beyond the technical considerations only.
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posed three questions that would be useful to investigate in more detail in the National Academies study that will follow this workshop, noting that the DOE is currently working on an analysis for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, to allow them to down-select from a myriad of potential technologies. These questions are: • Among the many criteria that need to be considered in making this decision (e.g., cost and waste management)
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