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Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles Workshop Summary (2011) / Chapter Skim
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From page 1...
... In 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy asked the National Academies to convene a public workshop addressing the capability of current and potential methodologies for assessing host state proliferation risk and resistance to meet the needs of decision makers.
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From page 2...
... Several examples of poor communication between these two cultures were cited, including: poor communication of policy needs to the technical community; a lack of clear definitions common to both the technical and policy communities for proliferation risk and resistance; and technical results that do not focus on the needs of policy makers. Some participants also noted that the communication difficulties are heightened by the reality that policy makers' decisions related to nuclear fuel cycle technologies -- domestically or internationally -- are not solely motivated by proliferation concerns, but are interwoven with other concerns, such as geopolitics, economics, energy, or radioactive waste management requirements.
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From page 3...
... Finally, participants discussed the possibilities for further analyzing why countries might choose to use nuclear fuel cycle technology to produce nuclear weapons material, using examples from social science and historical analysis. For exam ple, one participant suggested that there could be stark differences in approaches if the country of interest were a "closed" versus an "open" society.
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Key Terms

  • proliferation risk
  • fuel cycle
  • fuel cycles
  • participants judged
  • highly technical

  • poor communication
  • nuclear nonproliferation
  • advanced nuclear
  • produce nuclear
  • nuclear tech

  • technical results
  • waste management
  • previously separated
  • symposium participants
  • cycle technologies

  • host state
  • management requirements
  • received little
  • potential methodologies
  • underlying assumptions

  • definitions common
  • state proliferation
  • weapons material
  • proliferation concerns
  • policy decision

  • separated fuel
  • energy asked
  • provide findings
  • solely motivated
  • workshop addressing


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