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Pages 6-33

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From page 6...
... This is a measure of the quantity of a substance required to get a harmful effect. Depending on the type of harmful effects cause by the chemical, a highly toxic chemical may or may not be likely to cause death.
From page 7...
... In a deliberate release, a vehicle or vessel may be attacked or hijacked and driven to a densely populated area before the chemical release to maximize injury and destruction. • Chemical Weapons Event.
From page 8...
... Nerve agents require more sophistication to produce 8 than blister agents, but have been produced and used by terrorists (i.e., sarin was used in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Tokyo)
From page 9...
... AEGL-3 (ppm) 10 min 1 hr 8 hr 10 min 1 hr 8 hr Ammonia 270 110 110 2,700 1,100 390 Chlorine 2.8 2.0 0.71 50 20 7.1 Hydrogen Cyanide 17 7.1 2.5 27 15 6.6 Sarin 0.015 0.006 0.002 0.064 0.022 0.009 Sulfur Mustard 0.09 0.02 0.002 0.59 0.32 0.04 (Source: EPA's National Advisory Council/AEGLs website at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/chemlist.htm)
From page 10...
... Odor, vapor clouds, dead animals or dead fish, fire, and irritation to skin or eyes can signal the presence of hazardous materials. After a chemical has been identified, information on how to respond can be found in various references, such as Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)
From page 11...
... Estimating the release quantity and associated area with concentrations of concern may be more problematic from a chemical weapons release, particularly if there is a delay between exposure and observable symptoms. Particularly among blister and nerve agents, the persistence of chemical toxicity after release varies greatly (i.e., from minutes to weeks)
From page 12...
... Absorption through skin is the primary exposure route for some chemical weapons agents (i.e., essentially all blister agents and some nerve agents)
From page 13...
... Among the largest public populations at risk in enclosed spaces are in transit underground stations or terminals, airport terminals, large civil aircraft, and passenger cruise ships. Enclosed spaces with HVAC systems have increased exposure risks caused by continued circulation of toxic chemicals in the form of gases, aerosols, or fine particles.
From page 14...
... Symptoms from most chemical agents appear within minutes, but in the case of delayed detection of a release, effort may be needed to identify, decontaminate, and provide medical assistance to contaminated travelers, vehicles, and cargo after they have left the area of initial contamination. In some outdoor release cases (e.g., blister agent or VX)
From page 15...
... 2.2 BIOLOGICAL THREATS Familiarity with the fundamentals of biological agents can be useful in developing appropriate emergency response plans. Depending on the particular biological agent, effects range from sickness to death, and treatment of infections range from administration of vaccines and antibiotics that may prevent or destroy the infection to simple supportive care to keep infected people as comfortable as possible while their bodies fight the infection.
From page 16...
... The persistence of a biological agent may be quite different in the air, versus on surfaces or in soil or water. In this report chemical agents that substantially degrade in open air within 24 hours of release were defined as non-persistent.
From page 17...
... Quarantines are only considered for highly contagious agents. Based on contagiousness and persistence, the following categories of biological agents are referred to in this report and summarized in Table 2-8: 1.
From page 18...
... , Yersinia pestis in pneumonic plague cases, and influenza viruses may also be readily transferred from person to person. Weaponized versions of smallpox, hemorrhagic fever viruses, or Yersinia pestis would likely be formulated for PERSISTENCE (and CDC categories in parentheses)
From page 19...
... Line-drying clothes in the sun allows ultraviolet rays to kill most organisms. The use of disinfectant foams can increase the time a surface is exposed to effective concentrations of a disinfectant, which increases the likelihood of destroying the biological agent -- a particular concern for more persistent agents (e.g., anthrax spores and mycotoxins)
From page 20...
... The EPA has released an alert relative to environmental liabilities caused by mass decontamination runoff. 2.2.2 Emergency Response Needs Regardless of the cause of a biological release, from an emergency response perspective, the primary considerations for response management are biological agent type and formulation, quantity and persistence, exposure route, dispersion, and population density in the area at risk.
From page 21...
... Food contamination is also possible. Although only isolated cases of intentional food poisoning have occurred, several single accidental food poisoning events with chemical agents within the last decade have sickened thousands of people, suggesting the effects that could be achieved with intentional food poisoning.
From page 22...
... Because of the small amounts of dangerous biological agents that are transported and secondary packaging, the chance for release of significant levels of respirable particles is very low. Deliberate releases of gram to kilogram amounts of a biological agent in enclosed spaces (e.g.
From page 23...
... Unlike chemical agents that react within seconds to hours, the delay 23 between exposures to biological agents to onset of symptoms is often several days. This is also confounded by the fact that many of these diseases initially present with flu-like symptoms, which can add days to the correct diagnosis.
From page 24...
... . A confounding variable is that there are no rapid identification methods for biological agents, as there are for radiological and chemical agents.
From page 25...
... is a prime example of an RDD. A dirty bomb uses a conventional explosive, such as dynamite, to scatter a radioactive material, such as spent nuclear reactor fuel rods, or radioactive material from industrial or hospital equipment (e.g., Cesium-137 or Cobalt-60)
From page 26...
... For the purpose of first-responder detection of significant radiation, a detector or meter that measures alpha, beta, and gamma radiation dose rates from about 0.1 or 1 mrem/hour to 100 or 1000 rem/hour is adequate and can be purchased for about $400 to $1,500. Field personnel who may be first at the scene of an event may be able to provide critical threat information if they have the appropriate detection equipment.
From page 27...
... These factors and their interrelationship are further discussed below. Type and Energy The type and energy of a radioactive material, and its quantity, determine the extent of shielding or distance needed to protect people from radiation.
From page 28...
... The smallest particle size that can be distinguished by the unaided human eye is about 30 m in diameter. Table 2-5, in the preceding chemical agent subsection, shows the particle sizes of some commonly used substances to help put particle size in perspective.
From page 29...
... Spread of the contaminated area by traffic could also be an issue in ports, docks, canals, and rivers. The open sea, however, is not susceptible to significant radioactive particle contamination from passing ships because its enormous volume would dilute any radioactive material to an insignificant concentration.
From page 30...
... Essentially all modes of transportation may assist in population evacuations, as well 30 as in transporting first responders and providing emergency response supplies. Any transportation modes with large buildings may be considered for use as temporary shelters.
From page 31...
... Decontamination likely required. Medium-term suspension until safe levels achieved.
From page 32...
... For all agents, effective dispersal is a substantial difficulty. These difficulties are exemplified in the multiple attacks by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Tokyo first using biological agents without success and then chemical agents with modest success (i.e., diluted chemical and crude, relatively poor dispersion)
From page 33...
... The rapid onset of symptoms from most chemical agents in conjunction with rapid detection technology reduces the differences in effects between overt and covert chemical releases. In contrast, firm identification of biological agents often takes days after an event is suspected, and in a covert event, the development of suspicions of an event may also take days to weeks.


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