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4. Safety
Pages 54-70

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From page 54...
... Another unique hazard of fissile materials is the possibility of a criticality accident, i.e., the attainment of a self-sustaining nuclear reaction because of the inadvertent accumulation of too much plutonium or uranium-235 in an unfavorable configuration (see Appendix C)
From page 55...
... For employees with a measurable exposure working in these areas, the average dose in 1987 ranged from 155 to 267 mrem, depending on the area (Pacific Northwest Laboratory 1989~. Analogous exposure averages are slightly higher in the commercial nuclear electric power industry, but the comparison is complicated by the different operations and opportunities for exposure (e.g., steam generators)
From page 56...
... adopting operating practices and contamination controls to avoid the need for breathing apparatus, such as respirators or supplied air, during routine production activities and most maintenance procedures. Most sites within the complex have reasonably effective control programs, so that the use of respirators is reserved for emergency situations only, and supplied air is required only during certain maintenance procedures.
From page 57...
... One of the difficulties is the practice of conducting maintenance and production operations simultaneously; as a result, production workers frequently have to wear respirators for as much as 4 hours per shift Even in the absence of maintenance activities, contamination is prevalent, and workers have to wear respirators for 2 or more hours per shift. The overreliance on respirators has several negative consequences in addition to those listed above.
From page 58...
... quantities of plutonium have also accumulated downstream of the HERA prefilters in an exhaust duct of Building 771 at Rocky Flats (Scientech Inc.
From page 59...
... Convendonal Industrial Safety Practices Conclusion Some DOE contractors have indicated that criticality is their primary safety concern, awl nuclear safety has been greatly emphasized. There are indications, however, of lack of adequate attention to conventional industrial safety practices.
From page 60...
... A number of sites have sitewide emergency control centers designed to respond to plant emergencies: the Rocky Flats Plant and ICPP at MEL are two examples. Such centers are necessary, but in some cases they are inadequate.
From page 61...
... The inconsistency has resulted in a number of instances of fire safety issues being unevenly addressed across the complex or not addressed at all. This tendency has been aggravated in some cases by a lack of clear, explicit criteria from DOE concerning the design of fire protection features or the implementation of procedures to deal with fire protection issues unique to the weapons complex and not adequately encompassed by industry standards, such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
From page 62...
... The specific focus of our efforts was on filter plenum design. At Rocky Flats, the contractor has applied internally developed fire protection design criteria that are both explicit and conservative, featuring multiple stages of fire safety features.
From page 63...
... throughout the weapons complex. OSRs are facility-specific procedural requirements covering many different systems.
From page 64...
... CRITICALITY SAFETY Conclusion Department of Energy contractors are generally providing effective criticality controls for operations with fissile materials. A shortage of criticality
From page 65...
... Even to sustain the current efforts in ensuring criticality safety, DOE and its contractors will have to recruit and train personnel to produce experts in this highly specialized field. Training programs and facilities are obviously key to success in this area.
From page 66...
... In the absence of an or'~anizanon like the former Office of Nuclear Safety, DOE has no focus for conducting criticality safety measurements important to all nuclear facilities. DOE policies state that criticality accidents must be prevented, but the concomitant support is not always provided.
From page 67...
... Earthquake Criteria Each of the DOE facilities we visited seemed to have an adequate criterion for its "design basis earthquake." The criteria have resulted from a variety of studies, largely probabilistic, that have been sponsored by DOE over the past decade. In addition' some local DOE contractors have undertaken such studies independently.
From page 68...
... Upgrading Old Facilities Oak Ridge provides an example of the process being used for seismic review throughout the complex. The specific criterion for the design basis earthquake at Oalc Ridge is, of course, different from those at other facilities.
From page 69...
... If a new major process facility were to be constructed in Oak Ridge today, it would most likely be designed for something between 0.15 g and 0.18 g. For companson, the design basis for He Clinch River Breeder Reactor, proposed to be located near Oak Ridge, was 0.25 ge This difference in criteria for plants in the same geologic province, with the same exposure to earthquakes, is not surprising; it reflects the fact that the consequences of an earthquake-induced accident enter into ground-acceleration specifications.
From page 70...
... In the future it may be necessary to add to the evaluations some cost-benefit considerations concerning the possible loss of production capability in the event of an earthquake. Recommendation The Department of Energy should develop improved guidelines for seismic review of older structures housing hazardous facilities.


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