Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology (2012) / Chapter Skim
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3 Core Science and Technology Capabilities for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program
3 Core Science and Technology Capabilities for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program
Pages 35-72
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From page 35... ...
capability categories defined in the previous chapter: Enabling CBRN Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Chemical and Biological Agent Detection; Individual and Collective Protection; Medical Countermeasures; Hazard Assessment, Management, and Decontamination; and Cross-Cutting Science and Technology. In addressing the first five areas, excluding Cross-Cutting Science and Technology, the committee identified four to eight S&T capabilities for each category that "must be available to support Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD)
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From page 36... ...
CHEMICAL AND 3. INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE, BIOLOGICAL AGENT AND COLLECTIVE SURVEILLANCE, AND DETECTION PROTECTION RECONNAISSANCE Controlled Molecular Information Acquisition Analytical Methods Transport Materials and Analysis Discovery Discovery Instrumentation Barrier Materials Health Monitoring Development Engineering Environmental Sensor Systems Personal Protective Monitoring Development Systems Development Unknown Agent Collective Protection Identification and Agent Transport Analysis Systems Development Characterization Physiology 5.
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(3) If it can be found outside, should the government do it anyway?
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control of CBDP Yes 2) Can the capability be No found outside the government?
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If the CBDP does not agree with an individual assessment of an S&T capability, they are encouraged to undertake a de novo analysis of that capability, using the decision tree above,4 to reach their own conclusion. ENABLING CBRN INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE The CBDP must have a natural and fundamental role in the prevention of and strategic warning against threats to global and national security through the use of or exposure to priority biological and chemical agents.
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From page 40... ...
: information acquisition and analysis, health monitoring, environmental monitoring, and unknown agent identification and characterization. Information Acquisition and Analysis The core concept for this capability is that multiple dense sources of information pertinent to CBRN ISR exist and need to be properly mined, managed, integrated, distilled, and efficiently queried.
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From page 41... ...
One aspect of this is to consider health monitoring in the context of "One Health,"7 which considers human health in the global context of animals (domestic and wild) and includes all reservoirs and vectors (e.g., mammals, birds, ticks, mosquitoes, etc.)
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From page 42... ...
9 DoD health monitoring needs for the warfighter and civilian personnel are to be aware of, and be able to protect and respond to, threats to health and readiness, including those diseases that are endemic or presenting wherever DoD operates.
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From page 43... ...
Environmental Monitoring The DoD desires to operate in a "detect to warn" mode, which translates most broadly into "detect an approaching cloud of chemical or biological agent swiftly enough to issue a warning for the warfighters to don their protective gear." Thus, the committee's operational definition of environmental monitoring is what is known as "standoff detection," and typically would be utilized in the event of either a deliberate attack (chemical or biological) or an industrial accident (most likely chemical, but potentially biological)
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From page 44... ...
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENT DETECTION Detection of relevant chemical and biological agents is an important capability that underpins the CBDP. Sensors are needed that not only detect and identify agents over a wide range of concentrations, but also quantify airborne, waterborne, and surface contamination levels with adequate specificity to minimize false positives while responding as near to real time (seconds)
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From page 45... ...
Analytical Methods Discovery Current and anticipated chemical and biological agents must be characterized to identify and assess unique molecular and/or biological features that can be exploited to allow detection at acceptable levels of sensitivity and specificity in as near real time as possible. Chemical agent detection might be based on spectroscopic, mass spectrometric and/or chromatographic or mobility properties of the molecular agent or a derivative agent reaction product.
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From page 46... ...
Conversely, non-DoD laboratories will likely need to collaborate with DoD facilities for live-agent testing efforts. Instrumentation Development Promising analytical research methods capable of detecting and quantifying chemical agents need to be developed into reliable instruments capable of routine, and ideally automated, laboratory and field measurements.
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From page 47... ...
The development and testing of models to assess agent dispersal mechanisms and rates in various environmental media is a multidisciplinary challenge, and understanding these effects will have implications both for detection system and method development and the testing and evaluation of those systems. Biological agents can be dispersed by both the physical mechanisms listed above and by infected animal, bird, insect, and/or human vectors, creating additional challenges (see section on agent transport and viability analysis in Hazard Assessment, Management and Decontamination)
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From page 48... ...
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PROTECTION Deployed troops confronted or threatened with dispersed chemical or biological agents need both personal protective gear and collective protective shelters that will mitigate agent effects to the extent feasible. Personal protective gear may include respiratory masks and controlledpermeability suits, boots, and gloves.
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Personal Protective Systems Development New material formulations have to be incorporated into prototypes of improved protective gear by teams of experienced materials scientists and engineers. DoD laboratories have suitable expertise and should continue to lead in the production of initial prototypes.
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For the reasons discussed in the personnel protection systems development section above, limited prototype engineering capability is available outside DoD and close collaboration with the few commercial suppliers is needed. Physiology The ability of individual protective gear (e.g., suits, masks, gloves)
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Continued target identification for new and existing DoD-relevant biothreats will be critical for development of new innovative countermeasure drugs, vaccines, and potentially new therapeutic platforms. In general, and particularly for biological agents, there are many outside sources that can provide this service either within the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industries or academia.
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From page 52... ...
There are multiple contract research organizations that are well prepared and have the capabilities of applying GLP work for product development up to BSL-3. While this covers the vast majority of potential biothreats, BSL-4 biothreats and some chemical agents, a number of other biothreats, and chemical agents may require DoD expertise and facilities.
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From page 53... ...
Animal models against chemical agents and toxins are required for similar reasons. The maintenance of this capability requires multiple disciplines including pathology, immunology, systems biology, and aerobiology.
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The new DoD laboratories will have expanded capacity to do this work as well. Clinical Trials (GLP and GMP)
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These include Decontamination Methods Discovery, Decontaminant Development, Decontamination Resilient Materials Development, Decontamination Systems Engineering, and Agent Transport and Viability Analysis. Decontamination Methods Discovery Methods discovery for decontamination concerns the research and development to identify what will neutralize or kill chemical or biological agents.
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Methods discovery can and does occur outside of the government. CBDP should partner with the best expertise available to obtain the needed methods discovery.
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While the ability to test decontamination systems on real equipment exists within the DoD laboratories and facilities, the reluctance (due to overall cost of test and decontamination) to actually conduct the tests seemed very high, thereby making them unavailable for full-scale, live-agent testing.
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16 To the DoD, a critical question after a biological contamination incident will be "Is it safe now for people to remove their protective gear and resume normal operations? " Thus, the ability to provide robust viability assays for any biological agents that could be reasonably anticipated is of high importance to CBDP.
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From page 59... ...
This includes traditional chemical agents, non-traditional agents, and biological agents and toxins, as well as all other relevant agents needed for test panels and other research, development, test, and evaluation purposes. Lack of required reagents in a timely fashion can slow or seriously derail nearly all major CBDP research, development, test, and evaluation programs.
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From page 60... ...
Although computer-based simulation has developed extraordinarily rapidly, accurate simulation still depends on a foundation of empirical knowledge obtained through experiment. The DoD laboratories are uniquely equipped to carry out calibrating studies with actual agents in secure laboratories; but some types of tests require large-scale experiments, or experiments under a variety of conditions that cannot be simulated accurately in the laboratory.
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From page 61... ...
Currently most of the informatics capabilities are found outside of government proper. Some DoD laboratories have made large strides increasing their in-house capabilities in the past few years, particularly in terms of de novo annotation of bacterial genomes.
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For example, DNA sequence analysis may drive both the development of detection diagnostics and supply evidence of potential genetic engineering, which is of forensic value. For several reasons, the DoD chemical and biological laboratories may be involved in attempts to augment other US government capabilities to perform forensic analysis of incidents affecting US forces in order to inform attribution decisions and mission planning and decision making.
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From page 63... ...
Similarly, behavioral analysis is important to understand the mental state of those required to perform their missions under the added mental and physical stress of an impending or actual chemical or biological attack. Even if individual and collective protection gear functions perfectly as designed, there may be individuals who increase their risk of exposure due to behavioral factors (e.g., claustrophobia, extreme irritability due to discomfort, etc.)
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High-quality system engineering and analysis capability exists both inside and outside the government, although it does not seem to be resident throughout the CBDP. Repurposing Commercial Technologies The committee encourages the entire CBD community to take an active approach to following scientifically related fields of R&D and product development in an effort to identify non-CBDP projects, products, and personnel that may aid the CBDP meet its mission without direct, or with reduced, investment and shorten time to solution.
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Systems biology requires a strong base in fundamental science to be useful; it is not a silver bullet. Since chemical agents -- especially nerve agents -- attack multiple pathways, the topic is an ideal candidate for study in a systems biology program.
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From page 66... ...
Materials Science Materials science has a role to play in many of CBDP's R&D endeavors. Areas as diverse as temporary building construction materials to nanomaterials for targeted drug delivery and agent-surface transport modeling to studies on the degradation effects of decontamination methods on textiles draw on the field.
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and any restrictions or limitations on mission-critical activities that protective gear may introduce. SUMMARY OF CBDP CORE CAPABILITIES The committee identified 39 core chemical and biological defense S&T capabilities and created a framework that groups them in six categories.
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. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In identifying the science and technology capabilities necessary to support the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, the committee identified the following principle findings and recommendations.
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Cross Cutting Science and Technology Information Acquisition & Analysis Acquisition, Maintenance and Transport of Health Monitoring Critical Chemical and Biological Reagents Environmental Monitoring Simulation Unknown Agent Identification and Characterization Informatics 2. Chemical & Biological Agent Detection Forensics Analytical Methods Discovery A Education and Training Instrumentation Development A Behavioral Analysis Sensor Systems Development A Systems Analysis and Engineering Agent Transport Analysis A Repurposing Commercial Technologies 3.
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, and other non-DoD laboratories or related federal programs. Recommendation 3.1: The Director, JSTO-CBD, should ensure that the development of a Culture of Collaboration is a high priority for all elements of the chemical and biological defense enterprise.
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A single simulant, especially for chemical agents, is unlikely to possess all of the same physical, chemical, and/or transport properties of an actual agent; therefore, multiple simulants may be required to fully stress critical design parameters during T&E.
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72 CORE CAPABILITIES IN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE Review of Test and Evaluation Plans Finding 3.7: Test and evaluation plans apparently are not subject to independent external review. These plans are created internally, and the committee observed little evidence of the use of external expertise to review testing plans.
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