The National Academies Press

Currently Skimming:

II. THE KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON DECISION
Pages 3-5

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.

From page 3... ... The Kelo plaintiffs contended that the taking of their properties would violate the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which permits a governmental taking of private property only for a public use. Although the trial court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting some but not all of the takings, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the planned takings of the properties for the proposed economic development 5 California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) Read the entire page →
From page 4... ... The statute "expresses a legislative determination that the taking of land, even developed land, as part of an economic development project is a ‘public use' and in the ‘public interest.'"9 Moreover, various state agencies had studied the project's economic, environmental, and social ramifications,10 and, of course, the NLDC intended to capitalize on the expected Pfizer facility and the commerce and tax revenue that it would generate. The Kelo Court agreed with the trial judge and the Connecticut Supreme Court that "the City's development plan was not adopted ‘to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.'"11 The Court stated that the case did not involve the payment of compensation for the taking of one person's property "for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party…."12 Although "a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public' is the purpose of the taking,"13 the Court recognized in the Kelo case that the city was not "planning to open the condemned land -- at least not in its entirety -- to use by the general public."14 The proposed takings, nevertheless, were held to be for a public use. Read the entire page →
From page 5... ... Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.21 As for the petitioners' argument that under the circumstances the economic development project did not qualify as a public use, Justice Stevens' response was that the government's promotion of economic development is a traditional government function and that a public use is no less a public use because there is a benefit to a private interest or interests.22 "Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties."23 Thus, the Kelo case was not a matter of taking one private person's property to transfer it to another private party; "a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not presented in this case."24 Justice Kennedy's concurrence emphasized a point made in Judge Stevens' opinion for the Court: a government must not "be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit."25 Justice Kennedy agreed that the rational-basis standard of review, rather than a heightened level of scrutiny as argued by the petitioners, was appropriate for the case. One reason was that "the projected economic benefits of the 19 Kelo, 545 U.S. Read the entire page →

From page 3...

... The Kelo plaintiffs contended that the taking of their properties would violate the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which permits a governmental taking of private property only for a public use. Although the trial court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting some but not all of the takings, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the planned takings of the properties for the proposed economic development 5 California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)

Read the entire page →

From page 4...

... The statute "expresses a legislative determination that the taking of land, even developed land, as part of an economic development project is a ‘public use' and in the ‘public interest.'"9 Moreover, various state agencies had studied the project's economic, environmental, and social ramifications,10 and, of course, the NLDC intended to capitalize on the expected Pfizer facility and the commerce and tax revenue that it would generate. The Kelo Court agreed with the trial judge and the Connecticut Supreme Court that "the City's development plan was not adopted ‘to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.'"11 The Court stated that the case did not involve the payment of compensation for the taking of one person's property "for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party…."12 Although "a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public' is the purpose of the taking,"13 the Court recognized in the Kelo case that the city was not "planning to open the condemned land -- at least not in its entirety -- to use by the general public."14 The proposed takings, nevertheless, were held to be for a public use.

Read the entire page →

From page 5...

... Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.21 As for the petitioners' argument that under the circumstances the economic development project did not qualify as a public use, Justice Stevens' response was that the government's promotion of economic development is a traditional government function and that a public use is no less a public use because there is a benefit to a private interest or interests.22 "Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties."23 Thus, the Kelo case was not a matter of taking one private person's property to transfer it to another private party; "a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not presented in this case."24 Justice Kennedy's concurrence emphasized a point made in Judge Stevens' opinion for the Court: a government must not "be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit."25 Justice Kennedy agreed that the rational-basis standard of review, rather than a heightened level of scrutiny as argued by the petitioners, was appropriate for the case. One reason was that "the projected economic benefits of the 19 Kelo, 545 U.S.

Read the entire page →

← Previous Chapter Skim

Next Chapter Skim →

This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.

II. THE KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON DECISION Pages 3-5

II. THE KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON DECISION
Pages 3-5