Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology (2012) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix B: Additional Thoughts on the Nature of the Chemical Threat
Appendix B: Additional Thoughts on the Nature of the Chemical Threat
Pages 111-118
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From page 111... ...
The presence of US forces in numerous geographic niches, the diversity of potential biological threat agents, and the forces' proximity to naturally occurring diseases, makes comprehensive force health protection daunting. Additionally, the scalability of impact of naturally occurring and nefarious attacks must be addressed, i.e., not only can the massive release of a known or previously unanticipated agent have major 111
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From page 112... ...
It may be that it is to defend massed US ground forces against a Soviet-like attack, but that objective is a very limited one, and current efforts -- based on suits and masks of uncertain value -- are focused on a historical threat, and do nothing to reduce the possibility of strategic surprise. There are so many ways that new weapons (e.g., a "chemical suicide bomber," or, in a few years, "swarm" attacks using CB weapons)
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From page 113... ...
where political impact is more important than numbers of casualties, chemical weapons could be very effective. As an example, an attack on an embassy, other diplomatic establish ments, a corporate headquarters, or an oil-transshipment facil ity using persistent nerve agents would attract more attention- especially to the resulting casualties -- than would an attack using explosives.
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From page 114... ...
, and were judged by the United States to be inefficient for land warfare in the hypothetical conflict with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, however, reached a dif ferent conclusion, and continued to develop both chemical and biological weapons.
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From page 115... ...
For terrorist use, industrial chemicals (e.g., chlorine, phosgene, hydrogen peroxide, hydrofluoric acid) might be attractive since they are widely avail able, and are often shipped thorough, or in the vicinity, of cities in tank car or tank truck quantities.
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From page 116... ...
, but obviously requires care if the operators of the pro cesses are not to kill themselves and their immediate neighbors. Any country capable to a moderate level of industrial activity (for example, Iraq, Iran, N
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From page 117... ...
The agricultural industries concerned with animal health, insecticides, and similar matters is another source of relevant expertise. Countries that have endoge nous, developed pharmaceutical companies or industries, or have important farming sectors, are candidates for concern as sources both of skilled personnel, and as the sources for the invention or synthesis/manufacturing of chemical agents.
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