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4 Achieving Overmatch
Pages 75-130

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From page 75...
... . Even so, the committee found that the most promising options, at least in terms of costs and payoffs the committee could evaluate, given its limited assessment base, can be roughly categorized into five highpriority capability-improvement areas:  Designing the TSU  Focusing on TSU Training  Integrating the TSU into Army Networks  Balancing TSU Maneuverability, Military Effects, and Survivability  Leveraging Advances in Portable Power In each of these high-priority improvement areas, there are various options to consider and integrate, including improved or alternative technology options as well as non-materiel improvements in organization, doctrine, and other options that fall within the committee's definition of the human dimension.
From page 76...
... In the same time, the Marine Corps squad has been relatively stable at 13 men using three fire teams, except for a short period in the late 1970s when a Marine squad consisted of only 11 men. Army squad organization and size has been studied and reconsidered many times since World War II, starting with a 1946 infantry conference held at Ft.
From page 77...
... This standard represents a "worst case" load, in the sense that a mission duration less than 72 hours would reduce the Soldier load. As a consequence of the 72hour standard, Army developers have pursued multiple alternatives for manned and unmanned support vehicles, such as the M274 mechanical mule and the planned Soldier Mission Support System.
From page 78...
... Likewise, Soldier enhancements should increase the performance and effectiveness of the TSU. For example, sharing situational awareness within the TSU enhances an individual Soldier's situational awareness.
From page 79...
... As the Army considers encouraging enlisted careers reaching beyond the 20-25 years now the nominal standard, a shift in the expertise and experience levels of individual Soldiers might well have profound results on TSU performance, allowing the Army to capitalize on the training and experience of longer-serving deployment veterans. In listening to and questioning Soldiers, troop leaders, and materiel designers, the committee learned that what is broadly known in the research and development (R&D)
From page 80...
... The mission planning aid described later in this chapter (see Recommendation 14 and preceding text) would be a tool for delivering this knowledge to small-unit leaders for operations and mission planning.
From page 81...
... If institutionalized with Department of Army support, the center's results could be applied to expanded R&D program efforts in small unit leadership and small group social dynamics at ARI, the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, the Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED)
From page 82...
... Soldier Selection Selection figures prominently in achieving overmatch inasmuch as selection processes form the basis for recruitment, assignment, training, and retention decisions. Were one to succeed in defining the optimal squad or squads at a structural level, then it would also be possible to develop tools for maximizing the efficiency of individual squads during the process of personnel assignment.
From page 83...
... But taking advantage of these individual differences at the level of dismounted TSU operations has several facets. The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)
From page 84...
... For example, situational awareness within the TSU enhances an individual Soldier's situational awareness. Enhancing the shooting skill of one Soldier will, in turn enhance the lethality of the TSU.
From page 85...
... The TSU Training Imperative The TSU must have mastery of the methods, tactics, and technical knowledge and skills required to accomplish the assigned missions before the missions are undertaken. Current senior Army leader training emphases are that future missions comprising the entire range of military operations, including counterinsurgency and wide area security as 85
From page 86...
... The TSU master trainer would assess the strengths and weaknesses of each TSU in the company/battalion; understand the existing systems and new technologies available in the next readiness cycle; and prescribe a training syllabus to get each TSU to a mastery level on both current and forthcoming systems. Attributes for TSU master trainers might include legitimate academic degrees in education or psychology, as well as TSU leadership experience at levels above the company.
From page 87...
... established in accordance with Recommendation 3 of this report and discussed in both Chapter 3 and preceding sections of this chapter. Realistic Sociocultural Training Achieving TSU training objectives for noncombat tasks in stability operations may require an increased level of fidelity in virtual and constructive training facilities to recreate complex sociocultural situations.
From page 88...
... a facility for collecting and exploiting for training management the training performance data on individual Soldiers, and (2) graphical representation of the individual's performance attributes in virtual environments.
From page 89...
... Trainee immersion, so critical for the L-V-C integration concept, is especially challenging for application to dismounted TSU operations, where each Soldier should experience a unique, perceptually realistic relationship with the immediate terrain. Realistic simulation of walking, running, crawling, and taking cover -- all routine TSU member behaviors -- are technology challenges to be overcome to make the immersion experience valuable for Soldier training.
From page 90...
... . To meet the TSU training imperative, all simulations and games used for training should have an automated AAR system included as a standard part of the system.
From page 91...
... . Recommendation 8: The Army should focus training for the individual Soldier and TSU in the near term as follows:  Define TSU training objectives to produce TSUs that perform acceptably on the TSU MOPs and MOEs.
From page 92...
... -based personal location system combined with data communications that enable a Soldier to view his location, the location of other Blue force personnel and vehicles, information on enemy spot reports, mission command graphics, text messages, and similar warfighting information. The goal of these Army systems was to enable situational awareness at the Soldier level, not necessarily to integrate the Soldier within the small unit.
From page 93...
... At the TSU level, high bandwidth rate communications networks are needed that can operate in austere locations, in complex terrain (e.g., urban or mountainous) , in all weather, and can overcome cyber security threats in the tactical environment.
From page 94...
... Situational Understanding A crucial concept to guide this integration into the Army network is the necessity of ensuring that TSU leaders and individual Soldiers have sufficient situational 2 The overview in this section, which is drawn from Appendix F, focuses on sensor needs organic to the dismounted TSU and how that sensor capability interacts with other TSU capabilities across the DOTMLPF domains. Appendix F reviews the capability needs and technology solutions for both organic and supporting sensing missions.
From page 95...
... Military Effects Enhanced situational awareness, the ability to rapidly transmit and receive tactical information (e.g., mission command graphics and fragmentation orders) , access to intelligence organizations and lethal systems supporting the TSA, the ability to rapidly generate and access reports, enhanced capabilities to plan and rehearse missions, and improved ability to support on-the-spot training and rapid utilization of lessons learned will all contribute to Soldiers and TSUs making sound decisions on application of military effects and dominating both lethal and nonlethal engagements.
From page 96...
... Integration into logistics networks will enhance the ability to rapidly resupply a TSU when needed, thus reducing need to carry excessive ammunition, food, water, etc. and thereby contributing to reducing Soldier load.
From page 97...
... Publication 10-20, Company Intelligence Support Team Handbook, will assist leaders in understanding the mission and purpose of CISTs and how to better use these teams. This small-unit intelligence capability enables the company to maintain situational awareness and possibly even attain brief periods of situational understanding and information superiority.
From page 98...
... Small unit leaders will need to be educated and trained on how to best exploit this evolving capability of being integrated into the network. Their professional development will need to address "reach back" and "reach forward" capability in the areas of mission command, intelligence, fires, mission planning, location/tracking of forces, social networks, and all of the associated enablers for these functions.
From page 99...
... and the information being conveyed be designed to accommodate the skill levels of Soldiers and TSUs. A significant part of the overall systems engineering effort is to optimize the impact of these interfaces and accompanying information on Soldier and TSU performance and effectiveness.
From page 100...
... Examples include integration of sight and sound situational awareness inputs to the individual Soldier, information collection sensors on robotic platforms, biometric sensors for identifying civilians, and, sensors or other devices supporting the location and tracking of dismounted personnel and warfighting platforms. Emphasis in the near term should be on developing organic communications capabilities with some access to adjacent units and immediate higher echelon organizations.
From page 101...
... The same interface doesn't necessarily need to be in use during an entire TSU mission; video may be essential during planning, whereas a single image may suffice during execution. For example, during the planning and rehearsal phase, TSU leaders may want to use large tablet-size devices, but during the execution of a mission, devices should be no larger than a smart phone.
From page 102...
...  The users (Soldiers and TSU leaders) of information must have the ability to -- in an automated fashion -- prioritize information for mission command, information collection, and dissemination purposes.
From page 103...
... For example, Appendix G discusses organic situational awareness sensing capability designed to provide a higher level of sensing out to 900 meters from the TSU's location (the primary ring) , with a lower level of sensor capability extending to 1,800 meters (the secondary ring)
From page 104...
...  The network should also identify behavioral trends of both enemy and civilian activities to alert Soldiers and TSU leaders of anomalies. Integration of the Soldier and TSU into the Army's networks will require nearterm investments in Army networks such as the following:  Communications network enhancements including TSU-level network management, remote control of radio transmission modes, and hands-free display interfaces capable of operating in all weather conditions, day and night, without compromising the security of the Soldier or TSU;  Information networks capable of providing position location and tracking information in GPS-denied environments, automated tagging of information received to aid visualization, prioritization and dissemination, and access to level 1 situational awareness data from supporting sensors; and  Socio-cognitive networks capable of providing real-time access to such things as reports on tactical ground activities from collateral units and biometric databases for identification of adversaries.
From page 105...
... BALANCING TSU MANEUVERABILITY, MILITARY EFFECTS, AND SURVIVABILITY As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the interactive consequences, positive and negative, of any particular capability option can extend across several, if not all, of the five capability categories (situational understanding, military effects, maneuverability, sustainability, and survivability) used in Chapter 2 to describe what dismounted TSUs must be able to achieve across the entire range of military operations.
From page 106...
... Based on presentations and discussions with Soldiers, it is obvious to the committee that, in practice, the dismounted Soldier's combat load is far too great, often exceeding the upper limits stated in Army doctrine such as the above definitions. A vignette from recent operations in Afghanistan illustrates how excessive Soldier load can degrade not only maneuverability but also military effects and survivability.
From page 107...
... Army Medical Research and Materiel Command found that 24 percent of medical evacuations from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom were due to noncombat musculoskeletal injuries and 72 percent of medical discharges were from chronic musculoskeletal injuries.7 As these examples illustrate, excessive Soldier loads degrade not only maneuverability of both individual Soldiers and TSUs but also their resilience, survivability, and effectiveness. Given these wide-ranging negative consequences, why are dismounted Soldiers still carrying excessive load?
From page 108...
... Military Effects The physical means for achieving military effects at the dismounted TSU level -- personal and crew-served lethal weapons, nonlethal weapons, ammunition, the communications and other electronic devices to call for and guide supporting fires or reinforcements and to conduct stability operations, the power sources these weapons and devices require, and so on -- all contribute to Soldier load. Obviously, improvements in the weight efficiency (unit of effect per unit weight)
From page 109...
... Coupling enhanced mobility and agility with the right combination of lethal and nonlethal capabilities (including integrated organic and supporting fires) will give dismounted TSUs increased effectiveness in combat operations and the flexibility for appropriate and decisive response across the range of stability operations.
From page 110...
... As discussed in Appendix J, doctrinal, training, materiel, and leadership changes will be necessary to enable rifle squad leaders to request supporting mortar and other joint fires. Considering both combat and stability operations, dismounted TSU and Soldier maneuverability and lethality needs vary with roles, missions, and phases of a mission.
From page 111...
... Across the range of military operations, the protection function alone consists of "…capabilities to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to assets, forces, partners, and civilian populations to preserve combat power and freedom of action." (TRADOC, 2010) As a result of Iraq and Afghanistan, many people would believe that the infantry Soldier's survivability in the future depends only on better and lighter armor protection.16 This emphasis on increasing the ballistic protection of the Soldier to increase survivability has hindered maneuverability and endurance of both the dismounted TSU and the individual dismounted Soldier by adding to Soldier load and constraining Soldier agility.
From page 112...
... The optimal balance at the system level is unlikely to be simply a matter of reducing Soldier load, improving weapons and ammo, using a robot carrier, or any other single, materiel-focused approach. As argued in Chapter 3 and again in the "Designing the TSU" section of this chapter, there are multiple options for improving capability in one area or another, but ensuring decisive overmatch requires putting together the whole package and, most important, ensuring that a contribution in one capability is not outweighed by unintended decrements to other capabilities essential for overmatch across the entire range of dismounted TSU missions and tasks.
From page 113...
... . However, analogous studies need to be conducted today to determine if the same findings are supported, in the context of current doctrine, mission command technologies, and training initiatives, for operational scenarios characteristic of what the Army expects dismounted TSUs to do in the future.
From page 114...
... The examples discussed here, selected to illustrate the variety of opportunities, are loadcarrying systems designed for use by a dismounted TSU, exoskeletons, lethal/nonlethal weaponry, IPE, mobility planning aids, improved resupply for TSUs engaged in an extended operation, Blue Force tracking technology at the individual Soldier level, and rations. Load-carrying Robot Systems.
From page 115...
... Lethal/Nonlethal Weaponry. As discussed in Appendix J, the Army has multiple ongoing activities aimed at improving the individual weapons available to dismounted Soldiers, the crew-served weapons that a dismounted heavy weapons unit might use, and an expanding array of nonlethal weapons for use in combat or combat-related stability operations.
From page 116...
... Mobility Planning Aids. TSU leaders need a "mobility planning aid" that would predict TSU mobility in terms of speeds for both endurance distances and rushing sprints, as a function of (1)
From page 117...
... TSU maneuverability could be enhanced if small unit leaders had immediate knowledge of the locations of subordinate fire teams and individual Soldiers, especially in night operations, obscuring environments, or complex terrain (e.g., urban structures)
From page 118...
... If the goal is TSUs with decisive overmatch, then mental agility must be a criterion for TSU leadership positions. Finally, from a personnel perspective the musculoskeletal injuries problem must be addressed within all relevant DOTMLPF domains.
From page 119...
... Integration of individual protective equipment with passive and active cooling technologies offers potential to improve Soldier performance. Finding: Experimental trials are needed to develop models for predicting the vulnerability of dismounted individual Soldiers and TSUs as a function of Soldier load and measures/indicators of individual/TSU mobility and agility such as dash speed (e.g., cover to cover)
From page 120...
... TSU Mission Planning Aid Finding: TSU leaders and their commanders at higher echelons need to understand how factors across all the DOTMLPF domains affect not only Soldier load but also the more encompassing goal of balancing maneuverability, effective action, and survivability to ensure small units have decisive overmatch wherever and under whatever circumstances they operate. Given the range of missions and tasks that dismounted TSUs may be called upon to perform in the future, even experienced leaders at the TSU level and higher echelons cannot be expected to know immediately the best combination of available options, extending across all DOTMLPF domains, for the optimal balance of maneuverability, military effects, and survivability in every environment and engagement.
From page 121...
... Also, the aids to Soldier load planning and mobility and the endurance effects of different loads could be incorporated in training simulations and games. Recommendation 14: The Army should develop a mission planning aid to assist in balancing maneuverability, military effects, and survivability, for use in training and operations by TSU leaders and leaders at higher echelons.
From page 122...
... As described in Appendix I, battery systems will continue as the mainstay energy source for the Soldier either as a stand-alone source or as a component of an air breathing hybrid configuration. The specific energy of rechargeable batteries is approaching the specific energy of today's primary batteries, and advances in rechargeable lithium-air batteries now provide battery-like performance on a par with fuel cells.
From page 123...
... In addition to small fueled engines, the Army has focused on developing several types of fuel cells for a wide range of applications ranging from "wearable" energy sources to large battery chargers. Small fuel cells applicable at the Soldier and TSU level are sufficiently advanced that they are being evaluated in the field.
From page 124...
... SOURCE: Adapted from NRC, 1997. The selection of a rechargeable battery storage technology as the principal choice for the dismounted Soldier's energy source would necessitate the parallel introduction of a recharger technology sufficiently small and lightweight to be applicable at the dismounted TSU level.
From page 125...
... Finding: The full impact of energy harvesting mechanisms on Soldier and tactical small unit performance has not been determined. Leveraging these advances in energy sources will help to reduce Soldier fatigue, eliminate Soldier anxiety associated with tenuous resupply, increase Soldier confidence in situational awareness from powered sensors, and provide needed assurance that communications links with higher levels in the command structure can be maintained.
From page 127...
... 2012. Understanding Mission Essential Competencies as a Job Analysis Method.
From page 128...
... 2003. The Modern Warrior's Combat Load Dismounted Operations in Afghanistan, April - May 2003.
From page 129...
... Fort Eustis, Va.: Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command.


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