Determining Core Capabilities in Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology (2012) / Chapter Skim
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4 Proposed Approach
4 Proposed Approach
Pages 73-82
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From page 73... ...
This approach, combined with some of the programmatic and laboratory-level considerations described in Chapter 5, is intended to provide guidance for coordination and development of consensus within the CBDP community. The 2004 Joint Defense Capabilities Study on "Improving DoD Strategic Planning, Resourcing, and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities" describes a management approach with increased emphasis on strategy, planning, and accountability (see Figure 4.1)
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From page 74... ...
In a fiscal environment that demands choices be made among which capabilities DoD can develop and sustain, decision making is even more challenging. In these contexts, planning often relies on requirements-based processes which describe preferences for individual capabilities based on assumptions of the most likely conditions for which they will be needed.
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From page 75... ...
PROPOSED APPROACH 75 Priority Capability 1 Chemical Standoff Detection 2 Chemical Point Detection 3 Biological Point Detection 4 Biological Standoff Detection 5 Respiratory and Ocular Protection 6 Biological Prophylaxis 7 Field Analytics 8 Personnel Contamination Mitigation 9 Integrated Early Warning 10 Radiological Standoff Detection 11 Radiological Point Detection 12 CBRN Reconnaissance 13 Equipment Contamination Mitigation 14 Chemical Prophylaxis 15 Medical Surveillance 16 Percutaneous Protection 17 Medical Diagnostics 18 Battle or Operating Environment Analysis 19 Biological Therapeutics 20 Chemical Therapeutics 21 Battle or Operating Environment Management System 22 Expeditionary Collective Protection 23 Radiological Prophylaxis 24 Fixed Site Contamination Mitigation 25 Radiological Therapeutics 26 Fixed Site Collective Protection 27 Methods of control 28 Remains Disposition 29 Hazardous Waste Control FIGURE 4.2 Joint Priority List (JPL) from 2011.
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From page 76... ...
The output of this process approach is guidance on which capabilities to pursue. Execution and Strategy Planning Resourcing Accountability Assessment of Missions & E ectiveness, Tasks Costs & Risks Iterative CONOPs and Desired Test Cases Tradeo TTPs Capabilities Analysis Threats Alternative As-Is Portfolios of Capabilities Capabilities FIGURE 4.3 Diagram of an approach for planning in a capabilities-based process.
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From page 77... ...
Components of the new approach include identifying a meaningful set of test cases, selecting and assessing sound measures of effectiveness, building creative portfolios of capabilities, and developing tools to conduct iterative tradeoff analysis.1 Identifying Meaningful Test Cases Proliferation of missions, ambiguity about threats, and multiplicity of CONOPS can lead to innumerable potential scenarios against which program portfolios can be assessed. Practicality demands that assessment be constrained to a concise set of test cases.
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From page 78... ...
However, developing creative portfolios of alternatives requires iterative deliberation between the warfighter and support operations, science and engineering, systems analysis, and cost analysis communities. Incorporating this deliberation into strategic planning is critical to sound analysis.
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From page 79... ...
From Specification to the Research-Development-Acquisition Process The R-D-A process is well established within DoD, and many elements of the established process are adequate for the CBDP. For the R-D-A process to be effective for the medical countermeasures program, however, R-D-A should be done as a team approach with end-to-end involvement, including regulatory processes considered in the earliest phases.
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From page 80... ...
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In considering the strategic planning process necessary to support the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, the committee identified the following principle findings and recommendations. Capabilities-Based Planning, Development, and Acquisition Finding 4.1: A requirements-driven S&T process is not a good match for the CBDP.
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From page 81... ...
Planning should expand the range of options considered; iterative review and realistic red-teaming should challenge assumptions built into plans and promote innovations in defense to correspond to that in the threats. The scope of red-teaming and review should encompass the threats and activities against which performance is assessed and the evaluations of performance are made.
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