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2. Management
Pages 14-33

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From page 14...
... The principal official in an area office reports to an operations office, and the manager of the operations office in turn reports to officials at DOE headquarters. In the past, some managers of DOE field offices reported directly to the Undersecretary, whereas others reported to the ASDP.
From page 15...
... Although the size of the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (EH) staff increased as a result, neither this staff nor that of DP, which has line management authority, is large, especially when viewed in relation to the total number of people in the nuclear weapons complex.
From page 16...
... In contrast, DOE orders may become effective during the term of a contract and prescribe new requirements for conduct by DOE organizational units and contractors. Award Fees A Deparunent contract typically provides that the contractor shall recover the cost of operations, plus a fee that is determined at least in part by the adequacy of the contractor's performance.
From page 17...
... Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (1951) Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Co.
From page 18...
... University of Califorrua Savannah River Site (1953) Westinghouse Savannah River Co.
From page 19...
... The notice has several components: · To establish unambiguous internal accountability for the compliance of operations in the nuclear weapons complex with health, safety, and environmental requirements, the Secretary has placed these line management responsibilities entirely on the ASDP. The ASEH was explicitly relieved of responsibility for developing and coordinating policy for nuclear reactors and nonreactor nuclear facility safer; this responsibility is being assigned to the Assistant Secretary for
From page 20...
... In addition, he established a separate Office of Nuclear Safety with broad responsibilities to monitor and audit all aspects of nuclear safety in the Deparunent, reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary. We agree with the Secretary that line management under the ASDP should have undiluted responsibility for all aspects of the operations of the weapons complex, including safeguarding health, safety, and the environment.
From page 21...
... Although the ASDP has initial line responsibility for budget issues and for the overall management of the nuclear weapons complex, several managers of operations do not report directly to the ASDP, but instead report to the Undersecretary. In the case of the manager of the Savannah River Operations Office, this special line of reporting has been changed by SEN-6-89 (DOE 1989b)
From page 22...
... Recommendation The Department should strengthen its management structure by delegating authority and responsibilityfor the initial resolution of issues to the lowest possible management levels, subject to clear guidance and support from upper management. Internal Oversight Structure Conclusion An oversight body internal to DOE but outside line management, such as the organization under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of
From page 23...
... The oversight function, if properly implemented, has an important role in the DOE management structure. As noted above, decisions should be made at the lowest line management level with competence if decisional gridlock is to be avoided.
From page 24...
... There thus may well have been an impression within the Department that the EH had expanded beyond its appropriate bounds. Further, the ability to provide the operational line management with staff competent in health, safety, and environmental areas in competition with the DNFSB, the DOE contractors, and other private industrial organizations as well as other agencies of government at all levels may have led the Deparunent to conclude that the ASEH could not retain or recruit the necessary staff to continue providing safety oversight.
From page 25...
... Although there is opportunity for organizational reform, the function of oversight should be maintained. Whenever the cognizant oversight staff finds a lack of compliance with goals or applicable orders or regulations, or determines that designs, practices, or allocation of resources violate or threaten to violate reasonable standards at any level of management, they should attempt to ensure appropriate actions by DP line management.
From page 26...
... Recommendation The Department should maintain an internal oversight organization with the authority to seek resolution of issues within the line management structure. Communication Directives from Headquarters Conclusion Problems exist in the development and content of communications from DOE headquarters tofield offices and contractors.
From page 27...
... Operations of rices are responsible for providing direction specific to the facilities within their purview based on orders issued by DOE headquarters. In general, however, the operations offices do not provide additional specialized direction, with the result that disparate facilities are governed by the same instructions.
From page 28...
... We found that many of the contractors and the associated operations offices operated independently, with insufficient awareness of the existence of similar problems elsewhere in the complex. False alarms from the alpha continuous air monitors (alpha-CAMs)
From page 29...
... The ACNFS has provided useful advice to the Department in connection with a wide range of issues over the short period of its existence. The Secretary has determined, however, that the role of the ACNFS should be supplanted by the congressionally chartered DNFSB with regard to those facilities that are to be within the jurisdiction of the new board.
From page 30...
... Availability of Qualified Personnel Conclusion The effectiveness of the weapons complex in accomplishing its diverse, demanding tasks depends on the technical capabilities of DOE and contractor employees; qualif ed people trained in a number of relevant technical .
From page 31...
... The net consequence has been a serious loss of expertise at DOE headquarters and in its field offices. Moreover, often when their on-the-,ob training begins to make new DOE technical employees effective, they become prime recruiting targets for the contractors and other segments of private industry.
From page 32...
... The complexities and hazards of processing nuclear materials make it mandatory that production workers have some understanding of the theory of the processes, in addition to purely mechanical on-thejob aspects. Programs at Rocky Flats and the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP)
From page 33...
... There is no simple cure for Be ills we have enumerated: they are part of a national problem. Recommendation DOE should require each major contractor within the complex to implement a strong training program with qualified instructors, adequate classroom sessions on theory, state-of-the-art mock-~s and computer simulations for hands-on experience, and where necessary, a f~th-shift schedule to allow adequate timefortrairung.


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