Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology (2012) / Chapter Skim
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 13-24
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of the National Academy of Sci ences (NAS) will identify the scientific and technology capabilities that must be available to support Chemical and Biological Defense Program 13
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The committee considered the following objectives as they approached their charge: 1.Defining the terms "core scientific and technology capabilities neces sary for conducting core CBDP RDT&E activities" that is acceptable to all DoD CBDP and Laboratory stakeholders. Define how DoD sustains core capabilities, accounting for DoD sustainment guidance, resources, and authorities.
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These included DoD Laboratory personnel; Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JSTO-CBD) , Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD)
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Information received during the data-gathering process was examined during committee deliberations and the findings, conclusions, and recommendations are described in this report. THE THREAT IS AMORPHOUS The Threat Cannot Be Defined Solely by the Number of Expected Casualties The United States remains the dominant conventional military force, but experience in a succession of wars -- from Vietnam to Afghanistan-have made it clear that a conventional force cannot necessarily respond effectively to non-conventional engagements.
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have the characteristic that the advantage presently lies strongly with the attacker. There are many possible weapons, from those that are highly developed and very familiar (e.g., hydrogen cyanide, classical nerve agents, anthrax)
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The challenges of biological security differ from those of nuclear securityc · Much less is known about state biological weapons programs than about state nuclear weapons programs. · Non-state actors will not have a nuclear program, but might obtain a weap on, or fissile materials that have been produced by others.
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· A robust S&T base to respond to the unknown may be more beneficial than very specific counter measures. The model for biological security within our service laboratoriesd is similar to nuclear "surety" 1.
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· The threat, although long-standing, is one for which there is very little operational experience, and substantial resistance on the part of DoD to realistic modeling and experimentation. The argument often made is that "there are no good models and simulants." It is probably largely incorrect, but more importantly, when it is cor rect, then developing good simulants, to enable realistic simulation, should be recognized as a priority.
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Relatively little of this technology has been transferred to organizations responsible for CBD, so, for appropriate problems, there is the potential for significantly increasing capabilities just by using existing technology. The DoD effort in CBD has also been hindered by its inability to form close connections with academic laboratories, and by the practice of keeping much of the research internal to DoD laboratories.
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using realistic simulants, and computer modeling. The computer modeling in this area is a crutch: it is safe and inexpensive relative to real exercises, but ineffective in providing solid engineering information to use in building better and more realistic models.
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When used, it leads to informed choices about implementable strategies to improve security and defense capabilities. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In exploring the state of the chemical and biological warfare threat, the committee identified two principle findings: Mission and Strategy Finding 1.1: The threat is unpredictable, changing, and dependent on the nature of conflict.
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